Conventional social behaviour amongst microfinance clients by Dos Anjos, Pablo Lucas
 
 
 
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
AMONGST MICROFINANCE CLIENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P. LUCAS 
 
PhD 2014 
CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
AMONGST MICROFINANCE CLIENTS 
 
 
 
PABLO LUCAS 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Manchester Metropolitan University for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Business School 
Centre for Policy Modelling 
2014 
Conventional social behaviour
amongst microﬁnance clients
by
Pablo Lucas
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Manchester Metropolitan University
Business School, Centre for Policy Modelling
© February 2014
The copyright of this thesis is owned solely by the author. Quotation or use of any
information in this document must acknowledge this thesis as the source and reference.
2I hereby declare that research presented in this thesis was done
only by myself at the Centre For Policy Modelling, Manchester
Metropolitan University, except where due acknowledgement
is made and has not been submitted to any another degree.
Pablo Lucas
Supervisors: Bruce Edmonds, Scott Moss
28th February 2014
Date
2
3Dedicated to Wasyl and Jadwiga Zawalski.
3
4Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude for all academic opportunities, mentorship and
technical discussions with Bruce Edmonds, Scott Moss, Armando Geller (George Ma-
son University), Bogdan Werth, Shah Jamal Alam (University of Edinburgh), Emma
Norling and Ruth Meyer at the Centre For Policy Modelling (CFPM), Manchester Met-
ropolitan University. Thanks too for the suggestions received from Cathy Urquhart and
Edmund Chattoe-Brown. For me, it was truly enriching to have worked at the CFPM.
Federico Morales at PROIMMSE-IIA, Mexico National Autonomous University, and
Ignacio García, at University of Buenos Aires, have facilitated liaison with the non-
governmental micro-ﬁnancier in Chiapas, Mexico, and contributed to improve the data
collection using surveys and ethnographic observation ﬁeldwork. This has been de-
veloped with support from the microﬁnance institution directors, employees and cli-
ents. I am thankful to Gabriela Camacho Guerrero for her administrative help and for
having learnt more about the structure of Mayan languages with Otto Schumann.
The support received from the Chair of Sociology, in particular of Modeling and Simula-
tion, based at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule in Zürich, Switzerland allowed
the collection of further data for this research project. I am thankful to the additional
funding received via the call for proposals in Experimental Data-driven Sociology, by
Dirk Helbing, plus the useful discussions held there with Sergi Lozano and Carlos Roca.
Another signiﬁcant acknowledgement must be made to the experience acquired at the
World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), United Nations Uni-
versity in Helsinki, Finland. There I have discussed and further developed research
foundations, mainly by collaborating with Wim Naudé, Augustin Kwasi Fosu and Luc
Christiaensen. I am grateful to the publications assistant at WIDER for her assistance.
Finally, thanks to inspirational discussions with: Boaz Odier (Imperial College Lon-
don), Klaus Troitzsch (Universität Koblenz-Landau), Frank and Virginia Dignum (Uni-
versiteit Utrecht), Barry Silverman (University of Pennsylvania), Rainer Hegselmann
(Universität Bayreuth), Nigel Gilbert (University of Surrey), Ruth Aylett (Heriot-Watt
University), Dennis Young (Georgia State University) and Alexander Smajgl (CSIRO).
And most important of all:
Thanks for the support from my family.
4
5Abstract
This doctoral thesis inductively explores the role of conventional social behaviour adop-
ted by individual microﬁnance clients regarding their inﬂuence over their own collective
success as a microcredit group. The collective credit in question is subject to an adapt-
ation in Mexico of the Grameen Bank lending framework. An analysis is made on the
close interplay between institutional rules, i.e. the repayment conditions imposed by
the microﬁnance institution (henceforth MFI), and the emergent cooperation and pen-
alisation mechanisms that are handled by clients themselves to meet their targets. Thus
the research is focused on the clients’ strategies to socially manage debt and defaulters.
In this case study, a socio-economical ﬁeldwork has been completed through surveying
600 microcredit clients, their 2404 active loans, 35 credit oﬃcers plus their board of di-
rectors. This took place in the southernmost state of Mexico, Chiapas, from September
2007 to February 2008, and data analysis was carried out during that period until July
2009. All ﬁndings were discussed with relevant stakeholders and policy makers. This
proved key in providing inﬂuential insights that helped to improve the institutional re-
gulatory framework. That resulted in a policy change that beneﬁted over 20,000 clients.
Apart from institutional regulations, it has also been observed group-level strategies
devised by microﬁnance clients themselves to assess and deal with defaulters over time.
These operate independently from the MFI framework as, despite inﬂuencing when and
how quotas should be repaid, their criteria is entirely dealt with and evolved within
credit groups. The obtained outcomes from analysing social and ﬁnancial data include:
• (I) insights backed by empirical data helped to inﬂuence an adaptation of the
MFI funding credit policy, so that group structure and conventions are actually
taken into consideration in a bid to foster more successful microcredit groups;
• and (II) an analysis deemed reliable by the stakeholders for policy-making pur-
poses, which has also guided the development of an exploratory model for simula-
ting behaviour of how microcredit groups may deal with repayments in adversity.
As a result of having developed this research project, three contributions to knowledge
are discussed in the thesis. These are organised below according to relevant topics.
1. Understanding the behaviour within studied microﬁnance groups: based on the
analysed evidence, a hypotheses is suggested about how group location and mem-
bership can inﬂuence the dynamics of acceptable behaviour regarding defaulters.
2. Informing policy-making with research ﬁndings: a demonstration of how stake-
holders can assess the usefulness of knowledge –produced via research– for policy-
making purposes, taking into account the phenomenon’s particular context.
3. The development of an agent-based model (henceforth ABM): application of the
proposed ABM methodology, aimed at strengthening validation throughout the
modelling process with emphasis on use of evidence and stakeholder participation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This doctoral thesis considers the roles of conventional social behaviour, i.e. informally
expected behaviour according to the participants, amongst microﬁnance clients with
regards to maintaining successful ﬁnanced groups. The case study in this research pro-
ject is a microﬁnance institution (henceforth MFI) operating in Chiapas, which is the
southernmost Mexican state –and consistently has been one of the poorest since 1970
[Biggar, 2009, Chiquiar, 2005, Yoshioka, 2006]. There the MFI has adapted the pioneer
Grameen Bank group lending framework in 1999 to suit their local circumstances1.
One key aspect, and perhaps the most discussed, for the success of the MFI scheme
is the condition in which credit instalments can be granted without needing conven-
tional collateral [Brau and Woller, 2004, Ledgerwood, 2001]. That means none of the
traditional property, for example in the form of ﬁnancial assets, are required to backup
collective credit applications. Instead a criterion based on the concept of social col-
lateral and poverty lines are used by MFIs as the main evaluators as to whether the
institution should collectively fund small-scale entrepreneurs. The idea is that the
burden of repaying credit quotas on time in this framework becomes a collective re-
sponsibility, through the harnessing of social pressure and trust between all the group
members as a way to stimulate productive economic activities. However this has been
little researched as to how these social pressures work.
1 Nota bene: due to the sensitive data, the MFI required omission of their precise identity
and location of operations as a condition to allow the publication of the research ﬁndings.
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Despite worldwide success of the microcredit framework, which has been consolid-
ated since the 1970s by Muhammad Yunus leading the Grameen Bank initiative in
Bangladesh, there is still a need for more in-depth understanding of how group mem-
bers deal with defaulters and honour their outstanding debts in time. This doctoral
research is focused on the interplay between bottom-up, behavioural conventions and
top-down, institutional rules governing the MFI policies. The discussion presented in
this thesis is based on the analysis of data collected from credit oﬃcers and their groups
of clients.
1.1 Objectives and Contributions to Knowledge
The broad goal of this project is to further understand and explore the emergence
of conventional social behaviour amongst microﬁnance clients. The case study for this
thesis is a mid-sized MFI (slightly over 20,000 clients) in southern Mexico. This research
provides a contribution to understanding, in greater detail, the social structure and
supporting mechanisms within microcredit groups for dealing with institutional rules
governing collective credit. The speciﬁc objectives of this research are the:
• analysis of ﬁnancial and behavioural data collected from 600 microcredit clients,
which also includes the institution board of directors and their 35 credit oﬃcers;
• development of an agent-based (simulation) model (henceforth ABM), guided by
the ﬁndings and insights obtained by analysing the stakeholders’ collected data;
• evaluation as to which research ﬁndings, yielded from the process of analysing
the collected data and developing the ABM, were useful for policy-making by the
MFI.
12
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The three aforementioned objectives, along with publications and visits to other aca-
demic institutions, helped the development of the following contributions to knowledge:
1. understanding the behaviour within studied microﬁnance groups, based on the
analysed evidence, with a suggestion about how group location and membership
can inﬂuence the dynamics of acceptable social behaviour regarding defaulters2;
2. a demonstration of how stakeholders can assess the usefulness of knowledge –
produced via research– for policy-making purposes, taking into account the phe-
nomenon’s particular social context and socio-economic characteristics;
3. reﬁnement and application of an ABM development methodology, originally put
forward in this thesis, aimed at strengthening validation throughout the model-
ling process with emphasis on use of evidence and stakeholder participation.
1.2 Organisation of this Doctoral Thesis
In order to facilitate understanding how each subsection inform and is related to other
ones in the thesis, a diagram based on the table of contents is provided in Figure 1.1 on
the next page. Chapters and sections are coloured according to the following schema:
• (a) blue indicate the discussion of constructs used to develop the contributions;
• (b) cyan present how the research design has been proposed and carried out;
• and (c) green contain the ﬁndings obtained based on the relevant chapters.
2 This data has been gathered through surveys and complemented with ethnographic ﬁeld-
work observations leading to two suggestions. These are discussed in greater detail in chapters
5: “Research Findings” (page 100) and 6: “Final Discussions and Conclusions” (page 165).
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The arrows in the diagram indicate how each part of the thesis inform the development
of the next section and, thus, also suggest a logical approach to understand the thesis.
1 Introduction (Objectives, Key Concepts and Document Organisation)
3 Agent-Based Social Simulation (ABM)
3.1 Types of Scientific Models
3.2 ABM as a Scientific Model
3.2.1Different Approaches to build an ABM
3.2.1Challenges in ABM Social Simulation
3.3 Modelling the behaviour of MFI clients
2 Social Enterprise
2.1 Microfinance as a Social Enterprise
2.2 The role of Microfinance in Public Goods
2.3 Group Lending Approaches in Microfinance
2.4 Usage of Poverty Lines in Social Enterprise
4 Research Design and Development
4.1 The MFI Context during Data Collection
4.2 Design of Data Collection and Analysis 5 Research Findings
5.1 Fieldwork Findings: Officers
5.2 Fieldwork Findings: Clients
4.3 Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM) 
4.3.1 Developing an Ethnographic Decision Tree 
4.3.2 Implementing the EDTm into the ABM
5.4 Insights Based on the ABM analysis
5.4.1 Modelling Guidance and Impact in Policy-Making
5.4.2 Discussion of the EDSM and Simulation Results
7 Appendices
8 Bibliography
6.1 Contribution to knowledge 
(subsections: social behaviour, policy-
making, building the ABM)
6.2 Future Research (follow-up, 
applicability of the ABM, social 
network analysis)
6 Final Discussions and Conclusions
5.3 Using findings to build the EDTM and ABM
5.3.1 The iterative process of utilising findings
5.3.2 The Evidence-Driven Simulation model (EDSM)
5.3.3 Structure, Processes and Parameters of the EDSM
Figure 1.1: Diagram depicting the thesis organisation
The twined relationship between the two main topics is discussed in the chapters marked
in blue. Each is key to inform the research problem and how it has been tackled with
the proposed research design. Chapter 2: “Social Enterprise” (page 17) contain key
discussions that substantiate the understanding of relevant open issues in microﬁnance.
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In Chapter 3: “Agent-Based Social Simulation” (page 48), the relevant aspects of the
state-of-the-art in ABM are discussed and an in-depth development life cycle is proposed
within sub-section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)”.
Chapter 4: “Research Design and Development” (page 75) contains a detailed dis-
cussion of the research design. It covers the cross-sectional structure of the surveys,
the randomisation procedures to minimise biases in selecting credit clients and a dis-
cussion of the relevant behavioural ﬁndings that are then contextualised with ﬁnancial
data.
Chapter 5: “Research Findings” (page 100) presents two discussions based on the
results obtained via the research design and data analysis that has been duly carried
out:
• Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers” (page 101) and Section 5.2:
“Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114), focused on the surveys
that have been administered to all the stakeholders involved in the case study;
• Section 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132),
which is focused on the agent-based model that has been developed and then the
discussion moves onto Section 5.4: “Insights Based on the ABM analysis”.
The last chapter, 6: “Final Discussions and Conclusions” (page 165), sums up the cri-
tique regarding diﬃculties, achievements and promising future research ideas. Should
the reader wish to access additional information about the discussed topics, the appen-
dices can be found from page 175 onwards. The last section contains all the references
used in the thesis.
15
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1.3 Research Problem and Research Questions
The aim of this research is to understand in greater detail how and when social beha-
viour inﬂuences both micro (individual) and macro (collective) dynamics within micro-
credit groups, using the state of Chiapas in Mexico as the speciﬁc case study. Given
the speciﬁc nature of behaviour within microﬁnance groups, and the lack of empirical
analysis of actual coping individual behaviour that deal with defaulters, new data has
been collected and analysed according to the research design discussed in Chapter 4:
“Research Design and Development” (page 75) in order to address the questions below.
The research problem consists thus of empirically investigating the behaviour, within
microﬁnance groups, that enables members to cope with defaulters. For this, two sets
of research questions have been generated. The ﬁrst set is about credit oﬃcers and
these are addressed in detail in Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers”
(page 101):
1. What is understood by support, moral and ethics within microcredit groups?
2. What is seen as advantages and disadvantages of their microcredit framework?
3. What are the observed clients’ actions regarding missed meetings and payments?
The second set of research questions, regarding the credit clients, are addressed in detail
in Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114):
4. What is the composition of their business and advice networks?
5. What are the statuses of their group composition and credit?
6. What are their typical actions regarding missed meetings and payments?
The methodological research question addressed in this thesis is: how can one explore,
under diﬀerent adverse conditions, the role of individual behaviour within the collective
responsibility imposed by a microcredit group? This has been done by developing
an ABM 3 using the evidence analysed that addresses the aforementioned research
questions.
3 Discussed in Section 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132).
16
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Chapter 2
Social Enterprise
“This is business with a social objective, which is to help people get out of poverty.”
Muhammad Yunus, 2009
This chapter contains key discussions to understand how MFIs can be assessed as Social
Enterprises (SEs) and which gaps can be tackled in the under-provision of public goods
through microﬁ-nance. For that it is necessary to be acquainted with the diﬀerent
settings a MFI can operate, the levels in which the organisation progress plus the tools
and concepts that facilitate these analyses. The chapter also highlights the need to
design research to inductively explore the behaviour dynamics in microcredit groups.
The table of contents (henceforth TOC) is below and the next paragraph provides the
ﬁrst key deﬁnition.
The term Social Enterprise (henceforth SE) can be deﬁned as an organisation that seeks
to achieve social aims via entrepreneurial (economic) activities, without an intention
to supplant governmental or private organisations [EMES and UNDP, 2006]. Thus
this can include cooperatives, credit associations, foundations, charities and any other
entity that locally provide –or contribute– to a collective beneﬁt (product or services).
Contents
2.1 Microﬁnance as a Social Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 The Role of Microﬁnance in Public Goods . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Group Lending Approaches in Microﬁnance . . . . . . 31
2.4 Usage of Poverty Lines in Social Enterprise . . . . . . 41
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2.1 Microﬁnance as a Social Enterprise
The quote by one of the microﬁnance pioneers, on the previous page, concisely encapsu-
lates the main objective that is embedded in the overall mission and deﬁnition of a SE.
I.e. to pursue a business model that channels most of its proﬁts into solutions to either
socio-economic or socio-environmental adversities. These, in turn, are often partially
due to inadequate provision of public goods. This includes a wide range of productive
and redistributive institutions, which can be diversely structured as: foundations, not-
for-proﬁt, non-governmental organisations (henceforth NGOs) and the public sector.
Examples of that include the cooperatives, credit unions, charities, voluntary organ-
isations such as charities and MFIs [Austin and Chu, 2006]. This implies that the
backdrop of SEs must encompass their own awareness of having an impact in terms
of promoting social cohesion and/or mitigating poverty, a concept which has substan-
tially diﬀerent connotations in developed and developing economies1. In short, a SE is
generally focused on creating new market opportunities to develop a social agenda.
The impact of harnessing the entrepreneurship facilitated by SEs has been witnessed,
throughout the world, in a wide range of innovative public good matters. This includes,
for example: health provision (e.g. nutrition, disease prevention and treatment), gov-
ernance (e.g. the evaluation and adaptation of sustainable policies), education (e.g.
general and ﬁnancial literacy), employment (e.g. creation of jobs and access to banking
services) [Alter, 2002, DTIUK, 2002, Davister et al., 2004, Borzaga et al., 2008a]. Given
the variety of SEs institutional settings and on-the-ground contexts, their eﬃcacy and
eﬃciency are typically vulnerable from a number of perspectives. Each of them in-
clude various components, yet all of these depend –to a greater or lesser extent– on
the local political and economical status quo in which a SE is operating. Such complex
circumstances aﬀect the most those SEs that operate within (a) very limited ﬁnancial
autonomy and/or (b) have to cope with overly restrictive political regimes, as then
their access to services in the public or private sector may be impaired [EMES and
UNDP, 2006].
1 In terms of using absolute poverty and relative poverty lines, nationally and internationally.
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The former issue is linked with the eminent impossibility of SEs becoming fully self-
suﬃcient in economic terms, whilst the latter issue is about SEs having to deal with
excessively centralised –and often corrupt– politicians and/or civic institutions [Town-
send, 2006, United Nations, 2006, 2010, UNITAR, 2013]. These diﬃculties highlight
the need to employ eﬀective models of interaction between stakeholders, researchers
and policy-makers. Such approach can help to safeguard against the risk of SEs devel-
oping chronic ineﬃciencies that may ultimately lead them towards to becoming wholly
unﬁt for their own original purposes of mitigating poverty. In this sense, an in-depth
understanding (both qualitative and quantitative) of the societal problems targeted by
a SE is essential to appropriately design and assess their expected and actual socio-
economic impact. One can therefore generally understand a SE as an organisation that
is developed either by an individual or a group of social entrepreneurs, which may be
directly supported by governmental policies. Thus every MFI is a potential innovative
provider of, or contributor to, a public good. However it is still important to diﬀeren-
tiate an SE from a business focused only on proﬁt-making. SEs are essentially engaged
in applying business principles to tackle issues of inequality and poverty. An excellent
diﬀerentiation of these is illustrated in the quote below by [Townsend, 2006]:
“It is not enough to describe poverty as a condition applying to those whose disposable
income is low relative to that of others. This is to fail to distinguish conceptually
between inequality and poverty. Poor people are not just the victims of a maldistribution
of resources but, more exactly, they lack, or are denied, the resources to fulﬁl social
demands and observe the customs as well as the unfolding laws, of society. This lends
itself to scientiﬁc observation, measurement and analysis of multiple deprivations.”
Note that socially responsible, yet traditional, enterprises are not the same as SEs. The
former means that it has some of its own structure dedicated to deal with the socio-
economical or environmental matters that are aﬀected through the byproducts of their
prime proﬁt-making activity. In contrast, a SE such as a MFI has –as its main objective–
the provision of services aimed at mitigating socio-economical or socio-environmental
problems.
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In this sense, it is useful to consider the variety of enterprises, ranging from being
fully philanthropic to fully commercial organisational models. The rectangle in Figure
2.2 below indicates the extensive diversity of SEs [SEUK, 2013, Murray et al., 2010].
SEs are then best understood as hybrid organisational models. This is due to their
necessary balance between obtaining social and ﬁnancial gains. Therefore the further
left an organisation is in the depicted spectrum, the less likely it can invest any proﬁt
back in activities that are aimed at producing social gains. On the other hand, the
further right an organisation is in the depicted spectrum, the less likely it will invest
proﬁts in activities that are aimed at producing social gains. Then a SE that aims at
simultaneously solving social / environmental problems and receiving a ﬁnancial return
for that at market rates, such as the studied MFI, follows a social purpose enterprise
model.
The leftmost organisations, in the depicted spectrum below, function by being mission-
driven, interested in the creation of social value and appealing to the goodwill of stake-
holders. Their purpose is geared towards delivering beneﬁts to their target public and
are not allowed to pursue proﬁt as an ultimate goal. Its beneﬁciaries pay nothing, as
capital is acquired by donations/grants, and its workforce consists mainly of volunteers.
The rightmost organisations, i.e. fully oriented by commercial gains, contrast in every
sense with other organisational models that focus on some hybrid model that includes
a social return. That is due to their appeal to self-interest and market-driven creation
of economic value, so that its beneﬁciaries and workforce are paid at market rates.
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The need to ensure that SEs are sustainable and not at risk of mission drift has lead to
the development of social performance, or social accounting, toolkits [Campion et al.,
2008, Zeller et al., 2003] and other measurements of institutional viability depending
on the type of SE that one wishes to develop [UNITAR, 2013, Ledgerwood et al., 2013].
MFIs tend to be interested in social accounting/performance as a way to measure
poverty/inequality outreach and impact of their policies in multiple levels. These are
aimed at assessing how and to which extent SEs actually achieve their proposed social
goals. Measuring such impact is often troublesome, as criteria can include evaluation of
semi-subjective aspects of well-being and living standards. Reporting on the social im-
pact that SEs and other traditional businesses have often done through self-assessment
along with third party audits. These may include silent and shadow reports, which are
proposals for a social account based on data that is publicly available and generated
by other sources than the organisation in question. This diﬀers from a self-assessment
report, which collates data made publicly available by the organisation [Dey, 2007].
The advantages of having diﬀerent types of assessments include, for instance, help-
ing managers to better understand the circumstances their SEs operate and facilitate
donors’ decisions as to where their investments should be directed. As a side note, these
assessments were underway at the institution surveyed for this research. Yet generally
little is known about how the policies of a MFI aﬀect in practice how internal group
events (i.e. at the micro-level) are actually dealt with collectively. During this project,
prior to the administered data collection, despite institutional interest there was no
systematic way of considering the inﬂuences from the top-down regulations and from
the bottom-up conventional social behaviour within groups. Thus results, particularly
those in Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers” (page 101), Section 5.2:
“Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114), and Section 5.4.1: “Discussion
of the EDSM Results” (page 147), contributed to inform the MFI in terms of policy-
making and also encouraged the board to systematically collect individual data about
the behaviour of participants within their funded groups.
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As every SE strives to deliver a social mission, it is important to evaluate how MFIs
perform both economically and socially. Figure 2.3 below illustrates a study carried by
the Geneva International Academic Network2, between 2004 and 2006, which analysed
the eﬃciency of 40 MFIs operating in 24 countries all over the world. Their criteria was
that each institution should be serving a minimum of 3,000 clients over a minimum of
ﬁve years, with complete transactional ﬁnancial records from 1999 to 2003. Despite the
varied contexts of where the MFIs operate, the plot depicts that MFIs have generally:
• been ineﬃcient both in social and ﬁnancial performance (bottom left);
• compromised performance either socially or ﬁnancially (top left, bottom right);
• and, ideally, been eﬃcient both in social and ﬁnancial terms (top right);
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Figure 2.3: 40 MFI social and ﬁnancial performances, adapted from [MIX, 2007]a
a Cluster and factor analyses based on ﬁnancial and social performance variables.
This illustrates the discussion on the potential role of the public sector in progress-
ively, and sustainably, integrate MFIs into traditional, non-subsidised markets. That
is because an eﬀective MFI operating as a SE can contribute to poverty mitigation,
particularly as ﬁnancial performance is not the only proxy for their eﬃciency.
2 This refers to a research project jointly funded by the International Labour Organization,
the Geneva Institute of Development Studies, the European Union and the Ford Foundation.
22
Microﬁnance as a Social Enterprise 23
There are, for example, MFIs which are socially eﬃcient in their operations but struggle
ﬁnancially. However the opposite of that, i.e. ﬁnancially eﬃcient and somewhat socially
ineﬀective, seems more common. There is thus an important role of public policy to
assist SEs, such as MFIs, to contribute with poverty mitigation policies. This topic is
further discussed in Section 2.3: “Group Lending Approaches in Microﬁnance” (page
31). To a large extent MFIs used to oﬀer only microcredit products, assuming that
clients would essentially graduate out of the program and join other, more traditional,
banking institutions. Historically donors have been the primary source of funding, yet
that causes a variety of managerial diﬃculties as funding is unpredictable. These issues
aﬀect MFIs by creating diﬃculties to timely deliver services and also, sometimes, can
politically interfere in targeting which clients should beneﬁt from their policies.
Over decades MFIs evolved so that a greater variety of ﬁnancial products is oﬀered
and hence focus changed onto keeping the best customers in the system, along with
managing a recruitment program for new customers. The diversiﬁcation of funding
sources became widespread, so that even small institutions may aim at accessing local
and international markets. In this sense the most common elements to analyse the
viability of MFIs include the: organisation’s mission, vision, its board members qual-
iﬁcations, duty to care3, plus the relationship between management and executives
[Klarsfeld et al., 2012]. Figure 2.3, on the previous page, illustrate the fact that MFIs
are typically analysed in terms of ﬁnancial and institutional viability. The latter is of
greater interest to this research, as it aims at understanding how enterprises can adapt
to fulﬁl their social missions. Whilst still recognising that donors remain a signiﬁcant
source of funding, generally MFIs tend to operate at basic levels and often strive for
“deep outreach” 4 and also ﬁnancial sustainability. So to better understand the dif-
ferent operational levels a MFI can experience as a provider of SE, one should bear in
mind their: market understanding (formal and informal sectors), degree of streamlined
operations, repayment administration, anti-delinquency measures, sustainability of in-
terest rates, saving and insurance services. With these under control, a MFI can focus
on its social mission.
3 I.e. the MFI members’ adherence to the organisation and personnel well-being.
4 I.e. the institution does physically reach where clients are, rather than the opposite.
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As micro-ﬁnancial resources are fungible5, MFIs face a constant pressure to manage
multiple ﬁnancial activities: tracking of loans and savings, liquid assets, access to insti-
tutional credit and emergency funds [UNITAR, 2013]. In light of the aforementioned
reference regarding an organisation’s institutional and ﬁnancial viability, MFIs have
been classiﬁed as progressing within and between three levels. Each of them exhibit
the following set of features accordingly [UNITAR, 2013, Ledgerwood et al., 2013]:
• Level 1: the institution is not self-suﬃcient operationally, therefore revenues of-
ten fall short of operating expenses. This is due to the organisation still relying
almost exclusively on donations for the continuation of operations and erosion of
their assets either via inﬂation side-eﬀects and poor client performance (delin-
quency or defaulting). The high operational costs of such MFI, combined with
the reluctance to charge more sustainable interest rates according to their reality,
create a very diﬃcult environment in which to succeed with a SE mission. The
MFI eﬀectively act as a freelance intermediary between donors and clients.
• Level 2: the institution is operationally self-suﬃcient but ﬁnancially unsustain-
able due to inﬂation continuously eroding equity, despite interest rates and fee
income that cover operational expenses. The MFI has adopted best practice
guidelines, is generally eﬃcient, has satisfactory ratios of client-to-staﬀ, allowing
staﬀ to control both client delinquency and defaulting. Funding depends on a
combination of donations, savings and bank loans. For this reason MFIs at this
level vary from those still relying mostly on donations to those either verging –or
experiencing– unsubsidised proﬁtability. This is considered a transitional level.
• Level 3: the institution is both operationally and ﬁnancially self-suﬃcient. The
former aspect is fully covered from retained earnings, client savings and possibly
–but not necessarily– commercial loans. Interest rates and fees cover the cost of
services delivery, return on savings and management. The MFI seeks to increase
the total equity via proﬁts and attracts investments from other organisations.
5 I.e. resources that can be interchangeably used by diﬀerent clients.
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The MFI sector at large has been evolving to accommodate diﬀerent types of insti-
tutions, according to the client needs and the regulation of their ﬁnancial services.
These include organisations in diﬀerent levels of informal and formal development, as
discussed on the previous page, which are further illustrated with the examples below.
The researched MFI for this project was at level 3, therefore with enough leeway to
explore how to improve the delivery of their social mission. This has been done by
identifying and exploring how their groups of clients self-organise to repay quotas.
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While financial service providers are often 
characterized as formal, semiformal, or informal, 
traditionally referring to their regulatory status, 
we classify them as either community-based 
(generally informal with no legal status) or insti -
tutional (generally more formal and in some cases 
regulated). 6 
Community-based providers include both 
individuals (such as friends and family, money -
lenders, shop owners, traders, and deposit 
 collectors) and groups, including indigenous 
groups, such as ROSCAs and accumulating sav -
ings and credit associations (ASCAs), and facili -
tated groups trained by external agencies, such as 
Savings Groups (SGs) and Self-Help Groups 
(SHGs). While more formal than ROSCAs, these 
facilitated groups are not considered to be “insti -
tutions,” as they, for the most part, are not legally 
licensed as financial service providers, have few 
expenses, and provide services primarily within 
the group itself (see chapter 6).
Institutional providers include member-owned 
financial cooperatives a d NGOs, which are nor -
mally registered and possibly supervised, as well 
as banks (private and public), deposit-taking 
MFIs, and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
flexibility, product features, and service quality). 
However, informal financial mechanisms may 
entail cost, inconvenience, embarrassment, and 
sometimes depletion of the very social capital on 
which they are built. More needs to be under -
stood about how the informal sector expands out -
reach, if and how those relying on the informal 
sector are underserved, and how the quality of 
consumers’ lives could be improved as a result of 
access to formal financial services. Chapter 2 pro -
vides a more detailed discussion of demand and 
how we can learn from the informal sector and 
the behavior of clients.
Supply: Providers
While most of the first microfinance institutions 
were established as NGOs, the sector has evolved 
o include many types of prov ders. Specialized 
commercial banks providing a range of financial 
services have proven that the poor are “bankable,” 
while member-based community groups have 
shown that financial services can be provided 
directly by the community on a sustainable basis. 
Providers are discussed in detail in part II of this 
book; an overview of the types of providers is 
included here and illustrated in figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3  The Range of Financial Service Providers
Note:  ROSCAs = rotating savings and credit associations; ASCAs = accumulating savings and credit associations; CVECAs = caisses 
villageoises d’épargne et de crédit autogérées ; SACCOs = savings and credit cooperatives; NGO = nongovernmental organization; 
MFIs = microfinance institutions.
a. Mobile network operators are regulated as communication companies; most are not licensed to provide financial services.
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Figure 2.4: Types of micro ﬁnanciers, adapted from [Ledgerwood et al., 2013]
Although the majority of MFI are established NGOs, the sector has been changing
continuously and currently contains a wealth of diﬀerent service providers worldwide.
These range from specialised individual-based initiatives to fully-regulated national
commercial banks [Battle, 2009]. The spectrum of the ﬁgure above highlights the
diversity achieved in 30 years of microﬁnance: sustainability is achieved with diﬀerent
types of organisations –regardless of whether there are, or not, formal regulations.
Community-based providers tend to be informal and without legal status. These are
not considered institutions, thus often are not legally licensed as ﬁnancial providers.
On the other hand, institutional providers tend to be formal and regulated. Even if
such organisations are member-owned, a public registration is required and supervision
is usually done by a larger public or private sector framework –depending on the MFI.
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Each type of organisation presents particular advantages and disadvantages regarding
the context of operations, so there is not a single optimal MFI solution. Organisations
with greater levels of formalisation, tend to exhibit better levels of institutional and ﬁn-
ancial viability. These also tend to oﬀer a wider variety of microﬁnance products and/or
a broader spectrum of terms and conditions to suit a greater diversity of clients. For
this reason, such institutions may be more reliable in the long-term than community-
based providers. Microﬁnance providers driven by newer technologies, such as based
on mobile networks, introduce convenience and enable faster scaling of transactions.
Whilst there has been a continuous increase of commercial MFIs, informal providers6
remain the main source of microﬁnance services for the very poor [Ledgerwood et al.,
2013]. It is also known that often microﬁnance clients use more than one provider, be
it formal or informal. The level of formality depends on whether there are normative
regulations7 for the type of organisation in question. These in turn, particularly in
the domain of microﬁnance, are inﬂuenced by the informal conventions of the society
and business community the providers are situated in. A subset of these are the social
conventions adopted by the microﬁnance clients, which has been tapped into this re-
search8. As discussed by Ledgerwood et al., in the 2013 “Microﬁnance Handbook” and
others [Coleman, 1998, Shipton, 2007, microLINKS and USAID, 2010], these informal
conventions deﬁne the acceptable behaviours for individuals based on a combination of
factors including culture, value systems, history and practices of the community.
As these conventions do not operate based on the responsibility of just one person,
the creation and adoption of acceptable behaviour is necessarily a collective and –most
likely– a localised activity within and perhaps also between groups. This research is
focused on tapping into the identiﬁcation of what are these conventions are and on their
role amongst the surveyed microﬁnance clients and an in situ ethnographic observation
of microcredit groups over one month.
6 I.e. organisations that are not fully regulated and formalised, as previously discussed.
7 I.e. written law, government policies and/or industry standards that are enforced.
8 Chapters 4: “Research Design and Development”, 5: “Research Findings” (pages 75, 100).
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This project therefore does not focus on the creation and adoption of informal conven-
tions, but rather on better understanding what these are and how these operate with
regards to groups that are bound by formal credit rules. The origins of informal con-
ventions are varied and can persist for generations, depending on the circumstances in
which these have been created and maintained [microLINKS and USAID, 2010]. These
may include historical experiences of ethnic conﬂict, natural disasters, chronic lack of
resources, infrastructure or opportunities. One could argue that communities marked,
for example, by signiﬁcant conﬂict may be less receptive to group lending frameworks.
One can support the eﬀectiveness of microﬁnance core services, which is the interaction
between clients (demand) and service providers (supply), by understanding the local
context and informal conventions therein. This can be helpful in terms of organisations:
• developing better capacity, via specialised training or other means of learning9,
both within the service provider and interaction with external policy makers;
• developing, in a coordinated manner, the scaling of microﬁnance services by plan-
ning the actual oﬀset of limitations and capacity of diﬀerent providers;
• developing human capital resources to provide an appropriate participation of
microﬁnance providers and customers in the wider ﬁnancial market system10;
• developing research to provide microﬁnance organisations with new knowledge
and relevant up-to-date evidence that can facilitate the management of services.
Each of the aforementioned aspects above, of course, depends on funding. Organisations
with greater levels of formality tend to rely either on private or public investors. In the
microﬁnance industry, however, traditionally there has been a wider range of investors.
9 Depending on the local industry, with partnerships between the public and private sector.
10 This activity is also sometimes referred to, in the literature and industry, as advocacy.
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As donors and governments do not seek proﬁt, these two are the key enablers of MFIs to
deliver their mission as SEs, which are aimed at mitigating issues of under-provision or
access to public goods. These have been, and are likely to remain, important providers
of resources that enable the infrastructure of SE providers [UNITAR, 2013].
2.2 The Role of Microﬁnance in Public Goods
The satisfactory provision of public goods, particularly through successful innovative
governmental means, can play a signiﬁcant role in the overall societal welfare and it
can provide eﬀective means to mitigate degrees of poverty [Squire, 1993, Timothy and
Maitreesh, 2006, World Bank, 1990]. Some examples of welfare-enhancing public goods
include health services (e.g., [Timothy and Maitreesh, 2006]), schools (e.g., [Labaree,
1997, Alesina et al., 1999, Timothy and Maitreesh, 2006]), underlying infrastructure
for clean water (e.g., [Timothy and Maitreesh, 2006, Shaﬁk, 1994]), provision of urban
sanitation (e.g., [Shaﬁk, 1994, Alesina et al., 1999]) and transportation infrastructure
such as public roads (e.g., [Alesina et al., 1999, Timothy and Maitreesh, 2006]).
Throughout this thesis microﬁnance is discussed as a way of improving the livelihood of
the poor through facilitating access to public goods, even if that means partly privat-
ising them. Making the poor eﬀectively pay for the provision of public goods without
microﬁnance is a diﬃcult balance. That is because such proposal also implies negating,
to some degree, access to public goods to the unsuccessful ones [Mader, 2011a,b]. Thus
when state intervention is insuﬃcient to provide adequate access to public goods, mi-
croﬁnance can still promote development by increasing bottom-up market activity. As
discussed further in Section 2.4: “Usage of Poverty Lines in Social Enterprise” (page
41), the MFIs operating as a SE do not necessarily seek to fully replace governments
for the provision of public goods, but MFIs certainly aim to mitigate issues of access to
public goods and provision of more economic opportunities to those living in poverty.
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Yet economic theory suggests a general under-provision of public goods [Hardin, 1968].
This is due to the overarching assumption that individuals would behave as the homo
economicus. That implies in individual behaviour that only selﬁshly considers one’s
own costs and beneﬁts, even when these are mainly accrued from others [Cornes and
Sandler, 1996]. In other words, following the classic economic theory, one would take
into account the assumed tendency for individuals to be self-interested. Thus, unless
there are institutions enforcing behaviour towards promoting the public good, these
will tend to not collaborate to achieve what are essentially collective interests [Olson,
1971].
Despite the central hypothesis in the economic argument that individuals are essentially
selﬁsh, there are also insights from behavioural and experimental economics suggesting
that individuals can also concede substantial amounts of their own beneﬁt to improve
the circumstances of others [Gächter, 2010]. This in turn implies that there is hetero-
geneity in the underlying individual social preferences towards public goods, and this
has been documented experimentally [De Oliveira et al., 2009, Fischbacher and Gachter,
2010]. Therefore one can explore this relationship between group heterogeneity and the
provision of public goods, in terms of a potentially negative relationship [Alesina et al.,
1999, Miguel and Gugerty, 2005, Vigdor, 2004] with regards to the group composition
of a public good [Fischbacher and Gachter, 2010, Gächter and Thöni, 2005].
In this regard, it is known that the poor can strive considerably to help others in
their social circle if necessary [Collins et al., 2009]. Those living in poverty can be in-
ﬂuenced by a variety of factors, which may simultaneously inﬂuence on when one should
group together to improve their individual situation and their community welfare. In
this sense public goods that are voluntarily provided can be of great importance to
low-income communities. This role is particularly important when aid from the state
is misapplied (e.g. due to to corruption) or is insuﬃcient (e.g. lacking resources, for
whichever reason).
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One of the best established links between diversity and welfare is the relationship to
growth; albeit it is debatable as to whether this mechanism is causal [Ahn et al., 2003,
Easterly and Levine, 1997, Costa and Kahn, 2003]. A higher income can improve wel-
fare, but welfare is also aﬀected through other mechanisms such as quality of governance
[Mauro, 1995]. These variations are bound by the concept of fractionalisation, which
is also referred to in the literature as systemic heterogeneity or diversity, and has an
overall negative impact on public goods. These include governmental services [Alesina
et al., 1999, Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007], voluntary work [Miguel and Gugerty,
2005, Vigdor, 2004], and community participation [Alesina and Ferrara, 2000].
Nevertheless appropriate policies can be implemented to overcome diﬃculties imposed
by high levels of fractionalisation in public goods [Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007,
Miguel, 2004]. Hence, at least theoretically, diversity can also be positively related to
growth by inspiring new ideas and innovation within communities. Yet that is only the
case when the diﬃculties to manage diverse interests remain somehow under control.
Otherwise the positive eﬀects of diversity may be forced to deal with the structurally
overwhelming diﬃculties of providing a public good to a very diversiﬁed set of clients.
The best known way to prevent such undesirable scenario is the design and main-
tenance of eﬀective institutions [Easterly, 2000]. Research pointing to the negative
eﬀects of diversity in the provision of public goods generally rely on demographics to
examine heterogeneity; with an argument that this characteristic reduces the ability
to promote positive social preferences (e.g. trust and cooperation) [Ahn et al., 2003,
Easterly and Levine, 1997, Mauro, 1995, Alesina et al., 1999, Miguel and Gugerty,
2005, Vigdor, 2004]. This is partially due to the researchers’ inability to reliably either
measure or experimentally aﬀect individual social preferences on a large scale. Hence
the lack of behavioural data, both empirical and experimental, has generally hampered
attempts to deductively investigate and demonstrate what is the relationship between
heterogeneity in individual preferences and voluntary contributions to public goods.
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2.3 Group Lending Approaches in Microﬁnance
There are diﬀerent frameworks that implement microﬁnance as a SE, yet all of them
are based on the idea of shared responsibility to repay quotas via a group lending ap-
proach. For four decades the original microcredit framework has been evolving various
aspects to better suit services according to a variety of local demands. Both solidarity
(collective) and individual lending can be available as SEs through {micro}credit ser-
vices. This thesis is focused on discussing the former case, as it requires social collateral
to function, which is the backup of collective responsibility over credit using one’s own
social network. There is to date a strong tendency in the microﬁnance industry to
primarily serve women. This is due to consistent worldwide evidence supporting that
women tend to invest more earnings to improve living conditions of their household and
default less often than men [MIX, 2009, 2010, ILO, 2002, Armendariz and Morduch,
2005]. According to these, the studied MFI in this thesis11 can be considered to be:
• mature and not-for-proﬁt nature (i.e. it has been operating for at least 8 years);
• with medium outreach (i.e., serving between 10.000 and 30.000 clients);
• having a low ﬁnancial intermediation (i.e. their total voluntary savings divided
by total assets is equal to less than 20% of the total ﬁnancial portfolio);
• and is focused on the low end market (i.e. the average balance per borrower is
less than the local equivalent of 150 United States Dollars – henceforth USD).
The studied MFI has also participated without loss, during 2009, in the Kiva.org12
peer-to-peer funding scheme. As microcredit schemes lend to their clients without any
traditional collateral, apart from their social collateral, repayment cycles tend to be
much and require smaller credit quota amounts that clients have to repay than the
commercial loans that are typically available at mainstream banks.
11 A more in-depth discussion is in Chapter 5: “Research Findings” (page 100).
12 Based in the United States, it allows individuals to invest via the Internet in local social
entrepreneurs around the world, whose loans are mediated on the ground by a partner MFI.
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This diﬀerence is important as microcredit frameworks are systems where quota in-
stalments are generally designed to encourage a rapid increase in the amount that
individual clients are dealing within their ﬁnanced groups. At times the interest rate
of microcredits can be substantially higher than traditional bank loans, as institutions
rely on such earnings to cover the relative high administrative costs associated with
numerous small loans. This is a diﬃcult challenge, especially for young and small insti-
tutions, as external funding is usually necessary to keep operations smooth. Many MFIs
also oﬀer diﬀerent SE services to their clients, such as basic healthcare and education,
either via themselves or in partnership with other organisations. Many modern SEs
tend to tailor services both to cover foreseeable events and unforeseeable adversities13 as
fully-ﬂedged, yet still ﬁnancially independent, extras to the microﬁnance services. Since
microcredit clients rely both on the individual capabilities and their social network ca-
pacity to succeed, group size and group portfolio are important aspects to consider for
these institutions. A MFI has to devise a minimum group size that is small enough to
encourage joint responsibility and prevent free riders, yet with a maximum that allows
prevention of its own collapse in case members experience adversities. The researched
MFI for this project deals with groups ranging from three to seven members. For more
details on this, please see Section 4.1: “The MFI Context during Data Collection”
(page 77).
Figure 2.5 on the next page depicts, at a high level of abstraction, the observed cycles
and states requiring liaison between credit oﬃcers and clients in the MFI operations.
Basically, if clients already know the terms of the microﬁnance services, they may
form groups and apply for credit collectively. If all participants meet the MFI socio-
economic criteria, credit is granted to all applicants who now are jointly responsible to
repay that amount in due time. If the application is unsuccessful, the whole procedure
is then terminated. Once credit has been distributed to all group members, credit
oﬃcers regularly update the MFI records with regards to the payment activity of every
ﬁnanced individual in a group.
13 Examples include: bad investments, unproﬁtability and illnesses. For this thesis, some of
those adversities have been modelled as shocks to the simulated microﬁnance groups. Please
see Table 5.23: “Conﬁgurable parameters for group circumstances in the EDSM”, Chapter 3:
“Agent-Based Social Simulation” (page 137) for more details on about the proposed approach.
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As discussed in Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers” (page 101) and
Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114), mutual social and
ﬁnancial monitoring amongst members is crucial for reducing moral hazard14 in groups.
clients 
know 
MFI?
credit 
officers
form groups 
and apply
yes
log refusal
approve?in budget?
no
suspend 
procedure
yes monitor all 
groups
log finances
visit credit 
centre
yes no
no
Figure 2.5: Cycles involving oﬃcers and clients, based on observing the MFI
The dotted line represents the ﬁnancial management tasks that are, usually in the case
of branchless15 microﬁnance and banking, only partially done at the MFI headquarters
[Mas, 2009, Helms, 2006, CGAP and FGV, 2010]. The operations of the studied MFI are
eﬀectively branchless as the institution employs a mobile network of retail credit agents.
Regardless whether the bulk of operations are carried in centralised or distributed credit
oﬃces, only the credit oﬃcers systematically collect client data. To date the only known
exception known to the author is when microcredit quotas are paid via mobile phones.
This is still rather uncommon as aﬀordable mobile banking is generally unavailable to
the very poor communities throughout the world. Even when clients manage larger
amounts of money, often institutions do not oﬀer electronic means of repaying quotas.
I.e. groups are likely to not have access to devices with reasonable, regular terms of
usage like M-Pesa, which is a Kenyan mobile money-transfer system, pioneered in 2005.
14 I.e. no incentives to protect from risks in which one cannot be aﬀected by its consequences.
15 That is, all MFI clients are visited by credit oﬃcers who are based at a central oﬃce.
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Despite the fast adoption of mobile technology in some developing countries [Pohjola,
2003], access and maintenance costs for these to be used in MFIs are generally still pro-
hibitive. Unless there are speciﬁc subsidies (public and/or private) to launch aﬀordable
mobile services, the networks’ terms of usage –even when these are less expensive than
landlines– tend to be unﬁt for the purpose of those living below poverty lines. M-Pesa
is a good example of a mobile banking system that managed to be aﬀordable16 and thus
has become popular for local money transfers in Kenya [Mas and Morawczynski, 2009].
This service became so successful that in 2008 it partnered with Western Union17 to
pilot a cross-border mobile money transfer service with the UK [Omwansa, 2009].
This is an example of the importance to properly regulate the cooperation between
social (e.g. microﬁnance) and commercial (e.g. mobile) enterprises targeting the poor.
As a reference, according to [Lyman, 2009, Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009], since its
2007 commercial launch, M-Pesa had nearly seven million clients and is responsible for
daily transfers averaging 1.96 million USD, with a total transfer of 1.7 billion USD; of
which 80% are under 50 USD and 50% under 10 USD. This service enabled, for the
unbanked, to access banking services simply by owning a mobile phone. This is a signi-
ﬁcant achievement, as thousands of merchants facilitate individuals to open accounts,
handle deposits and withdrawals based on the customers’ mobiles. An ethnographic
ﬁeldwork was carried out interviewing about 350 M-Pesa clients, 14 ﬁnancial diaries
and 21 focus groups in two communities in Kenya, Kibera and Bukura [Morawczynski,
2009]. The study revealed that most transfers are of either nature: (a) frequent regular
income-supplementing (small sums for general use) or (b) occasional lump sums for
speciﬁc investments (e.g. education and productivity). Most senders are urban men,
whilst most recipients are rural women or retirees. Despite its success, problems with
the M-Pesa system include: the network overload that results in failed transactions
–either in terms of notifying either side or not processing them at all. This happens as
the same bandwidth is used for all users of mobile services (i.e. data, voice, text).
16 Through a 2005 private (Vodafone, the holding company of Kenya’s Safaricom mobile net-
work) and governmental (UK Department of International Development) sectors collaboration.
17 An international branch-based money transfer service that is popular with the unbanked.
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Microﬁnance provided by Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
There are other settings for collective and solidarity-based lending schemes that diﬀer
from traditional MFIs as SEs. This includes the informal Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations (henceforth ROSCAs) and the Accumulating Savings and Credit Associ-
ations (henceforth ASCAs) [Bouman, 1995, Ledgerwood et al., 2013]. In both schemes
all group participants are themselves informally responsible, i.e. without any formal
institutional organisation, to manage their own individual quotas. The main diﬀerence
is that the latter case (ASCAS) may require the appointment of one person per group
to keep track of deposits and lending surpluses. As in the formal microﬁnance frame-
work, these two aforementioned schemes are focused on exploiting the social network
and social collateral of poor individuals to enhance the likelihood of successful collective
ﬁnancing. ROSCAs and ASCAs contain context-speciﬁc social conventions for support-
ing and sanctioning individuals, similar in kind to those observed and discussed during
the development of this doctoral thesis18. In this sense it is remarkable to observe that
collective ﬁnancial cooperation can be sustained through social conventions alone, and
not necessarily be backed with a formal set of potential penalisations. Across the mi-
croﬁnance frameworks, as in ROSCAs and ASCAs, there is generally a strong presence
of social and ﬁnancial commitment between participants, which arguably helps them
to repay quotas in time [Van Bastelaer, 2000, Ito, 2003, Rutherford and Arora, 2011].
The relevance of personal relationships in social networks has a very prominent role
in group lending for the poor. This aspect is particularly important in microﬁnance
as it has allowed to scale up variations of the original framework to reach far more
clients than other similar schemes. In this regard, the formal shape of an institution
can indeed be designed to help this synergy. That is because MFI regulations have a
direct impact on how groups are organised over time, as the member’s reliability are
essentially tied with the socio-economic conventions of what is considered acceptable
behaviour in groups. For example, whenever voluntary cooperation fails to materialise,
social pressure through ostracising and embarrassment can be deployed as sanctions
–and, in certain circumstances, group-level ﬁnes may also be managed by groups.
18 For a more in depth discussion on this topics, please refer to Section 5.2: “Fieldwork
Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114, Chapter 5: “Research Findings”).
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This has been observed elsewhere and in the ﬁeldwork carried out for this project [Van
Bastelaer, 2000, Lucas, 2009b]19. These strategies employed by group participants ﬁlter
out opportunists, which are also referred to in the literature as free riders. In other
words, borrowers themselves can assume the responsibility, instead of the ﬁnancing
institution, to select and manage the clients participating in their collective credit.
The major MFI schemes in operation tend to diﬀer from ROSCAs and ASCAs in
terms of how their rules are pragmatically linked to the concept of social collateral.
That is primarily noticeable in terms of having collective credit tracked by both the
ﬁnancier institution and participants, which may involve legal join liability towards
clients. The Grameen Bank and various adaptations based on their framework, such as
the one discussed in this thesis’ case study, do not require that [Grameen Bank, 2010,
Stiglitz, 1990, Ghatak, 2000, 2002], and only implement an informal notion of it. I.e.
in such systems there is no attempt of legally enforcing rules against defaulters. On
the other hand, no client would be able to renew credit in case their group debt is left
outstanding. In this way, the selection of participants tends to be assortative whenever
possible during the screening process. Due to the usual transport limitations20 in the
areas where –typically rural– clients live, this may also be constrained by location21.
The case study presented in this thesis22, is an adaptation of the Grameen frame-
work with aspects borrowed from another major microﬁnance organisation. That is
the Foundation for International Community Assistance (henceforth FINCA), founded
in 1984 and known for being a synonym with village banking23. The latter requires
their ﬁnancial services being similar to the ROSCAs, as participants receive –in a round-
robin fashion (i.e. sequentially and periodically)– loans from the mandatory savings
gathered from all group members [Karlan, 2007]. The studied MFI in Chiapas, the
southernmost Mexican state, also has savings services but those are not allowed to be
used for repaying credit. This practice varies within the diﬀerent setups of MFIs, as
19 The latter reference is available in Appendix III: Second Fieldwork Report (page 192).
20 I.e. diﬃculties in accessing it, such as cost and limited routes or timetables.
21 This may also impose restrictions as to which type of business one can pursue.
22 See Section 4.1: “The MFI Context during Data Collection” (page 76.
23 I.e. microcredit that is administered via local, ﬁxed branches instead of a centralised one.
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on the other hand, FINCA employees must continuously emphasise to clients the need
for groups to monitor their members. This is because otherwise FINCA itself will be
serving as the collateral for the loan. This means that defaulting groups –in theory–
pose a greater risk to FINCA than in other microﬁnance frameworks where savings
expenditure are exclusively set for diﬀerent purposes –as every collateralised risk is
conﬁned within groups. Another major diﬀerence, between FINCA and the studied
MFI framework, is that clients of the former structure must reach their branches by
themselves. That can happen through invitations or individual initiative, and clients
are not able to choose –neither a priori nor a posteriori– in their applications which
group they shall join. Potential clients are put on a list and, when that reaches a
certain number24, a group is automatically formed. FINCA is thus relying, rather
heavily, on the increasing awareness of their operations through informal word-of-mouth
recommendations within the community where their branches are based, as no explicit
instructions to existing clients or advertising are given in order to ﬁnd new credit
applicants. This framework is centralised and does not take advantage of the emergent
properties derived from an individualised peer selection process for group formation, as
the entire process is controlled by FINCA as an institution. Weekly meetings, held at
their distributed MFI oﬃces, encapsulate and regiment all the activities that monitor
every ﬁnanced group.
The aforementioned descriptions contrast with the MFI studied in this thesis, as the
meetings to monitor groups take place simultaneously in distributed centres across a
large geographical region. Thus collecting and merging data of their multiple clients is a
completely asynchronous undertaking. Reviewing default events, and deciding what to
do in each occasion, is diﬀerent in these two cases. FINCA employees supervise and may
interfere in this process by assigning clients who deal with defaulters or late payers.
Such decisions in the studied MFI are made diﬀerently, as every action is entirely
managed by clients, without the full knowledge of the credit oﬃcers. A more detailed
discussion about this can be read in Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance
Clients” (page 114).
24 Groups ﬁnanced by FINCA may contain, at their discretion, from 10 to 50 members.
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This is an important distinction as it aﬀects how top-down (institutional) rules inﬂu-
ence bottom-up (group level) social behaviour to deal with defaulters. The FINCA
framework, due to greater centralisation, is more restrictive than the Grameen Bank
framework. The legal context in which SEs operate is often challenging as more tra-
ditional types of businesses –due to historical reasons– usually already have speciﬁc
regulations that facilitate their operations and long-term planning. It is intricate to
design a well-balanced, country-wide policies that allow favourable conditions for SEs
to develop. Traditional business models are likely to have a better and more estab-
lished legal framework, which helps with growth due to experience. SEs often face
challenges without having the backup of appropriate regulations and, sometimes as a
consequence of that, also lack investments25. With speciﬁc legislation SEs could be
entitled to incen-tives through ﬁscal systems or other businesses interested in support-
ing their initiatives. Solutions in this regard are invariably local ones, as the social
context warranting the existence of SEs is very varied throughout the world [Defourny
and Nyssens, 2010].
In developing economies such as Mexico, this thesis’ case study, state-wide regulations
about microﬁnance are often linked –due to local political reasons– with the legislation
of economic cooperatives –which may not strictly be a SE. The Mexican segmentation
of ﬁnancial institutions is based on size and legal structure, essentially meaning that
both traditional enterprises and SEs can oﬀer microﬁnance services [Rosenberg, 2007].
That can be beneﬁcial to clients due to more competition and specialisation of ﬁnancial
products, yet in addition MFIs are also legally allowed to explicitly concentrate on
proﬁt-making. An example of that is the Compartamos MFI26, which brought their
business to an IPO27 in April 2007, despite severe criticisms from the industry [Yunus,
2007]. If not properly regulated, microﬁnance may undermine development as clients
can act as the engine of proﬁt-making and still not mitigate their own poverty. To date
in Mexico it is not straightforward to identify and analyse the socio-economic impact of
an SE as there is no strict diﬀerentiation between MFI as SE from commercial ventures.
25 I.e. apart from sources such as philanthropy or individual donations from society.
26 Known in the industry for high interest rates, sometimes over 80% [Rosenberg, 2007].
27 I.e., Initial Public Oﬀering: the ﬁrst time a ﬁrm issues shares for stock market investment.
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Monitoring and Enforcing Collective Responsibilities in Microﬁnance
The need for self-monitoring within groups eﬀectively transfers much of the lender’s
responsibilities, and of assessing information uncertainties, to borrowers themselves as
they must rely on personal relationships to ensure group cooperation [Grameen Bank,
2010]. Social networks are often put in context as an eﬀective social collateral that
allows the distinction of genuine personal negative shocks from individual dishonesty
or reneging. But disorganised group lending schemes could lead to higher default rates
than individual lending ones. For example, individuals paying on time may decide to
retaliate against defaulters by either also not paying their quotas, or refusing to cover
in-group eventual defaults, as a new loan would not be granted anyway. That would
have been considered an anti-social action within the credit group. Such attitude would
be likely to hinder an individual’s own ability to renew credit, but it also may spur the
formation of a new group altogether that may apply for further new credit instalments.
Some MFIs, for example the one studied in this research, do not track individual
information as to who did not cover defaults, so such anti-social behaviour would pass
unnoticed by the institutional ﬁnanciers. The same situation is less likely to be unknown
amongst the local microﬁnance clientele themselves, as an anti-social participant can
signiﬁcantly impair his/her own collateralised social network. That is, the individual
web of contacts can directly contribute to enhance or worsen reputations over time.
Such a hypothetical scenario is plausible and probably has already happened in the
studied MFI, but the local social conventions between group members may also have
already ﬁltered out such individuals over time. This illustrates the rather powerful
means of bottom-up self-organisation regarding joint liability that can, at least in part,
be supported with top-down (institutional) rules designed speciﬁcally for that purpose.
In essence, this would mean that microﬁnance groups are encouraged to gradually take
over the underwriting, monitoring, and enforcement of collective loan contracts. The
nature of self-formed groups incentivise individuals to collectively avoid unreliable par-
ticipants, as otherwise these can adversely aﬀect their own group performance and
ability to remain funded by the organisation responsible for the provision of credit.
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In this regard, one can observe culturally-dependent variations as to how such group-
level conventional social behaviour is shaped. Lending policies are inﬂuential for group
performance, as such top-down regulations may support or hinder aspects that contri-
bute to the success of a group lending framework [Woolcock, 1999]. There are diﬀer-
ences all over the world regarding to what is considered to be the best approach to
manage non-ﬁnancial aspects of a microﬁnance framework [Guttman, 2007]. Never-
theless group lending, based on social collateral, has been substantially successful by
coupling the advantages of endogenous peer selection with the intention to achieve high
repayment rates [Brau and Woller, 2004, Ghatak, 1999]. Yet there are also microcre-
dit loans speciﬁcally designed for other purposes than productive, enterprise-focused
investments. These loans, despite providing important improvements in the livelihood
of those who are living in poverty, are not the focus of the discussion in this research
thesis. Instead, the discussion is focused on micro loans used for economically proﬁtable
activities.
Individual reputation is a key aspect for social collateral to work eﬀectively, as one’s
exposure to inappropriate actions could adversely impact one’s ability to access fur-
ther credit and perhaps also to do business with others in the local community. The
experience obtained during this research project generally corroborates to this fact:
“... group borrowers must in eﬀect meet collateral requirements not just as borrowers
but also as monitors. [...] group loans will only be chosen over other sources of ﬁnance
when group members have a decided cost advantage in monitoring and sanctioning each
other relative to outside lenders and intermediaries.” [Conning, 1996]
The diﬃculty is then to assess the quality and value of social collateral. Unless there
is previous knowledge about the applicants’ networks, there is no eﬀective way to
appraise social collateral before actually granting credit to groups. This uncertainty
regarding creditworthiness, along with the similar socio-economic circumstances of ﬁrst-
time borrowers, justify –at least in part– the usual low credit and high interest rates
oﬀered –often genuinely in bona ﬁde– to inexperienced clients [Hermes et al., 2005].
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2.4 Usage of Poverty Lines in Social Enterprise
After understanding the diﬀerent ways to control group lending, through managing
the concept of social collateral, another instrumental concept to grasp is the role of
poverty lines in SEs. These are helpful in assessing clients on whether these should
receive collective funding. Thus instead of traditional assets serving as collateral for
credit, a social network is used to backup credit by assigning it a collective repayment
responsibility. Peer pressure may thus be understood as a component of social capital,
which in this case is exercised by group participants towards achieving a common goal
[Ito, 2003]. In the microﬁnance framework this is ensured by the top-down institutional
rules on how credit should be repaid. If someone in a group defaults, nobody in that
group would be allowed to access further credit. In this way, social collateral works as a
guarantee for renewing credit as that depends on cooperative repayment behaviour from
all group members. The ASCA and ROSCA saving and funding frameworks (discussed
in the previous section on page 35), employ social collateral but have no external
regulation28 to implement joint liability over shared assets. This means that groups
are required to self-organise in terms of strategies to meet their individual obligations
as part of a collective obligation. That is the foundation of microﬁnance services.
Individuals living close to a poverty line, i.e. those adversely aﬀected to reach the
minimum estimated income needed to secure life necessities, have been historically
denied formal credit due to lenders’ diﬃculties, both in terms of logistics and cost, to
assess such potential clients. That include limited and expensive means of screening
new applicants, monitoring credit and enforcing repayment of the would-be clients. The
formal monitoring of individual performance is important for MFIs to determine which
and how their clients should be sanctioned or encouraged. These tasks in traditional
credit management schemes needed fundamental changes for the creation of collective
ﬁnance frameworks that rely mainly on social collateral, as then peer monitoring and
enforcement –inline with the institutional rules– can be done by clients themselves.
28 I.e. enforcement requires no legal apparatus –apart from some variations such as FINCA.
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As introduced in the previous section, poverty lines are essentially local socio-economic
deﬁnitions that are used to identify how adversely aﬀected individuals are in terms of
fulﬁlling the basic and immediate living necessities in a particular geographical area.
Since the 1960s various national and international measures have been adopted to
evaluate –either in relative terms to local citizens or absolute thresholds29– diﬀerent
standards of living. Approaches range from measures of social security and welfare
beneﬁts, relative income of an equivalised national average30, a minimum basket of
goods of living needs and an absolute threshold separating those living in poverty.
Comparing and assessing poverty trends has been diﬃcult as quality of datasets and
deﬁnitions vary considerably across individual –or group of– countries around the world
[Srinivasan, 2004]. This lead the World Bank (henceforth WB) to propose a common
international poverty threshold, which was set in the 1990s as one USD per day31
and it is regularly updated32 using the trade-based Purchase Power Parity (henceforth
PPP)33.
Whilst these measures (poverty lines and PPP) have been intuitively useful for bench-
marking purposes, such as tracking the 2015 milestones of the Millennium Development
Goals (henceforth MDG) [United Nations, 2010], this is still a non-consensual approach.
As a result, the PPP is best understood as providing an approximative yardstick to the
multi-faceted challenge of poverty. It uses a universal deﬁnition of what constitutes
poverty and deprivation [Sinha, 2006]. As a consequence one should expect some vari-
ation when interpreting reported relative or absolute poverty rates. For instance, 2008
ﬁgures for the Mexican population –according to [CIA, 2008] – are 18.2% in terms of
food-based poverty, 47% in terms of asset-based poverty34 and –according to [World
Bank, 2005]– these values up to 2004 are respectively reported as 17.6% and 47.7%.
29 The former is used in developed economies, whilst the latter is used in developing ones.
30 I.e. an average based on household members weighting diﬀerently according to occupations.
31 Roughly corresponding to the poverty lines of some of the poorest countries in about 1985.
32 In 2005 the UN updated the MDG poverty line to 1.25 USD [Ravallion et al., 2009].
33 I.e. a price comparison between two countries, assuming negligible transaction costs.
34 I.e. considering household expenditures in housing, clothing and transport.
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The latter reference has the additional capacities-based poverty35 at 24.5%. A signi-
ﬁcative lowering of overall poverty has been observed amongst the Mexican rural pop-
ulation, where indicators improved, between 2000-2004, from 42.4% to 27.9%. That
means extreme poverty36 has been considerably reduced in the country. Amongst the
rural population (60.7% of the surveyed people), 35.1% were agricultural workers, 43%
self-employed and 71.8% with incomplete primary schooling. Nevertheless, when local
data is aggregated over time or space and benchmarked with an index such as the
PPP, the usefulness of universal poverty indicators for forecasting purposes becomes
questionable. This happens as changes by locally relevant socio-economic events can
be statistically unobservable at the aggregate level and structural breaks (i.e. non-
stationary trends) could be present in time series [Srinivasan, 2004, Chatﬁeld, 2000].
The rather arbitrary exercise of calculating a global poverty line, which is then de-
ployed alongside the PPP, does not necessarily reﬂect the actual cost of meeting one’s
essential consumption and services requirements. There are various examples, in nu-
merous developing and developed economies, where a single raw (i.e. unprocessed) food
item can cost considerably more than one or two USD per day. This illustrates how
the aforementioned approach is potentially problematic in terms of using PPP-based
approximations to consumption needs. That is due to the requirement of aggregation of
prices37 from diﬀerent countries, which can have substantially diﬀerent socio-economic
circumstances. Therefore, there is no worldwide standard, or a detailed set of income-
dependent capabilities to evaluate someone as non-poor; nor a systematic way to assess
which resources –in each country– would be required to appropriately evaluate poverty.
One potentially useful approach could be the deﬁnition of minimum local costs one has
to achieve the recommended daily calorie intake, whilst taking into account other local
non-nutritional costs in this process. That would be a similar approach to the current
UN and WB approaches, but without using a global, currency-based approximation to
costs that is subject to constant trade-inﬂuenceable aggregations.
35 I.e. non‐ food available income for spending on education and health services.
36 I.e. the share of the population considered as being under the food poverty line.
37 Frequently such nation-wide data is either unavailable, considerably outdated or estimated.
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Nevertheless the current PPP approach is still the most widely used threshold and has
been improved over the years with more reliable prices provided regularly by the WB
initiative entitled “International Comparison Program”38. Figure 2.6 below depicts the
threats facing those considered to be either slightly above or under poverty lines. Eﬀect-
ive precautionary and mitigation tools –including e.g. microﬁnance services including
credit and savings targeted at the extremely poor. Other tools would be socio-economic
safety nets39 to the moderately poor– are necessary for a smoother individual absorp-
tion40 of both exogenous and endogenous socio-economic shocks. Once in severe crisis
(extreme poverty), it is indeed a tough struggle to gradually improve one’s own socio-
economic condition by means of safely increasing income and accumulating assets.
Safety net
              unexpected shocks
(economic, illness, crop failure, etc.)
          with poverty
mitigation strategies
     without poverty
mitigation strategies 
Poverty line
TIME
Figure 2.6: Threats close to a poverty line, adapted from [Churchill, 2007]
Both commercial and subsidised tools can provide some of the necessary means for
reducing the impact of economic downturns. The application of economic development
policies should reduce the vulnerability of those facing various adversities imposed due
to economic deprivation and lack of access to basic services, such as suﬃcient sanitation
and education. Therefore if one’s economic pressures exceed the household expenditure
capacity, there should be public-sector alternatives that allow an appropriate socio-
economic protection to ﬁll in such gaps –until the circumstances are overcome.
38 A global statistical partnership to collect, compile and estimate PPP-based price datasets.
39 I.e. resource-transfer programs, lead either by the public (e.g. governments) or private
sector (e.g. SEs), that are designed to prevent further worsening of vulnerable communities.
40 I.e. without signiﬁcantly eroding the limited –if at all existent– regular income or savings.
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Figure 2.7 depicts examples of initiatives that have been used throughout the world
to tackle this issue, with the aid of poverty lines. Such a yardstick helps to identify
and delineate the needs of those in extreme poverty, which is the fulﬁlment of basic
needs (e.g. health, shelter and training). Right above the poverty line there is the
economically-active poor41 which may access microﬁnance services (e.g. credit and
savings). The aim of microﬁnance is to progress these to the lower-middle income
class42 and so access standard commercial ﬁnancial services. The categories presented
below and on the previous page are broad and require no strict deﬁnition in terms of
numerical income, as the absolute values will vary across local and world regions.
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Figure 2.7: Tools for poverty alleviation, adapted from [Robinson, 2001]
Chronic insecurity aﬀect those close to a poverty line with a constant risk of severe
income shocks. As a reference, in 2005 the world population consisted of: 25.7% (1.4
billion) poor people relative to a 1.25 USD per day poverty line, 32.1% (1.751 billion)
were at risk by having an income between 1.25 USD and 2.50 USD per day and 60%
(3140.2 million) if the poverty line income yardstick was set to 2.50 USD [Islam, 2009].
41 Which may, to some extent, overlap with the moderate poor depicted in Figure 2.6.
42 Which is roughly equivalent to the vulnerable non-poor category depicted in Figure 2.6.
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In 2004, the Microcredit Summit Campaign reported that there were 3,044 MFIs in
developing countries giving microloans to over 92 million clients [United Nations, 2006].
There is some discussion as to whether microﬁnance can be eﬃciently employed to help
the extremely poor [Biggar, 2009]. This is suggested in the bottom middle section of
Figure 2.7, due to their more urgent and basic life needs. Assessing microﬁnance eﬃc-
acy in mitigating poverty outreach is not a straightforward task. That is why working
a poverty line can help understand aspects of ﬁnancial sustainability, social perform-
ance and also devise methods to assess at what stage of poverty someone actually is.
Amongst numerous poverty assessment tools that work with poverty lines, probably
the two most prominent ones used in the current microﬁnance industry are the:
• Grameen Bank initiative entitled Progress out of Poverty Index (henceforth PPI),
which is a country-speciﬁc scorecard43 set to systematically track poverty levels
over time [Schreiner et al., 2002, Schreiner, 2009]. This approach tackles many
problems of using generic poverty lines, which is discussed on page 43 in this sec-
tion, as it uses a national poverty line adjusted to country characteristics, taking
into account the one or two USD per day PPP international poverty lines.
• United States Agency for International Development44 (henceforth USAID) initi-
ative entitled Poverty Assessment Tool45, which uses a single PPP-based interna-
tional poverty line to deﬁne poverty degrees and, via legally binding regulations,
allocates a certain amount of funding towards each category [USAID, 2008].
The PPI criteria includes aspects as access to sanitation, schooling (literacy and numer-
acy skills), use of telecommunication technology, ﬂooring, cooking utensils, fuel con-
sumption, entertainment and housing structure. Depending on the PPI score obtained,
MFIs can classify each household according to a table that proportionally segments a
national poverty line, allowing speciﬁc reports per household. The studied MFI works
with the PPI to evaluate achievements of their social mission of serving the poorest.
43 Which is about assessing and monitoring organisational change and not only statistics.
44 A government-led agency charged with administering non-military aid to foreign civilians.
45 The IRIS Center, University of Maryland, is commissioned with the PAT development.
46
47
Summary and Conclusions of Chapter 2:
Social Enterprise
The chapter discussed the structure in which the concept of Social Enterprise, which
includes examples such as the MFI studied for this research project, and how other
organisations are contextualised in terms of the following relevant operational aspects:
• private and mixed (i.e. institutions operating with public and private capital)
means of providing, directly or indirectly, alternatice access to public goods;
• ways of operationalising collective credit frameworks as a Social Enterprise;
• and how social collateral can be used in conjunction with poverty lines to enable
Social Enterprises to provide their clients with better access to public goods.
Microﬁnance can be implemented with diﬀerent group lending frameworks, yet these
all depend on the concept of social collateral and are adapted by an MFI using a
poverty line as a baseline yardstick for assessing the collateral of credit groups. Thus a
conclusion from this chapter is that, in order to understand and track the the delivery
of a SE mission via microﬁnance, it is not enough to assess the economic performance
of a MFI. Yet this is the predominant approach used to research behaviour within these
micro-credit groups.
Financial soundness is the ﬁrst requirement for an institution to sustainably pursue a
social mission. Thus, despite the wealth of information regarding the assessment of
MFIs operating as SEs, there are a number of open challenges to further understanding
and exploring the internal dynamics within credit groups. These include key research
questions such as: “What are the credit clients’ typical actions regarding missed meet-
ings and payments?” and “What does the MFI know about clients’ actions regarding
missed meetings and payments?”.
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Chapter 3
Agent-Based Social Simulation
This chapter contains key discussions to understand the role of scientiﬁc models, in-
cluding simulations, with highlights of the most important diﬀerences between th kinds
of modelling and a conclusion as to why an agent-based approach has been chosen as
the most appropriate simulation approach for this research project. The chapter begins
with an introductory discussion on the variety of scientiﬁc models, including how dif-
ferent approaches to implementing simulation models are situated within that context.
Then the next section contains a discussion on the aspects that are particularly relev-
ant to the development of agent-based simulations. The following subsection contain
a discussion on the diﬀerent approaches to building an ABM then another subsection
contains a discussion on the challenges of simulating social phenomena using an ABM.
The chapter concludes with a review of diﬀerent research approaches to modelling the
behaviour of microﬁnance clients. To locate the content, please refer to the TOC below.
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3.1 Types of Scientiﬁc Models
Models are central to science and appear in numerous formats. These range from phys-
ical representations (e.g. architectural scale models) all the way through to purely
abstract mathematical speciﬁcations (e.g. models of theorem generalisations). The
usefulness of each scientiﬁc model is closely associated with their type and area of
application. Some scientiﬁc models intend to provide a theoretical representation, by
means of implementing speciﬁc hypotheses. In these cases the intention is that, by
testing the model, one ought to deductively contribute to either corroborate or falsify a
theory by means of carrying out an experiment. Other types of models may simply in-
tend to represent a particular aspect of a phenomenon to allow an inductive exploration
regarding how assumptions and processes have been represented and implemented.
Despite the diversity of scientiﬁc models, they all are aimed at being somehow use-
ful regarding the actual phenomenon, matching one or more of the following objectives:
interpreting or describing data (e.g. quantitatively or qualitatively), testing interven-
tions (e.g. deductive experimentation or inductive exploration), synthesising studies,
forecasting (e.g. econometrics) and/or idea elucidation (e.g. demonstration) [Sarkar,
2013, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007]. Thus the common feature amongst models is to:
“[...] provide a simpliﬁed representation, of what is known and relevant, that is some-
how helpful to further understand, describe or explore the real phenomena [...]
[Geweke, 2005].
One can then best understand the role of scientiﬁc models when thinking about them
in terms of usefulness, rather than truthfulness. I.e., although a model may not be
absolutely true1 regarding the real phenomenon, it may still be useful to some degree
regarding the real system. This is typically the case of simulation models, which often
only implement what is of apparent relevance to be experimented with. A comparison
between the variety of approaches to simulation is introduced on the next pages.
1 In terms of a model being, representation-wise, fully accurate, correct and complete.
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Table 3.1 below illustrates the most important diﬀerent simulation approaches and
their general features. Each one is reviewed based on how diﬀerent it is from another
in terms of the simulation level, possibilities for communication and scalability in light
of complexity. In every approach, researchers can compare the feasibility of obtained
results with data that has been collected from a real-world scenario. That is what
happens in case there is comparable data from the target phenomenon. Yet a unique
advantage of an ABM simulation model is that some can provide a generative approach
[Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005, Epstein, 2006]. That is, those simulation models that are
based on the continuous interaction between entities can generate outcomes that one is
unable to completely foresee prior to running simulations. Therefore if one is interested
in the interaction between entities, the agent-based approach is the most ﬂexible.
Approach Simulation Interaction Complexity Scalability
Equation-
based
of macro as-
pects
agents are isol-
ated (no comm.)
either linear or
non-linear
numerical
processing
Discrete
queueing
of micro as-
pects
a representative
agent or none
dependent on
timing scheme
depend on
input data
system
dynamics
single entity
composite
no interaction is
needed
simple agent,
complex world
environmental
relations
Micro-
simulation
focus on a
group or task
isolated agents,
maybe parallel
may include
social actions
group seg-
mentation
Cellular
automata
inter-group
inﬂuences
neighbourhood
dependent
simple and dis-
tributed
according
to a matrix
Neural
networks
depend on
sensing cells
discrete and
between layers
depend on lay-
ering schemes
training
dependent
Learning
models
statistical
mechanics
no agent interac-
tion is needed
depend on
types of data
data-set
dependent
Multi-
level
intra- and/or
inter-group
no agent interac-
tion is needed
ﬂexible level-
ling setup
computing
power
Agent-
based
multi-entity
interaction
either direct or
indirect
agent architec-
ture is ﬂexible
computing
power
Table 3.1: Diﬀerent approaches to social simulation, updated from Lucas [2007]
Computational simulations, including the agent-based approach, are models that re-
quire implementation using programming languages. Simulations oﬀer mediation of
knowledge development between theoretical approaches and experimental (or empir-
ical) approaches to research a social phenomenon [Frigg and Reiss, 2011, Guala, 1998].
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Analytical models result in data that is directly dependant on the input, which is made
of a parameters are set, and one is typically interested in this approach for optimisa-
tion purposes. Finding an optimal solution may be computationally very demanding,
leading to signiﬁcant delays in processing a model, so simulations are often used to
speed-up this process. As there are various abstraction levels for simulations, one must
understand the necessary level of systemic granularity (i.e. the amount of detail that
one should model) [Remondino, 2004]. Hence there are four main approaches to simu-
lation:
• Discrete Events: these consist of systems with global rules and local dynamics,
which are due to entities passively reacting by transitioning from one internal
state to another [Banks et al., 2009]. A model of this type consists of ﬂowcharts
describing how data and resource ﬂow between the speciﬁed entities. These are
passive and go through processes such as queueing for processing, seizing and re-
leasing resources. Due to the general purpose, discrete event models have become
popular in niches where the structure of processes are essential. These include, for
example: business services, manufacturing and logistics [Choi and Kang, 2013].
Hence modellers using this approach have to deﬁne an algorithm that takes into
account the global process through which entities will be processed.
• Dynamic Systems: these consist of systems modelled mathematically based on
continuous variables that are based on physical measurements or theoretical ex-
periments [Wolkenhauer, 2001]. These include, for example, those related to
kinematics (i.e. the mechanical features of motion prior to being exerted over an
entity) and dynamics (i.e. the mechanical features of motion while being exerted
over an entity): location, velocity, acceleration, pressure and density. Due to the
precise nature of this approach, most focus is on understanding the causal struc-
ture of the phenomenon of interest [Hanneman, 1988]. The variety of linear and
non-linear mathematical motions explored and explained by dynamic systems
includes a wide range of dynamics such as chaotic and bifurcation trajectories
[Zhang, 2006]. The successor of this approach, System Dynamics, is based on
simpliﬁed principles of dynamic systems and is discussed on the next page.
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• System Dynamics: deals with aggregates at the highest level of abstraction, as
there are global rules and global dynamics (i.e. a top-down approach) [Meadows
et al., 1974, Rowell and Wormley, 1996]. Flows of information, between entities
in the system, are controlled by a set of equations that can lead to positive (i.e.
reinforcing) or negative (i.e. balancing) loops. These concepts have been adapted
from theories of physical systems, regarding their control and dynamics, so that
could be applied to management. A system dynamics simulation is concerned
with the interconnection of the model components that work and aﬀect each
other. That is as one can explore linear and non-linear dynamics at the aggreg-
ate level, aiming at exploring the whole system and predicting eﬀects within it.
For this reason there is no communication between components, but data points
that aggregate at diﬀerent rates. That is thus a reductionist approach that is
fully dependent on how the model components are mechanically interconnected.
• Agent-Based: can deal with all levels of abstraction simultaneously, as it consists
of active individual entities with local rules and local dynamics (i.e. a bottom-up
approach), which generate macro outcomes (i.e. based on their aggregate) [Gil-
bert, 2007]. An ABM then is a formal representation of a real phenomenon, in
the form of a computer program, with the goal of: a) describing the target system
more precisely than with non-discursive languages and b) allowing experimenta-
tion with the simulation model [Moss and Edmonds, 2005]. The ABM approach
allows to tackle the complex interplay of multiple social processes through the
analysis of results obtained from the interaction of heterogeneous entities. This
enables researchers to explore trajectories both at the macro (i.e. system-wide)
and micro (i.e. individual entity) levels. Such departure from the more tradi-
tional mathematical simulation approach, such as system dynamics and dynamic
systems, is signiﬁcant. A further key advantage and diﬀerence regarding ABMs,
is the ability to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative evidence in the
model [Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005, Epstein, 2006]. These capabilities are the es-
sential rationale for having chosen this approach to further understand the social
phenomenon of interest in this research project.
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3.2 Agent-Based Simulation as a Scientiﬁc Model
Due to the ﬂexibility of ABM discussed in the previous section, one can conclude
that such approach is appropriate to deal with middle range theories. I.e. those with
a context-speciﬁc limited set of assumptions from which hypotheses are drawn from
[Wallace and Wolf, 2005, Merton, 1967]. That is not the case for functionalist, grand
theories that are all-encompassing and wide-ranging. It is also not the case with empir-
icist approaches derived from logical positivism, which emphasise data analysis without
theoretical constructs [Burns, 2009, Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991]. To better under-
stand this diﬀerence, a clear deﬁnition of the functionalism theory is given below:
“ The analysis of social and cultural phenomena in terms of the functions they perform
in a sociocultural system. In functionalism, society is conceived of as a system of inter-
related parts in which no part can be understood in isolation from the whole. A change
in any part is seen as leading to a certain degree of imbalance, which in turn results
in changes in other parts of the system and to some extent to a reorganization of the
system as a whole. [...] functionalism was based on the model of the organic system
found in the biological sciences. ” [Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969]
This macro-sociological approach is characterised then by the overall concern about un-
derstanding the structure, nature and balance of the interdependence between organisa-
tions. The numerous diﬃculties of proposing and accurately testing socio-behavioural
hypotheses, regardless of whether these are based on grand or middle-range theories,
can be ameliorated by the requirements imposed by the development of evidence-driven
ABM simulations. That is because such simulation models require a greater precision
(i.e. clarity and non-ambiguity) to computationally represent the assumptions and pro-
cess that have been empirically-grounded. This process can thus contribute to clarify
observations guided by the principle of middle-range theories that have been empirically
grounded [Gilbert, 2008, Kuorikoski, 2010, Squazzoni, 2012].
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Various approaches to model and simulate social phenomenon are becoming increas-
ingly popular as research approaches, especially in academia, but also –to a lesser
extent– in industrial and commercial environments. In this sense, particular atten-
tion has been given to computer science agent technologies for building ABM [Luck
et al., 2005]. Besides criticism to over-simpliﬁcations found in models strictly based
only on keep-it-simple principles, many are still developed without guidance provided
by experimental or empirical evidence [Axelrod, 2005, Edmonds and Moss, 2005]. For
an ABM modeller of a social phenomenon, it is essential to consider that social beha-
viour is subject to inﬂuences that are only well understood with detailed knowledge
about the phenomenon in question. This is usually attainable with non-experimental
data, yet there is a growing number of cases where experimental data is also at hand.
Many abstract models use plainly unrealistic assumptions to represent structure and
processes of social behaviour, a fact that further complicates cross-validating models
at macro and micro levels [Moss and Edmonds, 2005, Gilbert, 2007, Moss, 2008]. Such
practice is particularly evident when modellers use personal estimations to justify ar-
bitrary implementation decisions and conﬁgurations. These diﬃculties arise due to the
unavailability of datasets about social phenomena. Hence datasets often are:
• (a) non-existent, thus requiring funding to collect and process information;
• or (b) unavailable due to privacy agreements, such as in non-disclosure clauses;
• or (c) if at hand, the description of processes or subjects is incomplete or outdated.
Research in this area must overcome sizeable barriers in devising methods and resources
to systematically collect data for improving representations of social behaviour, which
also guide the modelling of ABM aimed at stakeholders and policy-makers. Another
signiﬁcant issue is the general neglect in the research community regarding security
of potentially sensitive data. This includes non-standard procedures employed in data
collection, analysis, storage and the responsibility modellers may need to emphasise
the present-day relative incipience of validation methods for assessing their own results
obtained in social simulations [Moss and Edmonds, 2005, Gilbert, 2007, Moss, 2008].
54
Agent-Based Simulation as a Scientiﬁc Model 55
There are no established standards on what is acceptable quality in terms of using
behavioural data for informing social simulation research. Coding of non-anonymised
qualitative data and attributes, collected in questionnaires, oral interviews, mailing
lists, online forums or social networking databases is to some extent arbitrary –as this
often completely relies on the coder. At best institutional recommendations are in
place, but these usually do not address data provided to and derived from ABMs.
The theoretical potential of social simulation models seems, at least to some degree,
overshadowed by their foreseeable disadvantages [Boero and Squazzoni, 2005, Bankes,
2002, Lucas, 2011, Edmonds et al., 2013]. This is crucial, as there have been various
suggestions that ABM could support, or even guide, decisions and policy-making. This
might be possible with aid of a full-time, in-house and experienced modeller working in
close liaison with stakeholders and policy-makers. Yet this is unlikely to be successful if
inexperienced users are expected to cope by themselves with the common limitations of
running such simulations and interpreting its results. The aforementioned diﬃculties,
along with the multi-disciplinary historical factors that have been continuously shaping
the inter-disciplinary ﬁeld of social simulation, have contributed to a status quo that:
• (i) is lacking an eﬀective de facto development-cycle methodology, focused on
producing results that somehow are potentially useful beyond academic theories,
• (ii) has piled criticism on the numerous social simulation models, including
ABMs, that bear little relation to the actual social phenomenon in question.
It has not yet been possible to produce, through ABMs, useful predictions of the con-
sequences of simulating speciﬁc policy options. Moreover, non-academics understand
the commercial and educational contributions from Artiﬁcial Life software (henceforth
ALife) and other game-like simulation models. Yet there is a much greater diﬃculty in
realising what are the non-theoretical contributions that one can obtain from an ABM.
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Implementations that successfully fulﬁl commercial or educational purposes abound,
but none of these are really intended to contribute with results of wider stakeholder
or policy-maker interest. Notable examples include: various online role-playing com-
munities such as Maple Story [Pearce, 2009], ALife educational models like Noble Ape
using neural networks (discussed in [Lucas, 2007], Chapter 4: “Emotion and Social
Interaction”), artiﬁcial evolutionary biology in Tierra [Swan, 2009], games similar to
The Sims [Martey and Stromer-Galley, 2007] and virtual environments such as Second
Life [Ritzema and Harris, 2008]. Although agent-based research has been gradually
consolidated as an alternative to traditional social and economic science methods, to
date, no example of an ABM could be found that has provided direct contributions to
policy-makers or stakeholders [Edmonds et al., 2013].
This lack of policy relevance is perhaps the most important open problem aﬀecting
the credibility of social simulation research in other domains. Non-academics tend
to appreciate the direct potential of ABM, as a third way of doing science [Axelrod,
2005]. Yet these same people can point out that an ABM may not directly improve
their understanding of actual, non-virtual social phenomena beyond illustrating theor-
etical hypotheses that require further evidence for actual validation. Simulation models
oriented towards entertainment or exploration purposes are most likely the only –if
any– software similar to ABM that non-experts have used. Further to this, it is also
commonly known that simpler, theory-driven models tend to be made fully and freely
available by authors than richer, more complex ABM. Despite noteworthy progress
in the development of evidence-driven2 and participatory social simulation modelling
methodologies3, impact on the wider non-academic community is negligible. In this
sense, it is important to notice the subtle, yet fundamental, distinctions between ABM
simulations built with methodologies that are driven mostly by evidence (qualitative
and/or quantitative) and those ABM development approaches that are driven mainly
by theory.
2 I.e. qualitative and/or quantitative data-driven ABM development, such as the proposal
discussed in Section 4.3: Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM) (page 86).
3 I.e., involving stakeholders throughout modelling, implementation and validation processes.
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The aforementioned approach tends to guide the modelling process through direct ob-
servation and data analysis (experimental or not). Thus the ﬁne-grained decisions on
how to computationally represent detailed aspects of a social phenomenon depend on
the quality and reliability of the available evidence. An advantage of this approach is
that modellers can discuss and evaluate their decisions more directly with the stake-
holders. Conversely the latter aforementioned approach would mainly involve building
representations using existent academic theories, which are often not fully grounded on
data and require a signiﬁcant amount of adaptations to allow implementation using a
computer language.
When access to stakeholders is unavailable, it is no longer possible for the modeller to
justify assumptions for building an ABM as having been validated by stakeholders. In
other words, the modeller would need to decide –based on his/her own understanding–
which of the conﬂicting-yet-feasible interpretations of the qualitative data would best
represent the social phenomenon, or social process, in question. Ultimately it is the
technical limitations of the chosen platform for implementation that will inﬂuence what
and how the simulated social structures are computationally represented and processed.
To some extent then, both evidence- and theory-driven4 ABM representations are sub-
ject to the simpliﬁcations demanded by the technical limitations of whichever software
framework the modeller has chosen to work with. Another consequence is that simu-
lation results can diﬀer substantially depending on the precision of replication eﬀorts
[Lucas and Payne, 2014] and whether guidance has been derived mainly from evidence5
(quantitative and/or qualitative) or theory [Gilbert and Conte, 1995, Moss, 2008]. On
the other hand, evidence-driven approaches tend to direct ABM modellers towards us-
ing a more up-to-date and a multi-dimensional understanding of the social phenomenon.
That is because the stakeholders participating in the modelling process can be directly
accessed to strengthen the validation of qualitative data interpretations, which are
needed to build and understand an ABM that is being grounded on evidence.
4 Please refer to Section 3.2.1: Diﬀerent Approaches to Build an ABM Simulation (page 58).
5 I.e. experimental or non-experimental data about the phenomenon of interest.
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3.2.1 Diﬀerent Approaches to Build an ABM Simulation
Given the ﬂexibility of the ABM research framework and implementation tools, it
is possible for researchers to accommodate radically diﬀerent development approaches
and methodologies in the process of building a simulation model. As a consequence of
this, one can ﬁnd various examples of models developed either by being mainly theory-
or evidence-driven (qualitative and/or quantitative). ABM can thus be interpreted as
belonging either to one or another approach. The earliest approaches to ABM were
undeniably theory-driven, as that is how the research area begun: providing a com-
putational alternative for experimenting with sociological theories or hypotheses that
could not be experimented with in actual settings. This is illustrated by [Alam, 2008]:
“ A major reason behind the scant presence of available evidence-driven agent based
models is that such models require the modellers to engage deeply with the evidence.
The model’s assumptions and the results must be taken back to the experts and also
stakeholders iteratively during the whole modelling process. Understandably, modellers’
access to the evidence is constrained by limited availability of resources in developing
descriptive bottom-up models. This is in stark contrast to ad hoc or prior theoretical
models based on the modeller’s speculations about social reality. ’’
Hence in an attempt to improve the status quo, researchers in the ABM community seem
to be increasingly motivated towards developing simulation models that are grounded
on existing empirical or experimental evidence, rather than just theory. Due to the
nature of socio-economic phenomena, ABM modellers certainly have to confront the
inherent subjectiveness that accompanies the task of representing –unambiguously, as
it has to be implemented computationally– the relevant social structure and process.
To code these, one will have to use a non-discursive and precise notation, that is: a
programming language.
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There is no de facto standard to evaluate and validate an ABM, despite proposals put
forward to document agent-based models in [Grimm et al., 2010] and [Polhill, 2010].
Provided there are enough resources and time, modellers can experiment with diﬀerent
implementation methods in search of the most successful approach to develop an ABM.
As this would be very time-consuming, it is likely that only one methodology, algorithm
and modelling language will be fully implemented. And that is probably the one which
the researcher has most experience with. Generally, a diﬀerent coding approach is
tested only when the ABM is being replicated. This is important in the modelling
lifecycle of an ABM as such challenges recur within the processes of data collection,
analysis, interpretation and implementation of qualitative information [Given, 2008].
This is also crucial in ABM because observable social behaviour, i.e. that with potential
to be modelled, may not be strictly conditioned by the observable circumstances.
The relevance of representing accurately, say the geographical features, in an ABM
depends directly on what one aims to simulate. For instance, Land Use, Land Cover-
Change and transportation models6 aiming at informing policy-makers require superior
accuracy and credible geographical representations, along with an appropriate corres-
ponding behaviour than more abstract simulation models. These types of models tend
to render themselves inadequate for policy-making purposes. A good way to highlight
what is important to model as an agent-based simulation is to analyse quantitative and
qualitative data about the speciﬁc phenomenon of interest.
[Shapiro, 2007] discusses the importance of using a similar result-driven approach (in
this case, problem-solving) to guide one whilst deciding what is the most appropri-
ate sociological method to employ. Therefore, in this sense, both quantitative and
qualitative data are absolutely necessary bearings for agent-based modellers to further
understand the phenomenon in question.
6 See discussion in Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM”
(page 65) and Section 5.4.2: “Modelling Guidance and Impact on Policy-Making” (page 163).
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The importance of pursuing development of new knowledge about the actual social
phenomenon, and not only about the social simulation model itself, is what warrants
the proposal of a development lifecycle that is thoroughly evidence-driven (i.e. involving
qualitative and/or quantitative data). Such approach to develop an ABM shall be one
of that requires: the selection of assumptions, justiﬁcation of implementation decisions
and then validation of results to be mainly backed by the existing data, which has been
sourced from the social phenomenon participants and not just theoretical conjectures.
In this regard, it is important to consider the roles of how inputs of diﬀerent types
and qualities of data can inﬂuence the modelling process and results obtained in social
simulations. This is crucially relevant for agent-based modellers, as the prevalence of
implementation platforms based on object-orientation has clearly facilitated the incor-
poration of heterogeneity into agents. Both in terms of behaviour and the integration
of diﬀerent types of data structures into the simulation model. This means that the
agents can be autonomous entities, which may be individually diﬀerent from each other,
both from their behaviour and data input perspective. This adaptability of ABMs is a
considerable advantage as it allows the interaction between diﬀerent, coexisting agents
within one model and the integration with other models if deemed necessary. Due
to the steep increase in complexity involved in analysing nested models7, modellers
interested in informing policy-making with simulation results tend to refrain from this.
Fully theory-driven approaches for building ABM present a tendency to detach the
modelling process from data, if at all analysed by the modeller, about the actual so-
cial phenomenon. This is because it is often diﬃcult to collect –or access– up-to-date
quantitative and/or qualitative datasets about non-virtual and virtual social phenom-
ena. Complete –or good enough– behavioural data may sometimes be unattainable. Yet
if at hand one reckons that analysing such information would account for a description
of the dynamics registered in past events.
7 Discussion in Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 90).
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For that reason, ABM modellers always require a balance between how much theory
and how much available evidence shall drive the development of a simulation model.
In this spectrum there are development methodologies which gravitate towards being
exclusively theoretical (such as some used for particular computational economic mod-
els [Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006]) and others, rather at the other extreme, which require
extensive stakeholder participation (such as those ABM developed using the companion
modelling approach) [Bousquet et al., 1999]. In this regard then it is worth mention-
ing that my experience in building ABM has suggested a productive emphasis onto
the collection and analysis of evidence (quantitative and/or qualitative), over purely
theory-driven approaches. In this way, there is a facilitation of how developers can
validate the modelling process itself, as discussed in detail by [Moss, 2008].
3.2.2 Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM
It is paramount to understand the usefulness and implications of research intending
to use ABM models beyond theoretical, hobbyist or educational purposes. For that,
it is necessary to confront unresolved issues surrounding the design, development and
testing of such simulations. E.g. it is key to understand the recurring issues that
both theory- and evidence-driven –qualitative and quantitative– modellers face whilst
collecting, analysing and translating data into social simulations. Thus this section
contains a discussion on the ongoing momentum in the ABM research domain to im-
prove some of the longest-standing methodological issues regarding the development of
social simulation that ought to be useful beyond theory. Some recommendations are
put forward in Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page
86) following the evidence gathered for this research thesis: from literature, surveys
and interviews.
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As a preliminary gathering of data, 12 leading academic researchers –each of them
having managed at least one mid to long-term (three to ﬁve years) social simulation
projects in Europe and the United States– have been interviewed 8 regarding how their
endeavours were modelled, applied and whether these have been useful beyond theory.
The administered questionnaire consisted of eliciting their views with these questions:
• (I) How were ﬁeldwork ﬁndings used to guide the simulation development?,
• (II) What were the contributions of simulation results to stakeholders?,
• (III) Were simulation results regarded by them as useful as ﬁeldwork ﬁndings?,
• (IV) What could have improved the chances of providing these via simulations?.
Three businesses oﬀering ABM which take into account social behaviour were also ap-
proached, but all organisations refused to participate due to non-disclosure agreements.
All surveyed researchers mentioned that ABM targeted the scientiﬁc community and
could, at best, provide plausible results regarding scenarios that, albeit coherently built,
no simulation result could be regarded as directly useful for policy-making purposes. All
(12) cited that gathering detailed data about the actual phenomenon by interviewing
stakeholders and reviewing existent literature helped them to properly understand their
context and served as a good guide during the modelling process. More than half (7)
mentioned that stakeholders and policy-makers were not interested in the ABM per
se, and only that real success cases (even those with only anecdotal evidence) are
what they would take into account. A few (3) mentioned that ABM, despite being
pragmatically unusable by end users, attracted great interest from stakeholders and
policy-makers, but regarded the modelling process itself as time-consuming –and at
times unproductive.
8 Data was compiled until July 2009, on time for discussions at the 6th European Social
Simulation Association Conference in September, then updated for the AI & Society Journal.
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The aforementioned ﬁndings contrast with the generally positive experience with ﬁeld-
work. Despite demanding much time, the majority (10) conﬁrmed that it was useful
to acquire knowledge regarded as relevant to the practitioners9. Directly engaging
with stakeholders and policy-makers was interpreted by all (12) as indispensable to
improving their understanding of the actual social phenomenon. Yet maintaining an
eﬃcient interaction and management of the practitioners’ interest over months of work
engagement was equally deemed strenuous and diﬃcult10. Some (4) of the surveyed
subjects cited that ABM perhaps could be integrated in tools for mediating group
decision-making. Being conﬁdent about model results was another aspect raised by
all (12) interviewees, along with diﬃculties of coding and interpreting qualitative data
appropriately11. Being able to communicate the model itself, and its results, in an easy
and intelligible way to a non-technical audience has also been mentioned as a challenge
by all interviewees. Some (6) of the surveyed subjects mentioned that their focus was
to theoretically model a social phenomenon in a plausible manner, without intention
to inﬂuence it.
After submitting the preliminary version of [Lucas, 2011] on January 5th 2009, an email
by Scott Moss was sent on April 28th to the mailing list for computer simulation in the
social sciences (henceforth SIMSOC) entitled “any correct policy impact forecasts?”.
As it can be seen in the mailing list Web archives12, until 30th June 2009 there were
more replies from authors, based in more countries, than my survey presented in this
section. Even with worldwide replies, no single example of a ABM that has been useful
prior to policy implementation could be found. Though insightful discussions followed
in SIMSOC, including the threads: “Merging at the edges”, “what is the point?” [of
modelling] and a follow-up, “The point and the process” and “Purpose of Modelling”.
9 The remaining two did not administer any ﬁeldwork or other similar in situ studies.
10This ﬁnding is supported by other, larger research projects regarding the collaboration
between policy-makers and researchers such as [Segone, 2008, Young and Mendizabal, 2009].
11 See [Mauthner et al., 2002, Given, 2008] for some descriptive examples of these issues.
12 Archives are available online at this address: www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/simsoc.html .
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Note that this is not necessarily tied with the idea of usefulness limited to numerical
forecast or prediction, as the challenge remains open: to provide useful results beyond
theory about the actual social phenomenon –and not simulation models themselves–
directly by interpreting the ABM results.
As stated in my SIMSOC reply on 11th June 2009, all academic discussions I have
engaged since May 2008 with researchers on issues surrounding the usefulness of ABM
yielded similar conclusions in terms of what has been done so far beyond theory with
this type of simulation model. This issue does not only depend on validation, as the
actual focus is to strive for further understanding on how and when ABM may be
pragmatically useful. I have also emphasised in my post the value of further exploring
issues, which are recurrent in diﬀerent domains, on how real policies are discussed,
implemented and evaluated13.
Policy-makers would wish a way to reliably predict and forecast as their most desirable
outcome of a simulation model. That is evident, as it would be their ultimate tool:
to allow the reliable testing of hypothetical scenarios. However such ideal is rather
implausible with the current ABM state-of-the-art, and depending on the nature of
the social phenomenon this goal may remain wholly unachievable –regardless of the
deployed simulation approach.
It is diﬃcult to understand how exactly a social phenomenon can inﬂuence the political
process of policy-making. There is a great variety of inﬂuences and agents, so unless
social circumstances are very similar, analyses of how past case studies have developed
is likely to be ineﬀectual in assessing new scenarios [Taleb, 2007].
13 For other examples, please refer to the Overseas Development Institute program entitled
Research and Policy in Development at www.odi.org.uk/programmes/rapid and International
Development Research Centre (IDRC) online publication: Knowledge to Policy [Carden, 2009].
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These peculiarities hinder accuracy and plausibility of simulation models, as previously
relevant knowledge backing the implemented assumptions, may simply no longer reﬂect
reality. Simulation models that depend heavily on physical aspects, such as Land Use,
Land Cover-Change and transportation are currently the best contenders to provide
useful results beyond theory. This is because, in these cases, the repertoire and scale
of possible social behaviour is heavily constrained, particularly in terms of the circum-
stances regarding their occurrence and possible development. These features force a
strict framing of the social phenomenon during the modelling process, and this rein-
forces the requirement for accurate –or at least highly realistic– representations of what
can happen in these simulation models.
However if geographical or physical aspects are largely irrelevant to the social dy-
namics in question, modellers must consider a much broader set of plausible cognitive
aspects when modelling individual behaviour. This happens as the total scope of ten-
able behaviour-to-be-modelled can expand dramatically. In such cases, the nature and
constraint of plausible behaviour may be little understood and thus rather diﬃcult to
model plausibly. That is when access to empirical or experimental data can be very
helpful to guide the development of an ABM.
Despite general stakeholder interest in ABM, those with inﬂuence over the phenomenon
in question tend to be cautious in using results obtained from such models. As dis-
cussed later in Chapter 5: “Research Findings”14 (page 100), it is unclear what can be
done with data obtained from ABM that cannot be objectively compared with existing
evidence. For example, when a completely unprecedented scenario15, is suggested by a
simulation model. In these cases, setting apart what is really relevant to be modelled,
from what is not, may be indeed a catch-22 for modellers. Similar arguments in this
regard have been put forward elsewhere, such as by [Bankes, 2002] and [Gilbert, 2009].
14 Also highlighted on the poster in Appendix V: Usage of Agent-Based Models (page 204).
15 That is, lacking data that is at least qualitatively similar to any comparable case study.
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If compared to simulation models, commissioned ﬁeldwork has greater chances of being
useful in a timely fashion, as it is feasible to provide more up-to-date reports about
speciﬁc aspects of the actual socio-economic phenomenon. Experience, including the
survey previously discussed, backs up the fact that insights obtained in ﬁeldwork ana-
lysis are often clearer to understand and act upon than simulation results. In this
thesis, issues raised via ﬁeldwork were directly related to events that were still occur-
ring in the MFI. Hence stakeholders and policy-makers could quickly recognise the value
and implications of that new knowledge. Simulation models tend to operate on much
longer, or hypothetical, time scales and this invariably creates diﬃculties to interpret
potential inaccuracies. This is perhaps the strongest pressure for methodologies that
systematically embed validation steps throughout the development process of an ABM.
Furthermore, with the exception of participatory and immersive-augmentative sim-
ulations, evidence-driven (i.e. qualitative and/or quantitative data) modellers work
with sensitive data about the subjects of a social phenomenon. Not much guidance
is available about this, as only one code of ethics speciﬁcally targets research using
simulation models –such as ABM [Ören et al., 2002]. In it, items 2.6 to 2.8 address the
professional issues arising from the rationale that modellers are responsible for clearly
presenting the applicability of their simulation and interpret the results in light of
veriﬁable evidence [Ören, 2002].
To date none of the following research associations had a single institutional docu-
ment online regarding research ethics. This includes the: European Social Simulation
Association, North American Association for Computational Social and Organization
Sciences and Paciﬁc Asian Association for Agent-based Approach in Social Sciences.
The Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation , since its ﬁrst volume in Janu-
ary 1998, has only one paper –which is [Conte and Paolucci, 2004]– that tangentially
relate ethics, responsibility and accountability, but of agents and not modellers.
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3.3 Modelling the Behaviour of Micro-ﬁnance
Clients
Whilst there are diﬀerent approaches to modelling the behaviour of microﬁnance clients,
most are econometric or game-theoretical and are not focused on interaction aspects
of social collateral in microﬁnance [Rodriguez Meza, 2000, Vogelgesang, 2007, Karlan,
2007]. Even more limited are the few existent agent-based approaches to microﬁnance.
Despite the growing interest in the industry to better understand social aspects of
microﬁnance [Sinha, 2006, CGAP and EU/ACP, 2008], these have either been imple-
mented as a proof-of-concept16 or are focused on ﬁnancial aspects of the industry. The
discussion that follows in this section concerns examples of existing approaches, both
ABM and non-ABM, aimed at modelling and simulating aspects of microﬁnance.
Neoclassical econometric approaches typically propose linear models that are tested
using variations of the Ordinary Least Squares (henceforth OLS) regression, which
includes a strong assumption that regressors are fully exogenous and contain no mul-
ticolinearity17 [Greene, 2011]. One example of this is given by [Gomez and Santor,
2001], based on the hypothesis that social capital18 is a determinant of the success of
individuals funded through the Calmeadow Metrofund, the biggest SE operating as a
MFI in Canada. In this example, cross-sectional survey data is analysed along with
the MFI administrative ﬁles – and ﬁndings include: (a) that individuals with little
or no ﬁnancial collateral can beneﬁt from increased levels of social capital, and (b) a
theoretical basis that certain environments where microﬁnance clients are based can
lend itself better than others depending on their type of business. The combination of
socio-economic data to account for social and ﬁnancial measures, along with controls
for neighbourhood and individual properties, is the popular OLS method for linear
estimation to statistically model and describe microﬁnance [Ledgerwood et al., 2013].
16 Online examples include a 2005 NetLogo’s library entry “Economic Exchange”, and a sub-
sequent extension of that version in “Microcredit in Bangladesh” term-time academic project.
17 I.e. two or more predictors being correlated, so that one is linearly predicted from others.
18 In the sense of a network of relationships and neighbours to facilitate individual action.
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Another rather diﬀerent, yet nevertheless popular, approach to model microﬁnance
is to apply game-theoretical concepts. [Rajeev et al., 2006] for example proposes to
model the decision-making of individual borrowers as to either one should become an
entrepreneur in a relatively risky project or in a relatively safe project. In this type of
approach, individual trade-oﬀs are analysed in terms of characterising degrees of proﬁt
probabilities attached to each decision option. In this case, it is assumed that clients
will only be able to repay credit when their individual projects are successful. This is
based on the assumption that traditional credit funding frameworks should encourage
the uptake of the safest, best-suited service to each client. This, in microﬁnance, would
oﬀset the fact that MFI schemes work with measures of joint liability within groups
to help them to indicate when riskier projects may be a good idea to fund due to the
collective nature of credit repayment. This is a common feature amongst MFIs.
[Gine et al., 2010] provides a similar discussion in this regard, but with a model that is
focused on just one representative borrower and lender. I.e. the supply-chain market is
assumed to converge towards an equilibrium. In game-theoretical models, such as the
one discussed in the previous reference, one can calculate all the possible solutions, so
that one can aim at predicting how an iterated version of the design can be analysed.
This was useful to provide insights into investment decisions over time as a payoﬀ mat-
rix that describes every feasible result in light of every client’s possible joint liabilities.
According to the ﬁrst aforementioned reference in this page, the designed game has
been played 27 times by hundreds of actual MFI clients during seven months in Peru.
Results have been used to draw hypotheses and questions about loan features, such
as that group lending can induce moral hazard19 instead of reducing it. That is, in
absence of institutional (i.e. top down) incentives for one to guard against collective
risks20, certain institutional policies can in fact hinder –if not altogether preclude– the
positive (bottom-up) eﬀect of assortative matching21.
19 In this case, this relates to one person’s inability to evaluate the consequences of whether
another peer in the group can indeed keep up with his/her credit entrustments over time.
20 E.g. when a MFI framework does not allow participants to form groups by themselves.
21 This is also discussed in 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients (page 130).
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Another research project has investigated experimentally whether the existence and
strength of family ties yield diﬀerences in repayment performance [Carillo, 2010]. This
took place with microcredit groups in the Mexican state of Oaxaca and consisted of
23 sessions, during three weeks between September and October 2009. Diﬀerent game
conﬁgurations collected data from 143 participants who were all clients of a local MFI.
Each person was given a loan and needed to decide on investing either in a risky or safe
project. Two versions of the game were played: with and without family members in
microcredit groups. This concluded that individual behaviour in groups composed by
family members demonstrated safer behaviour (i.e. better repayment rate) than those
groups without family members. Another reference, [Abbink et al., 2006] provides a
similar game-theoretical discussion in this regard, yet with focus on how proﬁt can be
maximised.
A diﬀerent study, involving 140 groups from Burkina Faso suggests that greater homo-
geneity amongst members in terms of ethnicity, occupation and income reduce ﬁnancial
performance [Paxton and Thraen, 2003]. Yet another analysis, of 102 groups from Er-
itrea suggests that monitoring and social ties of group leaders can reduce moral hazard
between lenders and borrowers (i.e. the group repayment performance depend on the
group leader) [Hermes et al., 2005]. Another analysis, of 128 microﬁnance groups in
Bangladesh [Sharma and Zeller, 1997] and 262 in Thailand [Ahlin and Townsend, 2007],
suggests that issues related to repayments tended to increase according to the number
of relatives in the respective groups.
Another type of modelling is best exempliﬁed by Microﬁn, which is a project funded by
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor22 (CGAP) since 1997. This is a essentially
a Microsoft Excel template that has been developed to facilitate the management of a
MFI, including tasks of business planning and ﬁnancial modelling [Lunde et al., 2006].
22 A microﬁnance international consortium of public and private development organisations.
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The latter feature results in a ﬁve-year ﬁnancial projection, showing trend analyses
based on actual datasets to aid ﬁnancial decision-making. Examples include: the design
of ﬁnancial strategies that take into account services to customers, analysis of institu-
tional capacity given the current available resources, monitoring of activity levels in
marketing and projected ﬁnancial statements. One acclaimed feature, both for training
and management (operational plus ﬁnancial) purposes, is that it allows the following:
“ [...] the user to test out the ﬁnancial consequences of implementing diﬀerent manage-
ment decisions, such as increasing loan sizes vs. increasing the number of borrowers,
or raising interest rates vs. cutting operational costs [...]”
[Waterﬁeld and Sheldon, 2004].
Despite its considerable success in the microﬁnance industry, one big disadvantage of
Microﬁn is that is is dependant on proprietary software. The continuous cost of main-
taining the Microsoft Oﬃce software license agreement is not negligible to many MFIs.
Moreover every oﬃcially supported operating system for this package is also propriet-
ary, which means further indirect costs to use the Microﬁn template reliably. That is
due to the Visual Basic For Applications23 requirement to run Microﬁn macros that
implement various of its functions, such as calculation of the transaction costs. Never-
theless Microﬁn is to date still one the most popular software used by MFIs worldwide,
as it serves them trust-worthily both for ﬁnancial management and extrapolations.
The need for more ﬂexible and cost-eﬀective systems has given rise to a number of
alternatives. Perhaps the most prominent example is the 2006 Grameen Founda-
tion’s Technology Center initiative to develop the multi-platform Micro Finance Open
Source24 Software (henceforth MIFOS) framework, which allows modular addition of
functions25. Both Microﬁn and MIFOS allow simple ﬁnancial simulations based on
statistical extrapolations.
23 An event-driven programming language designed to automate internal program processes.
24 I.e. the source-code is oﬃcially copyrighted but still made freely accessible to any user.
25 E.g. such as ﬁnancial forecast, banking protocols or PPI plug-ins [Campion et al., 2008].
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Another type of MFI-related simulation is embodied by Symbanc26, which is a soft-
ware ﬁrst developed in 2004 using system dynamics with the Vensim platform [Hirsch
et al., 2005]. This modelling approach is focused on analysing the complex interac-
tions between the proposed internal timings and feedback loops, between key variables,
which are intended to either reinforce or reduce the intensity of causal links between
the Symbanc modules. These are broadly depicted in Figure 3.8 below. To use it, the
user has to conﬁgure various ﬁnancial parameters (such as target market and nature
of products) and then the simulation model can be executed to generate a ﬁnancial
trajectory of the MFI. In other words, it allows the testing of ﬁnancial limits according
to a set of initial conditions in a system dynamics model.
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MFI Strategy'
Branch Network
and Staff
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Net Income'
Interest and Fee
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Loan Losses'
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MFI Equity'
Figure 3.8: Symbanc feedback loops, source: [Hirsch et al., 2005]
The total number of borrowers (left hub) depend on: the strategy set for deﬁning a
target market, area demographics, conditions of oﬀered loan services, extent of the
MFI branch network and a staﬀ-experience ratio. The loan portfolio (middle top hub)
growth depend on the left hub and the combination of internal (earnings and sav-
ings) plus external (public or private donors) funders. As one can observe, the most
connected nodes (i.e. those with both relatively many incoming and outgoing links)
form various inter-dependent loops that change values over time according to the other
modules.
26 Despite a free online version provided by Harvard University, the source-code is proprietary.
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The Symbanc model can simulate the ﬁnances of an institution up to eight years or
until the institution runs out of money [Hirsch et al., 2004]. Therefore the focus of
this simulation tool can be summarised as that of allowing a MFI to test their setup
regarding the multiple ﬁnancial trade-oﬀs for setting up and managing a MFI . In doing
so, the system dynamics model can illustrate some typical failure settings such as not
having enough capital to support continuous and fast growth in the number of clients.
Neoclassical and statistical quantitative approaches to decision-making are, by design,
normative27 and not empirically grounded in terms of testing models with domain-
speciﬁc datasets. These include the stochastic-dominance models, expected-value and
expected-utility models, some of which are discussed in this section. Such models are
based on the assumption that utilities can be calculated across the set of possible actions
an individual or organisation has and then the best alternative is chosen or suggested for
direct enactment. In this sense probit and logit analyses have two advantages over the
aforementioned models [Pedhazur, 1982]: (a) they are statistically testable using either
empirical or experimental datasets; and (b) the analysed trajectory choices of agents
are those of several, rather than one individual. The major disadvantage of the neoclas-
sical and statistical approaches is the rather unrealistic assumption of diﬀerent weights
being assigned to several variables. These are then tested in diﬀerent combinations to
determine which of several possible outcomes is –statistically– the best one. Although
this is good for optimisation purposes, it does not capture the decision-making process
itself. Thus these approaches may describe well the retrospective relationship between
variables and, ceteris paribus, may provide insights into predicting behaviour. Yet the
lack of heterogeneity considerably limits this type of modelling approach.
When one cannot rely on statistics about the phenomenon of interest, computational
and rule-based approaches to modelling decision-making can be used to build simulation
models that are based on less rigid assumptions than neoclassical and statistical models.
27 Linear-additive such as the regression approach, aiming to test relationships and contribu-
tions of independent variables to explain variations in a dependent variable [Pedhazur, 1982].
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The contrast with neoclassical econometric approaches is the grounding of a model
on qualitative insights collected from the stakeholders. This allows the creation of a
testable simulation model of decision-making based on data from individuals embedded
in the same context and activity. In contrast to the abundance of econometric and game-
theoretical models, there are few ABMs regarding behaviour of microﬁnance clients.
And none of these have been developed based on empirical or experimental evidence.
For example [Rashid et al., 2011] proposes a high-level abstraction for testing the ef-
fects of implementing a MFI policy. It includes processes for changing the income level
of clients and repayment ratio of microcredits over time. Agents have diﬀerent beha-
viours that are broadly grouped as either poor or non-poor. Their interaction is bound
according to a hypothetical grid, which inﬂuences behaviour such as: poor agents re-
ceiving credit from MFIs and economic activities of the non-poor from adjacent cells.
The model tracks global variables in a similar way as the discussed Symbanc example.
There is thus little contrast between these approaches28. Another preliminary ABM is
proposed, but it is not implemented, which is the modelling of multiple levels for the
regulation of the Mexican microﬁnance industry [Suarez et al., 2009]. This short paper
contains a philosophical discussion, taking the Compartamos MFI as a loose case study
to suggest that the structure formation within groups is driven by function-optimising
clients and that this in turn depend on their collective behaviour. One more prelimin-
ary ABM is proposed, but it is also not implemented: multiple agents should belong
to diﬀerent socio-economic groups [Hoekstra et al., 2007]29. Agents would then be
equipped with spending, social, strategic planning and learning behaviours that would
not be function-optimisations; but rather focused on allowing policy-makers to evaluate
their own decision-making based on a bottom-up understanding of how money ﬂows in
the system and what are its multiplier eﬀects across the participating entities. Another
very abstract (i.e. not based on data), but implemented, ABM use pre-deﬁned prob-
abilities to conﬁgure behaviours regarding switches of: project success, strategy change
(comparative or random), mutual repayment and group closure [Goldberg et al., 2004].
28 This is because various agent-based frameworks allow system dynamics implementations.
29 An initiative lead by the socio-economic development network Social Trade Organisation.
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Summary and Conclusions of Chapter 3:
Agent-Based Social Simulation
The chapter begun with a discussion on on the usefulness and types of scientiﬁc models,
which includes a wide range of diﬀerent approaches. This covered various approaches to
simulation, with particular emphasis on four main approaches: discrete events, dynamic
systems, system dynamics and agent-based models.
Next, a speciﬁc subsection on agent-based simulations discussed its role as a scientiﬁc
model, along with the diﬃculties of obtaining relevant qualitative and/or quantitative
datasets to guide the development of such a model. The diﬀerent approaches, and chal-
lenges, to building an agent-based model have also been discussed in detail. Then the
modelling of behaviour of microﬁnance clients has been discussed in terms of the follow-
ing diﬀerent approaches: neoclassical econometrics, game-theoretical setups, statistical
extrapolations, system dynamics and the incipient attempts using agent-based models.
MFIs rely on a constant ﬂow of information about their large number of small (of-
ten cash-based) transactions to eﬀectively manage their ﬁnancial operations. Success
in this niche depends heavily on having experience and knowledge of the local mar-
ket. This is not only a matter of quantitative information but also qualitative. This
ﬂexibility requirement makes the agent-based approach the most promising to take the
available evidence into account in a way that one can further explore and experiment
with. An agent-based model approach allows to tackle the complex interplay of mul-
tiple social processes through the analysis of results obtained from the interaction of
heterogeneous entities. This enables the exploration of trajectories both at the macro
(i.e. system-wide) and micro (i.e. individual entity) levels, which are based on the
computational representation of potentially both quantitative and qualitative insights.
74
75
Chapter 4
Research Design and Development
This chapter contains an introduction and complementary discussions –listed in the
TOC below– regarding the research design carried out to develop this thesis. These
discussions range from the decisions on the cross-sectional approach to data collection,
how each step relates to each other and the analysis of the compiled information from
the MFI clients and credit oﬃcers.
This chapter also contains a discussion about the proposed evidence-driven approach
for developing an ABM, a discussion with regards to the issues surrounding the integ-
ration of qualitative data in models and, ﬁnally, the structure of the developed ABM.
The chapter begins with an introduction of the MFI case study, then it moves onto
discussing what has been taken into account to develop the ABM simulation model.
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4.1 The MFI Context during Data Collection
The MFI has been operating in the Chiapas state, Mexico (see Figure 4.9), for nearly 15
years (having started in 1999) and is a non-proﬁt institution, which achieved ﬁnancial
sustainability after two years of having branched out of the Grameen Foundation using
guidelines from the CGAP [Biggar, 2009]. In addition to micro-credits, the MFI also
oﬀers life and material insurance in cooperation with Zurich Financial Services, micro-
savings plus educational and nutritional programs targeting mainly clients in rural
communities. Credit oﬃcers are trained by the MFI to facilitate, using Spanish or one
of the six languages of Mayan ancestry1, to apply a ﬁnancial approach to support the
MFI social mission of alleviating poverty. This happens mostly through reinvesting the
earnings obtained via the MFI periodic quota repayments and also the rather sporadic
community-based or philanthropic donations that is also channelled to provide credit.
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Figure 4.9: Chiapas, the southernmost state, adapted from [Cook, 2008]
1 The MFI works with clients in Spanish, Tsotsil, Tseltal, Chol, Tojolabal, Zoque, and Mam.
In this ﬁeldwork, the oﬃcers dealt with: 44% Spanish, 42% Chol, 8%, Tzotzil and 6% Tzeltal.
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The ﬁeldwork centred in understanding what are the conventional social behaviour
amongst members of micro-credit groups and whether it could inﬂuence their success.
As traditional collateral are not used to assess new or further credit applications, the
MFI employs a wide-range of socio-economic criteria to evaluate the collateral across
the applicants. Social collateral is assessed according to each individual circumstances
such as social aﬃliations and economic potential in relation to their local poverty line.
Certain criterion can be waived by MFI if a client performance is known beforehand
to the credit oﬃcer. As their actions are subject to economical constraints, both socio-
economic and behavioural data were collected and analysed. Interpreting potential
links between these was important to understand credit management at the group level
from a social perspective. The ﬁeldwork results served as a complementary source of
information to understand how credit clients and oﬃcers deal with the MFI rules. The
ﬁgure below illustrates where the 21 surveyed credit centres are geographically located
(i.e. where clients congregate) and thus where the ﬁeldwork data collection took place.
Figure 4.10: Raster KMLa plot of the 21 client locations surveyed during ﬁeldwork
a Google’s Keyhole Markup Language (KML) for geographical visualisation and annotation.
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4.2 Design of Data Collection and Analysis
To understand the roles of conventional social behaviour amongst microﬁnance clients,
with particular regards to the MFI rules, ﬁeldwork was carried out with the aim to
collect and analyse ﬁnancial and behavioural data on how participants of microcredit
groups deal with their debt. The timely management of quota repayment by a MFI
involves dealing with both individual and collective outstanding amounts. In case an
individual has defaulted, there is a practical need for the group to decide whether
another single individual or the group (wholly or part of it) shall take responsibility
to repay the outstanding amount to the MFI. Although institutional rules state that
the group is responsible for individual losses, yet in practice there are diﬀerent ways to
comply. By taking these dynamics into consideration, one way to probe the behaviour
of microﬁnance clients is to survey the practical experience of both clients and credit
oﬃcers. This is because the former enforces top-down rules set by the MFI whilst,
at the same time, the latter must self-organise coping strategies to ensure group-level
compliance with the top-down credit rules. These bottom-up conventions are the focus
of the ﬁeldwork data collection and analysis, which then –once thoroughly understood
and discussed with the available stakeholders– informed the development of the ABM2.
Initially two cross-sectional surveys were designed and administered at the MFI with
a time frame of four weeks, with a two month interval between them. One to credit
oﬃcers and another to credit clients. The ﬁrst administered survey was designed to to
elicit data about the experience of credit oﬀers with regards to their own administrative
tasks. The second administered survey was designed to elicit what were, at that time,
the social conventions and structural composition of groups with regards to their debt.
Once data from both surveys have been analysed, other two follow-up surveys, intended
to better understand previous responses, were designed and applied only to credit
oﬃcers (due to time and budget constraints). Once this process has been completed,
the group and individual ﬁnancial data has been analysed for that period.
2 See further discussion in Sections 4.3.2: “Implementing the EDTM into the ABM simula-
tion” (page 95) and 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132).
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An illustration of the order and relationship between surveys is provided below.
understanding of
MFI practices
group social 
conventions and 
composition
4 weeks
per survey
and 2 weeks
between surveys
issues affecting
credit repayment
social and
financial
sanctions
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
group and individual financial data
Sep. 2007 
to Feb 2008 5th
semi-structured
interviews with
randomly
selected
stakeholders
(credit officers
and clients)
Figure 4.11: Order of the complete data collection and analysis processes
The socio-economic analysis comprised of surveying 600 microﬁnance clients of mixed
Mayan ancestry, spread over the localities within approximately 180 km radius from
the MFI headquarters (as depicted in Figure 4.10: “Raster KML plot of the 21 client
locations surveyed during ﬁeldwork”, on page 77). The MFI groups ranged in size from
three to seven clients, and in total 261 groups were analysed together with respective
2444 micro-loans spanning across the data collection period of the designed ﬁeldwork.
Thus in total four surveys3 were administered at diﬀerent points in time and each col-
lected new information, making the design cross-sectional. Most of them (3) targeted
35 credit oﬃcers and have been ﬁlled in via Web browsers accessible to employees
at the MFI headquarters. LimeSurvey.org was used in a Debian.org server running
Apache.org with PHP.net and MySQL.org in Manchester, England. The survey ad-
ministered to the credit clients was ﬁlled in on paper, during one month as depicted
in the ﬁgure above.All data has been transcribed into a database to facilitate the an-
onymised analysis and the paper surveys remained in an academic storage located in
Chiapas, Mexico. Simple semi-structured interviews4 with randomly selected credit of-
ﬁcers, clients and MFI directors were also administered, between and after, September
2007 and February 2008. These consisted of randomly selecting a ﬁeldwork ﬁnding and
asking whether they would endorse it.
3 All questionnaires are in Section 7.1 (“Appendix I: Fieldwork Surveys”, page 176).
4 I.e. a ﬂexible model for carrying out interviews, allowing new questions to be brought up.
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As diﬀerent information was being collected at each step, this contrasts with those of
longitudinal research design. That is because, in this research project, the same type
of data is not being collected at diﬀerent periods of time. Instead a cross-sectional
approach was used, aiming at the collection of diﬀerent data at diﬀerent points in time.
Therefore the approach in this thesis does not lend itself to analyse trends or traject-
ories regarding the social conventions adopted by the credit clients, as a longitudinal
approach would. A longitudinal research design would have had an emphasis on con-
sistency of measurements over time, as it is intended to avoid changes in how a concept
is measured in practice. One would have been interested in telling apart changes that
are indeed genuine about the phenomenon, and not a byproduct of measuring diﬀerent
aspects at diﬀerent points in time. Thus the research design in this thesis contrasts
with the typical longitudinal designs described in [Menard, 2001, 2007] by not being a:
• Total population design. Despite the three surveys administered to every credit
oﬃcer, taking into consideration that some may have joined and others left from
one period to the other: each survey collected entirely diﬀerent types of data.
• Repeated cross-sectional design. This would have been an ideal approach to track
changes in values and relationships amongst variables, using the same survey ad-
ministered to the credit clients. Yet this was unfeasible due to cost and time.
• Panel design. Same subjects did not guide each data collection period; neither
credit clients nor oﬃcers. This could have had been the case if the research ap-
proached retrospective cases to be understood in terms of intra-individual changes
(e.g. behavioural or cognitive) which all the surveyed subjects participated.
The collected data does not diﬀerentiate which time-dependent processes inﬂuenced
each variable, thus precluding the account of diﬀerences between potential explanations
[Borgatta, 1991, Gilbert, 2008]. Moreover, it has only been possible to visit the MFI
once, due to time and budget constraints. The carried out iterative research design
allowed thus to elicit the relevant information that was unknown. And these ﬁndings
became straightforward useful insights to inspire a future, longitudinal research project.
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As depicted in Figure 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection and analysis pro-
cesses” (page 79), the ﬁrst survey contained 14 questions to credit oﬃcers; two weeks
later six questions followed-up in another survey and then ﬁnally –additionally two
weeks later– eight more in the ﬁnal survey. The survey administered to micro credit
clients consisted of ﬁve questions and was administered with the help of the MFI credit
oﬃcers. The criterion to select clients was discussed with the MFI director beforehand
and consisted of each credit oﬃcer choosing a maximum of three clients per day in a
diﬀerent credit centre that each of them had a scheduled visit. Further information
in this regard can be read with aid of Table 4.2: “How credit oﬃcers chose the 600
surveyed clients [Lucas et al., 2008]” (page 82).
Each questionnaire used to survey clients has been designed to elicit information that
would contribute to address the research problem and research questions introduced in
Chapter 1, Section 1.3 (page 16). Merged data from their ﬁve ﬁnancial databases, which
were distributed throughout the MFI operation centres, were also analysed. These
tracked group-level quota repayments, interest rates, gains and losses. Results elu-
cidated the client’s understanding of ethical and moral principles that contribute to
enforce success of their social collateral. Moreover, it has also been possible to uncover
some crucial aspects about repayment and defaulting, along with their understanding
of social collateral via trust relationships. These are discussed in the next chapter.
The criteria applied by credit oﬃcers to select clients is summarised below in Table
4.2. In this chapter, table with items written in italic font represent answers that have
not been considered similar by the thesis author, so these have not been aggregated
with other items. Gaining insights on both how MFI employees and clients tend to deal
with debts and defaulters is essential to analyse what is a social convention in terms
of acceptable behaviour within groups. This is particularly noticeable in this MFI case
study, as there are necessary interactions between group conventions and institutional
rules.
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In other words, these are the top-down rules that managed by the MFI and the bottom-
up conventions adopted at the group-level only. Thus apart from the institutional rules,
it has also been observed a set of group-level behaviours adopted by the microﬁnance
clients to assess and deal with defaulters in their groups. These operate independently
from the MFI framework as, despite inﬂuencing when and how quotas are repaid, the
group criteria is entirely dealt with and developed within groups.
Percentage Criterion regarding clients
25% best meeting punctuality
20% best credit vs. debt history
15% best repayment punctuality
10% each most responsible, best known
5% each most defaults covered, entrepreneurial, accessible
Table 4.2: How credit oﬃcers chose the 600 surveyed clients [Lucas et al., 2008]
Furthermore, the MFI kept ﬁve ﬁnancial databases and these have been analysed.
That included tracking of individual performances and socio-economics, with groups
classiﬁed either as being rural or urban. Records included information of the: individual
instalments, active businesses, scholarly levels, group credit, quota repayment statuses
and loan validity. Whilst the designed surveys focused on collecting data regarding the
social conventions for dealing with debt, ﬁnancial data was used to summarise the MFI
perspective as to how credit had been managed. Area-speciﬁc surveys on roads and
population were available as IRIS maps5 and KML. Whilst this data was not used in
this research, the MFI used this system to delineate the proﬁle of the surveyed clients.
There is a variety of research methods that one could deploy in the domain of mi-
croﬁnance, so it is worthwhile considering their overall diﬀerences. Some of these are
discussed next.
5 Geographical system created by the Mexican National Institute of Statistics & Geography.
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The ﬁgure below illustrates the spectrum of research approaches in this area, in terms
of how likely it would result in either contributing to strengthen an association6 or
potential causality. Therefore the further right in the ﬁgure, the higher the chances are
of one correctly claiming impact due to a designed intervention –and not by confounding
factors.
       ASSOCIATION
anecdotes, interviews, ethnography, cases
participatory research (focus groups / surveys)
Ethnographic Decision-Tree Modeling 
non-experimental, correlational research
      
 
Quasi-experimental research
    Agent-Based Simulation Models
          Non-randomised group trials
              Fully randomised group trials
              CAUSALITY
Figure 4.12: Towards association or causality, based on [Johnson, 2009, Gash, 2012] a
a Research based on mixed-methods cross this gap by using both qualitative and quantitative data
[Creswell and Clark, 2010, Geller et al., 2010, Ledgerwood et al., 2013, Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991].
Bearing in mind that most (quantitative) economic and (qualitative) social data is non-
experimental7, variables are not manipulated but measured directly from a population.
Association analyses made only with this type of data present confounding likelihood
and thus cannot be used to strengthen causation [Dunn, 2000, Keuzenkamp, 2006]. On
the other hand, non-experimental data is excellent to characterise the phenomenon of
interest and for this reason is a helpful source of information to design experiments.
A behavioural economic setup, for example, can be used to analyse results of quasi-
experiments8 carried out with real subjects, who themselves contain non-experimental
data [Guala and Salanti, 2001]. Another example of a quasi-experimental design is an
ABM, where endogenous variables of interest can be computationally tested without
exogenous interferences. This allows the design of experiments using a factorial design,
with simulations aimed at testing would-be scenarios conﬁgured with parameters where
the assignation of control and experimental groups would otherwise not be fully known.
6 I.e. a simple correlation of variables, which would have no bearing whatsoever on causation.
7 I.e. data originating from a process that the researcher cannot fully control or experiment.
8 I.e. a fully controlled environment where non-randomly selected subjects are grouped, with
at least one independent variable being manipulated and a dependent being variable measured.
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Randomised Control Trials (henceforth RCTs) have been widely regarded as the most
rigorous research method because they: (a) avoid selection biases by ensuring control
and treatment groups are essentially identical on average, (b) can test multiple inter-
ventions at once and (c) are more reliable, less costly in the long-term as it eﬀectively
provides a public good to other research projects9 [Segone, 2008, Karlan et al., 2009,
Johnson, 2009]. Yet various practical limitations, such as budget and time10, can im-
pose severe diﬃculties to carry out an RCT research design. When an RCT is either
unfeasible or inappropriate, it is worth considering the quasi-experiment as a good re-
search design alternative. That is because a quasi-experiment allows: (a) exploratory
research11, (b) hypothesis-testing12 and (c) provide similar results to RCTs13. On the
next page, Table 4.13 contains a “Summary of experimental methods used to study
microﬁnance, adapted from [Johnson, 2009]”.
Quasi-experimental research either compares before and after conditions within the
same group or a treatment and a control in diﬀerent groups. Both approaches can
be analysed using surveys or experimental data14. Simulation runs of an ABM can
thus serve for quasi-experimental testing as, like a RCT, one can set out to analyse the
eﬀect of diﬀerent factors by controlling what changes. In quasi-experiments one can
claim the elimination of exogenous interferences as the experimental conditions are fully
controlled, including the selection bias itself [Guala, 2005, Lehtinen and Kuorikoski,
2007, Mäki, 2005]. In other words, a quasi-experiment is an approximation to the true
RCT experiment given the practical conditions that one can actually experiment with.
Therefore, due to the ﬂexibility of quasi-experimental designs, one can explore and test
hypotheses with less resources and identify the most likely impact measures that could
then be proposed for a full RCT design, e.g. targeted at informing policy-making.
9 I.e. one can determine which impact or result is directly attributable to the intervention.
10 Sometimes also ethical, as a potential result of an experiment may not be acceptable.
11 Also referred to as formulative research, as it leads mainly to new insights and hypotheses.
12 With the caveat that this is done using simulation, not empirical or experimental, data.
13 I.e. an identical setup to quasi-experiments but where the participants of both treatment
and control have the same chance, in average, to be selected [Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991].
14 For instance, as a result of assigning diﬀerent loan contracts to the same MFI clientele or
the results of an experiment setup with a software for experimental economics such as zTree.
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Figure 4.13: Summary of experimental methods used to study microﬁnance, ad-
apted from [Johnson, 2009]
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4.3 Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)
An alternative way to explore the open issues regarding behaviour within microﬁnance
groups, as introduced in Section 2.2: “The Role of Microﬁnance in Public Goods”
(page 28), is to build an ABM. That is because the variations of individual social
preferences and group circumstances can be systematically tested without exogenous
interferences. For instance, one can test the provision of a public good, in the form of
a microﬁnance group, using conﬁgurations that may shed light onto the impact within
the group dynamics based on the interaction of diﬀerent individual behaviours.
An in-depth example of this approach, which uses experimental data for the input
of an ABM, is discussed in [Lucas et al., 2014]. The control variable in the aforemen-
tioned paper has its origins in public good experiments, which robustly demonstrated
that individuals can sacriﬁce their own interest in order to help others [Camerer and
Fehr, 2001, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, Henrich and et al.,
2001]. A set of individual social preferences has then been experimentally identiﬁed
[Ahn et al., 2003, Burlando and Guala, 2005] and the combination of these has been
implemented in an ABM. That is in addition to the traditional homo economics social
preference of individuals maximising their own proﬁt. This is an example of how a
phenomenon of interest, which is demanding (both time- and cost-wise) to test with a
RCT, can be further understood by analysing test results obtained from a simulation
model (i.e. a quasi-experiment).
Both the previous section and chapter have highlighted some critical methodological
issues regarding the development of social simulation that ought to provide useful res-
ults beyond theory to stakeholders. In order for this research exercise to be as useful
as possible to the MFI stakeholders, a decision has been taken to involve them from
the very beginning of the research process.
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There is no implication that social simulation modellers should approach hypotheses
strictly as problem-solvers or service-providers, but academics should be mindful of
the aforementioned status quo. Stakeholders are rarely interested in how the social
phenomenon is modelled, but would rather like to know what are the pragmatic contri-
butions –or consequences– from models. This is understandable, particularly if consid-
ering that currently social research ﬁndings taken into practical account tend to derive
mostly from ﬁeldwork or the modelling process itself –not from an ABM. The proposed
development lifecycle aims at mitigating some of the persisting modelling issues by:
• (a) emphasising the importance of data collection and analysis as a requirement
to signiﬁcantly enhance one’s ability to build social models and interpret results;
• (b) focusing modellers on being attentive to the need to strive for useful new
knowledge, both for academics and stakeholders, regarding a social phenomenon.
As introduced in the previous section, simulation models of social behaviour are cur-
rently only useful to stakeholders as a test platform of hypothetical scenarios. Social
simulations generate synthetic data about real social systems and thus require domain
experts to properly evaluate the usefulness of the results. Academic analyses tend to
focus on technical aspects regarding design, representation and simulation dynamics.
These involve, for instance, studying the model sensitivity to certain parameters, overall
maintenance and replications [Edmonds and Hales, 2003, Galán and Izquierdo, 2005].
To clarify the involved processes and their relationship in the proposed modelling ap-
proach, refer to the illustration below whilst reading the explanation that follows. The
diagram has evolved during the development of this thesis and depicts how modelling
has been conducted, which enabled the building of the ABM15 with guidance provided
by the data collected about processes within groups16, following the research design17.
15 See Section 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132).
16 Fig. 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection and analysis processes” (page 79).
17 See Figure 4.17: “The adapted EDTM development cycle” (page 93).
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Figure 4.14: Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM) [Lucas, 2011]
The lifecycle for developing an ABM social simulation is described in these steps:
1. The target system represents the social phenomenon itself, from which evidence
should be collected and analysed. This might require, for instance: administra-
tion of questionnaires, survey socio-economic circumstances and/or setup of an
automated strategy for collecting behavioural data18 from the stakeholders.
2. With analysed evidence, modellers proceed to discuss the plausibility of observa-
tions and assumptions with stakeholders. Here there is a potential loop as both
researchers and domain experts must reach a common understanding of what has
been analysed and whether hypotheses are based on realistic assumptions.
3. To design the model based on scrutinised evidence, which at this stage has been
veriﬁed by stakeholders19, it is a good idea to diﬀerentiate what is essential to be
in the model from what is contextual data about the social phenomenon. The
latter comprises much more than the former, thus caution must be observed.
18 Larger datasets have greater chances of providing richer analyses leading to useful ﬁndings.
19 I.e., the data can serve both to verify and justify how the social simulation has been built.
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4. Deciding how to implement agent behaviour and processes is entirely up to the
modellers, as no evidence favours any particular computational paradigm. Most
approaches nowadays use object-orientation20 due to the relative ease of repre-
senting behavioural features in simpliﬁed, self-contained autonomous threads.
5. Having a feasible model built based on the evidence, modellers can then proceed
to explore and test hypotheses using scenarios that resemble social phenomena
observations. Results are then compared to evidence and, to strengthen valid-
ation and development of knowledge, ﬁndings should ideally be discussed with
domain experts.
In case simulations consistently diverge from what has been observed in reality, it is
likely that something in the model has either been misrepresented, implemented in-
correctly or that parameters were set unrealistically. It is generally accepted, both by
academics and practitioners, that social simulation models should at least generate res-
ults that are plausible in light of the existing (qualitative and/or quantitative) evidence
[Moss and Edmonds, 2005]. It is recommended that modellers test the technicalities of
their simulation models before reaching the ﬁfth step, described above. A more com-
plete validation of obtained results in an ABM is only possible once the model has been
deemed plausible, both by academics and stakeholders. From this milestone onwards
modellers can try to mediate the development of new knowledge about the phenomena
–not the model itself – via the interpretation of obtained simulation results.
The diﬃculty in making social simulation models useful beyond theory, as highlighted
in Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM” (page 61),
is partially inﬂuenced by the fact that many –if not all– non-virtual social phenomena
are subject to continuous contextual change. Understanding and implementing such
conditions is not a trivial task21.
20 See discussion in Section 4.3.2: “Implementing the EDTM into the ABM simulation” (95).
21 Note that if social interaction only occurs in online systems, such as multi-player games or
social networking websites, users’ actions can be fully controlled and monitored in real time.
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As discussed, ﬁeldwork analyses has currently far greater chances of producing useful
ﬁndings, as it is feasible to provide up-to-date reports about speciﬁc aspects of the
social phenomenon that might still be observable. Conversely simulation models often
operate in much longer time scales, and this sometimes imposes diﬃculties to address
simulation issues carried from modelling to implementation.
The ﬁfth step on the previous page contains an important task, recommendable to be
carried out, both to well established and newly developed models: replication. An ABM
should ideally be replicated by modellers and compared as to how robust the original
results actually are. In this process one may ﬁnd issues in terms of how well speciﬁed
assumptions have been done, which will allow or not a correct replication [Edmonds
and Hales, 2003, Lucas and Payne, 2014].
It is worthy noticing that, if modelling one social phenomenon demands enough to
the point of challenging the generation of useful results beyond theory, one should bear
in mind the diﬃculties of nesting simulation models. This is not a diﬃcult technical
task, but it adds a considerable level of complexity to evaluate results obtained in such
mixed models. ALife, artiﬁcial societies and other virtual simulation systems have long
explored this by integrating, or nesting –in one virtual world– parallel and concurrent
models. An ALife biochemical model may, for example, depend on the results of an-
other model that simulates environmental conditions. This thesis is not focused on
such cases, but that is a good example of when validation is not relevant as all in it is
completely artiﬁcial anyway. That is not the case in social simulation, as the point is
to gain insights about real social phenomena via analysing simulations –and not just
the computer dynamics of a virtual reality. Thus it has been argued throughout this
section that researchers working this social simulation must address data validation
and veriﬁcation from the very beginning of the modelling process.
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4.3.1 Developing an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model
(EDTM)
The ﬁeldwork has been designed to elicit what the microﬁnance clients do when someone
defaults and how credit oﬃcers understand their role in this process. That is import-
ant as the whole group has to comply with the MFI rules of collective responsibility,
yet the institution did not know how this was being achieved at the group level and
this was the focus of this research. One way to model this bottom-up organisation is
by developing an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model (henceforth EDTM). Next, the
EDTM methodology is introduced and discussed in terms of the adaptations made.
Figure 4.15: The original EDTM development cycle [Gladwin, 1989]
As it can be observed in the ﬁgure above, the original EDTM combines the ethno-
graphic research cycle with a linear plan for hypothesis testing. EDTM is a systematic
methodology for building a model of decisions taken by a speciﬁc cohort, where the
process is driven by the data collected from the surveyed subjects themselves, rather
than the researcher hypothesis [Gladwin, 1989]. An EDTM requires thus an approach
to development that begins with the researcher selecting the decision-making context.
The original proposal of the EDTM suggests the setup of an ethnographic database,
containing both quantitative and qualitative information, so that this becomes the
reference material for consultation throughout the process of model development.
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In the approach put forward by [Gladwin, 1989], each question in a semi-structured
interview corresponds to a new level in the hierarchical tree, whilst each new answer
corresponds to either a new ramiﬁcation or a decision. The result, as illustrated below,
is a cladogram-like structure, with branches specialising according to the questions.
Figure 4.16: An example of an EDTM: student behaviour [Bernard, 2005]
There is no established methodology for implementing an EDTM into an ABM, thus
the developed ABM22 has been built based on the evidence collected with the aim to
shed light on how the clients in Chiapas deal with defaulters in their groups. It would
have been useful to have detailed information about events in the microﬁnance groups,
such as how much each person contributed to cover a speciﬁc default. As discussed
further on page 131, this data has not been collected by the MFI. To take such data
into consideration, it would have been necessary to monitor events linked to quotas
due after having started the data collection and apply the same survey questions to
them in diﬀerent points over time. This would require a longitudinal design, collecting
the same data over diﬀerent periods of time, but funding covered only a cross-sectional
design. This design assumes irrelevance of processes and time regarding the collected
data; thus it was unnecessary to account for dropout rates [Gilbert, 2008].
22 Described in Section 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132).
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To apply the EDTM methodology in this research, due to not being physically able
to access the decision-makers and other stakeholders located in another continent, it
has become clear that some adaptations would be necessary. The EDTM adaptation
allows the research to begin with surveys, which are –at a later stage– complemented
with an ethnographic approach based on in situ observations and interviews. In this
research project, this took place during one month at group meetings where events
were dealt with. This means that the ﬁrst phase has been done with a sequence of
surveys, with the intention to increasingly raise better questions and viewpoints about
the decision-making. These adaptations are discussed based on the illustration below.
administer an intial survey
to the decision-makers
administer follow-up
surveys and interviews
collect and analyse 
ethnographic data
create a decision-making
model with behaviour rules
EDAM
steps
1 and 2
implement the resulting
EDTM as an ABM
test / explore the
EDTM in the ABM
EDAM
steps
3 and 4
EDAM
step 5
Figure 4.17: The adapted EDTM development cycle
Bearing in mind the aforementioned adaptations, the development of an EDTM re-
quired then consideration of the following aspects: framing eﬀects (i.e. how the present-
ation of the decision-making process could inﬂuence the modelling itself), the criteria
for choosing subjects and data collection (i.e. the administration of interviews and/or
surveys, described in the previous section) and testing of the model as suggested before.
These are important because the model assumes the creation of a tree-like, hierarchical
structure to represent decision-making that is culturally-tuned by surveying a speciﬁc
group of individuals [Gladwin, 1989, Beck, 2000]. That is the reason for arguing that
it can be systematically tested via an ABM, where multiple agents are equipped with
the same EDTM. The evidence database, originally suggested for the development of
an EDTM, can also be used to facilitate the development of the related ABM.
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A rather arbitrary suggestion from the original proposal is that an EDTM is successful
if it can predict between 85% and 90% of the tested individual’s choices. This may
have been inspired by the concept of statistical conﬁdence intervals, yet it remains
unconﬁrmed if that is the case and whether the related literature would be applicable.
Given the likelihood of EDTMs being based on relatively small samples, there are
risks of statistical errors in testing hypotheses using the aforementioned framework
as normality tests would –most likely– not detect non-normality in a small dataset
[Maindonald and Braun, 2010]. This is pertinent as the EDTM has been developed, as
originally introduced by [Gladwin, 1989], and then embedded in the ABM as the agent’s
model of decision-making. The EDTM approach facilitates the qualitative validation at
the micro-level and contributes to cross-validate results of an ABM at the macro-level.
This is then a variation of the cross-validation approach [Moss and Edmonds, 2005].
The EDTM is a qualitative approach to research with the goal to model how people
make real-world decisions and to identify the speciﬁc criteria used by the individuals
in a group [Beck, 2000]. EDTM is thus an induction-based approach that enable one
to uncover unknown behavioural relationships and processes regarding actual decision-
making. These ﬁndings can then lead to the formation of hypotheses that provide
direction for further research involving either smaller ethnographic studies with smaller
samples or quantitative studies with larger samples [Wilson and Chaddha, 2009]. This
type of rich contextual information is helpful to guide the modelling of agent’s behaviour
in an ABM. Similar practice has been established through participatory modelling
[Squazzoni, 2012], which is also a qualitative-driven approach that enables unveiling
details at the micro level. Results obtained from an ABM can then be interpreted at
the aggregated, collective (i.e. macro) and disaggregated, individual (i.e. micro) level.
Thus an extra contribution in this thesis is the demonstration that the result of building
an ETDM23 can be integrated in the building of an ABM. This example could also have
been built in other rule-based computerised simulations, including: forward chaining
(e.g. using the Java Expert System Shell, henceforth JESS), backward chaining (e.g.
using Programming in Logic, henceforth Prolog)24, or as several if-thens in the ABM.
23 That resulted in Figure 5.23: “The proposed EDTM of decision-making within MFI groups”
(page 128), discussed in Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients”.
24 See Section 4.3.2: “Implementing the EDTM into the ABM simulation”.
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4.3.2 Implementing the EDTM into the ABM simulation
Unless the purpose of an agent-based model is purely theoretical, e.g. strictly regarded
as thought experiment or demonstration, it is most likely that the modeller will have
to deal with qualitative data to some extent. Agent-based developers are still generally
struggling with fundamental aspects as to how should quantitative and qualitative data
be used to inform model building and how experimental data, obtained from simulation
experiments, ought to be appropriately analysed [Lucas, 2014]. Further evidence to
this is that 2013 has been the ﬁrst time the European Social Simulation Association
(henceforth ESSA) has set up the Special Interest Group on this topic and hosted the
dedicated conference track entitled “Using qualitative data to inform behavioral rules”.
As introduced at the beginning of this chapter, there is a variety of research meth-
ods and types of data (quantitative and qualitative) the modeller can use in an ABM.
Social simulation development platforms25 are useful for building models that allow
accurate demonstration and testing of hypothetical scenarios. Yet, methodological dif-
ﬁculties, such as those discussed in Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social
Phenomena with ABM” (page 61), persist in preventing the provision of useful res-
ults beyond theory through the development of ABM. And one of these diﬃculties to
represent qualitative information is the inﬂuence of the programming approach itself.
Fully procedural and object-oriented models tend to lead the modeller to represent
data (qualitative and quantitative) as numerical properties and thresholds, which are
then controlled by a sequential (i.e. linear) process. These can be useful to reinforce
intra- and inter-agent positive or negative feedback loops, programmed to update and
log aspects of the monitored numerical properties. The update frequency may depend
on how long a simulation may run and whether thresholds are static (i.e. ﬁxed) or
dynamic (i.e. changeable) over time.
25 E.g.: SWARM, NetLogo, Repast, CORMAS, Ascape, SeSAm, SDML, MASON and M4A.
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As ABM simulation results are quantitative in nature, one can analyse possible correl-
ations between parameter conﬁgurations and results, in an attempt to shed new light
on understanding model path-dependency (or lock-in) properties either at the micro
(individual) and macro (collective) levels. Running a sensitivity analysis26 can help
understand a model implementation regarding the use of diﬀerent parameter values27.
All ABMs are structurally similar in the sense of having both processes and data being
updated at run time; even those models implemented declaratively using backward or
forward chaining data processing. In the latter case, qualitative data can be represen-
ted as a rule database and is then manipulated according to a symbolic order given by
resolution strategies. These involve logical constraint satisfactions, such as the Select-
ive Linear Deﬁnite (SLD, and its extension SLDNF to deal with negation as failure)
in Prolog [Roy and Haridi, 2004], or the pattern matching Rete algorithm available in
production rule systems such as JESS [Doorenbos, 2001].
In these declarative examples, a model will still have some procedural feedback loops
required to encapsulate these algorithms. It is crucial to check the representation con-
sistency and ensure that implementations are coherent when confronted with evidence,
otherwise the gathered data would have served of limited –if any– guidance. Neverthe-
less one could argue that declarative modelling, due to its diﬀerent coding approach,
can have the following advantages over fully procedural or object-oriented approaches:
• (a) knowledge is represented in a syntactical form that is easier to communicate
with stakeholders, as behaviour and facts are written as logical structures;
• (b) fact databases and inference rules linked to individual behaviour are updated,
by the modeller or model, without modiﬁcation of procedural control structures.
26 E.g. with the Model Exploration Module tool developed by Aitia.ai, henceforth MEME.
27 Despite such task being time-consuming as an ABM may not be analytically tractable.
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These advantages, particularly the second one, are useful for maintenance purposes,
as not much eﬀort would be required to update existing (qualitative or quantitative)
evidence embedded in an ABM social simulation. Procedural or object-oriented models,
on the other hand, usually require signiﬁcant changes in the simulation source-code to
reﬂect new evidence –specially new decision-making processes or rules. Yet it is unclear,
how a declarative approach could contribute to helping with making agent-based social
simulation models useful beyond theory, and thus if the extra technical eﬀort involved
in integrating these with an object-oriented simulation framework28 bring any concrete
advantage in this regard.
Although one must notice that diﬀerent computational paradigms present their own
technical limitations, or standards, in terms of representing behaviour and processes.
Another topic that has only recently begun to be analysed in greater detail is the
technical aspects of parallel and distributed model execution. To date the two most
popular agent-based simulation toolkits, viz.: NetLogo and Repast, can take advantage
of parallelism if modellers make use of speciﬁc Java libraries. Further to this, prob-
ably the only platform speciﬁcally designed for high-performance, taking advantage of
execution on Graphic Processing Units or supercomputers, is the Flexible Large-scale
Agent Modelling Environment framework (hence FLAME) [Richmond et al., 2010a].
It is worthwhile to point out that ABM modellers often implement algorithms that
deal with numerous objects (agents) and data structures that require little processing
per computation cycle. This feature lend itself to having rather little scalability poten-
tial [Foster, 1995] than those models where agents require more computing cycles and
storage resources to execute the tasks that have been deﬁned in a simulation time tick.
The latter statement holds, except when frequent communication is needed between
agents at runtime. Distribution, on the other hand, is usually more suitable when
the agents’ behaviours do not need to frequently exchange numerous messages over
high-latency computer networks.
28 Section 4.14: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM) [Lucas, 2011]” (page 88).
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Design and implementation of these features are usually dealt on a case-by-case basis,
so that each simulation model may be implemented with speciﬁc technical issues taken
into account. The Application Programming Interfaces (henceforth APIs) of all afore-
mentioned popular social simulation platforms provide basic and general structures
that modellers adapt to their speciﬁc needs. For example the @ScheduledMethod Java
annotation in Repast Symphony29 (v. 1.1.0) iterates over all active objects in an ABM
simulation, executing methods associated with each type as threads of a single program.
Time-division and concurrent multiplexing30 are not equivalent to parallel data or task
execution in architectures with multi-core processors and distributed memory. Afore-
mentioned APIs (apart from FLAME) do not oversee concurrent or parallel runs, so
modellers must tackle issues such as those of starving threads (i.e. not being able
to access the processor). Eﬀective design and execution of a parallel ABM is gener-
ally rather incipient if compared to the long-established running of simulations using
context-switching31 [Lysenko and D’Souza, 2008, Cicirelli et al., 2009, Richmond et al.,
2010b].
Albeit relevant for considering the development of an ABM, until the present date,
no published comparison is available about replications done in procedural, object-
oriented, parallel and declarative paradigms. [Edmonds and Hales, 2003] did, but only
using a declarative and an imperative language. It is unlikely that there would be any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in representing quantitative information in diﬀerent approaches.
Yet the representation of qualitative data depends directly on how a paradigm allows
such implementation. Hence because of this particularity, it is likely that there would
be some important diﬀerence between the replicated versions of an ABM using the
aforementioned paradigms. This remains an open research problem. In this project,
the implementation of the EDTM as an ABM has been fully object-oriented.
29 The project’s JavaDoc is available online at http://repast.sourceforge.net/docs/api.zip
30 A multi-threading approach popularly used as pseudo-parallelism in single core processors.
31 I.e., scheduled storing and restoring states to enable resuming execution of multiple tasks.
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Summary and Conclusions of Chapter 4:
Research Design and Development
This chapter discussed how the research design has been conceived, organised and
carried out in order to develop this research project. The discussion includes details on
the approach to data collection and analysis, with particular emphasis on how these
impacted the development of the agent-based social simulation. For this, an evidence-
driven approach has been introduced, which takes into account issues of integration of
both quantitative and qualitative date into a model.
The MFI context during the data collection process has been detailed, including the
criteria adopted for choosing which credit clients that have been surveyed. Diﬀerent ap-
proaches to experimentally research microﬁnance are discussed and then an adaptation
of the Ethnographic Decision Tree Model is presented. Data from the MFI stakehold-
ers has been collected through a combination of surveying stakeholders and in situ
observation.
Thus the chosen methods for carrying out this research project include the following.
• a) an adaptation of the Ethnographic Decision Tree approach, allowing iterative
surveys that are then complemented with semi-structured interviews;
• and b) the implementation of an agent-based model based on ﬁeldwork ﬁndings,
allowing the experimentation with diﬀerent scenarios of microﬁnance groups.
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Chapter 5
Research Findings
This chapter contains a discussion about the research ﬁndings grouped in sections of
the TOC below. The chapter highlights the outcome of carrying out the research
design previously discussed and how the data analysis has been done. This includes
a detailed discussion on how the EDTM has been developed and used for guiding the
implementation of behaviour in the ABM. In accordance with the discussion in Section
4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 88) and Section 4.3.1:
“Developing an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model (EDTM)” (page 93), all ﬁndings
have been discussed and deemed plausible by the stakeholders. The contributions to
knowledge, based on the sections below, are discussed in the next chapter.
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5.1 Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers
Table 5.3 below introduces the ﬁrst result from the administered surveys to credit
oﬃcers1 –which are the most common reasons, perceived by them, compelling credit
clients to pay quotas on time. These surveys were designed to understand how the
MFI employees interpret the impact of their policies over the ﬁnanced groups and how
clients actually behave within groups to repay credit.
Item Percentage Categories
1 18% conditions in which credit must be repaid
2 16% examples of solidarity (e.g. covering defaults)
3 16% mutual supervision between participants
4 15% mutual monitoring (by the MFI and groups)
5 15% abide to group rules (MFI and conventional ones)
6 14% economic rentability of their businesses
7 3% attributed to case-speciﬁc experiences
8 3% surveyed stakeholder did not answer
Table 5.3: Perceived factors inﬂuencing timely quota repayments
The experience of credit oﬃcers suggests a close relationship between the processes
surrounding the microﬁnance social collateral (items two to ﬁve) and economic eﬀect-
iveness (items one and six). The timely concurrence and convergence of these two
aspects are considered essential for the successful implementation of microﬁnance SE
frameworks [EMES and UNDP, 2006, Borzaga et al., 2008b]. Knowing how credit cli-
ents use social collateral mechanisms is helpful to tailor microﬁnance services and avoid
the side eﬀects of not taking the conventional behaviour within groups into consider-
ation at all [Armendariz and Morduch, 2005, Mas, 2009, UNITAR, 2013, Ledgerwood
et al., 2013].
1 According to Figure 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection and analysis processes”
(page 79) of Section 4.2: “Design of Data Collection and Analysis”, Chapter 4.
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Otherwise MFIs may be at the risk of increasing interest rates unrealistically, in an
attempt to oﬀset the high administrative costs emerging from a large number of small
loans and not understanding the mechanisms underpinning social collateral [Palier,
2004, Rosenberg et al., 2009, Hermes and Lensink, 2007]. These consequences would
be undesirable as those may shift the MFI mission from mainly alleviating to mainly
proﬁting from the impoverished clients to stay aﬂoat. Further to this, as also pointed
out in [Karlan, 2007], individual knowledge of someone’s default circumstances within
groups is crucial to assess whether eventual defaults within a group should be covered:
would it be due to moral hazard2 or genuine personal diﬃculties? Culture and tradition
can play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the conventional social behaviour used for dealing
with disputes and management of defaulting [Swidler, 1995]. In this sense, detailed
sociological and economical evidence can be relevant to stakeholders and academics
interested in analysing microﬁnance policies in diﬀerent places around the world. Due
to the innovative nature of microﬁnance, one could mitigate the under-provision of
public goods3 through its social and economic embedment [Lucas et al., 2014].
Considering that the studied MFI had, during the data collection period, an over-
all portfolio risk of group defaulting below 1% and ongoing repayment rates over 90%,
it is remarkable that no interference took place on how groups were formed or ma-
naged. Other MFI frameworks, notoriously those similar to FINCA, contrast with the
researched MFI as the former framework is more selective and more rigid institutio-
nally. That is because clients would have more frequent contact with the MFI staﬀ,
who then have to update the group members about the statuses of their loans and
individually advice who may use savings to cover defaults. This may be beneﬁcial in
order to protect the more vulnerable clients from being exploited by other members, as
it could arguably encourage a more egalitarian interaction within groups. However it is
also known that very frequent contact between credit oﬃcers and clients (e.g. weekly)
may result in MFI employees acting in less considerate ways toward group members
due to the intense managerial pressure to keep high repayment rates [Harper, 2002].
2 In this case, meaning an unwarranted default that is actually undetectable by other peers.
3 See Section 5.4.2 “Modelling Guidance and Impact on Policy-Making”, page 163).
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The case study MFI in this thesis only employs credit oﬃcers to act as supporters of
their SE framework. In other words, they are explicitly trained to not interfere in any
way on how groups are formed and deal with their debt or defaulters. That means
the credit oﬃcers’ role in meetings, where credit is given and quotas are repaid, is to
only facilitate the ﬁnancial consequences of the clients’ intended actions. The MFI
thus tracks the economic performance of their ﬁnanced groups and not individuals,
expecting the clients themselves to deal with their debt and defaults. As the group
has to evaluate the eﬀect of their collective actions, there is a need of an in-depth
understanding of which services each client is using. These include interest rates for
credit, savings and potential institutional ﬁnes in case of defaulting within groups.
This also means that clients must learn to manoeuvre their micro enterprises in light of
what is feasible investment-wise, which requires their awareness of risk management and
leadership. Despite the similarity between the Grameen Bank and FINCA microcredit
frameworks, the studied MFI has adapted their own institutional rules as it follows:
• (1) micro-savings are not a mandatory prerequisite to access micro-loans;
• and (2) micro-loans may be used for other purposes than economic activities.
This ﬂexibility implemented by the MFI provided their clients with a greater leeway to
plan, by themselves, how much should be invested in their micro-enterprises or improve
their living conditions. That seems to play a key role in how groups develop their own
ways of sanctioning individual defaulters, as otherwise only the MFI would. Institu-
tional screening does not guarantee cooperation amongst members, so the conditions
for that amongst clients themselves must be developed and sustained to encourage suc-
cessful credit groups. In order to harness social collateral4, the institution has to strike
a balance between the demand for understanding ﬁnancial constraints and the inter-
play between top-down (institutional) and bottom-up (group) conventions5. Having
an empirical and detailed understanding of this process is crucial, both for guiding the
development of an ABM and to inform policy-makers based on simulation results.
4 The concept has been deﬁned and discussed in Chapter 2: “Social Enterprise” (page 17).
5Discussed in Section 5.4.2: “Modelling Guidance and Impact on Policy-Making” (page 163).
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As most surveyed clients have had previous experience with some other form of saving
or lending between themselves, credit oﬃcers provided a rather clear account of groups
considered to be successful. Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 contribute to understand and repres-
ent the circumstances surrounding behavioural patterns adopted by successful groups.
Some of the most relevant support aspects –such as the overall importance of collective
liquidity of micro-loans– are listed below, in descending order of importance.
Item Percentage Categories
1 66% general mutual help
2 20% case-based cooperationa
3 6% trust between participantsb
4 6% focus on common goalsc
a Merged with: group comprehension (5%) and solidarity (2%).
b Merged with: camaraderie (2%) and sense of sharing (2%).
c Merged with: reciprocity (2%), union (2%) and equity (2%).
Table 5.4: Support as perceived by the microcredit oﬃcers
All top-listed items in italic indicate that they have not been merged with other qual-
itative concepts extracted from the data collection process following the EDTM ap-
proach6. By taking into consideration the explanation above, it is possible to notice
that the social circumstances suggested by the listed items in Table 5.4 (particularly
one and two) are in unison with listed items one, two and three in Table 5.5.
The qualitative data analysis has been done using only the following systematic ap-
proach, having each full response as the unit of analysis: qualitative categories have
been created, in order of occurrence and based on the author’s interpretation, as to
either belonging to an existing or a new category.
6 This includes data obtained by applying the proposal discussed in Section 4.3.1: “Devel-
oping an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model (EDTM)” (page 91) with surveys and interviews.
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A sense of reciprocity amongst clients endorses, to some extent, their behaviour as not
necessarily altruistic but geared towards a common good in which they themselves have
individual gains. In this case study that means having a successful microcredit group.
Item Percentage Categories
1 25% collective avoidance of individual defaulters
2 18% group ﬁnancial progress is steady overalla
3 17% general mutual help tends to be encouragedb
4 8% mutual monitoring (by the MFI and group)c
5 6% encouragement of eﬃcient problem-solvingd
6 6% collective and self-organised decision-makinge
7 4% collateral is optional for collective credit liquidity
8 4% group training (including ﬁnancial education)f
9 4% frequent communication (in-group and with MFI)g
a Merged with: debts can be covered collectively (10%).
b Merged with: sense of comradeship, sense of belonging (6%).
c Merged with: pressure on defaulters (2%) and agreements (2%).
d Merged with: collective non-ﬁnancial security (2%).
e Merged with: solidarity examples (e.g. covering individual defaults) (4%).
f Merged with: encouragement of speciﬁc example of cooperation (2%).
g Merged with: clear credit to clients and oﬃcers (2%).
Table 5.5: Advantages of the microﬁnance framework, according to credit oﬃcers
Table 5.6 below present which actions the surveyed MFI oﬃcers have witnessed in terms
of how clients provide support or solidarity to their group members7 in practice.
Item Percentage Categories
1 50% support (i.e. cover defaults of) who is ill
2 10% pay funeral homages
3 10% moral or economical aid
4 10% visit who missed meetings a
5 10% cover someone’s default
6 10% provide general help
a This can be done either individually or in groups.
Table 5.6: Supportive actions witnessed in microcredit groups
7 Apart from items 1 and 2, all others have been witnessed by the author during ﬁeldwork.
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Nearly 90% of all answers, in the last table on the previous page, contained descriptions
of speciﬁc cases in which one client helped another to solve a problem. The remaining
answers referred to strategies employed by clients for mutual monitoring. Thus there
is a strong suggestion, grounded on the data collected directly from the stakeholders,
that the social collateral8 concept is essential to individual behaviour within groups in
terms of deﬁning what is conventionally acceptable behaviour by other group members.
A complementary information to the ﬁndings obtained in the ﬁrst administered survey,
is that the last follow-up survey data unveiled the fact of over 80% of credit oﬃcers
have dealt with clients who used other forms of collective saving –or lending– before
joining the researched MFI. This is indicative that frameworks similar to ROSCAs or
ASCAs9 have been experienced by the community of clients prior to them joining the
oﬀered MFI services –which is in line with well-known trends [Ledgerwood et al., 2013].
Furthermore, Table 5.7 present the approximate distribution of how moral and eth-
ical principles are perceived within credit groups in which oﬃcers have worked with.
Item Percentage Categories
1 22% responsibility
2 21% honestya
3 15% solidarityb
4 12% disciplinec
5 10% hardworking attitude
6 9% communicationd
7 9% value people’s needse
a Merged with: respect (10%).
b Merged with the synonymous (in MFI terms): mutual help (3%).
c Merged with: commitment (5%) and institutional rule-abiding (2%).
d Merged with: trust relationships (5%) and sincerity (3%).
e Merged with: attentiveness (2%), cooperation (2%) and assistance (2%).
Table 5.7: Moral and ethical principles perceived within the surveyed groups
8 I.e. the backup of collective responsibility over credit using one’s own social network.
9 For more details about this topic, please refer to Section “Social Enterprise” (page 35).
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Whilst discussing ﬁeldwork ﬁndings with stakeholders and academics, simplicity has
been adopted over lengthier discourse. Simpliﬁcations were only done as long as the
case study had not been distorted into a narrative that obscured the original complexity
of the socio-economic phenomenon. The best way to engage stakeholders and academics
in meaningful discussions about the research was to highlight the relevant ﬁndings
without overshadowing the contextual information –which was often both intricate
and necessary to understand the socio-economic phenomenon in question. Hence the
grouping seen in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.7 and 5.8 considered the importance of diﬀerentiating
answers by: (a) those contributing more to the overall sample representativeness; and
(b) the less frequent answers, considered as being the less controversial for merging.
The criteria has been entirely devised and implemented by the author of this thesis.
Table 5.8 illustrates how answers from Table 5.7: “Moral and ethical principles per-
ceived within the surveyed groups”, can inﬂuence actions between clients that have been
observed by credit oﬃcers. Given the relative frequent contact of MFI credit oﬃcers
with clients, it is somewhat surprising that there were not more answers linking these.
Only items three and six, listed below, clearly relate trust between MFI employees and
borrowers. These results reinforce the argument widely accepted that microﬁnance
groups manage collective credit themselves [Rutherford and Arora, 2011].
Item Percentage Categories
1 28% paying quotas on time
2 12% covering eventual defaults
3 12% committing oﬃcers to groups
4 12% integrating clientsa
5 12% improving group communicationb
6 9% managing commitment between clientsc
7 6% improving time managementd
8 6% repaying debt in warranted adversitye
a Merged with: promoting trust amongst clients (6%).
b Merged with: getting better along (3%) and communicating payment dates (3%).
c Merged with: shared responsibility (3%) and managing oﬃcers’ trust (3%).
d Merged with: enforcing punctuality (3%).
e Merged with: supporting who is ill (3%).
Table 5.8: Actions within groups supported by participants’ morality and ethics
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An eﬀective MFI framework shall seek to increase the collective likelihood of the credit
clients to recover from economic shocks, without completely compromising their ability
to access new credit and repay quotas10. These are essential aspects to running a
successful microﬁnance framework [Palier, 2004, Karlan, 2007, Rosenberg et al., 2009].
Yet interestingly, despite the MFI in this case study being less regimented than the
Grameen Bank and FINCA approaches, the surveyed credit oﬃcers still perceive their
framework as being overly rigid. Perhaps, as witnessed in situ during the ethnographic
ﬁeldwork observing behaviour in credit centres during one month, that is due to credit
oﬃcers not being allowed to autonomously provide solutions to individual client needs.
In addition to the aforementioned observation regarding the adapted MFI framework,
the perceived absent moral and ethical principles reported in the administered survey,
can be interpreted as roughly corresponding to what opposes the categories presented
in Table 5.7 (page 106) and Table 5.8 (page 107). Analogously then, one can also in-
fer that these probably play an important role in the perceived qualitative diﬃculties
within the researched microﬁnance framework. These are presented in Table 5.9 below.
Topic Issues described by the surveyed credit oﬃcers
credit, timing,
management
slow authorisations, impossibility to pay in advance, man-
datory investments, credit only available to groups, lack
of monthly repayments, inﬂexible repayment dates, clients
want faster credit progression and initial credit is too low
communication oﬃcers get late for their visits to credit centres, insuﬃcientcommunication, misunderstandings and wrong information
meetings
mandatory presence of clients (attendance is strict), clients
are unwilling to feel like students and there is not enough
time for the credit oﬃcer to perform all their planned tasks
late payments no juridical or other methods to recover losses in due time
microcredit
groups
disorganisation, badly oriented groups, diﬃculties with dis-
tance between clients and not having groups working as one
other issues untrustworthiness, methodological misunderstandings, lackof interest amongst clients and oﬃcers not overseeing rules
Table 5.9: Disadvantages of the framework, according to credit oﬃcers
10 See e.g. Table 5.3: “Perceived factors inﬂuencing timely quota repayments” (page 101).
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Further details on the aforementioned aspects have also been observed in the data
collected in the ﬁrst survey11. That included the provision of post-credit consultancy
to the ﬁnanced businesses; approximately either to some (45%) or most (45%) groups
served by them. A minority of credit oﬃcers (10%) reported that they have been able
to provide that service to all microcredit groups served by them.
In an apparently paradoxical result, 53% of credit oﬃcers did report that clients could
miss both meetings and quotas, yet 72% of credit oﬃcers observed that there is another
trend regarding individuals missing meetings but not their payments. This unexpected
ﬁnding may be due to one, or perhaps a combination, of the following reasons:
• the question in the administered survey being misunderstood –yet this does not
seem to be the case, given the interviews during the ethnographic ﬁeldwork;
• the experience of oﬃcers in this regard varying substantially over time –a fact
that would not allow a uniform accumulation of evidence collected via surveys;
• or indeed both possibilities occur rather frequently amongst MFI groups –which
seem the most likely, given what has been observed during ﬁeldwork.
The perceived value of having such a detailed account of these aspects lead the MFI
to systematically incorporate an account of these events –by adding this data as a
requirement in the development of their new information system. The impact of this
ﬁnding is that credit oﬃcers will be collecting data about behaviour in the managed
groups, and not only observe it during visits to the credit centres. This will allow the
MFI board of directors to analyse, over time, what is happening behaviour-wise within
the ﬁnanced groups. This research, on the other hand, is a cross-sectional analysis.
11 This document is available in “Appendix II: First Fieldwork Report” (page 180).
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Following the discussion of ﬁndings ﬁrst reported in [Lucas, 2009b], one can observe
that the majority of groups have kept the same amount of credit (154) and members
(148). Some (980 groups kept exactly the same people in their groups after renewing
credit. Due to MFI board members reporting a steady occurrence of groups increasing
credit over time, it was to some extent an unexpected ﬁnding that only a minority (67
in total12) of experienced groups13 changed their instalments. This may be due to ha-
ving carried a cross-sectional ﬁeldwork, as the data analysis depend on what has been
captured of the complex phenomenon, and so it does not allow a longitudinal analysis.
A longitudinal design was unfeasible due to the need for extra funding and time to
track the MFI credit oﬃcers and clients over time14. If that had been possible, a more
detailed analysis would have been done in terms of understanding the dynamics of how
groups –and potentially the social conventions too– change over time. A longitudinal
approach would have the potential to shed new light on how the conventional social
behaviour evolves in group membership. Such an approach could allow the analysis of
the degree in which this is an indirect or an intentional process –with the possibility to
review the adequacy of credit instalments depending on group sizes and location.
Table 5.10, next, synthesises what credit oﬃcers consider the most relevant aspects
for achieving the best results whilst working for the MFI [Lucas et al., 2008]. The
ﬁnancial perspective is seen through the employees’ perception of what is important to
do for providing the ﬁnancier good bookkeeping. The operational and methodological
aspects overlap with regards to the importance of managing trust amongst clients; also
from clients to credit oﬃcers, in order to keep up with the implemented microﬁnance
scheme. These last two facets are some of the most relevant for MFIs, as lacking either
is a key indicative that lead traditional banking to fail servicing the very poor.
12 Or totalling 87, if the remaining 20 ﬁrst-time groups are also added to this analysis.
13 I.e., groups with more members working with the MFI for more than one full credit cycle.
14 As described in Section 4.1: “The MFI Context during Data Collection” (page 76).
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Aspect Answers given by the credit oﬃcers
ﬁnancial accurate information on managing debt andclients’ needs in a very considerate manner.
operational service eﬃcacy, promotion of trust betweenclients and oﬃcers for dealing with losses.
methodological trust clients to solve social and economicalproblems, under the microﬁnance umbrella.
Table 5.10: Indispensable features for the eﬃciency of the studied MFI
Table 5.11 below contain the suggestions, mentioned by the surveyed subjects, to im-
prove diﬀerent aspects based on their experience dealing with clients and the perspective
of Table 5.9: “Disadvantages of the framework, according to credit oﬃcers” (page 108).
The ﬁnancial aspect (of using individual savings to serve as collateral) is conceivably
inspired in schemes similar to ASCAs or ROSCAs15. This is particularly due to the
evidence that oﬃcers know that most clients have already experienced other forms of
collective saving, or lending, before joining a microcredit framework [Lucas, 2009a].
Aspect All suggestions from surveyed oﬃcers
ﬁnancial
promote voluntary savings within groups,
along with recommendations for using smal-
lest possible deposits to backup every credit.
operational
take more into account feedback from mee-
tings both to improve focus on social issues
and explain the framework to clients.
methodological
adapt some MFI rules according to groups’
locations, whilst maintaining a continuous in
situ training program (workshops) to clients.
Table 5.11: Suggestions to improve the studied MFI framework
According to data in Table 5.12: one can see that illnesses (23%), lack of proﬁtability
(14%) and poor investments (11%) are the leading causes to defaulting within ﬁnanced
groups [Lucas et al., 2008]. During ﬁeldwork, interviews with the MFI board members
conﬁrmed these three as the typically most inﬂuential issues aﬀecting due payments.
15 Both deﬁned in Section 2.3: “Group Lending Approaches in Microﬁnance” (page 35).
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The top answer is consistent with the long-established correlation between poverty-
stricken areas16 and the high epidemiological incidence of chronic nutrition and food-
related diseases [WHO and FAO, 2003, WEF, 2010]. Those most reported in the surveys
include: diarrhoea (26%), cold/inﬂuenza (16%), birth complications/fever (13% each),
breathing issues/diabetes (10% each), cutaneous diseases/cancer (3% each).
Item Percentage Observations
1 23% diseases and illnesses
2 14% lack of business proﬁtabilitya
3 11% poor business, or household, investments
4 9% family-related problems or costs
5 8% each other case-speciﬁc reasons, forgetfulnessb
6 4% each group issues, move household, got another credit
a Missed meetings amount to 15%, but is hereby interpreted as a consequence only.
b The latter may either be the case, or a pretext by clients to skip group sanctions.
Table 5.12: Common reported causes leading to individual defaulting
Items two and three in the table above clearly depend on the particular socio-economic
circumstances of each aﬀected individual or group. On the other hand, there is a
variety of issues inﬂuencing lack of proﬁtability, with the most frequently reported in
the administered survey being the lack of training (approximately 33% of the total).
The aforementioned reason, incidentally, is also the most frequently mentioned reason
for poor investments (20%). The latter issue aﬀecting an individual’s ability to pay
on time also has a signiﬁcant percentage attributed to diseases and rising debt17 (16%
each). That is followed by the following reasons: diverted investments (11%), excessive
competition and limited market (8% each). All other responses consist of compara-
tively less important, issues that amount from 1% to 6% of all survey responses.
16 Aﬄicted e.g. with issues such as: poor sanitation, malnutrition and lack of clean water.
17 This increasing of individual debt may be either due to single or multiple credit sources.
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In terms of managing debt, in this case study, it is essential to understand the following
two events described below. Table 5.13 depicts what microcredit borrowers tend to do
when someone from their group misses a meeting. Most of the gathered observations,
with the exception of item four and another item (covering defaults) in item 5, relate
to other clients evaluating the defaulter and the circumstances surrounding that event.
This aspect has been conﬁrmed in interviews with MFI employees and also witnessed,
during the administered ﬁeldwork, in credit centres by the author. The survey data
is a descriptive list of both consequences and actions deemed relevant by the group
participants, which is enforced during the meetings held by the MFI at credit centres.
Item Percentage Observations
1 38% visit the household (individually or in a group)
2 16% wait and check the defaulter’s justiﬁcation
3 9% each remind of their obligations, wait for the defaulter
4 6% expel the defaulter from their group
5 6% cover a default, depending on circumstances
Table 5.13: According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a meeting is missed?
Whilst the previous table dwells on absent participants when collective debt should
be managed, Table 5.14 follows through such events by showing what happens when
payments are also missed. Absentees are not automatically labelled as defaulters, as the
due amount may be paid by others on their behalf. When discussing these ﬁndings with
stakeholders, a clariﬁcation was made regarding Item four of Table 5.13: expelling. The
threshold as to whether this should happen seem to depend on the frequency of such
event and whether the majority of group participants refuse to support the individual.
Yet this remains to be further explored and could be followed-up with future research.
Item Percentage Observations
1 70% cover defaults collectively
2 16% combineda remind of their obligations, visit the household
3 13% seek to charge a group or MFI ﬁne; consider expelling
a Grouped to facilitate interpreting the consequential nature of this observation.
Table 5.14: According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?
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5.2 Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients
Building upon the knowledge discussed in the previous section, further progress has
been made in cooperation with the MFI stakeholders to understand how sanctions are
dealt with by groups themselves. This is where the approach of this research reached
the 3rd and 4th step depicted in Figure 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection
and analysis processes” (page 79). When discussing that group-level ﬁnes have been
carried out without interference from the MFI (see Table 5.13, page 113), the MFI
board members were surprised. It had long been common knowledge to credit oﬃcers,
but not to the board members. Another discussed aspect is the potential impact of
introducing new participants whilst simultaneously assessing older, coexisting, groups
funded by the MFI. It is particularly important to assess the impact of policies, e.g.
whether evidence of a ﬁnancially sound clientele is a reliable proxy for individual im-
provements or simply a statistical reﬂection of removing under-performing participants
from the sample. Clients with greater experience in microﬁnance tend to be in a better
economic situation and have larger disposable income than newcomers [Karlan, 2001,
Robinson, 2001, Coleman and Wynne-Williams, 2006, Mukhopadhyay, 2007], so more
experienced clients in the MFI are naturally more likely to manage more credit.
In this case study, the aforementioned issue has been taken into account when in-
terpreting what are the feasible, unexpected eﬀects of the unusual 30% client dropout
that happened once data collection ceased [Lucas, 2009b]. Leaving is not necessarily
due to ﬁnancial failure: clients may be expelled from groups due to lack of cooperation,
or leave voluntarily in search of higher individual credit or better interest rates. Deaths
are also part of the exit rates and create a signiﬁcant impact in groups18. Furthermore,
one should be aware that this research project may contain an implicit selection bias
towards the most successful groups, as those tend to stay longer in the MFI program.
18 See Table 5.6: “Supportive actions witnessed in microcredit groups” (page 105).
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The cross-sectional nature of this research means that diﬀerent groups have been sur-
veyed simultaneously. Thus ﬁndings are a subset snapshot of what the total credit cli-
ent population actually is. A repeated cross-sectional type of longitudinal approach19,
would have allowed analyses of the MFI groups over longer periods of time. Yet that
would have also required substantial larger funding and more time. Both were unavail-
able, so individuals have not been ﬁnancially and behaviourally tracked within groups.
The criteria used by credit oﬃcers to choose which clients to survey20 plus the per-
ceived relationship between group behaviour and their ﬁnances21 are suggestive that
the research design resulted in the data collection of the rather more successful MFI
groups.
If the design had been focused on analysing the broader impact of microﬁnance to
mitigate poverty and inequality, that would have required a longitudinal approach to
track clients that have left the MFI. Thoroughly assessing the impact of microﬁnance
programs, i.e. both at micro (client) and macro (community) levels, can be prohibi-
tively time consuming and expensive, as one shall seek to strike an appropriate balance
in order to keep the analysis within both what is manageable and what is representative.
The client survey22 focused on collecting structural data on how groups are composed
and how they monitor each other during credit cycles. One interesting aspect that
emerged from ﬁeldwork is the composition and location of surveyed groups. Questions
such as “Who would you ask personal advice?” and “With who would you collaborate
in a business activity?” allowed the identiﬁcation of up to three people in their net-
works. It is assumed that the order of answers roughly corresponds to the relevance of
each person to the interviewee. This premise is only pertinent to interpret the data on
the next page. Table 5.15 depicts that a majority (86% in total, with 50% aggregate) of
surveyed clients had relatives in their business network who were also in their groups.
19 As introduced in Section 4.2: “Design of Data Collection and Analysis” page 80).
20Table 4.2: “How credit oﬃcers chose the 600 surveyed clients [Lucas et al., 2008]”, page 82
21 These aspects are discussed later in this section in greater detail.
22 Available as the 2nd questionnaire in “Appendix I: Fieldwork Surveys” (176).
115
Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients 116
This ﬁnding is signiﬁcant as it directly violated an existent MFI rule that prohi-bited
relatives forming credit groups23. This case study suggests the importance of cul-
tural identity in encompassing the informal bound between microcredit group mem-
bers. There is relevant evidence24, validated by stakeholders, backing the suggestion
that social conventions can vary according to group composition. This is based on
the collected survey data and interviews with stakeholders, in the form that: (a) rural
groups, due to their remote location, would tend to be formed by family members and
employ more social pressure to drive out defaulting behaviour; whilst (b) urban groups
tend to contain more unrelated neighbours who prefer to administer group-level ﬁnes.
Business networka # of groups (percentage)b Aggregatec
relative 225 (86%), 105 (40%), 56 (21%) 386 (50%)
neighbour 76 (29%), 65 (25%), 38 (15%) 179 (23%)
friend 78 (30%), 82 (31%), 46 (18%) 206 (27%)
a Each analysed property is mutually exclusive, with approximate percentages.
b Correspondingly: ﬁrst, second and third unique set of answers.
c Data grouped per category, per topic (business network in this case).
Table 5.15: Non-aggregated composition of the clients’ business networks
Table 5.16 below depicts data of similar nature, when compared with the previous
table, however focusing on the advice network. Once again the majority (64% in total,
with 58% aggregate) indicated their relatives as being those whose surveyed subjects
rely most.
Advice networka # of groups (percentage)b Aggregatec
relative 167 (64%), 106 (41%), 39 (15%) 312 (58%)
neighbour 21 (8%), 33 (13%), 12 (5%) 90 (17%)
friend 45 (17%), 47 (18%), 28 (11%) 120 (22%)
a Each analysed property is mutually exclusive, with approximate percentages.
b Correspondingly: ﬁrst, second and third unique set of answers.
c Data grouped per category, per topic (advice network in this case).
Table 5.16: Non-aggregated composition of the clients’ advice networks
23 An attempt to lessen the patriarchal inﬂuence in deprived families (8th page from 180).
24 See e.g.: the discussion of the tables explained on page 113 and the ﬁgure on page 129.
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In both aforementioned tables, a minority (respectively less than 1% and then up to
slightly higher than 2% indicated people who are in the same group and also working
in the same proﬁt-generating activity. Considering the less frequent answers in the
second and third sets, it is possible that surveyed subjects may have either: avoided
providing more information about their peers, or indeed had no further information to
provide. The assumption mentioned on page 116 (of having indirectly collected answers
regarding people in order of importance) remains feasible, as whichever the case, this
remark would not change the previous paragraph. As the surveys were, at the time,
administered to clients belonging to various geographically distant credit centres25, no
social network containing promising structures could be constructed. That is because
the cross-sectional networks were too fragmented and contained too few links and nodes
for an Exponential Random Graph Model approach. It would be worth to develop a
research project to further explore aspects of social network analysis, mentioned in
Section 6.1.1: “Contribution to Knowledge: Conventional Behaviour” (page 168), as a
way to aim shedding new light on how the structure of groups change over time.
The discussion on the next two pages builds upon data regarding the actions most
associated with what clients do when a client has missed meetings (i.e. Table 5.13:
“According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a meeting is missed?” and/or payments
(i.e. Table 5.14: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?”),
both on page 113. Some actions have been witnessed in practice by the author during
ﬁeldwork and all have been conﬁrmed by stakeholders as a set of feasible group-level
social conventions for coping with defaulters. Conventionalised behaviour seems to
evolve according to past individual experiences and through recommendations ﬂowing
between microﬁnance groups. The conjecture is that clients can learn in this way, in-
cluding –for instance– how to administer social and ﬁnancial sanctions. The existence
of emergent strategies for dealing with defaulters is evidence of self-organisation within
the microﬁnance groups.
25 The approach and criteria for choosing surveyed subjects (i.e. Table 4.2) are on page 82.
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The second survey was administered to credit clients. It contained two similar ques-
tions made to credit oﬃcers in the ﬁrst administered survey. The results of these are
summarised below in two tables, one regarding actions clients engage when a meeting
is missed and the other regarding reported actions when a payment is missed. Inter-
estingly, both tables contain clients stating that such events never happened.
The most cited action, with regards to what clients do when a meeting is missed, has a
similarly high percentage if compared to the response obtained from credit oﬃcers 26.
The second item can be interpreted as being linked to the concept of social collateral,
as the MFI rationale is to encourage cooperation amongst micro credit clients that are
in need of relying on each other in order to access ﬁnancial services.
Item Percentage Observations
1 34% visit the household (individually or in a group)
2 19% discuss how to cooperate collectively
3 10% insist with ﬁnding the client
4 8% each seek to charge a ﬁne, ﬁnd out the reason
5 6% each never happened, remind of their obligations
Table 5.17: According to clients, what is done when a meeting is missed
The top two most cited actions, with regards to what clients to when a payment is
missed, have similarly high percentages when compared to the responses from credit
oﬃcers27. Other common actions include attempts to charge ﬁnes, visiting the de-
faulter’s household and somehow trying again to interact with the group member.
Item Percentage Observations
1 58% cover defaults collectively (when the defaulter is ill)
2 13% seek to charge a group or a MFI ﬁne
3 11% visit the household (individually or in a group)
4 6% never happened
5 4% each insist with the defaulter, remind of their obligations
Table 5.18: According to clients, what is done when a payment is missed
26 Table 5.13: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a meeting is missed?” (p. 113).
27 Table 5.14: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?” (p. 113).
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The timely provision of reliable new information to stakeholders and policy-makers, in
this and another twelve international case studies28, seem to date best achieved through
ﬁeldwork –or similarly commissioned research. Simulation models, regardless of how
detailed, represent social phenomena in a more formal and synthesised way than most
descriptive (i.e. text-based) or statistical accounts. The observed stakeholder preference
in this case study has clearly been simplicity to explain concepts and illustrate the social
conventions in question. The methods and approaches employed to implement these
accounts into an ABM were initially completely foreign to the MFI stakeholders. Thus
this prompted a sustained eﬀort, during the research development, to meaningfully
engage them in the modelling process and clarify every diﬃculty along the way.
Figure 5.18 below depicts a signiﬁcant number of groups concentrated in few centres.
Only a small number (15) of these repeat in the collected data. This is an indicative that
most of the credit oﬃcers adhered to the agreed criteria to select surveyed subjects29.
There are more locations plotted in Figure 4.10: “Raster KML plot of the 21 client
locations surveyed during ﬁeldwork” (page 77) as clients, despite belonging to one of
the six centres plotted below, may not live exactly where the credit centre is located.
115 
82 
39 
4 
15 
6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
N
um
be
r 
of
 g
ro
up
s 
Identified centre 
Distribution of unique 
groups per centre 
Figure 5.18: Unique groups associated with unique centresa
a 15 groups appear more than once in the dataset. Average number of clients per centre: 3.5
28 Discussed in Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM” (page
61).
29 See discussion in Section 4.2: “Design of Data Collection and Analysis” (page 81).
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All 600 surveyed clients were identiﬁed according to location, name and membership
number. That allowed processing ﬁnancial data of all 261 identiﬁed groups, of which
98% (256) paid on time, 72% (190) being rural, 37% renewed the same credit and 44%
had credit equally distributed amongst members. Groups varied from a minimum of
three to the maximum of seven. The average size is four, with a standard deviation
of 1.21. About 21% of the surveyed groups no longer existed by the end of the data
collection process. This sample is relatively close to the 30% client exit rate registered
by the MFI after that period. Some of the circumstances that contributed for that
include:
• (a) lack of security to manage credit centres, as some ﬁeldwork was delayed due
to organised theft (occurring during ﬁeldwork) targeting en route MFI oﬃcers,
• (b) sharp increase in competition for clients with other MFIs (the main compe-
titors included the Grameen Bank, FINCA and Compartamos [CGAP, 2007])30,
• (c) impossibility of the MFI to oﬀer higher credit to their most successful clients.
Next page’s Figure 5.19 depicts proportionally fewer groups managing credit with more
than ﬁve members. In the ﬁgure one can see two group structures represented: initial
and ﬁnal. Some (58) renewed credit whilst the data collection was being administered
–whilst others (259) were in credit cycles. 41 out of 56 groups reduced the number of
participants during the data collection process. The implicit suggestion, leaving aside
that groups may not have ﬁnished their credit cycles during ﬁeldwork, is that stability
is important both to the MFI and the clients. As previously discussed, expelling a
client from a group is not simple. That depends on the self-organised group evaluation
mechanisms, such as the one presented based on Figure 5.24: “A schematic representa-
tion of the clients’ decision-making” (page 129), to manage the instability inside groups
due to the removal of individuals.
30 Proﬁtability from high interest rates has been strongly criticised by non-proﬁt driven MFIs.
120
Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients 121
6 
12 
21 
14 
5 
62 
67 69 
43 
18 
0 
25 
50 
75 
3 4 5 6 7 
N
um
be
r 
of
 g
ro
up
s 
Group size 
Figure 5.19: Distribution of group size amongst surveyed clientsabc
a Deviation (R2) is 0.90, suggesting that group size distribution is rather regular.
b Total of 259 initial groups, as not all members could be identiﬁed in the remaining cycle.
c Top values are initial groups (259), whilst the bottom ones are ﬁnal groups (58).
These ﬁndings have been generally common knowledge to the credit oﬃcers and clients,
but not to the MFI board members. Despite good work conditions and relationships
with employees, the detailed information about how groups behave was not being insti-
tutionally absorbed at every level. Not having enough time for doing all that is reques-
ted of credit oﬃcers31 may be one of the compounding elements inﬂuencing the lack of
communication with the board. The erratic level of post-credit consultancy provided
to clients, mentioned on page 108, is an issue that could be further researched.
Group status Scale Status of collective credit
any change 58 (100%) avg. decrement, increment (1.5%)
removed members 41 (70%) 23 kept (56%), 18 reduced (43%)
added members 17 (30%) 3 kept (17%), 14 increased (82%)
Table 5.19: Structural and ﬁnancial statuses of surveyed groups
Table 5.19 depicts that, amongst groups that change, removal of a member is relatively
uncommon regarding the total number of surveyed groups (261). Average change tend
to involve one person: both increment and decrement of standard deviations are about
0.8. Maybe due to the small sample, ﬁnancially there seems to be little advantage to
shrinking groups, as credit is kept largely equal despite removals. Most groups that got
bigger have increased the total amount of credit –yet a small percentage did not.
31Table 5.9: “Disadvantages of the framework, according to credit oﬃcers” (page 108).
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In interviews, carried out as part of the adapted EDTM32, credit oﬃcers and MFI board
members commented that expelling is generally a diﬃcult event for credit groups to
handle, particularly when there are outstanding debts. Such events require a fresh
social reaﬃrmation33 from group members in order to maintain cohesion and stability
for keeping up with future payments. Disrupting the otherwise normal course of action
within MFI groups is probably undesirable, given that the discussed social conventions34
prioritise conforming individuals to what is generally seen as acceptable behaviour.
Similar arguments have been made elsewhere, such as in [Anthony, 2005, Ledgerwood
et al., 2013] where the authors discuss that individual clients who miss meetings, and/or
payments, can disrupt the collective access to capital.
After carrying out the ﬁeldwork, it became clear that an unexpected high number
of clients left the MFI. That did not aﬀect this case study, as not many surveyed
groups35 completed their full credit cycle during the ﬁeldwork. In the studied MFI,
experienced clients are those who tend to –most often– contact potential newcomers,
as there are no MFI advertisements or events to attract new clients36. For this reason,
recovery of the client base for this particular MFI has been a rather slow process.
The stakeholders suggested, during the interviews, that there seems to be a learn-
ing process amongst groups, which may help the propagation and internalisation of
social conventions. This suggestion is based on all the survey and ﬁeldwork evidence
presented in this chapter and seems likely to be conﬁrmed if, in the future, another re-
search is carried out with this intention. If this suggestion is indeed ratiﬁed, this would
be another research ﬁnding with useful potential for both practitioners and academics
interested in better bottom-up understanding of microﬁnance policy-making.
32 See Section 4.17: “The adapted EDTM development cycle” (page 93).
33 Conﬁrming, or re-establishing, the group conventions for dealing with defaulters and debt.
34 Figure 5.24: “A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making”, p.129.
35 58 in Figure 5.19: “Distribution of group size amongst surveyed clients” (page 121).
36Apart from the beginning of the MFI operations, as then there was a need to expand.
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As clients are not required to manage debt and credit at centralised branches, credit
oﬃcers travel periodically to where groups live to set up a local and temporary credit
centre37. This process is potentially key, yet it remains to be further assessed in the
future research: whether the internalisation and sharing of knowledge regarding which
social conventions are likely to be adopted by groups indeed diﬀer by location. Perhaps
there would also be interesting variations in terms of this diﬀusion in rural and urban
groups38. The suggestions about the learning process is that diﬀerent social conventions
are tested over time by clients, with the objective of managing defaulters and debt
throughout the validity of credit. Then gradually the less eﬀective strategies would be
abandoned in favour of the alternatives that provide better results for the group.
From this paragraph onwards, this section continues with ﬁndings from the ﬁnancial
analysis of the surveyed clients, both in terms of collective and individual credit. Tables
5.20 and 5.21 synthesise the state of all credit analysed during ﬁeldwork. As one can
see in Table 5.20 below, there are considerable diﬀerences between the minimum and
maximum credit that individuals received from the MFI. The variation is particularly
relevant in this case study, as the microﬁnance framework in question is focused at
providing credit to the poorest in the region of Chiapas, Mexico. Considering that val-
ues vary substantially, notice that some surveyed individuals (either in initial or ﬁnal
groups39) are relatively wealthy given the restrictions of their economical context.
Credit feature Minimum Average Maximum Std. dev.
full dataseta $ 500.00 $ 5,600.04 $ 39,538.00 $ 8,422.52
individual (initial) $ 1,000.00 $ 3,357.80 $ 14,600.00 $ 1,739.34
individual (ﬁnal) $ 1,000.00 $ 4,194.91 $ 14,500.00 $ 2,210.25
a I.e., all those (surveyed or not) in the cross-sectional dataset provided by the MFI.
Exchange rate: one USD = 13 Mexican Pesos.
Table 5.20: Surveyed individual credit in Mexican Pesos
37 The location is determined according to the clients’ locations. For example, see Figure
4.10: “Raster KML plot of the 21 client locations surveyed during ﬁeldwork” (page 77).
38 As alluded to the suggestions discussed in terms of behavioural conventions (page 129).
39 That is, as explained in the ﬁrst paragraph of page 121, those belonging to groups that
renewed credit (ﬁnal) and those still in credit cycles (initial) during the ﬁeldwork administration.
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This fact suggests that a number of surveyed clients have long been working with the
MFI. Otherwise, it would not have been possible for these individuals to manage credit
that is much higher than the minimum initially provided to newcomers. As a result,
surveyed groups depicted in Table 5.21 also contain diverse ﬁnancial statuses. The
exchange rate is the same as in the previous table, i.e. one USD = 13 Mexican Pesos.
The standard deviations are not necessarily high, as the surveyed groups diﬀer over
time40.
Credit property Minimum Average Maximum Std. dev.
group (initial) $ 3,000.00 $ 15,780.77 $ 73,000.00 $ 8,921.58
group (ﬁnal) $ 3,000.00 $ 9,064.47 $ 87,000.00 $ 11,305.53
credit increase $ 3,000.00 $ 3,283.70 $ 73,000.00 $ 2,383.95
Table 5.21: Surveyed collective credit in Mexican Pesos
Figure 5.20, on the next page, depict a general tendency of overall collective credit
amounting to the lower end of the scale and that groups managing high amounts of
credit are rather scattered. This is not surprising, given that the standard deviations
shown in Table 5.21 above are high in both initial and ﬁnal group conﬁgurations.
Thus one can consider that –proportionally to this sample– not many surveyed groups
registered a total amount of credit that is considerably higher than the corresponding
averages in the table above.
Analysing in greater detail the circumstances of clients with high credit could provide
further suggestive evidence to explore the suggestions 41 that the top, most successful,
ones are also the most likely to leave the MFI in search of higher individual credit or
better interest rates. This is important as, contrasting with the early developments
of microﬁnance, the current trend is to keep clients by allowing them to manage lar-
ger amounts of credit –instead of losing (or “graduating”) them to traditional banking
services [UNITAR, 2013, Ledgerwood et al., 2013].
40 See Figure 5.19: “Distribution of group size amongst surveyed clients” (page 121).
41 Mentioned ﬁrst in Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114).
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That is important, as the most successful entrepreneur MFI clients have diﬃculties to
ﬁnd others with comparable credit to form new groups. Demand for higher individual
credit seems to be evident amongst urban clients, where ﬁnancial sanctions also seem to
be employed more eﬃciently than rural groups seemingly preferring social sanctions.
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Figure 5.20: Distribution of the average initial collective credit (surveyed groups)
The ﬁgure below shows that most clients have individual credit at the scale’s lower end.
One can see that there are fewer, yet relevant and representative, number of individuals
with much more credit (i.e. above $30,000). The plot contains data of all clients in the
cross-section extracted from the ﬁnancial database, which include the surveyed groups.
1	  
368	  
9144	  
7289	  
4650	  
2254	  
1498	  
934	  
508	   266	   151	   57	   14	   8	  
1403	  
162	  
0	  
1000	  
2000	  
3000	  
4000	  
5000	  
6000	  
7000	  
8000	  
9000	  
10000	  
50
0	  
10
00
	  
20
00
	  
30
00
	  
40
00
	  
50
00
	  
60
00
	  
80
00
	  
10
00
0	  
12
00
0	  
15
00
0	  
20
00
0	  
25
00
0	  
30
00
0	  
39
50
0	  
40
00
0	  
N
um
be
r	  o
f	  c
lie
nt
s	  
Amount	  of	  credit	  in	  Mexican	  pesos	  
Distribu7on	  of	  all	  individual	  credit	  
Figure 5.21: Distribution of individual credit (full cross-sectional dataset)
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Figure 5.22 below depicts how individual and group debts compare regarding credit.
This plot complements Table 5.20: “Surveyed individual credit in Mexican Pesos” and
Table 5.21: “Surveyed collective credit in Mexican Pesos” (both on page 123), which is
aimed at providing a single plot of all collective and single credit instalments.
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Figure 5.22: Overall distribution of surveyed debts and credits
Considering the transitional state of the surveyed groups during ﬁeldwork, note that:
• the ﬁnancial state of groups tend to remain stable, as despite the high standard
deviation on the increase of group debt (bottom right data label), the initial and
ﬁnal group debts do not diﬀer substantially (bottom left and centre data labels);
• the diﬀerence between initial and ﬁnal group credit (top left and centre data
labels) is signiﬁcant, which indicates –despite the high variance within groups–
that renewed collective instalments were generally more successful than before;
• in terms of ﬁnal and initial individual credit, one can see greater variations –which
are particularly evident in the increasing standard deviations– due to the skewed
nature of the cross-sectional dataset shown in Figure 5.21 (on the previous page).
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5.3 EDSM Assumptions and their Justiﬁcation
Due to the usually signiﬁcant cognitive gap between modellers and the social phe-
nomenon stakeholders42, the author considered important to highlight how the parti-
cipation of stakeholders can considerably facilitate the development of both the adapted
EDTM43 and integrating the resulting representation in the EDAM44 approach to build
an ABM. This is because stakeholders understood –as the research progressed– how
data was being collected, analysed and used by the modeller. Such regular updates by
the modeller –in my experience– promotes a productive engagement with stakeholders,
as the original gap between both reduce over time as part of this ongoing interaction.
The EDTM presented on the next page has been built based on the qualitative ﬁndings
extracted from surveys, particularly Table 5.13: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do
when a meeting is missed?” and Table 5.14: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do
when a payment is missed?” (page 113), and validated with observations and interviews
during ﬁeldwork. This is the result of having carried out the discussed adaptation of
the EDTM, in which a sequence of survey questions has been administered to under-
stand what individual clients actually do to cope with in key circumstances45 in their
microﬁnance groups.
Due to the nature of the chosen approach to categorise the collected qualitative data46,
diﬀerent concepts could have been extracted from the survey to develop the EDTM.
The result presented in this thesis is in line with the original EDTM methodology,
intended to provide a composite, cross-sectional, culturally-grounded representation of
a decision-making process. The frequency of items in the identiﬁed categories have
been used to guide the representation of behaviour in the form of events registered by
each individual agent regarding another agent in the ABM simulating MFI clients.
42 In terms of one not being as experienced or as familiar with each other’s expertise.
43 See Section 4.3.1: “Developing an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model (EDTM)” (page 91).
44 Discussed in Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86).
45 Which consist of missed meeting and/or missed payments, as highlighted by the data.
46 As discussed in the previous Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers” (page 104).
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Missed meeting and not missed payment ?
Missed a payment and / or a meeting?
Is the client ill ? MyStatus
Is it the first time ?
LeaderVisit GroupVisit
Yes No
NoNoYes Yes
NoYes
Support Fine
Figure 5.23: The proposed EDTM of decision-making within MFI groups
Each ramiﬁcation is tested in the ABM, per credit cycle and per agent in the simulation,
resulting in an event as described in Table 5.26: “Summary of all possible events in
the “MeetingTrack” (page 143). The EDTM, which has been deemed plausible by
interviewed stakeholders during ﬁeldwork, is based on assumptions and stylised facts
extracted from:
– Tables 5.13: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a meeting is missed?”, and
5.14: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?” (page 113),
– Tables 5.17: “According to clients, what is done when a meeting is missed”, and5.18:
“According to clients, what is done when a payment is missed” (page 118),
– and Table 5.6: “Supportive actions witnessed in microcredit groups” (page 105).
The ﬁgure on the next page illustrates the processing stages of the EDTM presented
above. It is thus a schematic representation of how the surveyed groups deal with
adversity. In the diagram, one can see the order and structure of social conventions,
regarding how MFI clients deal with the penalisation –or support– of defaulters in their
groups.
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missed meeting leader visit
group visitmissed payment cover default ?
wait and check
MFI fine
group fine
during meetingskey events social pressure financial sanction
expel
voting
Figure 5.24: A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making
There are two key events that are evaluated by group participants: missed meetings
and missed payments. Missing the former does not necessarily imply defaulting, as
the due quota may have been paid in advance to the group or brought to the credit
centre by someone else. In this regard, a promising trial for the MFI would be to allow
payments via mobile networks47 by, perhaps, according to how successful each client
is.If a group member is missing in a meeting, other matters –that are not dependent on
that person– are usually dealt with. After waiting for the defaulter, and if the absentee
is still incommunicable, the outstanding quota is likely to be covered by the other
group members48 –during the ongoing meeting– in order to avoid a ﬁne from the MFI.
These tends to be higher than group-deﬁned ones, as it will eﬀectively aﬀect all group
members. It is during meetings that participants assess what to with a defaulter49.
Two empirically grounded suggestions are proposed, based on the ﬁeldwork ﬁndings.
• (a) social sanctions (i.e. pressure) may be preferred by microcredit clients in
rural areas (due to its potential eﬃcacy in groups formed mainly by relatives);
• (b) ﬁnancial sanctions (i.e. ﬁnes) may be preferred by microcredit clients in
urban areas (due to its eﬃcacy in groups formed by unrelated neighbours).
These suggestions are supported by the MFI stakeholders as plausible due to the as-
sortative nature of their group formation and likelihood that this process is bound by
geographical distances50. Both suggestions remain to be tested empirically. Social
sanctions are exerted either by the group leader visit or a group visit to the defaulter.
Stakeholders also mentioned the diﬃculty of expelling a client, which is sometimes at
stake if their future collective success depends on recurring defaulter in their group.
47 Assuming that the relatively high operational costs are somehow overcome appropriately.
48 Sometimes one single participant, with much more credit than others, covers the default.
49 To proceed with a social or a ﬁnancial sanction, depending on the circumstances.
50 Often large distances in diﬃcult terrain: see Figures 4.10 (page 77) and 5.25 (page 130).
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Figure 5.25 depicts the distribution in kilometres of all unique routes between ﬁeld-
work locations51. Most groups are located far from each other and many are not easily
accessible –particularly as rural clients tend not to be frequent users of paid transport-
ation. The lack of good infrastructure and aﬀordable transportation also seem to aﬀect
the ability clients have to trade goods without dealing with exploitative intermediaries,
who have resources to travel where clients live and operate enterprises.
2 
4 
3 
10 
8 
13 
7 
8 
10 
7 
8 
6 
7 
5 
8 
5 
2 
6 
4 
1 
3 
1 
4 4 
2 2 
6 
1 
3 
1 1 
3 3 
5 
2 
6 
3 
6 
5 
1 
4 
2 
0 
2 
1 1 1 1 
2 
3 3 
0 
2 2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
5 20 35 50 65 80 95 110 125 140 155 170 185 200 215 230 245 260 
R
ou
te
s 
us
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
M
FI
 
Approximate distance in kms 
Distribution of routes per 5 km 
Figure 5.25: Histogram of all distances covered during ﬁeldworka
a Average of 99 km, min. of 1.31 km, max. of 267 km, standard deviation of 72 km.
The average distance from the MFI headquarters, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, to the
other surveyed sites is about 73 km. The standard deviation is 57 km, as one can see
above, the total route lengths between clients vary considerably. Often oﬃcers use cars
provided by the MFI to reach every served credit centre, distribute credit and collect
debts to funded groups. However, if the client’s location can be easily reached via public
transport, that option would also sometimes be used by the institution’s employees.
During ﬁeldwork, all bookkeeping by credit oﬃcers was made on paper and the data
was later summarised into the MFI system by themselves at their headquarters. This
has been a simple and eﬀective way of maintaining their records up-to-date, but is likely
to be supplanted by the MIFOS.org open source customer relationship system.
51Figure 4.10: “Raster KML plot of the 21 client locations surveyed during ﬁeldwork”,p.77.
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Being able to keep a detailed record about actions within groups (e.g. why certain
losses have been covered and by whom) would help interpreting both the short and
long-term eﬀects caused –or reinforced– by these. Such knowledge would also be useful
to continuously reﬁne the ABM52, and validation of results53 presented in this thesis.
Having such detailed time series on how credit groups self-organise would strengthen
the foundations to understand –over longer periods of time– the applicability of every
registered event amongst clients54 with regards to what happens internally in groups.
Due to the cross-sectional nature of this ﬁeldwork, it is necessary to acknowledge the
limitations of extrapolating –or generalising– implications of this research beyond what
is discussed hereby. MFI rules and geographical circumstances can play similar roles
as those observed in this ﬁeldwork55, in the sense of allowing or constraining actions.
However other unobservable local factors may also inﬂuence the shaping of social con-
ventions between group participants in ways that are unexpected to the institution.
Another aspect that is also worth mentioning that the MFI board of directors, al-
though aware of the cautious remark made at the end of the previous paragraph, they
did perceive ﬁeldwork ﬁndings with less scepticism than the model results obtained with
the ABM. Every ﬁeldwork report56 contained new and detailed information about rel-
evant, but previously relatively unknown, aspects regarding the group self-organisation.
Some of the ﬁndings presented in these documents were promptly regarded as useful
contributions to improving some of the existing MFI policies57. So this stakeholder
assessment has probably been inﬂuenced by their general greater familiarity with the
concepts and processes discussed during the data collection58, plus the fact that the
stakeholders participated directly in deﬁning the questions used in the surveys.
52 See Section 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132).
53 Discussed in Section 5.4.1: “Discussion of the EDSM Results” (page 147).
54 See Section 1.1: “Objectives and Contributions to Knowledge” (page 12).
55 See [Karlan, 2007] for a discussion on aspects of cultural and geographic proximity.
56 Discussed ﬁrst in Section 4.1: “The MFI Context during Data Collection” (page 76).
57 See Section 5.4.2: “Modelling Guidance and Impact on Policy-Making” (page 163).
58 See Figure 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection and analysis processes” (page 79).
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5.3.1 The Iterative Process of Utilising Findings
According to the illustration in Figure 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection
and analysis processes” (page 79), the research design was carried out by following a
sequence of surveys that complemented the understanding of the MFI case study. Then
interviews were carried out with random stakeholders during the one month ﬁeldwork
in Mexico, regarding each of the ﬁndings discussed in Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Find-
ings: Credit Oﬃcers” (page 101)” and Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance
Clients” (page 114)”. Both credit oﬃcers and credit clients conﬁrmed that these are res-
ults in accordance with their experience. After this step, the more generic illustration
contained in Figure 5.24: “A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making”
(page 129) was also presented and discussed with the stakeholders. Then a more de-
tailed representation of the mechanism to internally manage and penalise individuals
was proposed in the second ﬁeldwork report. That was then reﬁned into the repres-
entation shown in Figure 5.23: “The proposed EDTM of decision-making within MFI
groups” (page 128).
5.3.2 The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)
The exploratory simulation modelis based on the collected and analysed data, de-
scribed in Chapter 5: “Research Findings” (page 100), and is aimed at simulating the
occurrence of events within credit groups based on the EDTM proposed to represent
conventional behaviour amongst MFI clients in this case study59. In total 41 conﬁg-
urations have been tested with the ABM, which generated non-aggregated data about
each individual agent, allowing the inspection of the dynamics at the micro scale. This
data has been aggregated so that the macro patterns could be analysed.
59 See section Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers (page 101) and Clients (page 114).
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The results of these analyses are described in Section 5.4.1: “Discussion of the EDSM
Results” (page 147). Registered events during simulations (i.e. missed meeting and /
or payment) are endorsed, from the perspective of individual agents, as being either
acceptable or unacceptable according to the EDTM. Analysing the total number of
events and endorsements did not help to explore the conﬁgured groups over time, so
instead focus has been on the averages and standard deviations60. The developed ABM
is a form of exploring the interaction amongst agents equipped with the same EDTM,
with no intention of forecasting. The interaction during simulations takes place during
the scheduled credit meetings, prompting each agent to go through its own memory in
search of previous event registries given to events regarding each speciﬁc group parti-
cipant. Every agent has also a randomly assigned list of tolerances about each group
member, which remains ﬁxed until the end of a simulation. No implementation of indi-
vidual ﬁtness has been done in the sense of optimisations, as events are just individually
endorsed either as acceptable or unacceptable, depending on each conﬁgured agent and
circumstances61.
The agents’ sensing ability is limited to sequentially consulting –in diﬀerent order per
consultation– the defaulters’ circumstances (i.e. the parameters) during a meeting.
And bearing in mind that there is no evidence from the EDTM to guide the model-
ling of certain features, stochasticity has been used in the following aspects of the ABM:
• collective incidence of illness, unproﬁtability or bad investment [Lucas, 2009b]62;
• processing order of such conditions, as ﬁxing that could create path-dependency63;
• when agents, tagged as potential defaulters, may default or miss meetings.
60 See Section 5.4.1: “Discussion of the EDSM Results” (page 147).
61 See Section 5.3.3: “Structure, Processes and Parameters of the EDSM” (page 136).
62 See Figure 2.6: “Threats close to a poverty line, adapted from [Churchill, 2007]” (page 44)
and Table 5.12: “Common reported causes leading to individual defaulting” (page 112).
63 See Section 4.3.2: “Implementing the EDTM into the ABM simulation” (page 95).
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The research throughout this thesis is focused on describing and exploring conventional
social behaviour, as this feature is pervasive in microﬁnance due to the social collateral
concept that is central for harnessing cooperation in microﬁnance64. Whilst collecting
and analysing data, it has been observed how institutional rules (i.e. the conditions to
repay credit) imposed by the MFI can interplay with the emergent (informal) cooper-
ation and penalisation strategies managed by group members65. In other words, apart
from formal credit rules, there are also group-level criteria for dealing with defaulters
and debt. Understanding these conventionalised behaviours in detail was deemed an as-
set by the MFI board members and this also helped in the ABM modelling process. One
of the main ﬁndings was the elucidation of how institutional (top-down) policies may
facilitate, or disrupt, the success of groups in relation to their organisation66. Despite
being central to microﬁnance, the available literature suggests that often MFI prac-
titioners lack thorough understanding of how conventional social behaviour amongst
group members aﬀect their collective responsibility to manage credit67. This happens
partially as collecting and maintaining this type of data is time-consuming and drains
resources from other MFI areas that deserve prompter attention and resources.
In case an a MFI has never systematically collected qualitative data from its credit
oﬃcers or clients, it can be considerably troublesome to administer questionnaires to
many hundreds –or thousands– quickly enough for timely analysis and presentation of
ﬁndings. This is particularly evident when institutional resources have been stretched
close to full capacity with other costly tasks, as then their ﬁnancial portfolio may be
at risk due to such extra expenses. Despite these being potentially useful, there is
no guarantee that such research should produce knowledge to stakeholders that is dir-
ectly relevant for policy-making. Those are one of the reasons that compelled the MFI
to collaborate with the development of this research thesis, as the research proposal
externally covered all the involved extra time and expenses during the project.
64 See the discussions put forward in Chapter 2: “Social Enterprise” (page 17).
65 See discussion in Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114)
66 Figure 5.24: “A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making”, p.129.
67 This is discussed in Section 2.3: “Group Lending Approaches in Microﬁnance”, page 31.
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Evidence from this case study suggests that there may be rather stable group-level be-
havioural conventions, including shared values and processes, contributing to sustain
long-term cooperation and management of penalisations within the surveyed microcre-
dit groups.
Such analysis of the microﬁnance clientele was useful both for guiding the modelling
discussed in this thesis and also provided the local policy-makers with new informa-
tion about their clients. Details from Section 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings: Credit Oﬃcers”
(page 101) were particularly informative for this. Other relevant insights were obtained
by analysing both the qualitative and ﬁnancial ﬁndings with stakeholders68. This in-
cluded conventionalised behaviour for administering: sanctions (e.g. via social pressure
or group-level ﬁnes or expelling) and cooperation (via covering individual defaults)69.
Another conjecture that emerged form the analysis is that the number of relatives
and neighbours seem to depend on group location, and that lead to the suggestions
as to what is pivotal to understand in terms of acceptable –or desirable– behaviour.
According to the collected data rural groups tend to contain relatives, whilst urban
ones neighbours (see page 168). This has been alluded to the suggestions discussed in
terms of behavioural conventions (page 129).
68 See Figure 4.11: “Order of the complete data collection and analysis processes” (page 79),
Figure 4.17: “The adapted EDTM development cycle” (page 93) and
Figure 4.14: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM) [Lucas, 2011]” (page 88).
69 See Figure 5.24: “A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making” (page 129)
and Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 114).
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5.3.3 Structure, Processes and Parameters of the EDSM
Figure 5.26 below illustrates how the EDSM operates. The agent parameters are conﬁg-
urable according to the boundaries set by the EDTM developed based on the analysed
data. These include the group circumstances listed in Table 5.23: “Conﬁgurable para-
meters for group circumstances in the EDSM” and ﬁnancial aspects listed in Table 5.25
“Conﬁgurable ﬁnancial parameters in the EDSM” (page 137).
no
configure 
clients
collected 
evidence
active 
quota?
Halt 
simulation
update  
"MeetingTrack"
yes process all 
group events
Figure 5.26: Diagrammatic representation of a EDSM simulation runa
a Dotted lines indicate either database queries (evidence) or insertions (simulation results).
The number of “Repayments”70 eﬀectively allows agents to process a proportional num-
ber of registered events about each other71 and update the agent individual “Meet-
ingTrack” data structure72 at runtime. I.e. a simulation with more repayments and
clients facing adversity will probably lead to more events. Once all iterations are pro-
cessed, the simulation is over and the user is then able to analyse results by interpreting
the detailed log of that particular simulation run or visualise aggregations of the former.
Table 5.22 on the next page contains the parameters regarding a simulation run. It is
possible to change values of these parameters whilst running the model, but that would
too reﬂect in the obtained results. This kind of experiment is probably best suited for
educational tests but not for analysing the overall behaviour of a given conﬁguration.
70 12 or 24: as in Table 5.25: “Conﬁgurable ﬁnancial parameters in the EDSM” (p. 139).
71 Fig.5.29: “Update of the “MeetingTrack” data structure, based on [Lucas, 2010]” (p. 141).
72 See Table 5.24: “The MeetingTrack event data structure of each agent” (p. 138).
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The ABM version made available to the MFI stakeholders and policy-makers included
an option to either visualise results in plots or write all details of every event between
group participants into a comma-separated value (henceforth CSV) text ﬁle.
Property Description Range
plots whether plots should be updated at runtime boolean
iterations number of times the model should run 1 to 10.000
init set chosen conﬁgurations for running the model clickable once
go execute model according to Iterations and Init clickable once
Table 5.22: Conﬁgurable parameters for running experiments using the EDSM
Table 5.23 below depicts the most inﬂuential parameters that inﬂuence results obtained
in the EDSM. The selection of those aﬀected by items three to ﬁve is random, as the
occasional missing of meetings and –sometimes too– payments due to their individual
conditions.
Item Property Description Range
1 rural whether is a rural or urban group boolean
2 MFI-Group size of the simulated group 3 to 7
3 bad investors how many may invest badly 0 to 6
4 unproﬁtable how many may be unproﬁtable 0 to 6
5 disease incidence percentage subject to diseasea 0% to 90%
a Of both clients and meetings that can be aﬀected, rounded to the nearest number.
Table 5.23: Conﬁgurable parameters for group circumstances in the EDSM
Along with all items of the individual agent data structure “MeetingTrack” (listed on
Table 5.24 on the next page), the following other elements are found in each agent
internal variables: individual “TotalDebt”, individual “Quota”, a vector listing each
of their “SpokenLanguages”73, “Location”74, “BusinessActivity”75 plus a randomly as-
signed “Tolerance” between every participant to allow greater variation of results.
73 If rural a language of Mayan ancestry is chosen and, if urban, Spanish is added too
according to the list in Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model (10th page from 206).
74 Chosen from a list in Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model (10th page from 206).
75 Chosen from the set of possible urban or rural businesses sourced from the MFI. These are
listed in the Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model (11th and 12th pages from 206).
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# Tracking Description of the stored data
0 the meeting identiﬁcation of the group meeting
1 the analysed client identiﬁcation of who is being analysed
2 the analyser client identiﬁcation of who is analysing
3 has the meeting been missed? boolean about the analysed client
4 has the meeting been missed? boolean about the analysed client
5 if a client is ill? boolean about the analysed client
6 if a client is a bad investor? boolean regarding the analysed client
7 the consequence text description of the relevant event
8 the potential group loss descriptive text about it
9 the client endorsement acceptable, unacceptable or MyConditiona
10 the debt the amount for this entry
11 the event’s occurrence order the order in the agent’s registry
a The last type of event, MyCondition indicates an agent describing itself.
Table 5.24: The MeetingTrack event data structure of each agent
All agent properties, apart from the update-able components of the “MeetingTrack”
vector, are immutable at runtime. If the simulation is conﬁgured with longer credit
cycles (“Repayments”, Table 5.25) and bigger groups (“MFI-Group”, Table 5.23) invari-
ably the number of entries in “MeetingTrack” will increase. This may lead to lengthier
micro-level narratives of each simulated group, which allows a ﬁne grained analysis of
the complete history of events registered amongst members of the simulated group.
Table 5.25 on the next page depicts the conﬁgurable ﬁnancial aspects of the EDSM.
Despite suggestions that credit clients may change behaviour depending on their cir-
cumstances in relation to someone else is credit or debt values76, the ABM that has
been tested by stakeholders and policy-makers did not take these conjectures into con-
sideration. There is no evidence, either from the MFI databases, administered data
collection, interviewed credit oﬃcers or clients, that could backup an assumption of
how the aforementioned economical aspects could inﬂuence behaviour. Thus, by fol-
lowing the evidence-driven approach from the EDTM, these ﬁnancial properties are
annotated in the “MeetingTrack” data structure (Table 5.24) for interpretation pur-
poses, but do not inﬂuence how clients may endorse each other (Figure 5.29) in the
simulation runs.
76 See e.g. the ﬁrst paragraph on page 125, regarding successful entrepreneur clients encoun-
tering diﬃculty in ﬁnding others with similar credit –or debt– to carry on within the MFI.
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Property Description Range
interest rate regarding the total individual debt 0.5% to 3%
equal credit whether credit is equally divided boolean
max agent debt maximum amount of individual debt $1.000 to $40.000
min agent debt minimum amount of individual debt $1.000 to $40.000
repayments number of meetings at a credit centre 12 or 24 months
Table 5.25: Conﬁgurable ﬁnancial parameters in the EDSM
The total range of relevant properties77 includes a MFI -Group containing between
three and seven people, assigned with 12 or 24 payments, either rural or urban, having
disease incidence varying in decimal intervals from 0 to 100%, plus a number of un-
proﬁtable clients and bad investors varying from zero to seven. There are respectively
5, 2, 2, 7, 7 and 11 possible variations per parameter. Without considering the ﬁnan-
cial parameters, this amounts to 10.780 possible combinations to fully test the model
parameter combinations. Sweeping through it all is unnecessary, as some combina-
tions are either unrealistic or impossible. For example, both surveyed and interviewed
stakeholders informed that groups with every participant being seriously ill, aﬀected by
unproﬁtability or bad investments would deﬁnitely not be granted credit. Thus such
ABM combination does not need to be tested and it is also not addressed at all in the
EDTM.
Given the aforementioned circumstances and the development approach discussed in
Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86), the de-
veloped simulation does not allow setting all group members as being aﬀected by an
issue listed in Table 5.23: “Conﬁgurable parameters for group circumstances in the
EDSM” (page 137). Nevertheless the simulation model could be easily adapted to test
groups with all participants facing some type of adversity. Results could then be com-
pared with those in Section 5.4.1: “Discussion of the EDSM Results” (page 147). The
next pages of this section are dedicated to discuss how the ABM simulation and agents,
which represent MFI clients, have been implemented.
77 See Table 5.22: “Conﬁgurable parameters for running experiments using the EDSM”,
Table 5.23: “Conﬁgurable parameters for group circumstances in the EDSM” on page 137 and
Table 5.25: “Conﬁgurable ﬁnancial parameters in the EDSM” above.
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The order in which the model is initialised is depicted in Figure 5.27 below. It starts
with setting the basic conﬁgurations chosen by the user and internal properties, such as
ﬁxing the random seed plus making available all possible features (languages, business
type and location) that clients will require for executing a simulation run.
Set 987654321 as random seed,
configure all 20 GIS-mapped locations, 6 
languages, 6 rural and 34 urban businesses
Create clients and officers and, depending on
location, assigning Mayans and businesses.
Tolerance is set randomly amongst clients. 
Group debt is distributed uniformly or
randomly according to a configured range. Shuffle
issues: Diseases, Unprofitable and Bad Investment.
Figure 5.27: The initialisation processes of the EDSM
Once the model has been started with the conﬁgured initial conditions, the simulation
will execute the procedures shown in Figure 5.28 below and Figure 5.29 (next page).
According to settings described in Table 5.23 (page 137), the processing order of the top
three issues hindering quota repayments (illness, bad investment and unproﬁtability)
is shuﬄed78 to avoid path-dependency (lock-in) issues. If events between simulated
clients would have always been processed in the same order, results may have been
inﬂuenced by the static nature (sameness) of such computational iteration. That is, if
the simulation model reinforces itself to follow a certain computational path, changing
this dynamics –and thus reach diﬀerent results– may be intricate due to the attenuation
(self-reinforcement) of positive or negative feedback from past choices. The fact that
social conventions may emerge from repeated behaviour79 does not mean that a model-
ler should hard-code these features. Doing so would simply demonstrate how one can,
computationally, replicate such features and would thus not consist of a platform in
which one may further explore the phenomenon of interest. Thus the proposed EDTM
is inﬂicted with the issues, as depicted in Figure 5.28 on the next page, in a diﬀerent
order every time an experiment is run in the implemented ABM.
78 I.e. each of the 6 combinations is proportionally distributed as about 16% of all events.
79 Either self-organised, or constrained by an institution, as in the case of credit clients.
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illbad investor unprofitable
Register whether a meeting event is missed,
PAID_ONTIME or MY_LOSS regarding the quota
Shuffle the order of all clients to endorse those afflicted
in "MeetingTrack", then update data about current event.
Figure 5.28: How issues aﬄicting clients are processed in the EDSM a
a Codes in capital letters denote internal events recorded by the model.
Figure 5.29 below describes how the EDSM proceed after reaching the last step shown
on the previous ﬁgure. First all simulated clients, from the same group, are gathered
into a vector that orders them diﬀerently every time an event should be processed.
From this auxiliary data structure, yet another unordered list is created containing
only those clients in adversity. In case there are defaulting events, all clients analyse
the defaulter’s circumstances in relation to one’s own situation and then an event is
registered in the corresponding individual “MeetingTrack” (Figure 5.24, on page 138).
Select all
simulated clients
Select clients
in adversity 
All clients analyse
defaulting events
first time events 
flagged by clients
Clients update 
MeetingTracks
Figure 5.29: Update of the “MeetingTrack” data structure, based on [Lucas, 2010]
Events occurring for the ﬁrst time are ﬂagged individually as, e.g. one would not
consider expelling someone who missed a meeting or payment just once80. Events are
processed sequentially but the order in which agents join this queue is never the same,
which is yet another mechanism to avoid computational path-dependency issues that
agents could otherwise reinforce at runtime.
80 See ﬁndings discussed based on Table 5.13: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when
a meeting is missed?, Table 5.14: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is
missed? and Figure 5.24: “A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making” (pages
113, 129).
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Once all agents –including defaulters– assessed the circumstances and registered each
event regarding other agents in the current meeting, the remaining round of evaluations
(“Meeting”) are sequentially processed following again what is depicted in Figure 5.28:
“How issues aﬄicting clients are processed in the EDSM” (page 141). Then the quota
cycle depicted in the ﬁgure above continues to be processed. Table 5.26: “Summary of
all possible events in the “MeetingTrack”” on the next page contains the description and
summary of all possible events during a simulation that can be recorded. Obviously
there are more events regarding other group participants than oneself in this data
structure. The top three listed in it (MyStatus, MyLoss and PaidOnTime) are those
used by agents to describe their own circumstances during a particular meeting.
The events listed in the ﬁrst column appear in the 9th slot of the data structure depic-
ted in Figure 5.24: “The MeetingTrack event data structure of each agent” (page 138).
Occasionally this text description will also appear in the 7th slot, named Consequence,
of the same vector data structure to facilitate the reading of obtained simulation res-
ults. All other listed events are the result of one agent analysing the other. These
updates are processed recursively until the number of conﬁgured simulated meetings is
reached. Unsurprisingly this process can sometimes generate a substantially long text
log. That is due to the number of individual entries tending to increase as a direct
proportion to the number of defaulting –or missed meeting– events.
The narrative as to how surveyed stakeholders use their social conventions was con-
structed based on the EDTM, is depicted in Figure 5.23: “The proposed EDTM of
decision-making within MFI groups (page 128) and validated with interviews by the
randomly selected stakeholders as a good approximation to what happens in their real-
ity. There may be slight, or perhaps even signiﬁcant, variations of this elsewhere within
the MFI is geographical area of operation, but the discussed ABM is inline with the
cross-sectional ﬁndings discussed in the ﬁrst two sections of this chapter.
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Event Requisite Description Consequence
MyStatus assess oneself one’s own situation none directly
MyLoss assess oneself one’s own default none directly
PaidOnTime assess oneself acknowledgement none directly
LeaderVisit assess adversity a social pressure b NoLoss c
GroupVisit assess adversity d social pressure e NoLoss f
Support assess adversity g cooperation intent h CoveredLoss i
Fine assess adversity j cooperation intent k Fine l
CoverLoss assess adversity m vote for covering loss NoLoss n
a I.e., assess circumstances of who missed –for the ﬁrst time– a meeting but not a payment.
b I.e., apply the ﬁrst instance of social pressure according to ﬁeldwork ﬁndings (see Figure
5.24: “A schematic representation of the clients’ decision-making”, page 129).
c I.e., if tolerant this social sanction is deemed as acceptable, otherwise as unacceptable.
d I.e., assess someone subjected to a LeaderVisit but who has not yet missed a payment.
e I.e., this is the second, or next, instance of social sanctions mentioned in footnote b.
f I.e., if tolerant this is deemed by the client as acceptable, otherwise as unacceptable.
g I.e., assess who has missed at least one meeting and payment during the credit history.
h See Table 5.6 “Supportive actions witnessed in microcredit groups” (p. 105) and 5.8:
“Actions within groups supported by participants’ morality and ethics” (p. 107).
i I.e., if the client is ill and the analyser is tolerant to that, register it as acceptable.
j I.e., assess someone who has missed at least one meeting or payment in past meetings.
k Also based on footnote h, but additionally cast a vote for a further sanction.
l I.e., registered as unacceptable if healthy, otherwise cast a vote for a MFI _Fine.
m I.e., assess a known defaulter who has at least covered once someone’s previous loss.
n I.e., register as acceptable if evaluator is tolerant to the subject, otherwise unacceptable.
Table 5.26: Summary of all possible events in the “MeetingTrack”
The use of a data-driven development lifecycle81 helps to systematically gather and
justify which evidence (i.e. quantitative and/or qualitative data) to guide the building
of the model discussed in this section. This is helpful as the modeller can bear in mind
which evidence (experimental or not) is principled as it has been systematically collected
and validated based on a quantitative and/or qualitative behavioural methodology. In
this research thesis, such guidance has come from carrying out the adapted EDTM82.
Note that each of the three adversities aﬀecting clients, listed in Table 5.23: “Conﬁg-
urable parameters for group circumstances in the EDSM” (page 137), could be subject
to entirely new research projects. Due to their ample inﬂuence potential, these have
been simpliﬁed as tags in agents to represent who is aﬄicted by a conditions and who
triggers event entries from other agents in case of missed meetings and/or payments.
81 See Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86).
82 See Figure 4.17: “The adapted EDTM development cycle” (page 93).
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Figure 5.30 is a top-level view of the ABM algorithm83. The structure is described
to facilitate the model understanding. It should be read with support of Table 5.26:
“Summary of all possible events in the “MeetingTrack”” (page 143), Table 5.6: “Sup-
portive actions witnessed in microcredit groups” (page 105) and also Figure 5.23: “The
proposed EDTM of decision-making within MFI groups” (page 128).
Set	  all	  control	  variables	  to	  0	  and	  random	  seed	  to	  987654321	  Load	  all	  possible	  languages,	  locations,	  urban	  and	  rural	  businesses	  Configure	  group	  with	  debts,	  adversities,	  tolerances	  and	  above	  attributes	  Write	  all	  configured	  parameters	  in	  the	  simulation	  output	  text	  file	  Set	  timer	  to	  0	  and	  OrderOfTrackedEvents	  with	  CurrentOrder	  as	  1.1	  	  REPEAT	  shuffle	  ProcessingOrderOfAdversities	  in	  the	  current	  meeting	  	  	   Set	  number	  of	  meetings	  that	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  DiseaseIncidencePercentage	  	   Randomly	  set	  who	  will	  be	  sick,	  also	  based	  on	  DiseaseIncidencePercentage	  	   Randomly	  set	  who	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  unprofitability	  or	  a	  bad	  investment	  	   Set	  ListOfAgentsInAdversity,	  uniquely	  identifying	  each	  of	  the	  affected	  agents	  	  	   WHILE	  there	  are	  still	  outstanding	  quotas	  to	  be	  paid	  and	  active	  meetings	  to	  attend	  	  	   	   Randomly	  set	  whether	  someone	  in	  ListOfAgentsInAdversity	  missed	  the	  meeting	  	   	   Randomly	  set	  whether	  those	  added	  to	  ListOfAbsentAgents	  missed	  a	  payment	  	   	   Log	  	  data	  in	  OrderOfTrackedEvents,	  each	  entry	  with	  CurrentOrder	  +	  0.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   REPEAT	  	  	  	   	   	   FOR_EACH	  agent	  entry	  in	  the	  ListOfAgentsInAdversity	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Search	  data	  about	  each	  agent	  in	  other	  agent's	  OrderOfTrackedEvents	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Deal	  with	  missed	  meetings	  and	  payments	  	  	   	   	   END_FOR	  	  	   	   UNTIL	  processing	  the	  given	  fixed	  order,	  per	  meeting,	  of	  all	  simulated	  group	  members	  	  	   END_WHILE	  	  	   WRITE	  in	  the	  simulation	  output	  text	  file	  	  	   	   total	  number	  of	  Acceptable	  and	  Unacceptable	  events	  	   	   the	  complete	  OrderOfTrackedEvents	  history	  of	  all	  agents	  	  	   	   SUMMARISE	  total	  number	  of	  events	  	   	   END_SUMMARISE	  	  	   END_WRITE	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Set	  all	  control	  variables	  to	  0	  and	  TotalNumberOfSimulationRuns	  +	  1	  UNTIL	  reaching	  TotalNumberOfSimulationRuns	  	  
Figure 5.30: Pseudo-algorithm of the implemented EDSM
83 Included in “Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model” (page 206).
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5.4 Insights Based on the ABM analysis
The insights provided by the implemented ABM, which has been developed based on
the data collected using the lifecycle described in Chapter 4: “Research Design and De-
velopment” (page 75) and discussed in the previous sections, in this thesis are two-fold.
Firstly, the ABM generates a micro-level record in each simulation run by providing:
• (I) a sequential log of registered events between microcredit clients in their group;
• and (II) a textual description of the same data, presented as a short story.
Examples of these can be found on pages 148 and 149, where Table 5.27: “Micro-level
log example (1 unproﬁtable, no missed payment)” and Table 5.28: “Micro-level log
example (unproﬁtable default, missed meeting)” are respectively discussed in detail.
Another type of insight provided by the ABM is the ability to systematically analyse
macro level patterns of simulated microcredit groups. These are obtained by varying
a range of feasible group conﬁgurations and circumstances, to observe the impact on
groups ranging from their minimum size up to the maximum number of seven84. The
analyses based on the macro-level patterns have been focused on the frequency of the
overall number of observed events between clients in simulated microcredit groups:
• there are few diﬀerences between simulated groups conﬁgured with 1 or 2 unpro-
ﬁtable clients, 1 unproﬁtable and 1 bad investor, or disease incidence aﬀecting a
group at 20%, 30% or 60% levels (results are discussed on pages 152 and 154);
• similar results are obtained by simulating groups conﬁgured with 3 or 4 unpro-
ﬁtable clients, 3 unproﬁtable clients plus 1 bad investor and 2 unproﬁtable plus
2 bad investors (results are discussed in greater detail on pages 157 and 156);
84 See Figure 5.19: “Distribution of group size amongst surveyed clients” (page 121).
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• another set of similar results are presented regarding simulated groups with dis-
ease incidence conﬁgured at 40%, 80% and 90% levels (discussion on page 158);
• other diﬀerent patterns are discussed regarding groups containing 5 unproﬁtable
clients (see page 159) and those with 10% of disease incidence (see page 160);
Discussing ﬁndings, both obtained in ﬁeldwork and the ABM, with stakeholders was
key to ascertain the relevance of insights to the regulatory framework of the MFI. The
expert stakeholders reported greater conﬁdence in using the simulation to analyse the
systematic dynamics of conﬁgured microcredit groups because the agent-based model
was developed based on the data collected directly from their clients85. The repor-
ted stakeholder experience of participating in the EDTM86 modelling process is also
considered important by the author –and this has also been highlighted by the MFI
stakeholders– as a way to facilitate the understanding of how conventional social beha-
viour amongst clients can inﬂuence a policy long-term success. Without this, seemingly
unimportant aspects about the social phenomenon could have been overseen, and thus
disregarded when formulating assumptions to be implemented in an ABM.
Qualitatively validating ABM results that have no comparable quantitative evidence
is an eminent issue, and this seems only clariﬁed by comparing quantitative simula-
tion results with new quantitative data. There has been methodological progress, yet
reliability of validation procedures is incipient. This contributes to ABM research be-
ing, to date, discussed rather more in theoretical and technical terms than practical
applications [Boero and Squazzoni, 2005, Bankes, 2002, Edmonds et al., 2013]. Whilst
interpreting the models’ processes and outputs can improve ones’ understanding of the
simulations, practical relevance of new ﬁndings to policy-making depend on analysis
of empirical evidence. The developed ABM contributes with results that complement
these with insights that would be otherwise unattainable without such a simulation.
85 In a process that the stakeholders themselves participated, thus were familiar with.
86 See Figure 4.17: “The adapted EDTM development cycle” (page 93).
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5.4.1 Discussion of the EDSM Results
In total 41 diﬀerent conﬁgurations were tested to provide data for the sensitivity ana-
lysis of the implemented ABM. Stakeholders considered credible both the modelling
approach and obtained results, which is good feedback from applying the lifecycle de-
scribed in Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86).
Each conﬁguration has been simulated 10.000 times87 and results were logged in de-
tailed comma-separated value88 (CSV89) ﬁles containing all the computed data per
agent (i.e. the micro-level of what occurs in a simulated group) and across agents (i.e.
the macro-level properties regarding all runs).
The hardware used to simulate the experiments was: an Intel Core 2 Duo at 2.26
GHz, 3MB L2 cache, bus speed at 1.07 GHz and 8 GB of RAM, running the “testing”
version of Debian Linux. The fastest simulation ran in about 0.16 seconds, whilst the
longest took about 4357.82 seconds, with an average of 8.16 seconds and a standard de-
viation of 23.77 seconds. The simulation model requires little computing power, despite
the intricate data structures and processes described in the previous chapter (Section
5.3.3: “Structure, Processes and Parameters of the EDSM”, page 136).
The aforementioned aspect would, however, not be the case if one the three adversities
(illness, unproﬁtability and bad investments) were modelled with greater complexity
than the simple stochastic and probabilistic nature in this version (see discussion of
Figure 5.28: “How issues aﬄicting clients are processed in the EDSM”’, page 141).
87 Due to the sheer number of runs, it was needed to increase the Java heap size (using
“Xmx7GB”) to run all simulations, so the virtual machine would not run out of memory.
88 I.e., a simple database ﬁle where each line is a record and ﬁelds are separated by commas.
89 All CSV ﬁles were processed using shell scripts, which contained pipes (“j”) connecting
serialised results obtained from running scripts using the following tools90: “grep, awk, tail,
xargs, ﬁnd, echo, print, sort, exit, uniq” along with output/input redirectors “<, <<, >, >>”.
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As an example, Table 5.27 below depicts all micro activity of a simulated group: in-
dividual events logged for the simulation run number 95. Through 12 meetings, the
simulated microﬁnance group generated a database with 14 entries. Only those in bold
describe what the group did regarding the event of interest, which is client_0 having
missed a meeting. This group of urban clients, located in Ixtapa, was conﬁgured with
three businesses: Grocery Store, Piñata91, Ice Cream Seller. Their languages consisted
of: all knowing Spanish, plus two knowing Tsotsil and one knowing Tojolabal. The
complete parameters list is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.3.3: “Structure,
Processes and Parameters of the EDSM” (page 137).
# Target From Missed Event Quota Status
1 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
2 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
3 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
4 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
5 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
6 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
7 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
8 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
9 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
10 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
11 client_0 client_0 true MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
11 client_0 client_1 true LeaderVisit NoLoss Unacceptable
11 client_0 client_2 true LeaderVisit NoLoss Acceptable
12 client_0 client_0 false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
Table 5.27: Micro-level log example (1 unproﬁtable, no missed payment)abc
a MyStatus allows one to identify which client is adversely aﬀected (client_0 in this case).
b The ﬁrst column indicates which of the 12 meetings, each due N$156, the entry is about.
c The third column indicates whether a meeting has been missed.
The verbatim output from the simulation model is equivalent to reading the following:
“A group with 3 is located in Ixtapa with the following individual businesses: grocery,
piñata and ice cream. They had a 12-quota credit and 1 participant that is being un-
proﬁtable, which lead to missing only the 11th meeting, without incurring a loss. That
occasion was deemed as acceptable by one member and unacceptable by another.”
91 I.e., a papier mâché ﬁgure containing toys and candy for children to celebrate festivities.
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Thus the more missed meetings and payments, the longer the story to tell will be. That
is in turn inﬂuenced by the group size, how many quotas must be processed and how
many are aﬀected by an adversity. In this case, tolerance diﬀerentiated “Status”92.
Table 5.28 is a diﬀerent example to that one presented on the previous page, as now an
unproﬁtable client misses both a meeting and payment. This simulation (run number
146) was conﬁgured with 12 quotas and group size 3. This case presents three events
to be endorsed, so the log length increased to 18. Up to the 5th meeting, then again at
the 10th meeting, events are registered as those previously presented. Nevertheless, the
12th meeting presents a default by client_0, which is willingly covered by client_1 but
unwillingly (due to the occurrence of VoteExpel) by client_2. This group was located
in Larrainzar, having three languages (Mam, Zoque and Spanish) with three diﬀerent
businesses (hammocks, clothing and ﬁshery).
# Target From MM MP Event Quota Status
1 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
2 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
3 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
4 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
5 client_0 client_0 true false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
5 client_0 client_1 true false LeaderV. NoLoss Acceptable
5 client_0 client_2 true false LeaderV. NoLoss Unacceptable
6 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
7 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
8 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
9 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
10 client_0 client_0 true false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
10 client_0 client_2 true false GroupV. NoLoss Unacceptable
10 client_0 client_1 true false GroupV. NoLoss Acceptable
11 client_0 client_0 false false MyStatus OnTime MyStatus
12 client_0 client_0 true true MyStatus MyLoss MyStatus
12 client_0 client_1 true true CoverLoss NoLoss Acceptable
12 client_0 client_2 true true VoteExpel AvoidL. Unacceptable
Table 5.28: Micro-level log example (unproﬁtable default, missed meeting)abcde
a MyStatus allows one to identify which client is adversely aﬀected (client_0 in this case).
b The ﬁrst column indicates which of the 12 meetings, each due N$136, the entry is about.
c The third column (MM) indicates whether a meeting has been missed.
d The forth column (MP) indicates whether a payment has been missed.
e LeaderVisit, GroupVisit and AvoidLoss were abbreviated due to diagrammatic limitations.
92 Discussion in Section 5.3.2: “The Evidence-Driven Simulation Model (EDSM)” (page 132).
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The story presented to stakeholders about events occurred in this group consisted of:
“A group with 3 is located in Larrainzar with the following individual businesses: ham-
mocks, clothing and ﬁshery. They had a 12-quota credit and 1 participant that is being
unproﬁtable, which lead to missing 2 meetings (the 5th and 10th), without incurring a
loss. These occasions were each deemed as acceptable by one member and unacceptable
by another. There was a default by the unproﬁtable member at the last meeting. That
was covered willingly by client_1 and unwillingly by client_2, who also casted an expel
vote.”
The previous two pages illustrate how the micro-level textual log of the EDSM unfolds
during the simulation runs and how the stories were presented to the MFI stakehol-
ders. Many thousands of these are the reason for the large size of the database with
all simulation results. Figure 5.31 on the next page depicts how the total number of
events varied across all conﬁgurations of the simulations. As one can notice, most sim-
ulation runs yield results closer to the lower end of the presented scale. If one takes into
account all simulated experiments, relatively few simulation runs yielded totals that
concentrate near the very minimum number of event entries. Similarly, the further
away from the average (81), one can observe a decreasing trend on the total number of
registered event entries.
One can also observe a rather large number of simulation runs registering total number
of event entries between the outer area delineated by the 39.85 value and inner area
delineated by the 123.4 value. Conﬁgurations that generated the lengthiest textual res-
ults93 were the most diﬃcult for stakeholders to interpret and the ones the MFI stake-
holders found least useful –precisely due to the intricate story. It is worth noticing that
this is in accordance with ﬁndings published elsewhere regarding how policy-makers are
more likely to take into consideration shorter, more practical summaries [Jones et al.,
2008].
93 E.g., those conﬁgured with a large group aﬀected by adversities and a 24 credit cycle.
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Figure 5.31: Total number of event entries between agents, across simulations
The aforementioned aspect, along with the need to further understand the dynamics of
the simulation model itself, prompted the analysis of the macro-level properties yielded
from groups of simulation experiments. Hence, from this paragraph until the end of
this chapter, the discussion is dedicated to scrutinising the observed features in the
aggregate dataset generated by running every plausible conﬁguration allowed in the
model. The MFI stakeholders found this a useful exercise in exploring scenarios based
on their clients observed and reported behaviour.
Results from testing diﬀerent conﬁgurations have been grouped by similarity regarding
their macro-level properties of each run, and have been aggregated for the macro-
level analysis. The previously discussed micro-level results are more detailed, as in it
every single event in every simulated group is logged. In other words, that dataset
contains every default and missed meeting along with the generated event entries from
every group member. The minimum total number of micro-level entries is 12 registries,
whilst the maximum was 291 registries. The average of all simulated experiments was
81 registered events and the standard deviation is of 50 registered events.
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Figures 5.32 and 5.33 below depict, correspondingly, averages and standard deviations
of the total number of representative events94. The data resulted from running simula-
tions ceteris paribus with one unproﬁtable client, varying group size. Those conﬁgured
with 12 quotas are depicted as (a), whilst (b) corresponds to simulation runs with 24
quotas. This notation is used throughout.
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94 I.e. LeaderVisit, GroupVisit, CoveredLosses, ExpellingVotes, TotalSupport, TotalFines.
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Despite variations in how often certain events occur, GroupVisit is the predominant
event in simulations depicted on the previous page and Figure 5.34. These include
simulations where the group size varied with: 1 unproﬁtable, 2 unproﬁtable, 1 unprof-
itable plus 1 bad investor, 20%, 30% and 60% disease incidence. All plots, apart from
the top left corner and middle left ones, depict CoveredLosses as more frequent than
ExpellingVotes. The other events remain largely stable throughout the runs.
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Figure 5.34: Simulation runs with averages similar to that of Figure 5.32
Most standard deviations in Figure 5.35 remain relatively proportional to each other,
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apart from those corresponding to LeaderVisit. Results below and those shown in Fig-
ure 5.34 suggest that, under these 6 depicted conditions, large variations of LeaderVisit
will not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the occurrence of GroupVisits and other events. This is
counterintuitive, given that the latter can depend on the former to occur.
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Figure 5.35: Simulation runs with standard deviations similar to Figure 5.33
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 155
Figure 5.36 shows that, again, GroupVisit is the most frequent event. That is despite
the large variation of occurrences, as shown in Figure 5.37. Other relatively frequent
events include ExpellingVotes and CoveredLosses. The remaining ones, TotalSupport
and TotalFines, are expectedly shown as having little relevance in this context: these
are rather generally infrequent due to the impact on groups95.
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95 See Table 5.14: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?”, page
113).
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 156
In the case below, the observed macro-level pattern (seen ﬁrst in Figure 5.32, on page
152) remains similar under all diﬀerent conﬁgurations shown in Figure 5.34. These
include runs where the group size vary with: 3 unproﬁtable, 4 unproﬁtable, 3 unproﬁt-
able plus 1 bad investor and 2 unproﬁtable plus 2 bad investors. Under such conditions
one can say that the event dynamics between group members is essentially the same.
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Figure 5.38: Simulation runs with averages similar to those of Figure 5.36
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 157
In Figure 5.39 below, it is possible to notice that only the graph in the bottom left
corner displays considerable variance in the occurrence of LeaderVisit. This suggests
that the overall pattern of total number of GroupVisit events being closely followed by
ExpellingVotes and CoveredLosses, observed in Figure 5.36 on the previous page, is not
dependant on such event. There are also diﬀerences in the occurrence of CoveredLosses,
but that is not signiﬁcant and also therefore not relevant for the analysed simulations.
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Figure 5.39: Simulation runs standard deviations similar to Figure 5.37
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 158
The next four graphs in Figure 5.40 depicts the similar average and standard deviations
of running simulations, ceteris paribus varying only group size, with 40% and 80% of
disease incidence. Simulation runs with 90% also lead to plots that are similar in kind
as those shown below. With 12 quotas, i.e. circumstance (a), one can see the ABM
leading to similar frequency of CoveredLosses and ExpellingVotes. Yet 24 quotas,
i.e. circumstance (b), the diﬀerence increased unexpectedly, as then the frequency of
CoveredLosses outgrows ExpellingVotes –implying a diﬀerent social dynamics in groups.
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Figure 5.40: Averages and standard deviations (40% and 80% disease)
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 159
Figure 5.41 and 5.42 below depicts similar results to the simulation runs containing 5
unproﬁtable with 12 quotas (Figures 5.38 and 5.39, pages 156 and 157 respectively).
However under the same circumstances and having to deal with 24 quotas, there is a
sharp decrease in the actual frequency and standard deviation of observed events. This
is unexpected result, as there is an increase in the total number of registered events.
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Figure 5.41: Average number of registered events (5 unproﬁtable)
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Figure 5.42: Standard deviation of registered events (5 unproﬁtable)
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 160
On the other hand, Figure 5.43 below depicts the only observed conﬁguration in which
the average frequency of events in fact decreases when the number of participants
and quotas are increased. This is also the only result that other events, namely
CoveredLosses and ExpellingVotes, in which the standard deviation eventually sur-
passes GroupVisit (as shown in Figure 5.44). I.e. the standard deviation of the afore-
mentioned events are not higher than the latter from the onset of (b) data.
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Figure 5.43: Average number of registered events (10% disease incidence)
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Figure 5.44: Standard deviation of registered events (10% disease)
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 161
Figure 5.45 below depicts the overall dynamics of groups having all but one participant
being aﬀected with an adversity. Surprisingly there was, in average, more GroupVisits
and ExpellingVotes with 12 quotas, instead of 24, in simulations with 6 unproﬁtable
participants (bottom left) –despite the relatively high standard deviations. In runs
conﬁgured with 3 unproﬁtable and 3 bad investors with 24 quotas, GroupVisit surpassed
all other events put together. Another unexpected result is that all least frequent events
remained within narrow boundaries in all of the simulations shown below.
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Figure 5.45: Averages and standard deviations (6/3 unproﬁtable, 3 bad investors)
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Insights Based on the ABM analysis 162
The Figures below show the total number (173) of randomly drawn simulation conﬁ-
gurations. Figure 5.46 depict the aggregate, and corresponding percentile, number of
simulations that ended with a full credit cycle with either more acceptable or unac-
ceptable endorsed events. One can notice that there is a somewhat similar shape –with
unexpectedly signiﬁcant percentiles– about how simulations, with microcredit groups
ranging from 3 to 7 members, tend to endorse each other until the end of a simulation.
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Figure 5.46: Simulations with most acceptable or unacceptable events
The aggregate, and corresponding percentile, number of simulations that ended with a
full credit cycle with exactly the same number of acceptable or unacceptable endorsed
events is depicted below in Figure 5.47. In this case one can notice that the percent-
iles, once again regarding collective credit ranging from three to seven participants, are
lower –conﬁrming the expectation that such results are less likely to occur.
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5.4.2 Modelling Guidance and Impact on Policy-Making
When ABM results are incomparable to existing evidence, it becomes rather unclear
what can be achieved from analysing a simulation dataset, apart from theoretical dis-
cussions and illustrations. Assessing to which extent social simulation models meet
their aims and objectives beyond theory is still currently an experimental process of
trials and errors. Given the broad scope of researchers’ backgrounds working on ABM,
there is a natural diversity of methodological aspects to be considered. One way that
helps the identiﬁcation and estimation of parameters for an ABM is behavioural data
collection and analysis. This data is also useful as a reference for evaluating simula-
tion results, otherwise only theoretical frameworks –which often require semi-arbitrary
adaptations for implementation purposes– would be guiding the ABM development.
It is thus argued hereby that reliable evidence is a requirement for social simulation
research that seeks usefulness both to academics and policy-makers. It is essential that
modellers have an excellent contextual understanding of the phenomenon of interest
to avoid, sometimes unknowingly and oftentimes unintentionally, embedding in their
models highly speculative assumptions that diverge from actual evidence or stakeholder
experience. The discussion put forward in 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Mod-
elling (EDAM)” (page 86) contain suggestions on how modellers can minimise issues
when developing ABM that are intended for purposes beyond theory by focusing mainly
on qualitative and/or quantitative data. Evidence about a given social phenomena can
be sourced by modellers from third-party sources96, but as recommended in the afore-
mentioned lifecycle, it would be preferable to establish a common understanding of the
available behavioural data directly with the stakeholders. My experience whilst devel-
oping the ABM for this research thesis and all those other researchers interviewed by
me97, demonstrate that many unintentional misunderstandings can be avoided whilst
modelling because of the direct access to stakeholders. This is a key advantage of
integrating an EDTM in the development cycle of an ABM simulation.
96 That is, people or organisations without direct participation in the researched case study.
97 See Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM” (page 61).
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Summary and Conclusions of Chapter 5:
Research Findings
This chapter contains all key research ﬁndings resulted from the design of data col-
lection and analysis discussed in the previous chapter. These include detailed insights
regarding ﬁeldwork ﬁndings of both credit oﬃcers and microﬁnance clients. In do-
ing so, the author has addressed the research problem of empirically investigating the
behaviour, within microﬁnance groups, that enables members to cope with defaulters.
Furthermore, the two sets of research questions have been answered, regarding credit
oﬃcers and credit clients. These consisted of, respectively, understanding: a) sup-
port, moral and ethics, b) perceived advantages and disadvantages of their microcredit
framework and c) observed clients’ actions regarding missed meetings and payments.
The second set consisted of understanding: a) the composition of clients’ business
and advice networks, b) the statuses of their group composition and credit and c) their
typical actions regarding missed meetings and payments.
The methodological research question has also been addressed, which consisted of
presenting an ABM exploration –under diﬀerent conditions– of the role of individual
behaviour within the collective responsibility imposed by a microcredit group.
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Chapter 6
Final Discussions and Conclusions
This research is focused on the role of microﬁnance as a social enterprise that can
provide an innovative public good to mitigate inequality and poverty. Microﬁnance
has been adapted around the world since the 1970s, with diﬀerent levels of scalability,
and one reason for that –beyond ﬁnancial management– is the increasing understand-
ing of conventional behaviour. By carrying out an evidence-driven research design,
an ABM has been built based on the data regarding how clients behave collectively
in order to deal with defaulters and debt over time. A representation of behaviour
has been tested via simulations in diﬀerent conﬁgurations and insights have been dis-
cussed in terms of the similarity of the observed outcomes. The TOC below contain
the contributions to knowledge and future research potential based on this thesis.
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Although it is somewhat straightforward to deﬁne poverty and inequality, it is diﬃcult
–and sometimes also inappropriate– to use one absolute threshold across world regions.
For this reason some of the key poverty assessment tools used by development organisa-
tions have been discussed in Section 2.4: “Usage of Poverty Lines in Social Enterprise”
(page 41). A further understanding of the conventional social behaviour amongst mi-
croﬁnance clients in the case study based in Chiapas, Mexico, has been achieved via
analysis of ﬁeldwork data and testing of an ABM built based on the research ﬁndings.
The latter has been developed according to the discussion put forward in Section 4.3:
“Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86) and Section: 4.3.1: “De-
veloping an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model (EDTM)” (page 91). That took into
account data from 635 stakeholders and an assessment of whether research ﬁndings
could be useful for policy-making. Evidence reported in Chapter 6: “Final Discussions
and Conclusions” (page 165) corroborate to the understanding of how social collateral
has been managed by group participants over time.
According to the analysed data, peer selection is endogenous and evidence suggests
that it is also geographically bound as a self-organised way for the MFI to eﬀectively
screen and monitor group members. These are manifested as social and ﬁnancial sanc-
tions over those not conforming with the group conventions. Another key ﬁnding was
that a signiﬁcant number of ﬁnanced groups were formed by relatives1, despite the ori-
ginal MFI prohibition of such practice2. Other studies have reported similar results, for
example: research on 146 groups in Madagascar [Zeller, 1998], 137 groups in Guatemala
[Wydick, 1999, Sanders and Nee, 1996] provide corroborative evidence that social ties
and group conventions can lead to higher repayment rates and that the geographical
distance between group members can impact behaviour of microﬁnance clients. This
research has raised a similar suggestion as illustrated on Figure 5.25: “Histogram of all
distances covered during ﬁeldwork” (page 130) and the reported behaviour in Tables
5.13: “According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a meeting is missed?” and 5.14:
“According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?”.
1 See Table 5.15: “Non-aggregated composition of the clients’ business networks” (page 116).
2 See discussion in Section 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (page 116).
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Thus one can see that there is a great variety of what does work in diﬀerent communit-
ies. The research project discussed in this thesis is a contribution to the understanding
and exploration of the microcredit clients’ behaviour in Chiapas, Mexico, where family
ties and location are suggested as an eﬀective selection to screen, monitor and enforce
behaviour amongst group participants.
The joint liability employed in group lending schemes provide many advantages to
microﬁnance clients wishing to improve their living conditions and move way upwards
in relation to a poverty line. Yet this may hinder the ﬁnancial development of the most
successful individuals in case these are unable –e.g. due to distance or inﬂexibility of
the group lending framework– to form a group with members having a comparable
repayment ability. In other words, when MFIs are unable to oﬀer diﬀerentiated credit
services, individuals who can borrow much more than other group members may either
leave the collective lending framework or stick with the potential of being adversely
aﬀected by less successful clients.
During the one month observation of microcredit groups in Chiapas, the author has
witnessed entrepreneur clients with considerably more credit than their peers exper-
iencing diﬃculties in ﬁnding others with a comparable ﬁnancial situation to prosper
further. Therefore, as markets are essentially pools of individual agents dealing with
incomplete information, joint liability oﬀers a powerful means to aid the smooth func-
tioning of MFIs by reducing information asymmetry and moral hazard3 between lenders
and borrowers4. In the case of this research project, joint liability is managed only at
the group level and the reported behaviours by the surveyed stakeholders have lead to
a model of decision-making.
3 By transferring most responsibility of screening, monitoring and enforcement to clients.
4 Assuming a context whereby the participants’ ﬁnancial circumstances are somewhat alike.
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6.1.1 Contribution to Knowledge: Conventional Behaviour
There is an empirically grounded suggestion, based on the ﬁeldwork ﬁndings, that
microﬁnance groups in this case study vary composition and social behaviour according
to location. The suggestion is that: those based in rural areas appear to be formed
mainly by relatives, who in turn may prefer the administration of social pressure as a
sanction tool. On the other hand, groups based in urban areas appear to be mainly
formed by unrelated neighbours, who may then prefer the administration of group-level
ﬁnes as a sanction tool. Eliciting the existence of these circumstances has contributed
both to stakeholders and academics to the understanding of how microcredit groups
deal in practice with the collective responsibility of making social collateral work. The
ﬁeldwork evidence for this is discussed throughout sections 5.1: “Fieldwork Findings:
Credit Oﬃcers” and 5.2: “Fieldwork Findings: Microﬁnance Clients” (pages 101, 114).
The most relevant aspects of the aforementioned social conventions have been built
into an EDTM representation of decision-making within MFI groups, and then further
explored with an ABM implementation. Such conventional social behaviour is likely to
have coexisted with other strategies for dealing with defaulters and collective debt. It is
also plausible that there is –amongst those groups belonging to the same credit centre–
a continuous learning and asynchronous evaluation process about diﬀerent approaches.
Further research would be needed to understand in detail how the transmission and
assessment is carried out within and across groups. The fact that credit oﬃcers travel
periodically to where clients live may be a relevant aspect to consider in this regard. Due
to diﬀerent transportation circumstances, there could also be an interesting variation
between rural and urban groups. The suggested conjecture is that diﬀerent social
conventions are tested over time to manage defaulters, with the less eﬀective strategies
being abandoned in favour of the better ones. The research ﬁndings presented shed
new light on how social collateral in microﬁnance is dealt with at the group level in
the researched MFI. This contribution to knowledge is thus anchored in the detailed
analysis of the social conventions reported by the surveyed stakeholders in Tables 5.13:
“According to oﬃcers, what clients do when a meeting is missed?” and 5.14: “According
to oﬃcers, what clients do when a payment is missed?” (page 113).
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6.1.2 Contribution to Knowledge: Policy-Making
Involving stakeholders in the research process was instrumental to clarify eventual mis-
understandings and provide them with at least a partial sense of ownership regard-
ing the new knowledge generated in this project. Both aspects facilitated the liaison
provided between researchers and stakeholders. The research design and ﬁndings are
highlighted throughout Chapter 4: “Research Design and Development” and Chapter
5: “Research Findings” (pages 75 and 100, respectively) and were taken into further
account by stakeholders to consider changes in their ﬁnancing policies because:
• (a) of the fact that some decision-makers participated in all stages of the process
of eliciting new information through ﬁeldwork –either directly whilst surveys were
being designed or indirectly by supervising how these were being administered.
During the modelling and implementation stages, due to funding restrictions, it
was no longer possible to be inasmuch contact as during the ﬁeldwork.
• (b) it was easier to relate ﬁeldwork ﬁndings, both in terms of time and scale,
to a known state of the socio-economic phenomenon, as some of what has been
reported could still be observed –or remembered– by those involved in it5.
• (c) the unfamiliarity of policy-makers with concepts and techniques of ABM res-
ulted in some level of scepticism when interpreting results obtained from the
simulation model. This further inﬂuenced diﬃculties in keeping up good and
frequent communication, once the modelling process begun. Yet, ﬁeldwork ﬁnd-
ings provided inﬂuential insights that helped the MFI to improve their regulatory
framework. This consisted of piloting, in a phased fashion, the encouragement
–instead of the previous prohibition– of microﬁnance groups formed by relatives.
5 See Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM” (page 64) and
the discussion in Section 5.4.2: “Modelling Guidance and Impact on Policy-Making” (page 163).
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6.1.3 Contribution to Knowledge: Building of an ABM
Given the critique on the state-of-the-art of social simulation, this research has –from
the very beginning– focused on how to improve the status-quo in terms of producing
more useful results to the involved stakeholders. This eﬀort was carried out throughout
the project and is discussed in detail in the recommendations put forward in Section
4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86), which includes:
• (a) the provision of a systematic and veriﬁable means of restricting modellers
regarding which aspects should be added into a simulation and which should be
left out from it, aiming at more practical contributions. That is, evidence-driven
modellers take the available data insights as the main guide to assess what is
essential to be in a simulation model from what shall be considered contextual
information, and needed to understand each scenario of a social phenomenon.
• (b) the encouragement of modellers to inductively elicit information and know-
ledge about the speciﬁc phenomenon. This can be done using the proposal in Sec-
tion 4.3.1: “Developing an Ethnographic Decision Tree Model (EDTM)” (page
91), with periodical checks with stakeholders during the administration of the
following steps in the lifecycle of the ABM development: data collection, data
analysis and selection of assumptions, representation of behaviour and processes,
then ﬁnally the discussion of the ABM simulation ﬁndings with domain experts.
• (c) a participatory design that can help stakeholders to better understand what
an ABM is, how they can inﬂuence its development and what are the limitations
of such approach. Given the demonstration of how an EDTM can help guide
the development of an ABM simulation, there is a good potential for substantial
contributions by exploring phenomena with such quasi-experimental approach.
That is because simulated data can provide insights that would otherwise be
unavailable to mediate discussions between researchers and stakeholders.
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6.2 Future Research
Along with the summaries of the contributions to knowledge in the previous sections,
there are three particularly interesting suggestions for future research based on this
thesis. The ﬁrst would follow up what has changed in the MFI as a result of this
research. The second is about exploring diﬀerent ways in which the ABM could be
used and/or extended. And the third is about carrying out a social network analysis.
An innovation the MFI has considered, based on the behavioural insights, is the im-
plementation of a system for payment and management of credit via mobile phones.
Clients would be able to pay due quotas and receive credit without needing to attend
the regular meetings. This would inﬂuence how the social conventions discussed in this
thesis operate and adapt, as then mobiles would open new ways to transfer money,
communicate with group members and arrange how to deal with their defaults. There
is good potential for mobile banking in the microﬁnance industry, both as a means
to repay credit to the ﬁnancing institution and for peer-to-peer money transfers. This
could reduce operational costs, speed-up data collection/analysis and reduce the risk
of oﬃcers being robbed en route to/from their clients –as witnessed during ﬁeldwork.
Group lending essentially depends on the response of MFIs to the diﬃculties arising
from dealing with numerous small loans and, in developing countries, usually the mi-
croﬁnance market is dense (i.e. containing both many clients as well as service pro-
viders) [ILO, 2002]. An alternative approach to model the micro-level decision-making
process which clients engage to deal with defaulters could be via mechanism design
(i.e. game-theory). Behaviour in groups is essentially an expression of social choice.
Thus based on a good understanding of the participants’ behaviour, one could propose
a function that evaluates in detail each of the key adversities a client can experience.
This would lend itself to a transactions costs perspective, as then one can attempt to
minimise the burden of collective monitoring and enforcement.
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6.2.1 Research Potential: Following-up the Findings
The MFI stakeholders did implement changes in their policies based on the research
ﬁndings presented in this thesis. Having a reliable, evidence-driven means of assessing
their clients’ behaviour was deemed on par with assessing the client’s levels of poverty
as a way to better inform decision-making. This involved further training of their credit
oﬃcers to update existing PPI surveys, to collect behavioural data per group, and in-
tegrate this into their information system. Based on this the MFI has been able to:
• oﬀer opportunities for longer (monthly) payment cycles in new ﬁnancial services,
to test a policy that encourages family members to form microﬁnance groups;
• introduce greater ﬂexibility in existing MFI services, so that individual clients
with good performance may apply for extra credit independently from groups;
• conﬁrm the lacking of client training is linked with groups not repaying credit,
prompting the MFI to capacitate their credit oﬃcers to ameliorate this issue;
• verify that clients with at least ﬁve years of experience tended to be above the
PPI-deﬁned poverty threshold and that the majority of dropout clients actually
have a similar ﬁnancial portfolio if compared to their typical newcomer client.
This research project has been able to provide the MFI stakeholders with new knowledge
that inﬂuenced funding policies, based on insights regarding how their microﬁnance
groups work internally. These aforementioned actions taken by the institution have also
been used as examples of innovations in subsequent fundraising bids. Thus a natural
follow-up of this research would be to analyse trends, and adapt the exploratory ABM,
based on the data that has been collected about the microﬁnance groups.
172
Future Research 173
6.2.2 Research Potential: Applicability of the ABM
Considering that ABMs are compact representations, in the sense of reducing the phe-
nomenon of interest to a minimum set of elements and processes, there is a great poten-
tial for these models to be used in educational settings. The relative ease and ﬂexibility
that these models have allowed users to quickly test the eﬀects of changing parameters
in a model can, in this way, serve as a research tool to facilitate the communication
and discussion of selected intricacies of the phenomenon itself.
The ABM in this thesis has allowed an exploratory assessment of processes that in-
volve asynchronous social interactions that would not be possible to analyse without a
computer simulation. An ABM is thus a ﬂexible approach for modelling speciﬁc prop-
erties and mechanisms of a complex social phenomenon, which can complement other
quantitative and qualitative approaches. In this case, the model has illustrated plaus-
ible outcomes about the dynamics of behaviour within microcredit groups in diﬀerent
scenarios. This could be further extended and researched with an ABM.
The MFI managers assessed simulation results as viable, yet regarded ﬁeldwork ﬁnd-
ings as more directly useful for decision-making. Social simulation is perhaps best
understood as a complementary approach to facilitate –along with more traditional
quantitative and qualitative methodologies– better descriptions of complex social real-
ities, such as role of social collateral in microﬁnance. Note however that this does not
imply social simulation results can be used for accurately forecasting what-if scenarios.
The suggestion put forward here is simply that the social simulation should provide: (I)
a relatively well understood6 set of illustrations about scenarios of interest, and also (II)
less ambiguous representations and explanations than purely textual (i.e. discursive)
accounts of scenarios about a social phenomenon that one wishes to better understand.
6 Both in terms of its scope, limitations and overall applicability according to its validation.
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6.2.3 Research Potential: Social Network Analysis
The imperfect information (asymmetry) approach to joint liability –operationalised via
social collateral–, has been discussed throughout this thesis as a useful framework to
understand the general rationale behind the design of group lending frameworks. Yet
few studies describe what groups empirically do to successfully self-organise. Whilst
developing this research project, the author has also noted the potential for a social
network analysis to contribute with new knowledge about the inner dynamics of so-
cial collateral through analysing the clients’ social networks. Examples include: a)
identifying diﬀerent types of individual centrality within groups, b) researching how
behaviour in diﬀerent groups may be interconnected, and c) providing a generative
approach to the statistical properties of the observed networks using the Exponential
Random Graphs approach. These could provide powerful insights on the statistical
properties of networked social collateral.
There is potential to further investigate the structure of microﬁnance business and
advice networks. For example it would be useful to know, in case of recovered defaults,
who actually lends how much money to whom in a group. This would shed new
light on the details and trends as to how defaulters are dealt with over longer periods
of time than a cross-sectional study. This would also improve our understanding of
the dissemination of conventional behaviour–and not the already established patterns.
That could lead to ﬁndings that would hone other MFI policies aimed at encouraging
what is considered to be desirable behaviour within the ﬁnanced groups.
Last but not least, intelligible visualisations of credit networks7 could facilitate the
analysis and discussion of statistical insights. Modellers and MFI stakeholders could
beneﬁt from being able to visualise the structures of networks in the light of credit tran-
sactional data. This could be achieved with a user interface that is intuitive enough,
that the researcher or MFI analyst could provide the users with results on demand.
7 Cross-sectional and, if available, longitudinal illustrations of the diﬀerent network states.
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Appendix
This section contains all supporting material referenced in this thesis. The ﬁeldwork
reports were developed and written by Pablo Lucas, who acknowledges the useful dis-
cussions held with Federico Morales and Ignacio García. The ﬁrst appendix includes
the four surveys focused on behavioural aspects of microﬁnance clients and oﬃcers.
The second, third and fourth appendix contain the anonymised reports. Every report
originally written in Spanish has been translated into English and were discussed, from
2008 to 2009, with researchers at the CFPM, Manchester Metropolitan University and
at the World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations Univer-
sity (UNU-WIDER) in Helsinki. Reports were ﬁrst written in Spanish to facilitate the
discussion with the microﬁnance stakeholders in Chiapas and at PROIMMSE-IIA.
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7.1 Appendix I: Fieldwork Surveys
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QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
                                                 
                                               Dear advisor, Our aim is to study the impact of trust and its relation to quota repayments 
                                                 amongst micro-credit group members promoted by you. Your answers will only be used  
                                                 in a research project being developed to better understand behaviour within micro-finance  
                                                  groups. Your participation is voluntary and anonymous. Thanks indeed for participating.
  
 
Municipality: __________ Area: _________ Language: _________  
 
 
1. Number in ORDER OF IMPORTANCE the disposition CAUSES to pay quotas. Number 1 is the most important. 
 
_____Honour group agreements  _____Credit conditions  _____Economic profitability _____Solidarity 
_____Mutual monitoring   _____Peer pressure among group members   _____ Other causes 
 
 
2. Describe what do you understand by “SOLIDARITY GROUP”? Could you provide examples?  
 
 
3. If a quota is NOT PAID, what are the most important CAUSES? 
a) __________________   ; b) _________________  ; c)________________ ; d)__________________ 
 
 
4. What are the ADVANTAGES of the solidarity lending methodology?  
 
 
5. What are the limitations of your methodology? When and why it does not work well? 
 
 
6. Mark which of the following LANGUAGES you commonly use to communicate with groups. 
Tsotsil,        Tseltal,        Chol,        Tojolabal,        Zoque,        Mam,        Spanish,        Other  _______ 
 
 
7. Which moral or ethical principles (solidarity, for example) are present where you work? 
 
 
8. Do ethical or moral principles from question 7 support trust and quota repayment amongst group members?   
             Can you explain how these occur? 
 
 
9. Which moral or ethical principles (solidarity, for example) do you miss where your work take place? 
 
 
10. How the absence of moral or ethical principles from question 9 affect trust and quota repayment within groups? 
  
 
11. What happens with group members when one of its participants: 
a) Is not attending meetings.       b) Is not paying on time. 
 
 
12. Do you know the economical activities of every group where you work? 
             a) All them (  );                b) Most of them (  );          c) Some of them (  ).  
 
 
13. Apart from moral or ethical principles, what other aspects should be considered to improve microfinance groups? 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
 
                              Dear client, Our aim is to study the impact of trust and its relation to quota repayments  
                                                   amongst micro-credit group members promoted by you. Your answers will only be used  
                                                   in a research project being developed to better understand behaviour within micro-finance                      
                                                   groups. Your participation is voluntary and anonymous. Thanks indeed for participating. 
 
 
1. Associate number:______________ Name: ______________  Reference number:______________  
 
 
2. Who would you ask personal advice?  
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?           Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:                         relative   ______   neighbour ____ friend ______ business partner ____ 
You ask this person:                        always    ______   sometimes ____ 
Where is this person living?            ( ) in the same area_______   ( ) Which other area?  _____________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?           Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:                         relative   ______   neighbour ____ friend ______ business partner ____ 
You ask this person:                        always    ______   sometimes ____ 
Where is this person living?            ( ) in the same area_______   ( ) Which other area?  _____________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?           Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:                         relative   ______   neighbour ____ friend ______ business partner ____ 
You ask this person:                        always    ______   sometimes ____ 
Where is this person living?            ( ) in the same area_______   ( ) Which other area?  _____________ 
 
 
3. With who would you collaborate in a business activity?  
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?           Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:                         relative   ______   neighbour ____ friend ______ business partner ____ 
You ask this person:                        always    ______   sometimes ____ 
Where is this person living?            ( ) in the same area_______   ( ) Which other area?  _____________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?           Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:                         relative   ______   neighbour ____ friend ______ business partner ____ 
You ask this person:                        always    ______   sometimes ____ 
Where is this person living?            ( ) in the same area_______   ( ) Which other area?  _____________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?           Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:                         relative   ______   neighbour ____ friend ______ business partner ____ 
You ask this person:                        always    ______   sometimes ____ 
Where is this person living?            ( ) in the same area_______   ( ) Which other area?  _____________ 
 
 
 
4. Do you know the projects being developed by every member in your group?  
             a) No (  );             b) Yes, all them (  );        c) Yes, some of them (  ). 
 
 
5. What is it done when one of your group members: 
a) Is not present at meetings? _____________________________________________________________ 
b) Is not paying on time?  _____________________________________________________________ 
QUESTIONNAIRE 3 
 
 
                             Dear adviser, after analysing data from the first questionnaire answered by you, we have 
                     prepared few more questions to enhance our understanding about the solidarity groups. 
                                                 Please, remember that your honest opinion is very important. Thanks for participating. 
 
 
1. How have you selected the clients to interview? 
 
2. What are the main DISEASES that cause DEFAULTING? 
a)                                    b)                                             c) 
 
 
3. What are the main CAUSES of LACK OF RENTABILITY among clients' projects? 
a)                                   b)                                             c) 
 
 
4. What are the main CAUSES of LACK OF INVESTMENT among the clients' projects? 
a)                                  b)                                              c) 
 
 
5. How frequently is it BOTH to MISS MEETINGS and PAYMENTS? 
 (a) NOT frequent.  (b) Occasionally. (c) VERY frequent.  (d) No answer. 
 
 
6. How frequent is it to MISS MEETINGS but PAY ON TIME? 
 (a) NOT frequent.  (b) Occasionally. (c) VERY frequent.  (d) No answer. 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 4 
 
            Dear adviser, after analysing data from the past 2 questionnaires answered by you, we have 
                  prepared few more questions to enhance our understanding about the solidarity groups. 
                                               Please, remember that your honest opinion is very important. Thanks for participating. 
 
 
1. Are SOCIAL PRESSURE and SANCTIONS stronger in RURAL or URBAN areas? 
(a) RURAL.            (b) SAME in both areas.         (c) URBAN.              (d) No answer. 
 
2. Are FINANCIAL PRESSURE and SANCTIONS stronger in RURAL or URBAN areas? 
(a) RURAL.           (b) SAME in both areas.          (c) URBAN.            (d) No answer. 
 
3. Are there more RELATIVES within groups based in RURAL or URBAN areas? 
(a) RURAL.          (b) URBAN.                             (c) No answer. 
 
4. In which areas are the most entrepreneurial clients based? 
(a) RURAL.          (b) URBAN.                             (c) BOTH.               (d) No answer. 
 
5. In which areas do you observe most DIVERSIFIED businesses supported by your methodology? 
(a) RURAL.          (b) URBAN.                             (c) BOTH.               (d) None. 
 
6. In Which areas do you observe most clients with best ability to handle INDIVIDUAL CREDIT? 
(a) RURAL.          (b) URBAN.                             (c) BOTH.               (d) None. 
 
7. In which areas do you observe most clients using all their common credit in the SAME BUSINESS? 
(a) RURAL.          (b) URBAN.                             (c) BOTH.               (d) None. 
 
8. In which areas do you observe most INTERMEDIARIES between micro-credit groups and their clients? 
(a) RURAL.          (b) URBAN.                             (c) BOTH.               (d) None. 
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1   Introduction 
This report synthesises initial results from studying effects of social conventions on how solidarity groups 
promoted by a micro-finance institution (MFI) work and evolve over time in Chiapas, Mexico. Due to our 
publishing agreement, their identity is omitted. This research is part of Pablo Lucas research project entitled 
Conventional social behaviour amongst microfinance clients, micro-credit.no-ip.org at CFPM, and Ignacio 
Garcia at Buenos Aires University. Findings are presented along with our strategy for capturing data using 
questionnaires to credit advisers and clients. Suggestions to a new MFI information system are also included.  
2   Data Collection Strategy 
Most discussions related to microfinance have not dedicated much attention to internal mechanisms amongst 
microfinance clients, where the so-called Solidarity Group (SG) concept is central to its success. A SG 
means the individual or group-wide decision to cover losses from a defaulting member, with or without 
fines. Little is actually known about how penalization and group liability is managed by clients themselves, 
and arguably the detailed influence of conventional social behaviour in these cooperative processes is even 
less understood. Some metrics fallaciously emphasise that such data and processes analysis should not take 
social contexts into account, or that cultural differences are not relevant. However, as this study exemplifies, 
sanctions and cooperation amongst clients belonging to micro finance groups can be directly related to 
community-specific social structures and their understanding of what is considered acceptable behaviour. 
 
Aiming to study effects of local social conventions on micro finance groups promoted by the MFI, two types 
of questionnaires were designed: one to better understand the seasoned experience of credit advisers on their 
fieldwork tasks, plus another oriented to uncover social behaviour and structural composition of groups. All 
advisors were questioned twice using online forms and, additionally, semi-structured verbal interviews were 
recorded during our fieldwork visit. The first questionnaire contained 14 questions, and some months later 6 
other online questions followed-up. LimeSurvey.org was used in a Debian.org serving Apache.org with 
PHP.net and MySQL.org database in Manchester, England. The clients’ questionnaire contains 5 questions 
and was administered by MFI advisers. A translation of all questionnaires is available as an annex at the end 
of this document. The MFI director instructed them to select 3 people per day in each different visited 
administrative centre. Figure 1 depicts the criterion used by advisers to choose interviewees, grouped into 
categories according to how answers can be unambiguously interpreted.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Advisers’ criteria to choose interviewees (data from the 2nd questionnaire). 
                                                           
1 Spanish version, presented to the MFI, is dated June 14th 2008. Translated on June 16th 2008. Latest review: May 12th 2010. 
2.1   Codifying Questionnaires 
From a total of 24 questions designed to credit advisers and clients, 13 were open-ended. That is, with data 
fields allowing free text as input. These ones along with recorded interviews were codified according to a 
matching criterion based on the Grounded Theory, in which every analysed answer was semantically 
grouped in wider categories following their sequential order. This process allowed statistical analysis and 
graphical representations of every emerging category by interpreting the data set whilst verifying categories 
with the domain experts at the MFI in Chiapas. 
 
The usual difficulties with codifying open-ended questions were minimised as most answers contained 
concepts that were very similar and in line with language used both by advisers and clients, in Spanish or one 
of the following Mayan languages: Tsotsil, Tseltal, Chol, Tojolabal, Zoque, Mam. This was verified with 
them during visits in May 2008. Decision-making diagrams in the last page of this document are based on 
analyses combining all sourced data show clients’ and adviser’s observed behavioural patterns. 
3   Credit Advisers’ Questionnaires 
The most relevant results so far obtained are presented including the composition of both administered 
questionnaires online and semi-structured verbal interviews with some credit advisers. The first 
questionnaire was answered by 35 employees, whilst 34 for the 2nd. Nota bene: The graphical formats of the 
annexed forms are slightly different as these were administered via a website. 
3.1 First Questionnaire 
 
Figure 2. What most influence on time quota repayments? 
 
According to credit advisers, a combination of the following reasons is the most important for group-wide 
credit liquidity: economic profitability (14%), keep group agreements (15%), mutual monitoring (15%), 
group vigilance (16%) and credit conditions (18%).  
 
 
Figure 3. What microfinance SG stand for? 
 
Figure 3 depicts the vast majority of credit advisers (66%) identifying the SG concept as mutual help, which 
in this context reinforces the strong sense of reciprocity amongst clients and not necessarily pure altruism. 
 
 
Figure 4. Examples given by advisers of what SGs do. 
 
About 90% of all answers included specific manifestations of help, whilst just 10% of all answers actually 
made references to mutual monitoring mechanism within credit groups as an example of solidarity. 
 
 
Figure 5. Why clients miss payments? 
 
The 3 main reasons perceived by advisers are: diseases, lack of profitability and lack of investment. Data 
collected in the 2nd questionnaire, presented in the next section, contain more details on each of those aspects. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. What are the advantages of microfinance SGs? 
  
The fundamental perception, verified both at interviews during the fieldwork and questionnaire data, is that a 
SG is an efficient mechanism to obtain financial resources and tie individual responsibilities in groups. 
Otherwise financial risk would increase to unsustainable, or very unstable, levels and there would be no 
other alternative to enforce desirable behaviour. As otherwise, mutual responsibility and social monitoring 
would simply not exist. 
 
  
 
 
Topic Categorised Answers 
Credit quotas, time 
and applications. 
Slow authorisations, impossibility to pay quotas in advance, mandatory investment, 
only available to groups, lack of monthly repayments, inflexible repayment dates, 
some clients want higher progressive credits and the initial credit amount is too low. 
Communication Advisers get late visiting administrative centres, insufficient communication, which as a consequence may lead to misunderstandings and wrong information. 
Meetings Mandatory presence of all clients, very strict rules to attending meetings, clients are not willing to feel like students, absent people and lack of time to conduct tasks. 
Late payments Lack of juridical support, or safer methods to recover losses and other charges. 
Groups Lack of control due disorganisation, badly oriented solidarity groups, difficulties when clients have never worked together and distance between households.  
Various non-
frequent issues 
Persistence of untrustworthiness, difficulties generated by misunderstandings about 
group solidarity scheme, disinterest amongst clients and advisers not keeping rules. 
Table 1. What are the disadvantages of microfinance SGs? 
 
Advisers perceive the methodology as over-regulated, or perhaps not enough flexible. The numerous issues 
categorised in Table 1 are put forward as limiting the leeway and how fieldwork operations are conducted. 
 
Figure 7. Existent clients’ moral and ethical principles. 
 
Honesty, hard-working attitude, respect and solidarity are perceived as the main ethical or moral principles 
observed amongst microfinance clients. These factors, amongst other socio-economical issues, are crucial to 
support MFI-imposed rules related to ensure the SG methodology in microfinance (see Figures 7 and 8). 
 
Figure 8. How does data from Figure 7 support trust and repayments? 
 
Figure 9. Moral and ethical principles not observed amongst clients. 
On the other hand, irresponsibility, untrustworthiness, indiscipline and non-cooperative behaviour are 
generally considered as the most negative attitudes to the success of a micro finance group (Figures 9 &  10). 
 
Topic Examples 
Missed quota repayments It is hard to recover missed payments and to control individual deposit sheets. 
Disorganised 
administrative centres 
Miscommunication, lack of integration, untrustworthiness, conflicts amongst 
clients and disbelief that microfinance can actually help in economic terms. 
Table 2. How the missing moral or ethical principles in Figure 9 affect micro finance groups. 
 
 
Figure 10. What microfinance borrowers do when someone misses a meeting? 
  
As seen in Figure 10, visits to defaulting clients’ homes by advisers, group representatives or the whole 
group, is clearly the most employed mechanism to exert social pressure. In Figure 11, another equally high 
percentage can be observed in terms of cooperative behaviour when some payment is not made on time. 
 
 
Figure 11. What do microfinance borrowers do when someone misses a payment? 
 
Figure 12. Post-credit business monitoring and consultancy provided by advisers. 
Albeit stated in their good practice guide, advisers are clearly facing difficulties in this sense (Figure 12). 
 
Topic Improvement Suggestions What should be kept in mind 
Finance 
Foment voluntary savings within groups, 
deposit smaller guarantees after receiving new 
credit, and better tracking of late-payments. 
Contribute with accurate information, 
how to support debt collection, efficient 
and considerate attention with clients. 
Operation 
Take more into account meetings’ feedbacks, 
better explanation on what solidarity means for 
the MFI, improve social focus with clients.  
Efficient service to clients, promote 
respect / trust amongst groups & advisers 
(specially to deal with illness and losses). 
Methodology 
Adapt MFI rules to clients in certain areas, 
keep the continuous training program, plus 
provide motivation and self-esteem workshops. 
Trust clients to discuss social and 
economical issues, whilst introducing the 
concept of an MFI solidarity group. 
Table 3. Understanding a SG. 
In addition to Figures 7, 9 and Table 2, advisors suggested what to focus to improve the MFI fieldwork. 
3.1   Second Questionnaire 
This second form was used to collect additional data about defaulting members that appeared in the first one.  
 
Figure 13. Which diseases usually induce clients to miss payments? 
 
The reported diseases are mainly inline with long-established poverty studies, which directly links poor 
socio-economical areas with precarious hygiene and preventable medical conditions (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 14.  Why lack of profitability persists? 
Advisers clearly have difficulties to provide business-specific consultancies as there are numerous economic 
projects facing diverse range of problems. Nonetheless, as most issues related to lack of profitability are 
linked to incomplete investment strategies, excessive competition and unidentified potential markets, it is 
suggested hereby the need for developing evaluative methods that can assist in doing a better diagnosis of 
local markets both from the advisers and client’s perspective (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 15.  Why lack of investment persists?  
 
Figure 15 show multiple debts, along with lack of training and using credit elsewhere, as the main 
undermining causes affecting businesses that should be receiving micro-credit investments. 
 
 
Figure 16. Payment and missed payment frequencies, in relation to meeting attendance. 
 
In Figure 16, some answers can have multiple interpretations: (a) 25% of data is clearly coherent denouncing 
cases with lots of clients missing meetings yet not their payments (combination of high non-attendance rate 
and quota-payments, but little frequent to not go and not pay). (b) 68% are cases where both indicators have 
low frequencies, where a possible interpretation is that the vast majority of clients are missing meetings. 
Finally, (c) 8% indicates high frequencies for non-attendance and quota-payments. Would it be possible to 
have a high non-attendance rate yet, at the same time, have many cases of payments and non-payments over 
the existence period of a group? In this sense, it is suggested to discuss these findings with experienced 
advisers at the MFI, as it seems the best way to obtain a more precise interpretation about (b) and (c).  
4   Clients’ Questionnaire 
The main results from the 600 interviewed clients are shown in the next page. The administered form was 
designed to collect structural information about how members are individually linked to each other, plus 
their internal monitoring and penalization mechanisms. It should be noted that, based on the results obtained 
from the first question given to the advisers in the second questionnaire depicted in Figure 1, most successful 
and active clients were the prioritised interviewees. 
 
Figure 17.  Relationships amongst interviewed clients. 
  
The first studied structure in Figure 17 refers to trust amongst people, where it is notable the high percentage 
of group members who are family members. The second type of registered relationships is related to the 
cooperation in economic projects. In this case, albeit with a lower percentage, it is significant the fact that 
large numbers of interviewed clients work in stable income-generating groups formed by family members.  
 
The financial evidence reinforces this finding as most of these groups are stable over longer credit cycles and 
are economically more successful. Given the MFI explicitly forbids such compositions, it was suggested that 
perhaps such compositions could actually be motivated instead of constrained. As the MFI have been 
adapting the Grameen Bank methodology for more than 10 years, probably this rule regarding family 
members, which seems to make sense in Bangladesh, can be changed to take advantage of this strong 
cultural influence that even pushed clients to break an MFI policy in Chiapas for their own good.  
 
 
Figure 18.  Mechanisms for: mutual monitoring and penalisation. 
 
As mentioned in Figure 10, the mutual monitoring in the MFI solidarity groups is strongly expressed by 
visiting defaulting member’s homes after missing a meeting or quotas; by the group representative, credit 
adviser or the whole group. There is also empirical evidence that this social pressure is much stronger and 
effective in rural areas. In terms of penalisation, the clients themselves set a fine for those who are not 
fulfilling their obligations. This may include advisers too, for example, in case of being late to meetings at 
the administrative centres. Such financial sanctions are considered as ultimatums amongst clients and are 
clearly more frequent and involve higher sums in urban centres where the MFI is operating.  Further 
investigation can verify a hypothesis, which came up during our fieldwork, that social monitoring and 
penalization strategies tend to be more severe in micro finance groups mainly formed by family members.  
 
5   Summary of Results and Suggestions to the MFI 
Illnesses, lack of profitably and investments are clearly the main causes that lead to defaulting clients. The 
first one is a real opportunity that this MFI can intervene by adapting its existent medical program to extend 
prevention schemes and tackle diseases, considerably enhancing the clients’ quality of life. With regards the 
other two aspects, our suggestion is to liaison directly with local development policy-makers and executives 
in order to gradually structure and scale distributed financial services such as credit provided by this MFI.  
 
This MFI has no systematic storage of evidence regarding social behaviour, mutual cooperation (SGs) that 
clients are often practising with credit advisers. The only wide-covered data are financial performance such 
as quota repayments, yet known information such as who covered losses in groups and other issues affecting 
their internal structure is not being registered. A very important recommendation is to include this type of 
information in the new system that is already being redesigned by your technological department staff.  
 
In one of our fieldwork trips to a suburban area, it was possible to evidence how delicate and important is the 
event of covering someone losses by means of a SG scheme. As one group member missed that crucial 
meeting without sending her payment by other means, after much discussion, the group member with the 
highest income and credit, decided single-handedly to cover that loss on behalf of all others. After that, and 
without the adviser’s interference, it was common sense amongst all group members that a high extra fine 
should be imposed to who missed the meeting and payment. This, amongst many other observed examples, 
is a clear example of a much-needed updated reinterpretation of microfinance methodologies. Unfortunately 
most academic and third-sector literature covers very little how their group members internally manage SGs. 
 
During the fieldwork visits to rural and suburban areas together with credit advisers, another suggestion was 
made to use small electronic devices such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDA). This was later discussed 
with the MFI director. PDAs could be used to collect data about clients and administrative centres as an 
easier means of storing information and updating this MFI’s central database. For example, every time credit 
advisers are back to the MFI, all data in every PDA could be quickly downloaded. Obviously it would be 
necessary to design a detailed plan on how this new technology can be employed in an efficient manner, 
especially in terms of physical security and logistic of storing sensitive data. In case this suggestion is 
deemed appropriate as part of the new system at this MFI, we could help with implementation strategies. 
 
Additionally, whilst this research project is being developed, probably other suggestions will appear with 
regards to which information this MFI could register. This can be both useful to internally analyse 
performance in relation to clients’ realities, and also to initialise the simulation model with social data that is 
more precise and up-to-date. There is no pretension that this innovative model can be used for predictive 
purposes, as it would be irresponsible to suggest such an application without a clear and safe methodology to 
validate results. This initiative is so far focusing on testing new scenarios to generate results that can then be 
analysed by the MFI management veterans. 
 
The experience of doing this report unquestionably demonstrates the huge effort involved in collecting social 
data in bigger scales, as the process is relatively slow and requires a lot of dedication and collaboration. If is 
feasible to introduce simple procedures in this MFI’s methodology to collect and store data that nowadays – 
many times – are only available informally or in paper, this MFI would be able to expand its own capacity 
and speed for analysing data with regards to how clients evolve over time financially along with relevant 
social aspects that has affected each individual during the existence of every group.  
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MFI credit officers’ 1st questionnaire, administered from Nov. 2007 and Feb. 2008.                ANNXES 
 
Dear advisor, our aim is to study the relationship between trust and quota repayments amongst micro-credit 
groups promoted by this MFI. Your answers will only be used in this research project focused on better 
understand conventional social behaviours in micro-finance groups. Your participation is voluntary, 
anonymous and remember: your honest opinion is very important. Thank you! 
 
Municipality: __________ Area: _________ Language: _________  
 
Number in ORDER OF IMPORTANCE the CAUSES to pay quotas. If needed, use Other causes. 
_____ Honour group agreements  _____ Economic profitability   ____ Solidarity   ____ Peer pressure 
_____ Credit conditions                    _____ Mutual monitoring    ____ Other causes 
 
Describe what do you understand by “SOLIDARITY”? Could you provide examples?  
 
If a quota is NOT PAID, what are the most important CAUSES? 
a) __________________   ; b) _________________  ; c)________________ ; d)__________________ 
 
What are the ADVANTAGES of the solidarity lending methodology?  
 
What are the limitations of the MFI methodology? When and why it does not work well? 
 
Mark which of the following LANGUAGES you commonly use to communicate with groups. 
 Tsotsil,        Tseltal,        Chol,        Tojolabal,        Zoque,        Mam,        Spanish,        Other  _______ 
 
Which moral or ethical principles (solidarity, for example) are present where you work? 
 
How can the ethical or moral principles in question 7 support trust and quota repayment? 
 
Which moral or ethical principles (solidarity, for example) do you miss where you work? 
 
 How the absence of mentioned moral or ethical principles affect trust and quota repayment?  
 
What happens when someone is: a) not attending meetings? ________  b)  not paying on time? _______ 
 
Do you know the economical activities of every group where you work? 
  a) All them (  );               b) Most of them (  );          c) Some of them (  ). 
 
Apart from the moral or ethical principles, which other aspects must be understood to improve groups? 
 
 
MFI credit officers’ 2nd questionnaire, administered from 15-05-08 14 14:15:44 to 16-05-08 18:41:12. 
 
Dear adviser, after analysing data from the first questionnaire answered by you, we have prepared few more 
questions to enhance our understanding about the solidarity groups. Please, remember that your opinion is 
very important. Thank you. 
 
How have you selected the clients to interview? 
 
What are the main DISEASES that cause DEFAULTING?  a)  b)  c) 
 
What are the main CAUSES of LACK OF RENTABILITY amongst clients' projects? a)  b)  c) 
 
What are the main CAUSES of LACK OF INVESTMENT amongst the clients' projects? a)  b)  c) 
 
How frequent is to NOT ATTEND MEETINGS and NOT PAY? 
(a) NOT frequent.  (b) Occasionally. (c) VERY frequent.  (d) No answer. 
 
How frequent is to NOT ATTEND MEETINGS and SEND PAYMENTS? 
(a) NOT frequent.  (b) Occasionally. (c) VERY frequent.  (d) No answer. 
 
Clients’ questionnaire, administered from Nov. 2007 to Feb. 2008. 
 
 
Dear client,  Our aim is to study the impact of trust and its relation to quota repayments amongst micro-
credit groups promoted by this MFI. Your answers will only be used in a research project developed to 
better understand behaviour within micro-finance groups. Your participation is voluntary, anonymous 
and remember: your honest opinion is very important. Thanks for your collaboration. 
 
 
Please, inform your associate number:__________ Name: _________  Reference Number:__________ 
 
 
Who would you ask for a personal advice?  
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?  Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:    family member__ neighbour___  friend ____ business partner ___ 
You ask this person:              always  ______  sometimes ____ 
Where this person is living? ( ) in the same area__ ( ) Which another area?  ________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?  Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:    family member__ neighbour___  friend ____ business partner ___ 
You ask this person:              always  ______  sometimes ____ 
Where this person is living? ( ) in the same area__ ( ) Which another area?  ________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?  Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:    family member__ neighbour___  friend ____ business partner ___ 
You ask this person:              always  ______  sometimes ____ 
Where this person is living? ( ) in the same area__ ( ) Which another area?  ________ 
 
 
With who would you participate in a business activity?  
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?  Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:    family member__ neighbour___  friend ____ business partner ___ 
You ask this person:              always  ______  sometimes ____ 
Where this person is living? ( ) in the same area__ ( ) Which another area?  ________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?  Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:    family member__ neighbour___  friend ____ business partner ___ 
You ask this person:              always  ______  sometimes ____ 
Where this person is living? ( ) in the same area__ ( ) Which another area?  ________ 
 
Name_________________________________________________ 
Is the person in your group?  Yes ___ No ____ 
This person is your:    family member__ neighbour___  friend ____ business partner ___ 
You ask this person:              always  ______  sometimes ____ 
Where this person is living? ( ) in the same area__ ( ) Which another area?  ________ 
 
 
 Do you know the projects being developed by every member in your group?  
             a) No (  );             b) Yes, all them (  );        c) Yes, some of them (  ). 
 
 
5. What is it done when one of your group members: 
a) Is not present at meetings?_________ b) Is not paying on time?___________________________ 
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Relating Financial characterisation of Microfinance Groups to Conventional Social Behaviour 
Pablo Lucas, Centre for Policy Modelling (CFPM), Manchester, England, pablo@cfpm.org 
1   Introduction 
This second report synthesises results from studying the effects of social conventions within the internal organisation and 
evolution of micro-finance groups, also known as solidarity groups, at a microfinance institution (MFI) in southern 
Mexico. According to our publishing agreement, their precise identity and location is omitted. The next section contains 
interpretations of all collected data and graphs, drawing on answers from the second questionnaire to credit advisors and 
five financial databases. I thank the MFI director, their team, Federico Morales, Ignacio García along with the CFPM and 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology for the support provided for this research. 
2   Data analysis 
Whilst data from credit advisors was collected using a Web-based questionnaire, financial data of groups and individuals 
were obtained by querying five MFI databases with help from their information technology administrator. All 600 clients 
were identified according to their location, name and membership number written on paper forms administered. Table 1 
below shows a total of 261 identified groups. After the fieldwork, between September 2007 and May 2008, it became 
clear that 72% of groups were rural and 37% had the same amount of individual credit within their groups.  
 
Total Rural Groups that renewed same credit Average group Credit equally distributed No longer existent 
261 72 % 37% (group max. 7, min. 3) 4 (1.21 std. dev.) 44% (8% new, 27% experienced) 21% since 03/08 
 
Table 1: General characterisation of interviewed groups 
 
The number of groups that no longer exist (21%) in the sample is comparable to the unusual 30% client exit rate 
registered by the MFI. This happened during a period in which three main problems entwined: (I) insecurity to manage 
credit in centres, (II) competition with other MFIs and (III) impossibility to offer higher credit to the most entrepreneurial 
clients. In Figure 1 (a) below one can interpret that many more experienced groups (latest) were interviewed than 
inexperienced ones (initial). It also demonstrates that, according to their databases, proportionally few groups manage 
more than 5 participants. In general group formation is concentrated between 4 and 6 members. When there are changes, 
there is a clear tendency to reduce their numbers and not add new ones. From 56 groups that changed, 41 have reduced 
the number of their members. Figure 2 and its explanation on page 2 illustrate this in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                                                                                     (b) 
 
Figure 1: (a) Group size distribution of interviewed groups, and (b) General characterisation of these groups 
 
Figure 1 (b) demonstrates that 98% of all groups have paid on time without fines. That is, only 5 were penalised: 4 rural, 
1 urban. According to Figure 2, page 2, the regularity demonstrated by the vast majority of groups suggests that a 
considerable effort is involved in changing membership whilst debt is active, both from group participants and MFI 
employees. Nevertheless, if necessary, exclusion is still the most frequent event when groups changed (only 17 have 
added new participants). Expelling someone involves a combination of factors. One of these certainly relates to internal 
group evaluation mechanisms, adopted and evolved by clients themselves, to manage and discourage individual events of 
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defaulting or missing meetings at their local credit centres. This mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6 and explained in 
page 4. Another factor that seems important is the apparent instability generated by removing individuals. In Figure 2, 
one can see that most groups (23) have not lost credit as a consequence of removals, yet a close number (18) actually lost 
liquidity in this process. During the fieldwork, credit advisors commented that indeed exclusions could be difficult for 
groups, particularly when there are outstanding debts. Expelling is understood as extreme events, as these require social 
reassertion by all group members, as otherwise their cohesion and stability presumably would have been improved.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: States of groups that changed over time 
 
Having said that, it is necessary to consider that there are other possible justifications for someone to leave a microfinance 
group. Examples include: death, clients who leaving voluntarily in search of higher individual credit, disillusioned 
participants with high interest rates and, perhaps most frequently, clients that failed in their businesses. In order to better 
understand the most frequent causes of groups that shrink over time, the new (3rd) questionnaire to credit advisors 
includes a question where up to 3 reasons can be given to the question: “What are the most frequent causes for removing 
a group member?”. The survey is ready to capture answers and it can be accessed at http://cuestionario-asesores.no-ip.org  
 
A clear minority of 17 groups added new members and, as expected, most of these also had more credit. Only 3 did not 
gather more money with the increase of their group members. In these less frequent cases, it is possible that the original 
credit had simply been divided more as a consequence of the newcomer. This process may result in an equal distribution 
or not. It all depends on the particular circumstances of each group. There could also be restrictions both from who was 
already a member and specific MFI rules for such cases. Curiously the initial group size average (4.69) and final (4.56) 
are practically the same, along with their standard deviations of 1.20 and 0.78 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Success factors ordered according to their importance by credit advisors (grouped answers) 
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Figure 3 demonstrates that, when grouped, “Credit conditions” is the main reason (19.27%) behind successful groups. 
Answers such as “Abide to group rules”, “Solidarity” and “Peer pressure” appear immediately after, each with 16.15%. 
The next one in order is “Economical rentability” (15.06%) and finally “Other reasons” (3.13%).  Albeit representative, 
one must take into account the fact that when these answers are plotted individually (Figure 4), there are important 
differences in the distribution of those factors. “Abide to group rules” (between 34% and 37%), “Peer pressure” (between 
15% and 31%) and “Mutual monitoring” (between 31% and 43%). This suggests that credit conditions are as important as 
the main individual aspects concerning social collateral with regards to the collective microcredit methodology.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Success factors ordered according to their importance by credit advisors (ungrouped) 
 
Figure 5 (a) below illustrates macro characteristics of most stable groups analysed during the fieldwork. Groups with new 
initial credits (20) are those that have only recently joined the MFI; or those that could have already renewed their 
previous instalments, as there are no outstanding debts. As a consequence, some of these may already have experienced 
how to manage and penalise defaulting members. Interviewed credit advisors confirmed that a learning process seems to 
take place in order for groups to internalise the conventional social behaviour depicted in Figure 7, which mainly deals 
with social pressure and consequences of unexpected behaviour by group members. Again, according to the fieldwork 
evidence, most new clients are currently recruited to the MFI exclusively by recommendations. There is no propaganda or 
taskforces to attract clients as during the beginning of their operations, when the MFI needed to expand into new areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: (a) Characteristics of most stable groups,                    (b) Distribution of interviewed groups per finance centres 
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Those experienced with microfinance are usually the ones who contact potential new clients. They inform where to find 
credit advisors and when their visit to local centres will take place. The main difference between the MFI in this case 
study and other institutions is the fact that clients are not required to manage debt and credit at their centralised branches. 
Instead, credit advisors travel to where clients live and setup a local finance centre there. This is important in the 
internalisation process and sharing knowledge about conventional social behaviour adopted at group levels. A feasible 
conjecture on the learning process is that different conventions, based on local social norms, have been tested over time 
with the objective of managing individuals throughout credit validity periods. Gradually, less effective strategies have 
been abandoned, whilst the alternatives with better results have been strengthened amongst the most successful groups. It 
is feasible that, at least partially, these experiences have been shared between other participants in credit centres. 
Information exchange about positive and negative strategies, albeit limited, is a probable way in which knowledge has 
been distributed amongst groups belonging to the same centre. The spread of these outcomes to different centres may 
have occurred with the help of credit advisors. Figure 5 (b), page 3, show a distribution that many analysed groups in this 
research came from different financial centres (115). The regularity in which penalisation within groups has been 
described suggests that there has already been an internalisation of adopted social conventions amongst interviewed 
groups and centres (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Mechanism identified for groups to internally manage and penalise individuals 
 
Figure 6 above illustrates, according to the answers analysed from questionnaires and in situ interviews, the order and 
structure of social conventions adopted by clients to manage and penalise defaulting members. There are two main events 
that are evaluated by group participants: missed meetings and missed payments. Missing a meeting does not necessarily 
imply defaulting, as frequently someone else carries the quota payment on the client’s behalf. Thus in case someone is 
missing during a financial meeting, clients usually wait for a while in case the person or some representative arrives late. 
If that is not the case, the group often covers defaulter’s debts to avoid further MFI negative consequences. All members 
value such events event and those can lead to social pressure, most typically by visiting households of those have not paid 
on time. Each visit may involve the group representative or all group members; it depends on what they understand as the 
most appropriate for the occasion. As it is illustrated in Figure 7(b), clients usually cover losses, but often charge fines. 
During the fieldwork it was possible to witness how these events unfolded. Figure 7(a) illustrates the most common form 
of social pressure on those who missed meetings: visiting their households and verification of their reasons. Figure 6 was 
drawn based upon the structure of data acquired from 3 questionnaires and in-depth interviews about these 2 situations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                       (b) 
Figure 7: What clients do when someone: (a) miss meetings and (b) miss payments 
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Table 2 below contains the most common causes attributed to defaulting clients. According to the reasons commented by 
credit advisors in the second questionnaire administered (Figure 9), the diseases that most contribute to defaulting are: 
diarrheic diseases, cold / flu, birth complications and fever.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
        Table 2: Most frequent defaulting causes 
 
Table 3 and 4 next synthesises the general state of all credit properties analysed during the fieldwork, both in individual 
and group terms. Individual credit (Figure 13 and Table 4, page 7) has considerable differences between their minimal 
($500) and maximum ($39,538) values, along with standard deviation of $8,422.52. This suggests that some of the 
interviewed clients have worked with the MFI for years, whilst others have just started. Consequentially, groups also 
show great variations (minimum $3,000 and maximum $87,000), but the standard deviation should not necessarily be 
understood as a high value as groups have different numbers of participants. Thus, it is important to interpret this data 
taking into account the existing variations depicted in Figure 10 and that groups vary between 3 to 7 members (Figure 1 
a). The increased value of credit group reflects, in the lower area, how new groups tend to evolve in a rather uniform 
manner, whereas experienced groups on the opposite side have progressed very differently. The latter ones are 
responsible for the relatively high standard deviation value ($2,383.95). Groups with the same credit distribution of 
individual credit had the most regular changes. The data shows that between $1.000 and $6.000, groups tend to evolve in 
similar ways, as their standard deviation ($958.77) is low when compared to the lowest individual credit ($500). Figure 
10 also shows that managing collective credit higher than $18.000 is rather unusual. The proportion of groups that work  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
Table 3: Statuses of collective credit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of group credit 
Causes Percentage 
Diseases 19 % 
Other reasons 13 % 
Lack of rentability 11 % 
Poor investments 9 % 
Family problems 7 % 
Miss meetings 6 % 
Negligence 6 % 
Have other credits 3 % 
Address change 3 % 
Group problems 3 % 
Credit property Minimum Average Maximum Standard Deviation 
Initial group $ 3,000.00 $ 15,780.77 $ 73,000.00 $  8,921.58 
Increased group $ 3,000.00 $  3,283.70 $ 73,000.00 $  2,383.95 
Final group $ 3,000.00 $  9,064.47 $ 87,000.00 $ 11,305.53 
Initial individual $ 1,000.00 $  3,357.80 $ 14,600.00 $  1,739.34 
Same individual $ 1,000.00 $    2,649.57 $  6,000.00 $        958.77 
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Figure 9: Percentages of diseases that affect defaulters 
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with high amounts of credit is scattered until the top group, which manages more than $87000. These findings are 
somewhat expected given that these amounts are considered high for microfinance. There are no groups in Figure 10 
managing credit between $46000 and $52000, $58000 and $68000, $72000 and $76000. Groups with high credits have 
more final than initial liquidity. This observation simply means that interviewed groups operating with larger amounts of 
money are investing MFI credit in their already successful business. Yet one should bear in mind, as discussed on page 1, 
that many groups no longer exist. Figure 11 shows that initial credits higher than $16000 are gradually less frequent, 
whilst most values concentrate between $10000 and $15000 are somewhat close to the average mentioned in Table 3 
($15,780.77). The final standard deviation is high ($11,305.53), so it is important to consider that proportionally there are 
few groups with credit higher than the initial or final averages. To compare credit and debt values with their respective 
standard deviations, Figure 13 on page 17 illustrates the distributions of all individual and collective relevant averages. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Average of initial collective credits received by interviewed groups  
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Average of final collective credits received by interviewed groups 
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                                    Créditos individuales 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of average individual final (red) and initial (grey) analysed credits 
 
In Figure 13 one can see that initial individual credits mainly concentrates on between $2000 and $3000. Immediately 
after $4000 appears and then there are only very few people that received higher instalments. The fact that very few 
clients have initial or final credit between the minimum values of $500 and $1500 is testimony that the vast majority of 
interviewed clients in this research are experienced with the MFI in question. It would be interesting to analyse in more 
detail the circumstances of the few clients with high individual credits, as these are precisely the ones who have a better 
potential to administer more money and so can easily leave the MFI in search of other financial institutions. That is 
important, as it is known that entrepreneur clients have difficulties finding other people with comparable credit to work 
together in their businesses. Table 4 show the properties of available credit in studied financial centres, including data of 
those who were not interviewed.  
 
Credit properties Minimum Average Maximum Standard deviation 
All individuals  $    500.00 $  5,600.04 $ 39,538.00 $  8,422.52 
Interviewed individual (initial) $ 1,000.00 $  3,357.80 $ 14,600.00 $  1,739.34 
Interviewed individual (final) $ 1,000.00 $  4,194.91 $ 14,500.00 $  2,210.25 
 
 Table 4: Credit of all 600 interviewed clients and the remaining 27507 credits of non-interviewed clients 
 
The main observations about Figure 14 (a) and (b) are: (I) stable groups (group=) frequently reduced debts (debts-), (II) 
stable groups that kept dept have not yet completed their credit cycles, (III) groups that reduced (group-) frequently 
increased their debts (debt+), but there are also many that increased credit (credit+), (IV) the majority of groups are stable 
(group= & credit=) and, as expected, increased their credits (credit+). 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 14: Statuses of groups that changed according to their (a) credit evolution and (b) debts 
Credits of who was 
interviewed (left). 
 
 
 
Al credit, including who was 
not interviewed (right). 
Number of groups 
Credit 
Credit 
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                                      Table 5: Collective debt statuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Distribution of individual debts 
 
There is no information on individual debt, as these are not registered in the MFI database. Thus Figure 15 and Table 5 
only contain collective data about debts. Defaulters’ justifications have only been, throughout the fieldwork, annotated on 
paper by the credit advisors, using a form for each group that monitors quotas per credit cycle. Despite difficult retrieval 
of this data, which has been filled in by hand would be possible via Optical Character Recognition scanners, but it would 
not contribute to better understanding the organizational dynamics of groups. This happens as only defaulting events that 
generated MFI fines have been registered. There are no references as to whether groups have decided to sanction (fine) 
defaulters. Albeit most of the credit advisors were aware of this group-level process, the MFI has yet no system in place 
to record this important information. A recommendation for this to be incorporated in their new planned information 
system has been made. Finally, Figure 16 below shows how the properties of individual and collective credits compare 
with the properties of collective debts during this fieldwork.  
 
Figure 16: Distribution of credit and debt, both individual and collective 
Debt property Minimum Average Maximum Standard deviation 
Collective initial -$ 800.00 -$ 9,732.55 -$ 73,000.00 $ 8,222.29 
Collective increase -$ 500.04 -$ 8,896.50 -$ 28,840.00 $ 6,314.44 
Collective Decrement $ 400.00 -$ 1,024.10  $ 24,366.61 $ 1,235.96 
Collective final -$ 800.00 -$ 0,756.65 -$ 69,600.00 $ 9,458.25 
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3rd Fieldwork Report on the 3rd questionnaire to credit officers (July 2nd 2009) 
Pablo Lucas, Centre for Policy Modelling (CFPM), Manchester, England, pablo@cfpm.org 
 
1   Introduction 
This report synthesises results from the last questionnaire to credit officers. Questions were designed to double 
check doubts derived from analysing previous data and findings. According to our publishing agreement, the 
microfinance institution (MFI) identity and location is omitted. Next sections contain interpretations of the 24 
credit officer’s answers collected online. This time fewer people participated, as despite increasing the number of 
employees, some officers no longer work for the same MFI. I would like to thank the MFI director and their team 
for supporting this study. 
2   Data analysis 
The questionnaire analysed in this report contained ten questions. Figure 1 below illustrates the proportions and 
absolute number of answers in the three text fields available for credit officers to fill in their answers on expelling 
causes, in no particular order. The most frequent causes stated were “defaults”, “lack of cooperation”, “missed 
meetings” and “personal problems”. Other answers included “high quotas”, “other debts” and “late payments”. 
Interestingly responses are largely concentrated on endogenous group aspects, whilst the less frequent ones focus 
mainly on exogenous group issues. This is relevant as microcredit methodology can be directly influenced by 
bottom-up social conventions that evolve at the group-level organisation. Thus understanding what causes 
infrequent, but very disruptive, events such as expelling is crucial. These answers provide further confirmation of 
what was indicated since the fieldwork started: successful group strategies focus on ousting who is not cooperative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: What are the most frequent expelling causes? 
 
Figure 2 shows that most credit officers agree with two of the strongest indications reckoned during the fieldwork. 
This includes observations that there are: (a) usually more family members in rural groups and (b) that most MFI 
clients already had previous experience with some other form of saving or lending money amongst themselves. 
These two highlighted aspects are consistent with usual trends published in microfinance and third-sector literature. 
 
 
Figure 2: Credit officers’ observations on groups experience and those formed by family members 
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Figure 3 illustrates credit officers’ understanding of some important social and financial aspects of their monitored 
groups. It includes a slightly counter-intuitive finding: most rural clients are trading without intermediaries. This is 
unexpected, as during fieldwork, most observed rural groups could not trade directly with their customers due to 
transportation limitations. This new result perhaps reflects changes in the circumstances where interviewees work. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A variety of issues surrounding client’s trade and group dynamics 
 
A large proportion of clients seemingly do not invest credit collectively, yet there are sizeable results both on rural 
and urban ones that do. Demand for individual credit is apparently more evident amongst urban clients. However 
the difference regarding answers including rural clients is not significant. Similar findings can be seen in terms of 
business diversification. Entrepreneurship is evident amongst rural centres. Nevertheless data suggests that 
differences observed by credit officers are not dependent on location, as most answers indicated that there are many 
strong entrepreneurs both in rural and urban groups. Financial sanctions were highlighted as most intense in urban 
centres; yet again this dataset does not allow a responsible interpretation beyond this statement. The last question in 
the figure regarding social pressure, suggests that both urban and rural groups employ significant peer monitoring. 
3   Final considerations  
This short report is meant simply to serve as a complimentary material to the other two extensive reports compiled 
on the social norms and financial aspects of all 600 surveyed microfinance clients. No more surveys are planned for 
this study, as much has changed since the core activities of fieldwork between September 2007 and May 2008, 
involving the analysis of all their 5 microfinance databases and 3 surveys completed from that period till July 2009. 
 
Some findings have been relevant both to the MFI policy-makers and academically, as there is evidence that the 
evolutionary social processes regarding the self-organisation of microfinance groups are still occurring amongst 
clients of the same MFI. All data from this project has been analysed, thus a future final publication will contain a 
more in-depth discussion on the relevant findings and research impact. As previously discussed with the MFI 
director, I welcome feedback on all publications and results from the simulation model based on this work.  
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The poster annexed on the next page has been presented following an invitation to
participate in the 2009 Rich Cognitive Models for Policy Design and Simulation Work-
shop, held in Leiden (Netherlands). For a discussion on the aspects mentioned in there,
refer to Section 3.2.2: “Challenges in Simulating Social Phenomena with ABM” (page
61) and Section 4.3: “Evidence-Driven Approach to Modelling (EDAM)” (page 86).
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 Usefulness of Social Simulation To Stakeholders Pablo Lucas, Scott Moss 
{pablo,scott}@cfpm.org
This poster is dedicated to the discussion of 
methodological issues of developing social 
simulation research that ought to provide useful 
results beyond theory to stakeholders. 
I.e. how can social simulation, or other products of an 
evidence-driven agent-based modelling approach, be 
useful insofar as fieldwork findings ?
Analysis of evidence is increasingly being used to 
guide understanding of social phenomena and 
processes of simulation design and validation. 
Statistically relevant data on social phenomena 
can be problematic as often is: (a) non-existent, (b) 
unavailable due to privacy issues agreements or (c) 
when at hand, datasets are typically outdated.
Social simulation status quo is not yet useful 
in practice to non-academic stakeholders, mainly due 
to validation problems + high speculative 
risk involved in taking onboard results obtained in 
these models for policy making purposes.
06/01/2009
Introduction Evidence-driven modelling life-cycle Ought to achieve
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7. Implementac¸a˜o no Kernel
•Modelo:
Figura 6: Subsistemas e Esquema da soluc¸a˜o
•Algumas caracter´ısticas:
– interface via o pseudo-sistema de arquivos ”/proc”;
– interage diretamente com o VFS, MM e NET;
–pode trabalhar com stateful inspection;
– tabela hash que pode armazenar:
∗ o protocolo;
∗ o enderec¸o VIP;
∗ a porta utilizada;
∗um RIP;
∗prioridades;
4. Algoritmos de Escalonamento
•Implementac¸a˜o e utilizac¸a˜o:
– sa˜o compilados como um LKM ou diretamente no KB original;
–podem ser carregados dinamicamente;
– todas as operac¸o˜es sa˜o executadas em ambiente supervisor (kernel);
– o arranjamento das regras pode ser definido de diversas maneiras;
–uma regra e´ dada pela tupla <VIP, Porta, Algoritmo>;
• Dynamic Load Balancing
Figura 2: Esquema do algoritmo DLB
6. LVS-DR
Figura 5: LVS via DR e seu Workflow
3. Componentes de Software
•Monitorac¸a˜o de recursos:
–Scripts e ferramentas
∗definem regras de ac¸a˜o com finalidade de reposic¸a˜o e
alerta em caso de problemas.
•Recursos:
– recurso prima´rio = ”Service Interface”;
– recurso secunda´rio (redundante) = ”Standby Interface”;
– o enderec¸amento absoluto estara´ sempre vinculado
ao ”Service Interface”;
•Comunicac¸o˜es dentro do ambiente cluster:
–daemon que trabalha junto com subsistemas do kernel Linux;
–Watchdog Timer;
– tipos de evento: interfaces, network e node;
Figura 1: Resumo de Componentes de Software
• Weighted Least Connection & Session Persistence
Figura 3: Esquema dos algoritmos WLC & SP
5. LVS-NAT
Figura 4: LVS via NAT
1. Broker
•Principais Objetivos
–diminuic¸a˜o da lateˆncia das conexo˜es;
– aumento da performance de processamento;
–balanceamento de carga (pedidos simultaˆneos) entre servidores;
– alta disponibilidade;
∗ eliminac¸a˜o de SPOFs (Single Point Of Failure);
∗ redundaˆncia;
– ”tunning” de servic¸os;
2. Abordagem da Soluc¸a˜o
•Camadas com maior abstrac¸a˜o:
– ”pool” (cluster) de servidores;
–Algumas vantagens:
∗ referenciac¸a˜o lo´gica transparente;
∗nenhuma alterac¸a˜o nos clientes;
∗possibilidade de efetivac¸a˜o de mudanc¸as internas sem
interromper ou degradar os servic¸os;
∗ escalonamento e granularidade individuais
para cada requisic¸a˜o;
Universidade Cato´lica de Pelotas - Escola de Informa´tica
Grupo de Pesquisa em Inteligeˆncia Artificial
Pablo Lucas dos Anjos, Luiz Antoˆnio Moro Palazzo
{pablo,lpalazzo}@ucpel.tche.br
Balanceamento de Conexo˜es e Alta Disponibilidade de Servic¸os
Social simulations vs. Games
Stakeholders are not interested whatsoever in how 
social phenomena is modelled, but rather in what 
are the pragmatic contributions from this 
research process or simulation tool.
Most findings taken into practical
account deriv  from fieldwork
findings, not simulations.
There is a pressing need for d veloping social 
simulation research that is useful to academics 
and stakeholders.
Persisting problems include:
(a) How can simulation results providing data beyond 
comparable existing evidence mediate acquisition of 
new knowledge about a certain social phenomenon?
(b) Which practical contributions social simulations 
can provide to stakeholders apart from illustrating 
hypotheses that are only verifiable with more data?
Bruce Edmonds, Scott Moss, (2005) From KISS to KIDS – an ‘anti-
simplistic’ modelling approach. In P. Davidsson et al. (Ed.): Multi Agent 
Bas d Simulation 2004. Springer, lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 
3415:130–144.
Scott Moss (2008) Alternative Approaches to the Empirical Validation of 
Agent-Based Models. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 
vol. 11, no. 1 5.
Scott Moss, Bruce Edmonds (2005) Sociology and Simulation: Statistical 
and Qualitative Cross-Validation. American Journal of Sociology, 110(4), 
pp. 1095-1131.
Ian Foster (1995) Designing and Building Parallel Programs: Concepts and 
Tools for Parallel Software Engineering. Addison-Wesley Longman 
Publishing Co., Inc. Available at: www-unix.mcs.anl.gov/dbpp , 3.4 Scalability 
Analysis
Joshua M. Epstein (2008). 'Why Model?'. Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation 11(4)12 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/4/12.html
Centre For 
Policy Modelling
MMU
Business School
Doctor in Business Administration (DBA)
54 – 90 months part-time
The Doctor in Business Administration
(DBA) is a new award at the Business
School but an award with and long and
illustrious history around the world. First,
developed in the early part of the 20th
century at Harvard University, the DBA
was originally designed to recognise the
research and advanced knowledge needs
of business and management
practitioners. It was deliberately designed
from its outset by the staff at Harvard
Business School to be different from a
PhD because they felt that business
people needed a broader qualification that
exposed them to research and
consultancy skills in real organisational
settings. This, they suggested, was
markedly different from the precise and
focused attention of traditional PhD
studies in the sciences and humanities.
Over the last eighty years, the DBA
award has grown in popularity and in the
last twenty has become a key part of the
higher education landscape in the UK.
The DBA is designed to meet the career
and personal development needs of mid-
career professionals and business people
who want to learn more about how
management research can inform and
improve their practice and the
performance of the organisations they
work for and with. The DBA provides a
broad introduction to a range of different
research approaches and methods and
develops the skills of people who want to
act as consultants within their own
organisation or to work with other
organisations to improve the way they
function.
The DBA is an important part of the
doctoral and research programmes at
MMU and a spring board for people who
want to progress to senior management
and consultancy positions. I trust that you
will find what you want in this course
and I look forward to meeting you if you
enrol.
Huw Morris
Dean
Further information
For further information about study opportunities in the
Business School please visit our website at www.business.mmu.ac.uk
Enquiries about this programme should be made to:
courses@mmu.ac.uk
+44 (0)161 247 6969
This information is correct at the time of going to press. For terms and conditions applicable
to the provision of the University's Educational Services please refer to the prospectus. March 2008.
This publication is available in alternative f rmats.
Please telephone 0161 247 3725.
Are you interested in self development and career development but can’t
take time out from your career? Do you want to seek out new ways of
managing and dealing with organisational challenges? Do you recognise the
need to develop a more evidence-based approach to management?
Welcome to the DBA at MMU Business School
Target system = actual social 
phenomenon from where fieldwork
data should be collected and analysed. 
Observations and assumptions
are selected from the target system
for analysis and plausibility check.
It is critical to differentiate
what is relevant to model from what is 
needed to understand a given context.
Representation and implementation of available data is a personal choice usually
based on the technical advantages of using procedural, object-oriented or declarative paradigms. 
Simulation data is analysed as to whether it resembles features found in the target
system and as to whether findings can help shed new light on the real social phenomena.
Still unclear how simulations can provide pragmatic useful findings as
fieldwork reports can be, both to guide stakeholders and modellers.
If simulation results systematically diverge from what has been observed in the target system, 
modellers usually need to reconsider implementation, data representation and the specified parameters.
Research network SageForLearning.ca has set clear 
boundaries between intellectual games and simulations.
Intellectual games: static rules for resolving conflicts, 
players as decision makers, competing cooperation 
strategies and goals associated with fictional characters. 
Simulations: limited representation of a phenomenon
   that necessarily mediates acquisition of new knowledge 
about the actual social system via simulations. 
Acquiring knowledge about models is not 
equivalent!
Useful social simulation requires evidence, otherwise 
one would not bother with credible and plausible 
justifications for modelling decisions and obtained results.
Sixth Framework Programme,Information Society Technologies.
EMIL, Emergence In the Loop: Simulating the two way dynamics
of norm innovation. EC Contract No. 033841
emil.istc.cnr.it            kaiowas.no-ip.org
Characterised projects so far: 6 evidence-driven models, including an interview with at least
one modeller per case study, regarding the usefulness of simulation results to involved stakeholders.
None had examples of pragmatic contributions to stakeholders provided via interpreting simulation results.
Deficient research methodologies, combined with developed models that are neither games nor
useful simulations per se, contribute to the lack of confidence in stakeholders considering results. 
This does not imply that social simulation researchers should see stakeholders as clients, but
simply highlights how little this type of research has contributed beyond academic theories.
Development phases
Model design Implementation
New knowledge?Target system
Fieldwork 
evidence
Simulation 
results
Define agent behaviour and
processes representations
Test scenarios
and hypotheses
Model verification,
validation and replication
Observations
and assumptions
Data collection
and analysis
Update of agent behaviour
and processes representations
Is the model able to generate
results resembling existent data?
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1 ; S imulat ion Model o f S o l i d a r i t y Groups wi th new c r e d i t . Licensed under GPL V2.
2 ; Pablo Lucas . pablo@cfpm . org ; Copy l e f t updates by the author on :
3 ; Obs . : Minor changes have been made between dates , but not a l l was l o gged .
4 ;
5 ; 15 Ju ly 2009
6 ;   p l o t what happened wi th the order o f problems ;
7 ;   r e s e t counters o f a l l meet ings problems ;
8 ;
9 ; 10 June 09
10 ;   graphs update as the s imu la t i on progress , i n s t ead o f a l l a t the end ;
11 ;   POTENTIAL: p l o t and c a l c u l a t e quotas inc r emen ta l l y towards the f u l l
12 ; payment , wi th i n t e r e s t ra tes , as the model does not ye t take t ha t i n t o
13 ; account in dec i d ing what agents do wi th d e f a u l t e r s due to l a c k o f ev idence ;
14 ;   Fixed a bug when maximum and minimum deb t s are s e t equa l ;
15 ;   s h u f f l e d aux OrderedGroup ( order to proces s i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i on s ) ;
16 ;   updated app l e t wi th s i x t h graph ;
17 ;   added graph to know the order o f problems ’ recurrence
18 ;
19 ; 8 June 09
20 ;   co r r ec t ed a bug to on ly a l l ow t o t a l bad i n v e s t o r s and unp r o f i t a b l e be l e s s
21 ; than the group s i z e , o the rw i s e the group w i l l on ly f ace problems and nobody
22 ; would be a b l e to take d e c i s i on s to overcome t h e i r c i rcumstances ;
23 ;   crea t ed a u x i l i a r y l i s t s to dea l wi th the order o f d i f f e r e n t f i n a l outcomes ;
24 ;   s e t p l o t s o f s imu la t i on outcomes update w h i l s t the whole run i s be ing
25 ; executed , as f i n a l bar graphs sometimes aren ’ t enough c l e a r ;
26 ;   made only update t o t a l group outcomes , e l ap s ed time and i n d i v i d u a l d e b t s ;
27 ;   some graphs update a long wi th execut ion , as the o the r s need order ing data
28 ; a t the end o f a l l f o r then to be p l o t t e d to he l p i n t e r p r e t i n g r e s u l t s ;
29 ;   added in i n i t a con t r o l about wr i t i n g to a f i l e or not , boo lean WriteToFile ;
30 ;
31 ; 5 June 09
32 ;   made h t t p :// cfpm . org /~ pab lo /ABSS_MC/ t e s t model a v a i l a b l e to the MFI board ;
33 ;   had a meeting wi th them and on June 7 th , a HowTo was presen ted to them ;
34 ;
35 ; 4 June 09
36 ;   ordered data output o f aux Plo t and graph us ing the s t r u c t u r e crea t ed
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37 ;   3 type s o f r e s u l t s are wr i t t en s e p a r a t e l y in a f i l e to he l p wi th graphing
38 ;   l o g g i n g a l l summarised data , r e g a r d l e s s whether P lo t s are on or o f f
39 ;
40 ;
41 ; 3 June 09
42 ;   ordered CSV output so graphs can be understood , s e c t i o n s zoomed and
43 ; c l a s s i f i e d ; d e b t s and e l ap s ed time kep t on in runs wi th enab led P lo t s ;
44 ;
45 ; 2 June 09
46 ;   added sw i t ch con t r o l as to weather data i s graphed or not ;
47 ;   co r r ec t ed equa l groups summary , as data wasn ’ t in aux summary l i s t ;
48 ;
49 ; 27 May 09
50 ;   Logged s imp l i f i e d even t s as shown in graphs and s t a r t e d running
51 ; an e x t e n s i v e s e n s i t i v i t y ana l y s i s o f the r e a l i s t i c parameters space ;
52 ;   THE main d i f f e r e n c e between groups wi th more ac c ep t a b l e even t s than
53 ; unaccep tab l e ones i s the c on s i s t e n t h i ghe r inc idence o f suppo r t i v e events ,
54 ; such as group v i s i t s , l o s s e s be ing covered , and l e s s e x p e l l i n g ( t a k ing
55 ; i n t o cons i d e ra t i on the number o f l o s s e s and missed meet ings ) .
56 ;   equa l group even t s p l o t on ly uses l i n e s as those occur f a r l e s s o f ten ,
57 ; so ana l y s i s o f how s imu la t i on s wi th s im i l a r r e s u l t s compare ;
58 ;
59 ; 22 May 09
60 ;   changed nomenclature from p o s i t i v e to a c c ep t a b l e and nega t i v e to unaccep tab l e ;
61 ;   put on l ine an app l e t to a l l ow s t a k e h o l d e r s and re s ea r che r s t e s t i n g i t ;
62 ;
63 ; 21 May 09
64 ;   changed ac c ep t a b l e even t s as the s u b j e c t be ing s i c k and eva l ua t o r t o l e r an t ,
65 ; and unaccep tab l e as not be ing t o l e r a n t on ly ;
66 ;   POTENTIAL: t e s t i f t o l e r a n t r e s u l t s are more l i k e l y in ru ra l groups ;
67 ;   d e l e t e d D i s ea s eA f f e c t s ”Mu l t i p l e c l i e n t s ” as t ha t c r ea t e s a unaccep tab l e
68 ; re in forcement o f a c c ep t a b l e events , thus a l s o removed Af fec tUnique sw i t ch .
69 ;   crea t ed graphs us ing the same events , both f o r groups wi th more accep tab l e ,
70 ; unaccep tab l e and equa l number o f t h e s e even t s . ;
71 ;   unaccep tab l e and ac c ep t a b l e group even t s p l o t s uses l i n e s , bars and dots ,
72 ; as o the rw i s e the f i n a l r e s u l t can become too p o l l u t e d ( busy wi th data ) . ;
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73 ;   added p l o t s o f unacceptab le , equa l and ac c ep t a b l e events , which he lped to
74 ; confirm tha t a c c ep t a b l e even t s on ly inc rea se when d i s e a s e s are in t roduced ;
75 ;   removed p l o t t i n g recurren t even t s when noth ing happens as p o l l u t e s graph
76 ; unnece s sa r i l y . I . e . , on ly show t h i n g s when the re i s some u s e f u l data in i t ;
77 ;   removed aux TotalNoLoss as i t p o l l u t e s a l l graphs , f i x e d i n d i v i d u a l d e b t s
78 ; s c a t t e r p l o t and empty MeetingTrack e n t r i e s ;
79 ;   removed aux TotalPaidOnTime , aux TotalNoLoss , aux TotalAvoidLoss ,
80 ; aux TotalMissedMeetings , aux TotalMissedPayments and aux TotalMyLoss
81 ; aux TotalPaidOnTime from acc ep t a b l e / unaccep tab l e graphs as t h e s e
82 ; genera te too many even t s t ha t are not u s e f u l to ana lyse many s imu la t i on s ;
83 ; i n s t ead some o f t h e s e even t s have been grouped to ease i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ;
84 ;   i n t e g r a t e d both t ype s o f f i n e s ( mfi and group in t o one proper ty in p l o t s ) ,
85 ; same th ing f o r t o t a l and p a r t i a l support , as o the rw i s e t h e s e even t s would
86 ; g e n e r a l l y not be v i s i b l e as t h e s e occur con s i d e ra b l y l e s s than o the r s ;
87 ; 11 May 09
88 ;   f i x e d a var ious c o n f l i c t i n g cond i t i on s when con f i gu r i n g probab l e d e f a u l t e r s ;
89 ;   t h i s model i s on ly u s e f u l when d e f a u l t i n g i n f l u e n c e s are inc luded ;
90 ;   counted only once occurrence o f aux Poss i b l eProb l emat i cMee t ings ;
91 ;   s e t MFI Adviser MeetingTrack r i g h t whenever MFI_Fines occur ;
92 ;
93 ; 10 May 09
94 ;   s e t l e n g t h o f f o r mu l t i p l e s i c k agents as the f o l l ow i n g : ; < round
95 ; ( Disease Inc idence * MFI  Group / 100) , i n s t ead o f a random MFI Group ;
96 ;
97 ; 09 May 09
98 ;   c on t r o l l e d var ious erroneous c on f i g u r a t i on s in having mu l t i p l e p o t e n t i a l
99 ; d e f a u l t e r s , Af fec tUnique a f f e c t s how the same c l i e n t s may be chosen ;
100 ;   r ep l aced aux Prob lemat icMeet ings wi th aux Poss i b l eProb l emat i cMee t ings ;
101 ;
102 ; 08 May 09
103 ;   separa ted setup d e f au l t i n g investment i n f l u ence , setup d e f au l t i n g 
104 ; d i sease i n f l u en c e and setup d e f au l t i n g unp ro f i t a b l e i n f l u en c e . So the s e
105 ; e ven t s can be con f i gured s epara t e l y , i f necessary as in the cases o f
106 ; mu l t i p l e c l i e n t s p o s s i b l y incur r ing d e f a u l t s in the same meeting ;
107 ;
108 ; 29 Apr i l 09
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109 ;   f i x e d output o f languages , bu s ine s s and l oca t i on , p l u s many t e c hn i c a l
110 ; d e t a i l s in the code have been r ewr i t t en f o r b e t t e r l e g i b i l i t y ;
111 ;   kep t l a s t eventcount w i th in the same output column ;
112 ;   POTENTIAL: check e f f e c t s o f > 50 and < 50 with f i x e d random seed ;
113 ;
114 ; 28 Apr i l 2009
115 ;   t o t a l equal , unaccep tab l e and ac c ep t a b l e groups a f t e r a l l c y c l e s ;
116 ;   f i x e d MFI Fine , Group Fine , Group Loss a l l empty in the end ;
117 ;   f i x e d bug in ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) ;
118 ; = ” t o l e r a n t ”) , s u b s t i t u t e d i f e l s e ( ( item 0 Language o f ( item 1
119 ; aux Prob lemat ic ) ) = ( item 0 Language o f ( item 0 aux Fine )) ) f o r
120 ; a c t u a l l y check ing the proper i n d i v i d u a l t o l e r anc e c r i t e r i a ;
121 ;   commented same bus ine s s type as a c r i t e r i a i f e l s e ( ( item 2 Business o f
122 ; ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) ) = ( item 2 Business o f ( item 0 aux Fine )) ) ;
123 ;
124 ; 27 Apr i l 2009
125 ;   added commentaries on the in format ion tab , s t andard i s ed source comments ;
126 ;   code p a r t i a l l y r ewr i t t en , removed Tota lS ick , meeting Unpro f i t ab l e Agents ,
127 ; aux SickEvents , Tota lBadInvestors , aux Mul t ip l eS ickAgents , meeting 
128 ; BadInvestor Agents , To ta lUnpro f i t a b l e and Tota lMeet ingSickAgents ;
129 ;   so r t ed l o g g i n g a l l a ccep tab l e , unaccep tab l e and s imu la t i on counters , wi th
130 ; a l l i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e data f o r a c c ep t a b l e or unaccep tab l e r e s u l t s ;
131 ;   f i x e d l o g g i n g o f l a s t s imu la t i on summary , and merged accep tab l e , equa l
132 ; and unaccep tab l e groups in the same f i n a l l o g to ease ana l y s i s ;
133 ;   moved #unde s i r a b l e s b e s i d e #d e s i r a b l e s in the log , to ease graphing ;
134 ;
135 ; 24 Apr i l 2009
136 ;   commented more on the in format ion tab , p o l i s h e d l o t s o f b i t s in code ;
137 ;   re format ted almost e v e r y t h in g f o r the output f i l e , mainly by dea l i n g how
138 ; to l o g a l l t h a t matters s e p a r a t e l y : aux Summary , aux TotalMissedMeet ings ;
139 ;
140 ; 23 Apr i l 2009
141 ;   f i x e d My_Loss in s i c kn e s s isn ’ t l e ad in g to o ther ac t i on s ;
142 ;   f i x e d deb t s order and l o g g i n g o f mfi / group f ine s , both f o r ru ra l and
143 ; urban groups , s e t cohes ion to SAME TYPE bus iness , language and s i c kn e s s ;
144 ;   removed i n d i f f e r e n c e in to l e rance , as t ha t cou ld s imply become i n t o l e r a n t ;
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145 ;   f i x e d suppor t ( l im i t / t o l e r anc e f o r cover ing l o s s e s f o r non  f i r s t t imers ) ;
146 ;   crea t ed d i f f e r e n t agent t ype s : c l i e n t s and advisor , then added counters
147 ; f o r unaccep tab l e and ac c ep t a b l e endorsements per meeting and cy c l e ;
148 ;   s e t and l ogged the c r i t e r i a o f succeed ing and f a i l i n g groups ;
149 ;   f i x e d l e n g t h o f aux Poss i l eRura lBus ines s and random seed ease r e p l i c a t i o n ;
150 ;
151 ; 22 Apr i l 2009
152 ;   f i x e d EMPTY MEETINGTRACK di sp l ay , COVER_Loss and VOTE_Expel are
153 ; no l onger r epea t ing f o r same agent in c e r t a i n even t s and meet ings ;
154 ;   f i x e d order o f problems logg ing , zombie agents ( dead ones t ha t appeared
155 ; in the next s imu la t i on c y c l e ) , added d e t a i l e d headers o f i t e r a t i v e runs ;
156 ;   ac c ep t a b l e even t s to f i r s t t imers w i l l on ly happen when an agent i s s i c k ;
157 ;   f i x e d l e n g t h o f SUPPORT and NO_SUPPORT by adding miss ing appropr ia t e /
158 ; r e s p e c t i v e deb t s f o r GROUP_FINE, MFI_FINE and Cover_Loss ;
159 ;
160 ; 21 Apr i l 2009
161 ;   r ep l aced numerical t o l e r anc e wi th b inary concept : i n t o l e r a n t or t o l e r a n t ;
162 ;   removed l i k e l i h o o d , managed deb t and inc l ude i t in the output , then checked
163 ; t h a t the l o g i s correc t , f i x e d header in format ion and des igned a way f o r
164 ; d i s e a s e to a f f e c t the whole c r e d i t c y c l e . f i x e d endorsements between agents .
165 ; l o g ged languages , bu s ine s s and l oca t i on , updated group deb t s a f t e r even t s ;
166 ;
167 ; 12 Apr i l 2009
168 ;   f i x e d repea ted even t s by only us ing aux Fine agent in the l a s t i t e r a t i o n ;
169 ;   changed l a b e l s on l o g g i n g events , added event o f who missed meeting
170 ; and payment . d e f ined MFI f i n e as i n t e r e s t ra t e on the c a l c u l a t e d debt ,
171 ; group f i n e as h a l f o f t h a t deb t ; the formal i s more seve re than in formal ;
172 ;   removed group number as s imu la t i on w i l l on ly make sense f o r one group
173 ;   removed r e l a t i v e s , so i f group i s ru ra l i t i s assumed they are most l i k e l y
174 ; to be fami l y members , o the rw i s e i t i s l i k e l y they are urban and ne ighbours ;
175 ;
176 ; 11 Apr i l 2009
177 ;   rev iewed and f i x e d even t s o f who missed meeting , but not payment , even t s
178 ; are g iven a f t e r ALL problems , s e t even t s o f f i r s t t imers and even t s o f
179 ; t hose who a l r eady have some i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r y about the whole group ;
180 ;
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181 ;
182 ; 10 Apr i l 2009
183 ;   l o g a l l h i s t o r y during the c r e d i t cyc l e , f i x e d Unpro f i t a b l e c l i e n t s l o g s ;
184 ;
185 ; 9 Apr i l 2009
186 ;   changed d e s c r i p t i o n s in r e v i s e d code , f i x e d agent 3 always re tu rn ing
187 ; Tolerance be low 0 , and o the r s h i ghe r than 100 in a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n ;
188 ;   aux TotalGroupDebt i s l o g ged accord ing to i t e r a t i v e runs , reduced i n t e r e s t
189 ; r a t e range from 0 to 3 , con f i gured t o t a l group deb t wi th i n t e r e s t ra t e ;
190 ;   s e t language d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n by l o ca t i on , ru ra l and urban , f i x e d group
191 ; deb t wi th and wi thout i n t e r e s t r a t e s and ProblemsOrder ;
192 ;   s e t agents f l a g s I sS ick , I sUnp r o f i t a b l e and IsBadInves tor ;
193 ;   s e t Defau l ted , MissedMeeting f o r s i c knes s , MeetingTrack f o r d i s ea se s ,
194 ; b ad in v e s t o r s and unp ro f i t a b l e , f i x e d non appearing I sS i c k where i t shou ld ;
195 ;   did a person misses a meeting / payment when : i s a bad i n v e s t o r (9%) , i s
196 ; u n p r o f i t a b l e (11%) or i s h i t by d i s ea s e (19%);
197 ;
198 ; 26 March 2009
199 ;   changed d i s p o s i t i o n f o r to l e rance , thus : removed [ un ] w i l l i n g n e s s i s s u e s
200 ; Tolerance ; depending on the s e va lues , they would endorse group
201 ; members d e s i r a b l y or unde s i r a b l y ; f i x e d var ious problems wi th l o g
202 ; output i s s u e s + aux Poss i b l eProb l emat i cMee t ings (Bad Inve s to r s , Unpro f i t a b l e
203 ;  Cl i en t s and Diseases );  f i x e d s e t non unique a f f e c t e d c l i e n t s ;
204 ;   f i x e d r e l a t i v e s are minimal ly a pair , u n p r o f i t a b l e and bad i n v e s t o r s unique ;
205 ;
206 ;
207 ; 17 Mar 09
208 ;   f i x e d minor i s s u e s in Disease Incidence , d id a setup d e f au l t i n g i n f l u e n c e s
209 ; f o r d i s ea se s , u n p r o f i t a b i l i t y and bad i n v e s t o r s ;
210 ;   ProblemNature a f f e c t i n g unique agents are de f ined in setup d e f au l t i n g 
211 ; i n f l u ence s , made Unp r o f i t a b i l i t y become Unpro f i t ab l e Cl ien t s , as Bad 
212 ; I n v e s t o r s ; Disease i s c a l c u l a t e d as inc idence , as t h e r e i s l e s s ev idence
213 ; about how the s e occur , o the rw i s e ep idemio logy would become the focus ;
214 ;   mu l t i p l e number o f s i c k agents c a l c u l a t e d un i que l y and randomly , o the rw i s e
215 ; j u s t one i s p i cked ; Unique ProblemNature means t ha t f o r each problem ,
216 ; namely Unpro f i t a b l e and Bad Inves to r s , t h e r e w i l l be unique agents . So
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217 ; t h e s e can i n v o l v e the same agent be ing a f f e c t e d by both problems .
218 ;   removed r e l a t i v e and neighbour UNwinlingness and Wi l l ingness , s u b s t i t u t e d
219 ; t h e s e s imply f o r a un i v e r s a l Wi l l i ngne s s and UNwinlingness property , as
220 ; now s imu la t i on s run only wi th groups formed e i t h e r by fami l y or ne ighbours ;
221 ;   removed ProblemsOcurr as needs to s e t when problems w i l l happen apart
222 ; from the beg inn ing ; l i k e d i s ea se s , as presumably nobody would s t a r t a group
223 ; wi th a l l be ing s i c k ; removed Non s e q u en t i a l op t i ons from unique and non 
224 ; unique ProblemNature as t ha t w i l l be de f ined by prob l emat i cmee t ings . t h a t
225 ; number depend most ly on d i s ea s e inc idence , but the number o f prob l emat i c
226 ; agents vary from Bad Investments , Un p r o f i t a b i l i t y and Diseases ;
227 ;
228 ;
229 ; 13 , 14 , 16 March 2009
230 ;   reduced the number o f d i f f e r e n t combinat ions in the parameter space ;
231 ;   added user messages to h a l t the s imu la t i on when con f i g u r a t i on s are wrong ;
232 ;   c on t r o l l e d a l l Bad Inve s to r s , s e q u en t i a l & unique and non unique ;
233 ;
234 ; 12 March 2009
235 ;   s e t a l l c l i e n t s knowing one Mayan language ( ru ra l ) and Spanish ( urban ) ;
236 ;   f i x e d var ious l o g d e t a i l s : p r e c i s i on s , i t e r a t i v e runs , l o ca t i on , counters ,
237 ; e qua l c r ed i t , aux TotalGroupDebt , PersonalDebt , QuotaWithInterestRate ;
238 ;
239 ; 11 March 2009
240 ;   commented a l l source code , co r r ec t ed a number o f i s s u e s in the numerical
241 ; op t i ons f o r d i s t r i b u t i n g Tolerance amongst group members ( Exponent ia l ,
242 ; Random, Poissan , Gamma and Normal ) , s e t equa l d e b t s concentra ted in
243 ; 33%, accord ing to the most common va lue s found in f i e l dwo r k ana l y s i s ;
244 ;
245 ; 11 February 2009
246 ;   co r r ec t ed languages i s s u e f o r ru ra l and urban groups , added Disease
247 ; Inc idence and ProblemsOccur parameters ; co r r e c t ed number o f s i c k
248 ; agents per c y c l e ; made d i s ea s e on ly a f f e c t one member per group ;
249 ;
250 ; 10 February 2009
251 ;   Corrected parameters accord ing to f i e l dwo r k f i n d i n g s ; Added Languages ,
252 ; Business , Locat ions to agents ; Random seed in the output , market ( urban
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253 ; or ru ra l ) ; timer , added deb t var iance and QuotaWithInterestRate repayment ;
254 ;
255 ; 20 October 2008
256 ;   Trans la ted e v e r y t h in g in t h i s model to Engl ish , added new con f i gu ra t i on s ,
257 ; c o r r e c t ed i n t e r n a l t imer ; co r r ec t ed i n i t o f the MaxIn i t ia lTo lerance f i x e d
258 ; the SimulationRun , and output i s s u e s ; wrote 1 s t Tolerance as par t o f runs ;
259 ;
260 ; 21 October 2008
261 ;   Changed Tolerance i n i t us ing a random f l o a t us ing a no rma l d i s t r i b u t i on ;
262 ; decimal po ints , apar t from debts , are d e a l t wi th a p r e c i s i on o f 3 ;
263 ;
264 ;
265 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; GLOBAL VARIABLES AND THOSE FOR THE INTERFACE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
266 ;
267 ;
268 globals
269 [ ;
270 ; Aux i l i a r y v a r i a b l e s regard ing agents .
271 ;
272 aux Poss ib leLanguages aux Pos s i b l eLoca t i on s
273 aux Pos s i l eRura lBus ine s s aux Poss ib leUrbanBus iness
274 aux LoggedEventOrder aux TotalGroupDebt
275 ;
276 ; Aux i l i a r y v a r i a b l e s regard ing s imu la t i on runs .
277 ;
278 aux OutputFile aux Repayment aux Summary aux PlotData
279 aux Poss ib l eD i s ea seEvent s ; number o f p o s s i b l e d i s e a s e even t s
280 aux UniqueS ickCl i ents ; c on t r o l who has been s i c k ( l i s t )
281 aux UniqueUnprof i table ; c on t r o l who can be one
282 aux UniqueBadInvestors ; c on t r o l who can be one
283 aux OrderedGroup ; a l l group members in f i x e d order
284 aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings ; how many p o s s i b l e t r ou b l e d meet ings
285
286 ;
287 ; LoggedEvents , unacceptab le , Tota lUndes irab le , MissedMeetings ,
288 ; MissedPayments , S i c kC l i en t s , BadInvestors , Unpro f i t ab l e , MY_Loss,
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289 ; ElapsedTime
290 ;
291 aux Tota lPart ia lSupport aux TotalVoteExpel aux TotalMFI_Fine
292 aux TotalMyLoss aux TotalGroupFine aux TotalGroupLoss
293 aux Tota lUndes i rab le
294
295 ;
296 ; S imulat ion counters
297 ;
298 aux TotalMissedMeetings aux TotalMissedPayments aux Tota lS i ckC l i en t s
299 aux TotalBadInvestors aux Tota lUnpro f i tab l e
300
301 ;
302 ; Loggedevents , accep tab l e , Tota lDes i rab l e , LEADER_Visit , GROUP_Visit ,
303 ; COVER_Loss + COVERED_Loss, NO_Loss , PaidOnTime , AVOID_Loss ,
304 ; ElapsedTime , aux Summary
305 ;
306 aux TotalSupport aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t aux TotalGroupVis it
307 aux TotalCoverLoss aux TotalNoLoss aux TotalPaidOnTime
308 aux Tota lDes i rab l e aux TotalAvoidLoss
309
310 aux DisUnpBIn aux DisBInUnp aux UnpDisBIn aux UnpBInDis
311 aux BInUnpDis aux BInDisUnp aux ProblemsOrderList
312
313 aux Run ; to make agents r e a l i s e where they are in the c r e d i t c y c l e
314 WriteToFile ; boo lean to have a ve r s i on f o r the app l e t , and another o f f l i n e
315 ]
316
317 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; AGENT TYPES ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
318 ;
319 ; Jus t two types , c l i e n t s and MFI_Adviser .
320 ;
321 breed [ MFI_Clients ] breed [ MFI_Adviser ]
322 ;
323 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
324 ;
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325 MFI_Adviser own [ MeetingTrack ]
326
327 MFI_Clients own
328 [ Tolerance ; agents endorse group members d e s i r a b l y or unde s i r a b l y
329 MeetingTrack ; l i s t t r a c k i n g a l l d e t a i l s per agent , format i s be low :
330 ;
331 ; 0 meeting = number o f corresponding one
332 ; 1 ana lysed agent = which agent i s be ing ana lysed
333 ; 2 memory agent = which agent i s s t o r i n g t h i s
334 ; 3 missed meeting = boolean
335 ; 4 missed payment = boo lean
336 ; 5 was s i c k = boo lean
337 ; 6 bad inves tment = boo lean
338 ; 7 u n p r o f i t a b l e = boo lean
339 ; 8 consequence = what the group or MFI did to t h i s person : l e ade r
340 ; or group v i s i t household , vo te f o r e x p e l l i n g , MFI or group f i n e .
341 ; 9 l o s s = covered agent l o s s , d id not covered l o s s , no l o s s
342 ; 10 event = accep tab l e , unaccep tab l e or MyCondition
343 ; 11 curren t deb t = what i s i n vo l v ed
344 ; 12 event order = what happened f i r s t
345 ;
346 ; Boolean
347 ;
348 IsBadInvestor I s S i c k I sUnpro f i t ab l e MissedMeeting Defaulted
349
350 Language ; one from the aux Poss ib l eLanguages
351 Locat ion ; l o c a t i o n o f c l i e n t s
352 Bus iness ; what are they doing wi th c r e d i t
353 PersonalDebt ; t o t a l i n d i v i d u a l deb t
354 QuotaWithInterestRate ; s e t QuotaWithInterestRate per agent and meeting
355 ]
356
357 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; INITIALISE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
358 ;
359 ; s e t the i n i t i a l c on f i g u r a t i on o f the s imu la t i on
360 ;
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361 to i n i t
362
363 clear a l l ; r e s e t s e v e r y t h in g to zero
364 set WriteToFile TRUE ; s e t WriteToFile FALSE
365 i f (WriteToFile ) [ set aux OutputFile ”No log set yet . ” ]
366 ; output f i l e
367 set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings 0
368
369 ; Unacceptab le
370 set aux Tota lPart ia lSupport 0 set aux Tota lUndes i rab le 0
371 set aux TotalGroupFine 0 set aux TotalGroupLoss 0
372 set aux TotalMFI_Fine 0 set aux TotalMyLoss 0 set aux TotalVoteExpel 0
373
374 ; Acceptab le
375 set aux TotalSupport 0 set aux Tota lDes i rab l e 0 set aux TotalGroupVis it 0
376 set aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t 0 set aux TotalCoverLoss 0 set aux TotalNoLoss 0
377 set aux TotalPaidOnTime 0 set aux TotalAvoidLoss 0
378
379 ; s imu la t i on counters
380 set aux TotalMissedMeetings 0 set aux TotalMissedPayments 0
381 set aux Tota lS i ckC l i en t s 0 set aux TotalBadInvestors 0
382 set aux Tota lUnpro f i tab l e 0
383
384 set aux UniqueBadInvestors [ ] set aux UniqueS ickCl i ents [ ]
385 set aux Summary [ ] set aux PlotData [ ] set aux UniqueUnprof i table [ ]
386
387 set aux DisUnpBIn 0 set aux DisBInUnp 0 set aux UnpDisBIn 0
388 set aux UnpBInDis 0 set aux BInUnpDis 0 set aux BInDisUnp 0
389
390 random seed 987654321
391
392 i f (MaxAgentDebt <= MinAgentDebt ) ; s top i f t h i s mistake happens
393 [ user message ”MaxDebt CAN’T be h igher or equal than MinAgentDebt . ” stop ]
394
395 ; Conf igure a l l p o s s i b l e LOCATIONS
396 set aux Pos s i b l eLoca t i on s [ [ ” Palenque ” ”17.50798988” ” 91.99140072”]
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397 [ ” Zinacantán ” ”16.76961756” ” 92.70765781”]
398 [ ” Yajalon ” ”17.17552193” ” 92.33510971”]
399 [ ” Ti la ” ”17.299772” ” 92.425797”]
400 [ ” Teopisca ” ”16.532464” ” 92.469976”]
401 [ ” Sa l to de Agua” ”17.60083013” ” 92.29820251”]
402 [ ” Pantelhó ” ”17.16900257” ” 92.29820251”]
403 [ ” Lar ra inzar ” ”17.04431178” ” 92.48840332”]
404 [ ” La Libertad ” ”17.65645414” ” 91.87797546”]
405 [ ” Ixtapa ” ”16.96880055” ” 92.67860413”]
406 [ ” Escu in t l a ” ”15.50132583” ” 92.67860413”]
407 [ ” Chilon ” ”17.07188219” ” 92.43209839”]
408 [ ” Chenalho” ”17.0600668” ” 92.43209839”]
409 [ ” La Zacualpa ” ”15.32259841” ” 92.4066925”]
410 [ ” Catazaja ” ”17.69112866” ” 92.1697998”]
411 [ ” J i t o t o l ” ”17.01739387” ” 92.68203735”]
412 [ ” Pueblo Nuevo” ”15.38152924” ” 92.68203735”]
413 [ ” Chiapa de Corzo” ”16.66842646” ” 92.82966614”]
414 [ ” Motoz int la de Mendoza” ”15.53572971” ” 92.41149902”]
415 [ ” Pueblo Nuevo So l i s tahuacan ” ”17.10863641” ” 92.72117615”]
416 [ ” San Cr i s t oba l de l a s Casas ” ”16.90968362” ” 92.72117615”] ]
417
418 ; Conf igure a l l p o s s i b l e LANGUAGES apart from Spanish .
419 ; ”” are omit ted from vec to r e n t r i e s be low fo r fo rmat t ing purposes .
420 set aux Poss ib leLanguages [ ” T s o t s i l ” ” T s e l t a l ” ”Chol ” ” Tojo laba l ” ”Zoque”
421 ”Mam” ]
422
423
424
425 ; Set a l l p o s s i b l e RURAL bus ine s s in t h i s format [ Span i shT i t l e Eng l i s hT i t l e ]
426 ;
427 set aux Pos s i l eRura lBus ine s s [ [ ” F l o r i c u l t u r a ” ” F l o r i c u l t u r e ” ”Ornament” ]
428 [ ” F r i j o l ” ”Beans” ” Agr i cu l tu r e ” ]
429 [ ” Cafe ” ” Cof fe ” ” Agr i cu l tu r e ” ]
430 [ ” Maiz” ”Maize” ” Agr i cu l tu r e ” ]
431 [ ” Animales ” ”Husbandry” ” L ives tock ” ]
432 [ ” Frutas y Legumbres” ” Fru i t s and Vegetables ” ” Agr i cu l tu r e ” ] ]
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433
434 ; Set a l l p o s s i b l e URBAN bus ine s s in t h i s format : Span i shT i t l e T i t l e Category
435 ;
436 set aux Poss ib leUrbanBus iness [ [ ” Abarrotes ” ” Groce r i e s ” ”Trade ” ]
437 [ ” Panaderia ” ”Bakery” ”Trade ” ]
438 [ ” Re f a c c i ona r i a ” ” Veh ic l e par t s ” ”Trade ” ]
439 [ ” Ta laba r t e r i a ” ” Leather Shop” ”Trade ” ]
440 [ ” P l a s t i c o s ” ” P l a s t i c s ” ”Trade ” ]
441
442 ; Drink
443 [ ” Aguas Frescas ” ”non a l c o h o l i c ” ”Drink ” ]
444 [ ” Pozol ” ”non a l c o h o l i c ” ”Drink ” ]
445 [ ” Cana” ” a l c o h o l i c ” ”Drink ” ]
446 [ ” Re f r e s co s ” ”non a l c o h o l i c ” ”Drink ” ]
447
448 ; Food
449 [ ” Quesos ” ”Cheese ” ”Food ” ]
450 [ ” T o r t i l l a s ” ” T o r t i l l a s ” ”Food ” ]
451 [ ” Anto j i t o s ” ” Anto j i t o s ” ”Food ” ]
452 [ ” Atole ” ” c e r e a l ” ”Food ” ]
453 [ ” Helados ” ” I c e cream” ”Food ” ]
454 [ ” Dulces ” ”Candies ” ”Food ” ]
455 [ ” Embutidos” ” Sausages ” ”Food ” ]
456 [ ”Pan” ”Bread” ”Food ” ]
457 [ ” Comida” ” d i sh e s ” ”Food ” ]
458 [ ” Po l l o ” ”Chicken ” ”Food ” ]
459 [ ” Lacteos ” ”Dairy ” ”Food ” ]
460 [ ” Tamales” ”Tamales” ”Food ” ]
461 [ ” Pescado ” ”Fish ” ”Food ” ]
462 [ ” Tostadas ” ”Toasts ” ”Food ” ]
463
464 ; Le i sure
465 [ ” Pinatas ” ”Pinata ” ” Le i su r e ” ]
466 [ ” Hamacas” ”Hammocks” ” Le i su r e ” ]
467
468 ; Art
219
Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model 220
469 [ ” Artesan ia ” ” Handicra f t ” ”Art ” ]
470
471
472 ; S e r v i c e s
473 [ ” Carp in t e r i a ” ”Carpentry ” ” Se rv i c e ” ]
474 [ ” Catalago ” ”Catalogue ” ” Se rv i c e ” ]
475
476 ; Personal care
477 [ ” Costurera ” ” Seamstress ” ” Personal care ” ]
478 [ ” Alhajas ” ” Jewe l l e ry ” ” Personal care ” ]
479 [ ” Cosmeticos ” ”Cosmest ics ” ” Personal care ” ]
480 [ ” Calzado ” ” Shoes ” ” Personal care ” ]
481 [ ”Ropa” ”Clothing ” ” Personal care ” ]
482 [ ” Es t e t i c a ” ”Beauty Salon ” ” Personal care ” ]
483 ]
484
485 setup agents ; to a l l ow con f i gu r i n g p r o p e r t i e s
486 con f i gure agents ; a long wi th t h e i r problems
487 i f (WriteToFile ) [ setup output f i l e ] ; c r ea t e f i l e output
488 end
489
490 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; CONFIGURE AGENTS ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
491 ;
492 ; s e t a l l parameters per agent
493 ;
494 to con f i gure agents
495 locals [ aux i aux L i s t aux Debt aux Agent aux LowerDebt aux Tolerance ]
496
497 ; c r ea t e l i s t s f o r c a l c u l a t i n g d i f f e r e n t Tolerance d i s t r i b u t i o n s
498 set aux Agent 0
499 set aux Debt 0
500 set aux LowerDebt 0 ; when Equa lCredi t i s se t , use the f i e l dwo r k f i n d i n g s
501 set aux L i s t [ ]
502
503 while [ aux Agent < MFI Group ]
504 [ ; r e s e t t h i s to c r ea t e i n d i v i d u a l t o l e r anc e o f a l l agents in t h e i r group
220
Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model 221
505 set aux i 0
506
507 ask turtle aux Agent
508 [ ; i n i t i a l i s e Tolerance
509 set Tolerance [ ] set aux Tolerance [ ] set MeetingTrack [ ]
510 set I s S i c k f a l s e set I sBadInvestor f a l s e set I sUnpro f i t ab l e f a l s e
511
512 ; c on f i gu r e agent language
513 set Language [ ]
514 set Language lput ( item (random ( length aux Poss ib leLanguages ) )
515 aux Poss ib leLanguages ) Language ; Pick up a random language
516 ; depending on loca t i on , Rural c l i e n t s know Mayan and Urban a l s o Spanish
517 i f not ( Rural ) [ set Language lput ” Spanish ” Language ]
518
519 ; c on f i gu r e the agent bus iness , r u ra l or urban
520 i f e l s e ( Rural )
521 [ set Bus iness item (random ( length aux Pos s i l eRura lBus ine s s ) )
522 aux Pos s i l eRura lBus ine s s ]
523 [ set Bus iness item (random ( length aux Poss ib leUrbanBus iness ) )
524 aux Poss ib leUrbanBus iness ]
525
526 ; d ea l wi th random to l e rance , go ing through a l l c l i e n t s apar t from i t s e l f
527 while [ aux i < MFI Group ]
528 [ i f ( aux i != aux Agent ) ; i t isn ’ t the same c l i e n t
529 [ ask turtle aux Agent
530 [ set aux Tolerance lput aux i aux Tolerance
531 set aux L i s t [ ]
532 ; 0 i n t o l e r an t , 1 t o l e r a n t
533 set aux L i s t lput random 2 aux L i s t
534 i f e l s e ( item 0 aux L i s t = 0)
535 [ set aux Tolerance lput ” i n t o l e r a n t ” aux Tolerance ]
536 [ set aux Tolerance lput ” t o l e r an t ” aux Tolerance ]
537 set Tolerance lput aux Tolerance Tolerance
538 set aux Tolerance [ ]
539 ]
540 ]
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541 set aux i aux i + 1
542 ]
543
544 ; c on f i gu r e Debts
545 i f e l s e ( EqualCredit )
546 [ ; s e t the LowerDebt as 33% d i s t r i b u t i o n MIN accord ing f i e l dwo r k
547 set aux LowerDebt ( (MaxAgentDebt * 33 .33 ) / 100)
548
549 ; make sure the deb t i s between the range and the same c r e d i t
550 while [ ( aux Debt < aux LowerDebt ) or ( aux Debt > MaxAgentDebt ) ]
551 [ set aux Debt precision (random f l o a t MaxAgentDebt ) 2 ]
552 ]
553 ; make sure the deb t i s between the range and with d i f f e r e n t c r e d i t s
554 ; random exponent ia l , random gamma, random normal , random poi sson
555 [ set aux Debt 0
556 ; g i v e the chance o f each agent to r e c e i v e a d i f f e r e n t c r e d i t
557 while [ ( aux Debt < MinAgentDebt ) or ( aux Debt > MaxAgentDebt ) ]
558
559 [ set aux Debt precision (random f l o a t MaxAgentDebt ) 2 ]
560 set PersonalDebt aux Debt
561 ]
562
563 set PersonalDebt aux Debt ; w i thout i n t e r e s t ra t e
564
565 ; QuotaWithInterestRate = Persona lDeb t In teres tRate
566 ; + PersonalDebt / Repayments
567
568 ; added i n t e r e s t ra t e
569 set QuotaWithInterestRate precision ( ( ( ( PersonalDebt * In t e r e s tRat e )
570 / 100) + PersonalDebt ) / Repayments ) 2
571 ]
572 set aux Agent aux Agent + 1
573 ]
574
575 set aux L i s t [ ]
576
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577 set aux L i s t ( item (random ( length aux Pos s i b l eLoca t i on s ) )
578 aux Pos s i b l eLoca t i on s ) ; p ickup one l o c a t i o n
579
580 ask MFI_Clients
581 [ set Locat ion [ ]
582 set Locat ion aux L i s t
583 ]
584
585 ; a l l deb t wi thou t i n t e r e s t ra t e
586 set aux Debt precision (sum values from MFI_Clients [ PersonalDebt ] ) 2
587
588 ; show ”Personal Debts wi thou t order : ” +
589 ; va lues from MFI_Clients [ PersonalDebt ] ; debug
590
591 ; show ”Tota l Group Debt wi thou t i n t e r e s t ra t e : ” + aux Debt ; debug
592
593 set aux TotalGroupDebt precision ( ( ( aux Debt * In t e r e s tRat e / 100)
594 * Repayments ) + aux Debt ) 2
595
596 ; show ”Tota l Group Debt WITH i n t e r e s t ra t e : ” + aux TotalGroupDebt ; debug
597
598 ; show ”Tota l i n t e r e s t ra t e : ” + pr e c i s i on ( ( aux Debt * In t e r e s tRa t e / 100)
599 ; * Repayments ) 2 ; debug
600 end
601
602 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; DEFAULTING EXTERNAL INVESTMENT INFLUENCE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
603 ; s e l e c t how exogenous d e f a u l t i n g i n f l u e n c e s might opera te
604
605 to setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e
606 locals [ aux Chosen ]
607 ; shou ld Bad I n v e s t o r s occur , i n i t i a l i s e counters
608 i f (Bad I nv e s t o r s > 0)
609 [ ; and ( Af fec tUnique ) )
610 i f e l s e (Bad I nv e s t o r s + Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s >= MFI Group)
611 or (Bad I nv e s t o r s >= MFI Group)
612 [ user message ”Unique/ Po s s i b l e Bad I nv e s t o r s and Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s
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613 CAN’T be h igher or equal than MFI Group . ” ]
614 [ i f (Bad I nv e s t o r s >= 1)
615 [ ; bad i n v e s t o r s can happen at any meeting
616 set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat i cMeet ings Repayments
617 set aux Chosen [ ] ; s e t the non unique a f f e c t e d c l i e n t s
618 while [ length aux UniqueBadInvestors < Bad I nv e s t o r s ]
619 [ set aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients
620 ; i f e l s e ( Af fec tUnique )
621 ; [
622 while [ (member? aux Chosen aux UniqueBadInvestors ) or
623 (member? aux Chosen aux UniqueUnprof i table ) ]
624 [ set aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients ]
625 ; ]
626 ; [ wh i l e [ (member? aux Chosen aux UniqueBadInvestors ) ]
627 ; [ s e t aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients ]
628 ; ]
629 set aux UniqueBadInvestors lput aux Chosen aux UniqueBadInvestors
630 ]
631 set aux UniqueBadInvestors s o r t aux UniqueBadInvestors
632 foreach aux UniqueBadInvestors [ ask ? [ set I sBadInvestor t rue ] ]
633 ]
634
635 ; show ”aux UniqueBadInvestors : ” + aux UniqueBadInvestors
636 i f ( aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings > Repayments )
637 [ set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings Repayments ] ; in case
638 ]
639 ]
640 end
641
642 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; DEFAULTING EXTERNAL UNPROFITABLE INFLUENCES ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
643 ; s e l e c t how exogenous d e f a u l t i n g i n f l u e n c e s might opera te
644
645 to setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e
646 locals [ aux Chosen ]
647
648 ; shou ld Unpro f i t ab l e Cl i en t s occur , i n i t i a l i s e counters
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649 i f ( Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s > 0)
650 [ ; and ( Af fec tUnique ) )
651 i f e l s e ( Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s + Bad I nv e s t o r s >= MFI Group)
652 or ( Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s >= MFI Group)
653 [ user message ” Po s s i b l e Unpro f i t ab l e C l i en t s and Bad I nv e s t o r s
654 CAN’T be h igher or equal than MFI Group . ” ]
655
656 [ i f ( Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s >= 1 )
657 [ set aux Chosen [ ]
658 ; ensure t he r e i s a unique , random l i s t o f Unpro f i t ab l e Cl i en t s
659 while [ length aux UniqueUnprof i table < Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s ]
660 [ set aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients
661 ; i f e l s e ( Af fec tUnique )
662 ; [
663 while [ (member? aux Chosen aux UniqueUnprof i table ) or
664 (member? aux Chosen aux UniqueBadInvestors ) ]
665 [ set aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients ]
666 ; ]
667 ; [ wh i l e [ (member? aux Chosen aux UniqueUnpro f i tab l e ) ]
668 ; [ s e t aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients ]
669 ; ]
670 set aux UniqueUnprof i table lput aux Chosen aux UniqueUnprof i table
671 ]
672 set aux UniqueUnprof i table s o r t aux UniqueUnprof i table
673 foreach aux UniqueUnprof i table [ ask ? [ set I sUnp ro f i t ab l e t rue ] ]
674 ]
675
676 ; show ”aux UniqueUnpro f i tab l e : ” + aux UniqueUnpro f i tab l e
677 i f ( aux Poss ib l eProb lemat i cMeet ings > Repayments )
678 [ set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat i cMeet ings Repayments ] ; in case
679 ]
680 ]
681 end
682
683 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; DEFAULTING EXTERNAL DISEASE INFLUENCE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
684 ; s e l e c t how exogenous d e f a u l t i n g i n f l u e n c e s might opera te
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685 to setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e
686 locals [ aux Chosen ]
687
688 ; shou ld d i s e a s e s occur , i n i t i a l i s e counters
689 i f ( Disease Inc idence > 0 )
690 [ ; c r ea t e a number o f p o s s i b l e d i s e a s e s occurrences based on the
691 ; Disease Inc idence percentage wi th regards to number o f Repayments
692 set aux Poss ib l eD i s ea seEvent s round
693 ( ( Disease Inc idence * Repayments ) / 100 )
694
695 ; count on ly once aux Poss i b l eProb l emat i cMee t ings
696 i f not any? MFI_Clients with [ I s S i c k = true ]
697 [ set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings aux Poss ib l eProb lemat i cMeet ings
698 + aux Poss ib l eD i s ea seEvent s ]
699
700 ;
701 ; i f e l s e ( D i s ea s eA f f e c t s = ” S ing l e C l i en t ”)
702 ; [ ; k ep t the same s i c k agent during a c r e d i t c y c l e
703 i f ( length aux UniqueS ickCl i ents = 0)
704
705 [ set aux UniqueS ickCl i ents lput one o f
706 MFI_Clients aux UniqueS ickCl i ents
707 foreach aux UniqueS ickCl i ents [ ask ? [ set I s S i c k t rue ] ]
708 ]
709
710 ; ]
711 ; [ s e t aux Chosen [ ] ; to s e t the non unique , mu l t i p l e a f f e c t e d c l i e n t s
712 ; show round ( Disease Inc idence * MFI Group / 100)
713 ; + ” NUMBER OF SICK AGENTS ” ; debug
714 ;
715 ; wh i l e [ l e n g t h aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s < round ( Disease Inc idence
716 ; * MFI Group / 100) ] ; ( random ( count MFI_Clients ) ) ]
717 ; [ s e t aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients
718 ; wh i l e [ member? aux Chosen aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s ]
719 ; [ s e t aux Chosen one o f MFI_Clients ]
720 ; s e t aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s l p u t aux Chosen aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s
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721 ; ]
722 ; s e t aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s s o r t aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s
723 ; f o reach aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s [ ask ? [ s e t I s S i c k t rue ] ]
724 ; ]
725 ; show ”aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s : ” + aux UniqueS ickC l i en t s ; debug
726 ; r e g a r d l e s s how d i s ea s e works , add i t s inc idence to t r ou b l e d meet ings
727
728 i f ( aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings > Repayments )
729 [ set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings Repayments ] ; in case
730 ]
731 end
732
733 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; SETUP AGENTS ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
734 ;
735 ; add agents to the s imula t ion , c l i e n t s and adv i so r
736 ;
737
738 to setup agents
739 create custom MFI_Clients MFI Group [ ]
740 create custom MFI_Adviser 1 [ set MeetingTrack [ ] ]
741
742 ; have an ordered l i s t o f a l l agents throughout the s imu la t i on
743 set aux OrderedGroup [ ] ; to avoid zombies ( agents c a l l e d ”nobody ”)
744 set aux OrderedGroup so r t MFI_Clients
745 end
746
747 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; WRITE THE OUTPUT FILE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
748 ; format the r e s u l t s
749 to setup output f i l e
750 locals [ aux i aux j ]
751
752 set aux OutputFile ( remove ” : ” date and time ) + ” , ” + Runs + ” runs , ”
753 + MFI Group + ” members , ” + Repayments + ” repayments . csv ”
754
755 f i l e open aux OutputFile
756 f i l e print date and time
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757
758 f i l e type ” S o l i d a r i t y Group with : ” + MFI Group
759 i f e l s e ( Rural )
760 [ f i l e print ” RURAL fami ly members . ” ]
761 [ f i l e print ” URBAN neighbour members . ” ]
762
763 f i l e print ” Disease Inc idence : ” + Disease Inc idence
764 ;+ ” . Disease A f f e c t s : ” + Di s ea s eA f f e c t s
765
766 f i l e print ” Unpro f i t ab l e C l i en t s : ” + Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s +
767 ” . Bad Inv e s t o r s : ” + Bad I nv e s t o r s
768
769 f i l e print ”MINimum debt : ” + MinAgentDebt +
770 ” . MAXimum debt : ” + MaxAgentDebt
771
772 i f e l s e ( EqualCredit )
773 [ f i l e type ”EQUAL ” ]
774 [ f i l e type ”UNEQUAL ” ]
775 f i l e print ” Credit d i s t r i b u t i o n . ”
776
777 f i l e print ”Repayments : ” + Repayments + ” . Runs : ” + Runs
778 f i l e print ”Maximum Pot en t i a l l y Problematic Meetings (MPPM) . ”
779 f i l e print ” ”
780 end
781
782 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; SIMULATE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
783 ;
784 ; run the model
785 ;
786 to go
787 locals [ aux i aux L1 aux L2 aux L3 aux L4 aux L5
788 aux L6 aux desirableNumber aux EqualNumber
789 aux undesirableNumber aux Cur r en t I t e r a t i on ]
790
791 reset timer ; g l o b a l t i c k count i s 0
792 set aux Run 1
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793 set aux LoggedEventOrder 1 .1
794 set aux L1 [ ] set aux L2 [ ] set aux L3 [ ]
795 set aux L4 [ ] set aux L5 [ ] set aux L6 [ ]
796
797 set aux Repayment 0 set aux desirableNumber 0
798 set aux EqualNumber 0 set aux undesirableNumber 0
799
800 ; s top i f t h i s happens
801 i f ( aux OutputFile = ” nothing set yet ”)
802 [ user message ”No OUTPUT has been de f ined . ” stop ]
803
804 ; wr i t e e v o l u t i on o f even t s per s imu la t i on
805 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e print ”ProblemOrder , Tota lLeaderVis i t , TotalGroupVisit , TotalGroupVisit , TotalSupport , TotalVoteExpel , Tota lFines ” ]
806
807 set aux ProblemsOrderList [ ]
808
809 ; wr i t e r e s u l t s per s imu la t i on c y c l e
810 while [ aux Run <= Runs ]
811 [ ; wr i t e r e s u l t s per meeting
812 while [ aux Repayment <= Repayments ]
813 [ ; i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e  type ”#Meeting ” + aux Repayment
814 ; i f ( aux Repayment = 0) [ f i l e  p r i n t ” , START” ] ]
815 meeting ; go through what a meeting i s supposed to be
816
817 ; order o f aux ProblemsOrderList [ [ aux DisUnpBIn , aux DisBInUnp ,
818 ; aux UnpDisBIn , aux UnpBInDis , aux BInUnpDis , aux BInDisUnp ] ]
819
820 set aux L6 lput aux DisUnpBIn aux L6
821 set aux L6 lput aux DisBInUnp aux L6
822 set aux L6 lput aux UnpDisBIn aux L6
823 set aux L6 lput aux UnpBInDis aux L6
824 set aux L6 lput aux BInUnpDis aux L6
825 set aux L6 lput aux BInDisUnp aux L6
826 set aux ProblemsOrderList lput aux L6 aux ProblemsOrderList
827 set aux L6 [ ]
828 set aux Repayment aux Repayment + 1
229
Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model 230
829 ]
830
831 ; r e s e t counters o f a l l meet ings problems
832 set aux BInDisUnp 0 set aux BInUnpDis 0
833 set aux UnpBInDis 0 set aux UnpDisBIn 0
834 set aux DisBInUnp 0 set aux DisUnpBIn 0
835
836 i f (WriteToFile ) [
837 f i l e print ” ” f i l e print ” ”
838 f i l e print ”#Run ” + aux Run ]
839
840 ; ElapsedTime , Cycle , LoggedEvents , . . .
841 set aux Summary lput timer aux Summary
842
843 ; move a long to the second meeting wi th co r r e c t va l u e s
844 i f ( P lo t s ) [
845 set current plot ”Elapsed Time”
846 set current plot pen ”timer”
847 plotxy aux Run timer ; i tem aux Summary ; t imer f o r the current s imu la t i on
848 ]
849
850 reset timer
851 set aux LoggedEventOrder 1 .1
852
853 ; l o g the complete h i s t o r y o f a l l agents in order o f even t s
854 ; put a l l e ven t s in one au x i l a r l i s t
855 foreach aux OrderedGroup [ ask ?
856 [ without i n t e r r up t i on
857 [ foreach MeetingTrack
858 ; to avoid the [ ] bug caught in aux Memory
859 [ i f ( length ? != 0) [
860 foreach ? [ set aux L1 lput ? aux L1 ]
861 set aux L2 lput aux L1 aux L2
862 set aux L1 [ ]
863 ]
864 ]
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865 ]
866 ]
867 ]
868
869 ; s o r t them a l l by eventID
870 set aux L2 ( sort by [ item 12 ?1 < item 12 ?2 ] aux L2)
871
872 ; wr i t e a l l t h e i r languages and bu s i n e s s e s
873 set aux i 0
874 i f (WriteToFile ) [
875 f i l e print ”Language , , , , Business , , , , Locat ion ”
876 while [ aux i < MFI Group ]
877 [ ; f i l e  type ” C l i en t : ” + ( aux i ) + ” , ”
878 foreach value from item aux i aux OrderedGroup [ Language ]
879 [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
880 f i l e type ” , ”
881
882 i f ( Rural ) [ f i l e type ” , ” ]
883 foreach value from item aux i aux OrderedGroup [ Bus iness ]
884 [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
885 f i l e type ” , ”
886
887 foreach value from item aux i aux OrderedGroup [ Locat ion ]
888 [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
889 f i l e print ” ”
890
891 set aux i aux i + 1
892 ]
893
894 f i l e print ” ”
895
896 ; l o g a l l t h e i r h i s t o r y during the c r e d i t c y c l e
897 f i l e print ”Meeting , Analysed , Memory , MissedMeeting , MissedPayment ,
898 I sS i ck , I sBadInvestor , I sUnpro f i t ab l e , Consequence , Payment ,
899 Status , DebtFocus , EventOrder , #EventCount” ; , TotalDebt ” ]
900 set aux i 1
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901 ; wr i t e them a l l
902 foreach aux L2
903 [ foreach ?
904 [ i f (WriteToFile ) [
905 i f e l s e ( i s agent ? ?)
906 [ f i l e type ” c l i en t_ ” + who o f ? + ” , ” ]
907 [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
908 ] ]
909 i f ( l a s t aux L2 = ?)
910 [ ; ElapsedTime , Cycle , LoggedEvents ,
911 set aux Summary lput (” Cycle : ” + aux Run) aux Summary
912 set aux Summary lput aux i aux Summary ]
913
914 i f (WriteToFile )
915 [ f i l e type aux i
916 f i l e print ” ” ]
917
918 set aux i aux i + 1 ]
919
920 i f (WriteToFile ) [
921 f i l e print ” ”
922 f i l e print ”ProblemOrder , Tota lLeaderVis i t , TotalGroupVisit ,
923 TotalGroupVisit , TotalSupport , TotalVoteExpel , Tota lFines ” ]
924
925 ; c r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i n g groups
926 i f e l s e ( aux Tota lDes i rab l e > aux Tota lUndes i rab le )
927 [ set aux Summary lput ” acceptab l e ” aux Summary
928 set aux desirableNumber aux desirableNumber + 1
929 set aux Cur r en t I t e r a t i on ” acceptab l e ”
930 ]
931
932 [ i f e l s e ( aux Tota lDes i rab l e = aux Tota lUndes i rab le )
933 [ set aux Summary lput ”Equal P&N” aux Summary
934 set aux EqualNumber aux EqualNumber + 1
935 set aux Cur r en t I t e r a t i on ” equal ”
936 ]
232
Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model 233
937 [ set aux Summary lput ” unacceptable ” aux Summary
938 set aux undesirableNumber aux undesirableNumber + 1
939 set aux Cur r en t I t e r a t i on ” unacceptable ”
940 ] ]
941
942 ; ElapsedTime , Cycle , #Events , Fina l Status , #Acceptab le , #Unacceptable ,
943 ; #LEADER_Visit , #GROUP_Visit , #COVER_Loss, #NO_Loss , #PaidOnTime ,
944 ; #AVOID_Loss , #Full_Support , Missed Meetings , Missed Payments ,
945 ; #ExpelVote ,#MFIFine , #GroupFine , GroupLoss , #MyLoss , #Par t ia lSuppor t ,
946 ; EventsWithSickCl ients , EventsWithBadInvestors , EventsWithUnprof i tab le
947
948 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lDes i rab l e aux Summary
949 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lUndes i rab le aux Summary
950
951 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t aux Summary
952 set aux Summary lput aux TotalGroupVis it aux Summary
953 set aux Summary lput aux TotalCoverLoss aux Summary
954 set aux Summary lput aux TotalNoLoss aux Summary
955
956 set aux Summary lput aux TotalPaidOnTime aux Summary
957 set aux Summary lput aux TotalAvoidLoss aux Summary
958 set aux Summary lput aux TotalSupport aux Summary
959
960 set aux Summary lput aux TotalMissedMeetings aux Summary
961 set aux Summary lput aux TotalMissedPayments aux Summary
962 set aux Summary lput aux TotalVoteExpel aux Summary
963 set aux Summary lput aux TotalMFI_Fine aux Summary
964 set aux Summary lput aux TotalGroupFine aux Summary
965 set aux Summary lput aux TotalGroupLoss aux Summary
966 set aux Summary lput aux TotalMyLoss aux Summary
967 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lPart ia lSupport aux Summary
968
969 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lS i ckC l i en t s aux Summary
970 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lBadInvestors aux Summary
971 set aux Summary lput aux Tota lUnpro f i tab l e aux Summary
972
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973 ; v i s u a l graphs o f a l l t h a t happens , p l u s l o g data
974 ; do the p l o t s i f t h e r e i s something u s e f u l to be shown
975 ;
976 i f ( ( ( aux Tota lDes i rab l e != 0) or ( aux Tota lUndes i rab le != 0)
977 or ( aux EqualNumber != 0) ) and ( P lot s ) ) [
978 set current plot ”Total group outcomes ”
979 set current plot pen ”Acceptable ”
980 plot aux desirableNumber
981
982 set current plot pen ”Equal ”
983 plot aux EqualNumber
984
985 set current plot pen ”Unacceptable ”
986 plot aux undesirableNumber
987
988 set current plot ” Ind i v i dua l debts ”
989 set current plot pen ”PersonalDebt ”
990 foreach values from MFI_Clients [ PersonalDebt ] [ plot ? ]
991 set current plot pen ”QuotaWithInterestRate ”
992 foreach values from MFI_Clients [ QuotaWithInterestRate ] [ plot ? ]
993 ]
994
995 ;
996 ; no v i s u a l p l o t s , but s t i l l l o g the data
997 ;
998 i f e l s e ( aux Cur r en t I t e r a t i on = ” acceptab l e ”)
999 [ set aux PlotData lput ”Acceptable ” aux PlotData ]
1000 [ i f e l s e ( aux Cur r en t I t e r a t i on = ” unacceptable ”)
1001 [ set aux PlotData lput ”UNdesirable ” aux PlotData ]
1002 [ set aux PlotData lput ”Equal ” aux PlotData ] ]
1003
1004 i f e l s e ( aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t != 0)
1005 [ set aux PlotData lput aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t aux PlotData ]
1006 [ set aux PlotData lput 0 aux PlotData ]
1007
1008 i f e l s e ( aux TotalGroupVis it != 0)
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1009 [ set aux PlotData lput aux TotalGroupVis it aux PlotData ]
1010 [ set aux PlotData lput 0 aux PlotData ]
1011
1012 i f e l s e ( aux TotalCoverLoss != 0)
1013 [ set aux PlotData lput aux TotalCoverLoss aux PlotData ]
1014 [ set aux PlotData lput 0 aux PlotData ]
1015
1016 i f e l s e ( aux TotalVoteExpel != 0)
1017 [ set aux PlotData lput aux TotalVoteExpel aux PlotData ]
1018 [ set aux PlotData lput 0 aux PlotData ]
1019
1020 i f e l s e ( aux TotalSupport != 0) or ( aux Tota lPart ia lSupport != 0)
1021 [ set aux PlotData lput ( aux TotalSupport + aux Tota lPart ia lSupport )
1022 aux PlotData ]
1023 [ set aux PlotData lput 0 aux PlotData ]
1024
1025 i f e l s e ( aux TotalMFI_Fine != 0) or ( aux TotalGroupFine != 0)
1026 [ set aux PlotData lput ( aux TotalMFI_Fine + aux TotalGroupFine )
1027 aux PlotData ]
1028 [ set aux PlotData lput 0 aux PlotData ]
1029
1030 ; unaccep tab l e
1031 set aux Tota lPart ia lSupport 0 set aux TotalVoteExpel 0
1032 set aux TotalMFI_Fine 0 set aux TotalMyLoss 0
1033 set aux TotalGroupFine 0 set aux TotalGroupLoss 0
1034 set aux Tota lUndes i rab le 0
1035
1036 ; a c c ep t a b l e
1037 set aux TotalSupport 0 set aux Tota lDes i rab l e 0
1038 set aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t 0 set aux TotalGroupVis it 0
1039 set aux TotalCoverLoss 0 set aux TotalNoLoss 0
1040 set aux TotalPaidOnTime 0 set aux TotalAvoidLoss 0
1041
1042 ; s imu la t i on counters
1043 set aux TotalMissedMeetings 0 set aux TotalMissedPayments 0
1044 set aux Tota lS i ckC l i en t s 0 set aux TotalBadInvestors 0
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1045 set aux Tota lUnpro f i tab l e 0
1046
1047 ; r e con f i gu r e agents f o r a new run
1048 clear turtles
1049
1050 ; to not repea t one more than needed
1051 i f ( aux Run < Runs )
1052 [ ; on ly se tup them again i f needed
1053 setup agents
1054 con f i gure agents
1055 set aux Poss ib l eProb lemat icMeet ings 0
1056 set aux Repayment 0
1057
1058 set aux UniqueBadInvestors [ ]
1059 set aux UniqueS ickCl i ents [ ]
1060 set aux UniqueUnprof i table [ ]
1061
1062 ; to avoid zombies
1063 set aux L1 [ ]
1064 set aux L2 [ ]
1065 ]
1066 set aux Run aux Run + 1
1067 ]
1068
1069 set aux i 0
1070 set aux L1 [ ]
1071 set aux L2 [ ]
1072
1073 ; put a l l e ven t s in one au x i l a r l i s t
1074 ; g e t a l l i tems to output , accord ing to the log ’ s l e n g t h
1075 foreach aux Summary [ i f e l s e ( aux i <= 23)
1076 [ set aux L1 lput ? aux L1
1077 set aux i aux i + 1 ]
1078 [ set aux L2 lput aux L1 aux L2
1079 set aux L1 [ ]
1080 set aux L1 lput ? aux L1
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1081 set aux i 1 ] ]
1082
1083 set aux L2 lput aux L1 aux L2 ; to ca tch the l a s t s imu la t i on summary
1084
1085 ; very d e t a i l e d log , wi th a l l e ven t s
1086 i f (WriteToFile ) [
1087 f i l e print ” ”
1088 f i l e type ”ElapsedTime , Cycle , #Events , F ina l Status , #Acceptable ,
1089 #Unacceptable , #LEADER_Visit , ”
1090 f i l e type ”#GROUP_Visit , #COVER_Loss, #NO_Loss , #PaidOnTime ,
1091 #AVOID_Loss , #Full_Support , ”
1092 f i l e type ”Missed Meetings , Missed Payments , #ExpelVote , #MFIFine ,
1093 #GroupFine , #GroupLoss , ”
1094 f i l e print ”#MyLoss , #Part ia lSupport , EventsWithSickCl ients ,
1095 EventsWithBadInvestors , EventsWithUnprof itable ”
1096
1097 foreach aux L2
1098 [ foreach ? [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
1099 f i l e print ” ” ]
1100
1101 f i l e print ”#acceptab l e : ” + aux desirableNumber
1102 f i l e print ”#Equal P&N log : ” + aux EqualNumber
1103 f i l e print ”#unacceptable : ” + aux undesirableNumber
1104 ]
1105
1106 ;
1107 ; l o g on ly con ta in ing p l o t data
1108 ;
1109 set aux i 0
1110 set aux L1 [ ]
1111 set aux L2 [ ]
1112 foreach aux PlotData [
1113 i f e l s e ( aux i <= 6) [
1114 set aux L1 lput ? aux L1
1115 set aux i aux i + 1 ]
1116 [ set aux L2 lput aux L1 aux L2
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1117 set aux L1 [ ]
1118 set aux L1 lput ? aux L1
1119 set aux i 1 ] ]
1120
1121 set aux L2 lput aux L1 aux L2
1122
1123 ; to he l p s epa ra t i n g each r e s u l t
1124 set aux L2 ( sort by [ item 0 ?1 < item 0 ?2 ] aux L2)
1125
1126 ; aux L1 = Equal , aux L3 = Acceptab le , aux L4 = Unacceptab le
1127 set aux L1 [ ]
1128
1129 foreach aux L2
1130 [ set aux L5 lput item 0 ? aux L5
1131 set aux L5 lput item 1 ? aux L5
1132 set aux L5 lput item 2 ? aux L5
1133 set aux L5 lput item 3 ? aux L5
1134 set aux L5 lput item 4 ? aux L5
1135 set aux L5 lput item 5 ? aux L5
1136 set aux L5 lput item 6 ? aux L5
1137
1138 i f e l s e ( item 0 ? = ”Equal ”)
1139 [ set aux L1 lput aux L5 aux L1 ]
1140 [ i f e l s e ( item 0 ? = ”Acceptable ”)
1141 [ set aux L3 lput aux L5 aux L3 ]
1142 [ set aux L4 lput aux L5 aux L4 ] ]
1143
1144 set aux L5 [ ]
1145 ]
1146
1147 ; aux L3 = Acceptab le
1148 set aux L3 ( sort by [ item 1 ?1 < item 1 ?2 ] aux L3)
1149 set aux L3 ( sort by [ item 2 ?1 < item 2 ?2 ] aux L3)
1150 set aux L3 ( sort by [ item 3 ?1 < item 3 ?2 ] aux L3)
1151 set aux L3 ( sort by [ item 4 ?1 < item 4 ?2 ] aux L3)
1152 set aux L3 ( sort by [ item 5 ?1 < item 5 ?2 ] aux L3)
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1153 set aux L3 ( sort by [ item 6 ?1 < item 6 ?2 ] aux L3)
1154
1155 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e print ” ”
1156 f i l e print ” Status , #LeaderVis i t , #GroupVisit , #CoveredLosses ,
1157 #Expel l ingVotes , #TotalSupport , #Tota lFines ” ]
1158 set current plot ”Acceptable group events ”
1159 foreach aux L3 ; aux L3 = Acceptab l e
1160 [ i f (WriteToFile ) [ foreach ? [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
1161 f i l e print ” ” ]
1162
1163 set current plot pen ” LeaderVi s i t ”
1164 plot item 1 ?
1165
1166 set current plot pen ”GroupVisit ”
1167 plot item 2 ?
1168
1169 set current plot pen ”CoveredLosses ”
1170 plot item 3 ?
1171
1172 set current plot pen ” Expe l l ingVotes ”
1173 plot item 4 ?
1174
1175 set current plot pen ”TotalSupport ”
1176 plot item 5 ?
1177
1178 set current plot pen ” Tota lFines ”
1179 plot item 6 ?
1180 ]
1181
1182 ; aux L1 = Equal
1183 set aux L1 ( sort by [ item 1 ?1 < item 1 ?2 ] aux L1)
1184 set aux L1 ( sort by [ item 2 ?1 < item 2 ?2 ] aux L1)
1185 set aux L1 ( sort by [ item 3 ?1 < item 3 ?2 ] aux L1)
1186 set aux L1 ( sort by [ item 4 ?1 < item 4 ?2 ] aux L1)
1187 set aux L1 ( sort by [ item 5 ?1 < item 5 ?2 ] aux L1)
1188 set aux L1 ( sort by [ item 6 ?1 < item 6 ?2 ] aux L1)
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1189
1190 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e print ” ”
1191 f i l e print ” Status , #LeaderVis i t , #GroupVisit , #CoveredLosses ,
1192 #Expel l ingVotes , #TotalSupport , #Tota lFines ” ]
1193
1194 set current plot ”Equal group events ”
1195 foreach aux L1 ; aux L1 = Equal
1196 [ i f (WriteToFile ) [ foreach ? [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
1197 f i l e print ” ” ]
1198 set current plot pen ” LeaderVi s i t ”
1199 plot item 1 ?
1200
1201 set current plot pen ”GroupVisit ”
1202 plot item 2 ?
1203
1204 set current plot pen ”CoveredLosses ”
1205 plot item 3 ?
1206
1207 set current plot pen ” Expe l l ingVotes ”
1208 plot item 4 ?
1209
1210 set current plot pen ”TotalSupport ”
1211 plot item 5 ?
1212
1213 set current plot pen ” Tota lFines ”
1214 plot item 6 ?
1215 ]
1216
1217 ; aux L4 = Unacceptab le
1218 set aux L4 ( sort by [ item 1 ?1 < item 1 ?2 ] aux L4)
1219 set aux L4 ( sort by [ item 2 ?1 < item 2 ?2 ] aux L4)
1220 set aux L4 ( sort by [ item 3 ?1 < item 3 ?2 ] aux L4)
1221 set aux L4 ( sort by [ item 4 ?1 < item 4 ?2 ] aux L4)
1222 set aux L4 ( sort by [ item 5 ?1 < item 5 ?2 ] aux L4)
1223 set aux L4 ( sort by [ item 6 ?1 < item 6 ?2 ] aux L4)
1224
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1225 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e print ” ”
1226 f i l e print ” Status , #LeaderVis i t , #GroupVisit , #CoveredLosses ,
1227 #Expel l ingVotes , #TotalSupport , #Tota lFines ” ]
1228
1229 set current plot ”Unacceptable group events ”
1230 foreach aux L4 ; aux L4 = Unacceptab le
1231 [ i f (WriteToFile ) [ foreach ? [ f i l e type ? + ” , ” ]
1232 f i l e print ” ” ]
1233 set current plot pen ” LeaderVi s i t ”
1234 plot item 1 ?
1235
1236 set current plot pen ”GroupVisit ”
1237 plot item 2 ?
1238
1239 set current plot pen ”CoveredLosses ”
1240 plot item 3 ?
1241
1242 set current plot pen ” Expe l l ingVotes ”
1243 plot item 4 ?
1244
1245 set current plot pen ”TotalSupport ”
1246 plot item 5 ?
1247
1248 set current plot pen ” Tota lFines ”
1249 plot item 6 ?
1250 ]
1251
1252 i f (WriteToFile ) [
1253 f i l e close
1254 set aux OutputFile ” nothing set yet ” ]
1255
1256 ; p l o t what happened wi th the order o f problems
1257 i f ( P lo t s ) [
1258 set current plot ”ProblemsOrder ”
1259 set current plot pen ”DisUnpBIn”
1260 ; p l o t aux DisUnpBIn
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1261 histogram  l i s t item 0 aux ProblemsOrderList
1262
1263 set current plot ”ProblemsOrder ”
1264 set current plot pen ”DisBInUnp”
1265 ; p l o t aux DisBInUnp
1266 histogram  l i s t item 1 aux ProblemsOrderList
1267
1268 set current plot ”ProblemsOrder ”
1269 set current plot pen ”UnpDisBIn”
1270 ; p l o t aux UnpDisBIn
1271 histogram  l i s t item 2 aux ProblemsOrderList
1272
1273 set current plot ”ProblemsOrder ”
1274 set current plot pen ”UnpBInDis”
1275 ; p l o t aux UnpBInDis
1276 histogram  l i s t item 3 aux ProblemsOrderList
1277
1278 set current plot ”ProblemsOrder ”
1279 set current plot pen ”BInUnpDis”
1280 ; p l o t aux BInUnpDis
1281 histogram  l i s t item 4 aux ProblemsOrderList
1282
1283 set current plot ”ProblemsOrder ”
1284 set current plot pen ”BInDisUnp”
1285 ; p l o t aux BInDisUnp
1286 histogram  l i s t item 5 aux ProblemsOrderList
1287 ]
1288
1289 ; show aux ProblemsOrderList
1290 ; ask MFI_Adviser [ show MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1291 stop ; s top the s imu la t e procedure
1292 end
1293
1294 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; DISEASES ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
1295 ; d e f i n e who i s s i c k
1296 to d i s e a s e s
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1297 locals [ aux SickAgents aux Chosen aux Memory ]
1298
1299 set aux SickAgents 0
1300 set aux Memory [ ]
1301
1302 i f e l s e ( aux Poss ib l eD i s ea seEvent s < 1)
1303 [ stop ] ; i f t h e r e are no more d i s ea s e even t s
1304 [ ; a person misses a meeting when : i s h i t by d i s e a s e (19%)
1305 foreach aux UniqueS ickCl i ents
1306 [ i f e l s e (random f l o a t 100 > 50)
1307 [ ask ? [ set MissedMeeting t rue ]
1308 i f e l s e (random f l o a t 100 < 50) ; 25% of those w i l l a l s o miss payments
1309 [ ask ? [ set Defaulted true ] ]
1310 [ ask ? [ set Defaulted f a l s e ] ]
1311 ]
1312 [ ask ? [ set MissedMeeting f a l s e ]
1313 ask ? [ set Defaulted f a l s e ]
1314 ]
1315
1316 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack co r r e c t
1317 set aux Memory lput aux Repayment aux Memory ; meeting
1318 set aux Memory lput ? aux Memory ; who i s ana lysed
1319 set aux Memory lput ? aux Memory ; who s t o r e s
1320 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f ? aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1321 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f ? aux Memory ; missed payment?
1322 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f ? aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1323 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f ? aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1324 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f ? aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1325 set aux Memory lput ”MyStatus” aux Memory ; no consequence
1326
1327 i f e l s e ( Defaulted o f ?)
1328 [ set aux Memory lput ”MY_Loss” aux Memory ] ; acknowledge l o s s
1329 [ set aux Memory lput ”PaidOnTime” aux Memory ] ; ack . payment
1330
1331 set aux Memory lput ”MyStatus” aux Memory ; no event
1332 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f ? aux Memory ; curren t deb t
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1333 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory ; l o g ged order
1334
1335 ask ? [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1336 ; ask ? [ show ”DISEASE MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1337
1338 set aux Memory [ ]
1339 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
1340 ]
1341
1342 ; reduce the number o f remaining i n c i d en t s
1343 set aux Poss ib l eD i s ea seEvent s aux Poss ib l eD i s ea seEvent s   1
1344 ]
1345 end
1346
1347 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; UNPROFITABLE ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
1348 ; d e f i n e who can be unp r o f i t a b l e
1349 to unp ro f i t ab l e
1350 locals [ aux Memory ]
1351 set aux Memory [ ]
1352
1353 i f ( Unpro f i tab le Cl i en t s > 0)
1354 [ ; a person misses a meeting when : i s u n p r o f i t a b l e (11%)
1355 foreach aux UniqueUnprof i table [
1356 i f e l s e (random f l o a t 100 < 50 )
1357 [ ask ? [ set MissedMeeting t rue ]
1358 i f e l s e (random f l o a t 100 > 50) ; 25% of those w i l l a l s o miss payments
1359 [ ask ? [ set Defaulted true ] ]
1360 [ ask ? [ set Defaulted f a l s e ] ]
1361 ]
1362 [ ask ? [ set MissedMeeting f a l s e ]
1363 ask ? [ set Defaulted f a l s e ]
1364 ]
1365
1366 ; ask ? [ show ”MissedMeeting : ” + MissedMeeting + ” ,
1367 ; De fau l t ed : ” + Defau l t ed ] ; debug
1368
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1369 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack co r r e c t
1370 set aux Memory lput aux Repayment aux Memory ; meeting
1371 set aux Memory lput ? aux Memory ; who ana lysed
1372 set aux Memory lput ? aux Memory ; who s t o r e s
1373 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f ? aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1374 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f ? aux Memory ; missed payment?
1375 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f ? aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1376 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f ? aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1377 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f ? aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1378 set aux Memory lput ”MyStatus” aux Memory ; no consequence
1379
1380 i f e l s e ( Defaulted o f ?)
1381 [ set aux Memory lput ”MY_Loss” aux Memory ] ; acknowledge l o s s
1382 [ set aux Memory lput ”PaidOnTime” aux Memory ] ; acknowledge payment
1383
1384 set aux Memory lput ”MyStatus” aux Memory ; no event
1385 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f ? aux Memory ; current deb t
1386 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory ; l o g ged order
1387
1388 ask ? [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1389 ; ask ? [ show ” Unpro f i t a b l e MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1390
1391 set aux Memory [ ]
1392 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
1393 ]
1394 ]
1395 end
1396
1397
1398 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; BAD INVESTOR ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
1399 ; d e f i n e the bad i n v e s t o r s p r i o r to c r e d i t admin i s t ra t i on
1400 ;
1401 to bad inves tor
1402 locals [ aux Memory ]
1403 set aux Memory [ ]
1404
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1405 i f (Bad I nv e s t o r s > 0)
1406 [ ; a person misses a meeting when : i s a bad i n v e s t o r (9%)
1407 foreach aux UniqueBadInvestors [
1408 i f e l s e (random f l o a t 100 > 50 )
1409 [ ask ? [ set MissedMeeting t rue ]
1410 i f e l s e (random f l o a t 100 < 50) ; 25% of those w i l l a l s o miss payments
1411 [ ask ? [ set Defaulted true ] ]
1412 [ ask ? [ set Defaulted f a l s e ] ] ]
1413 [ ask ? [ set MissedMeeting f a l s e ]
1414 ask ? [ set Defaulted f a l s e ] ]
1415
1416 ; ask ? [ show ”MissedMeeting : ” + MissedMeeting + ” ,
1417 ; De fau l t ed : ” + Defau l t ed ] ; debug
1418
1419 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack co r r e c t
1420 set aux Memory lput aux Repayment aux Memory ; meeting
1421 set aux Memory lput ? aux Memory ; who i s ana lysed
1422 set aux Memory lput ? aux Memory ; who s t o r e s
1423 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f ? aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1424 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f ? aux Memory ; missed payment?
1425 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f ? aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1426 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f ? aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1427 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f ? aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1428 set aux Memory lput ”MyStatus” aux Memory ; no consequence
1429
1430 i f e l s e ( Defaulted o f ?)
1431 [ set aux Memory lput ”MY_Loss” aux Memory ] ; acknowledge l o s s
1432 [ set aux Memory lput ”PaidOnTime” aux Memory ] ; acknowledge payment
1433 set aux Memory lput ”MyStatus” aux Memory ; no event
1434 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f ? aux Memory ; curren t deb t
1435 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory ; order
1436
1437 ask ? [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1438 ; ask ? [ show ”BAD INVESTOR MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1439
1440 set aux Memory [ ]
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1441 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
1442 ]
1443 ]
1444 end
1445 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; EVENTS ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
1446 ; go through a l l agents h i s t o r i e s and update them
1447 ;
1448 to al l meeting events
1449 locals [ aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s aux Problematic aux Fine
1450 aux Memory aux VoteExpel ]
1451
1452 set aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s [ ]
1453 set aux Problematic [ ]
1454 set aux Fine [ ]
1455 set aux Memory [ ]
1456
1457 i f ( length aux UniqueS ickCl i ents > 0) [
1458 foreach aux UniqueS ickCl i ents [
1459 set aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s lput ? aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s ] ]
1460
1461 i f ( length aux UniqueUnprof i table > 0) [
1462 foreach aux UniqueUnprof i table [
1463 set aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s lput ? aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s ] ]
1464
1465 i f ( length aux UniqueBadInvestors > 0) [
1466 foreach aux UniqueBadInvestors [
1467 set aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s lput ? aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s ] ]
1468
1469 set aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s remove dup l i c a t e s aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s
1470 set aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s s o r t aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s
1471
1472 ; go through a l l c l i e n t s and update t h e i r event h i s t o r i e s
1473 foreach ( s h u f f l e aux OrderedGroup )
1474 ; f o reach aux OrderedGroup
1475 [ i f e l s e not (member? ? aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s ) ; not a Prob l emat i cC l i en t
1476 [ ask ?
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1477 [ without i n t e r r up t i on
1478 [ set aux Fine lput ? aux Fine
1479 ; show ”aux Fine : ” + aux Fine ; debug
1480
1481 ; l ook f o r t h e i r data and put in t o the o ther c l i e n t s
1482 foreach aux Prob l emat i cC l i ent s
1483 [ ; show ”aux Prob l emat i cC l i en t s : ” + aux Prob l emat i cC l i en t s ; debug
1484
1485 foreach MeetingTrack o f ? ; an aux Prob l emat i cC l i en t s
1486 [ ; c l i e n t misses meeting ( item 3) , not payment ( item 4)
1487 i f ( item 3 ?) and not ( item 4 ?) and ( item 0 ? = aux Repayment )
1488 [ ; show ”Meeting : ” + ( item 0 ?) + ” , Who: ” + ( item 1 ?) +
1489 ; ” , TRUE MissesMeeting : ” + ( item 2 ?) +
1490 ; ” , FALSE Misses PAYMENT: ” + ( item 3 ?) ; debug
1491
1492 ; g e t r e l e v an t va l u e s : agent and meeting when t ha t happened
1493 ; t r ou b l e d meeting
1494 set aux Problematic lput ( item 0 ?) aux Problematic
1495
1496 ; p rob l emat i c agent
1497 set aux Problematic lput ( item 2 ?) aux Problematic
1498 ; show ”aux Prob lemat ic : ” + aux Prob lemat ic ; debug
1499
1500 ; g e t data about the t r ou b l e d agent in o ther agent h i s t o r i e s
1501 ask item 0 aux Fine ; on ly go through the curren t f i n e agent
1502 [ ; add the event , f i r s t t imer
1503 i f e l s e ( length MeetingTrack o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = 0)
1504
1505 ; c l i e n t misses meeting , NOT payment
1506 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has missed a payment , group
1507 ; v i s i t househo ld (more pres sure )
1508
1509 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has NOT missed a payment be fore , group
1510 ; l e ade r v i s i t househo ld ( l e s s pre s sure )
1511 ; endorse POSITIVELY, i f i s s i c k
1512 ; endorse NEGATIVELY, i f ISN ’T s i c k
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1513
1514 [ ; show ”EMPTY MEETINGTRACK: ” + MeetingTrack o f
1515 ; i tem 0 aux Fine + ” , Agent : ” + who ; debug
1516
1517 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has NOT missed a payment , group
1518 ; l e ade r v i s i t househo ld ( l e s s pre s sure )
1519
1520 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack
1521 ; p rob l emat i c meeting
1522 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1523
1524 ; who i s the problem
1525 set aux Memory lput ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1526
1527 ; who i s s t o r i n g data
1528 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Fine ) aux Memory
1529
1530 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f
1531 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1532
1533 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f
1534 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed payment?
1535
1536 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f
1537 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1538
1539 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f
1540 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; bad inves tment ?
1541
1542 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f
1543 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1544
1545 set aux Memory lput ”LEADER_Visit” aux Memory ; consequence
1546 set aux Memory lput ”NO_Loss” aux Memory ; ack . i t
1547
1548 ; language , to l e rance , debt , f i n e ( aux Run?)
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1549 i f e l s e ( ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 ) < 0 )
1550 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1551 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1552 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1553
1554 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1555 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1556 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1557
1558 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1559 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1560 ] ]
1561
1562 [ i f e l s e ( item 1 item ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 )
1563 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1564 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1565
1566 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1567 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1568 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1569
1570 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1571 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1572 ] ]
1573
1574 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1575 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; curren t deb t
1576
1577 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory ; order
1578 ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
1579 [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1580
1581 ; ask ( item 0 aux Fine ) [ show ” event MeetingTrack : ”
1582 ; + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1583
1584 set aux Memory [ ]
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1585
1586 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision
1587 ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
1588 ]
1589
1590 ; l ook f o r the aux Fine c l i e n t database
1591 [ ; show ”AUX_FINE: ” + aux Fine + ”MEETINGTRACK_OF: ” +
1592 ; MeetingTrack o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) ; debug
1593
1594 foreach MeetingTrack o f ( item 0 aux Fine )
1595 [ ; found data about corresponding t r ou b l e d agent
1596
1597 ; same agent and missed pas t meeting , avoid empty e n t r i e s
1598 i f ( length ? != 0) and (
1599 ( item 1 ? = item 1 aux Problematic ) and ( item 3 ? ) )
1600
1601 [ ; show ”FOUND prob l emat i c : ” + ?; debug
1602 set aux Memory [ ]
1603
1604 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has missed a payment be fore , a l l
1605 ; group v i s i t househo ld (more pres sure )
1606
1607 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack
1608 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Problematic )
1609 aux Memory ; p rob l emat i c meeting
1610
1611 set aux Memory lput ( item 1 aux Problematic )
1612 aux Memory ; who i s the problem
1613
1614 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Fine )
1615 aux Memory ; who i s s t o r i n g data
1616
1617 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f ; missed meeting?
1618 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1619
1620 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f ; missed payment?
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1621 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1622
1623 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f
1624 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1625
1626 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f
1627 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1628
1629 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f ; u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1630 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1631
1632 set aux Memory lput ”GROUP_Visit” aux Memory ; conseq .
1633 set aux Memory lput ”NO_Loss” aux Memory ; ack . i t
1634
1635 ; i f e l s e ( I sS ick o f ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) )
1636 ; [ s e t aux Memory l p u t ”Acceptab le ” aux Memory ]
1637 ; [ s e t aux Memory l p u t ”Unacceptab le ” aux Memory ]
1638
1639 ; language , to l e rance , debt , f i n e ( aux Run?)
1640 i f e l s e ( ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 ) < 0 )
1641 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1642 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1643 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1644 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1645 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1646 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1647 ] ]
1648
1649 [ i f e l s e ( item 1 item ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine ) 1) Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1650 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1651 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1652 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1653 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1654 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1655 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1656 ]
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1657 ]
1658
1659 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1660 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; a c t ua l deb t
1661
1662 ; l o g ged order
1663 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory
1664
1665 ; s e t aux Memory [ ]
1666 ; show ”Found_Meeting : ” + ( item 0 ?)
1667 ; + ” , Ana lysedCl ient : ” + ( item 1 ?)
1668 ; + ” , Prob lematicMeet ing : ”+( item 0 aux Prob lemat ic )
1669 ; + ” , Prob l emat i cC l i en t : ” + ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic )
1670 ] ]
1671
1672 ; to avoid r e p e t i t i o n s o f GROUP_VISIT even t s
1673 ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
1674 [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1675
1676 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision
1677 ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
1678
1679 ; ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
1680 ; [ show ” event MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1681
1682 ] ; end o f search ing aux Fine ’ s e x i s t i n g database
1683 ] ; end o f : ” ask item 0 aux Fine”
1684 ]
1685
1686 ; who missed meeting and payment f o r the f i r s t time
1687 ;
1688 i f ( item 3 ?) and ( item 4 ?) and ( item 0 ? = aux Repayment )
1689 [ ; show ”Meeting : ” + ( item 0 ?) + ” , Who: ” + ( item 1 ?)
1690 ; + ” , TRUE MissesMeeting : ” + ( item 2 ?)
1691 ; + ” , FALSE Misses PAYMENT: ” + ( item 3 ?) ; debug
1692
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1693 ; g e t r e l e v an t data : agent and meeting when t ha t happened
1694 set aux Problematic lput ( item 0 ?) aux Problematic ; meeting
1695 set aux Problematic lput ( item 2 ?) aux Problematic ; agent
1696 ; show ”aux Prob lemat ic : ” + aux Prob lemat ic ; debug
1697
1698 ; data about the t r ou b l e d agent in o ther agent h i s t o r i e s
1699 ask item 0 aux Fine
1700 [ i f e l s e ( length MeetingTrack o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = 0)
1701
1702 ; add the event , f i r s t timer , c l i e n t misses meeting AND
1703 ; payment , i f d e f a u l t e r covered some l o s s OR has been
1704 ; s i ck , cover t h i s c l i e n t l o s s , AND FINE i f group formed
1705 ; by ne ighbours in urban areas , endorse , NEGATIVELY
1706 ; DO NOT f i n e i f group formed by fami l y members in ru ra l
1707 ; areas , endorse POSITIVELY AND cons ider e x p e l l i n g , i f
1708 ; missed more than 1 payment , endorse NEGATIVELY
1709
1710 ; i f d e f a u l t e r HAS NOT covered some l o s s OR HAS
1711 ; NOT been s i ck , DO NOT cover t h i s c l i e n t l o s s AND
1712 ; ADD MFI f i n e endorse NEGATIVELY
1713
1714 ; IF missed more than X payments ( i n d i v i d u a l t o l e r anc e ) ,
1715 ; vo te f o r e x p e l l i n g ( unaccep tab l e event ) , i f t h i s c l i e n t has
1716 ; missed a payment be fore , group v i s i t househo ld (more
1717 ; p re s sure ) , i f t h i s c l i e n t has NOT missed a payment be fore ,
1718 ; group l e ade r v i s i t househo ld ( l e s s pre s sure )
1719 ; endorse POSITIVELY, i f i s s i c k
1720 ; endorse NEGATIVELY, i f ISN ’T s i c k
1721
1722 [ ; show ”EMPTY MEETINGTRACK: ” + MeetingTrack o f
1723 ; ? + ” , Agent : ” + who ; debug
1724
1725 ; i f d e f a u l t e r HAS NOT covered some l o s s OR HAS NOT
1726 ; been s i ck , DO NOT cover t h i s c l i e n t l o s s AND ADD MFI
1727 ; f i n e endorse NEGATIVELY
1728
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1729 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack
1730 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1731 set aux Memory lput ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1732 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Fine ) aux Memory
1733
1734 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f
1735 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1736
1737 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t ( item 3 MeetingTrack o f item 1
1738 ; aux Prob lemat ic ) aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1739
1740 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f ( item 1 aux Problematic )
1741 aux Memory ; missed payment?
1742
1743 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t ( item 4 MeetingTrack o f item 1
1744 ; aux Prob lemat ic ) aux Memory ; missed payment?
1745
1746 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic )
1747 aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1748
1749 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f
1750 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1751
1752 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f
1753 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1754
1755 ; i f d e f a u l t e r has been s i ck , cover t h i s c l i e n t l o s s
1756 i f e l s e ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1757
1758 [ ; l ook f o r Language , Location , Business
1759 ; i f e l s e ( ( item 2 Business o f ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) )
1760 ; = ( item 2 Business o f ( item 0 aux Fine )) )
1761
1762 i f e l s e ( ( (who o f item 1 aux Problematic )   1) = 0)
1763 [ i f e l s e ( item 1 item 0 Tolerance o f
1764 ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
255
Appendix VI: the Agent-Based Model 256
1765 [ ; show ”SICK, FULLY COHESIVE Group . ” ; debug
1766 set aux Memory lput ”SUPPORT” aux Memory
1767 set aux Memory lput ”COVERED_Loss” aux Memory
1768 set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ”
aux Memory
1769 ]
1770
1771 [ set aux Memory lput ”PARTIAL_SUPPORT” aux Memory
1772 set aux Memory lput ”GROUP_Fine” aux Memory
1773 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory
1774 ] ]
1775
1776 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 0 Language o f
1777 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) ) = ( item 0 Language o f
1778 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) )
1779 [ set aux Memory lput ”PARTIAL_SUPPORT” aux Memory
1780 set aux Memory lput ”GROUP_Fine” aux Memory
1781 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory
1782 ]
1783 [ set aux Memory lput ”MFI_Fine” aux Memory
1784 set aux Memory lput ”GROUP_Loss” aux Memory
1785 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory
1786 ] ] ]
1787
1788 ; p rob l emat i c c l i e n t i s not s i c k
1789 [ ; Language , Locat ion i s a lways the same , Business
1790 ; i f e l s e ( ( item 0 Language o f
1791 ; ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) ) = ( item 0 Language o f
1792 ; ( item 0 aux Fine )) )
1793
1794 i f e l s e ( item 1 item 0 Tolerance o f
1795 ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1796 [ ; i f group i s l e s s cohe s i v e
1797 ; show ”NON SICK, PARTIALLY COHESIVE Group . ” ; debug
1798 set aux Memory lput ”PARTIAL_SUPPORT” aux Memory
1799 set aux Memory lput ”GROUP_Fine” aux Memory
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1800 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1801
1802 [ ; show ”NON SICK, NON COHESIVE Group . ” ; debug
1803 set aux Memory lput ”MFI_Fine” aux Memory
1804 set aux Memory lput ”GROUP_Loss” aux Memory
1805 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory
1806 ] ]
1807
1808 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1809 ; ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) aux Memory ; current deb t
1810
1811 ; c on f i gu r e new deb t s
1812 ; show aux Memory
1813 i f e l s e ( item 8 aux Memory = ”MFI_Fine”)
1814 [ set aux Memory lput precision (
1815 ( QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1816 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) ) * 2)
1817 2 aux Memory ; doub le
1818
1819 ; + ( ( ( QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1820 ; ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) )
1821 ; * In t e r e s tRa t e ) / 100) ) 2 aux Memory ; too low
1822
1823 ; show ” event deb t : ” + item 11 aux Memory ; debug
1824 set aux TotalGroupDebt precision
1825 ( aux TotalGroupDebt + item 11 aux Memory) 2
1826
1827 ; show ”aux TotalGroupDebt AFTER event : ”
1828 ; + aux TotalGroupDebt ; debug
1829
1830 ; s e t MFI Adviser aux Memory
1831 ask MFI_Adviser
1832 [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1833
1834 ] ; current deb t
1835 [ i f e l s e ( item 9 aux Memory = ”GROUP_Fine”)
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1836 [ set aux Memory lput precision
1837 ( ( QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1838 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) ) +
1839 ( QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1840 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) ) / 2 ) 2 aux Memory
1841
1842 set aux TotalGroupDebt precision
1843 ( aux TotalGroupDebt + item 11 aux Memory) 2
1844 ] ; group f i n e as h a l f o f curren t deb t
1845
1846 [ set aux Memory lput precision
1847 ( QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1848 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) ) 2 aux Memory
1849 ] ]
1850
1851 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory
1852 ; ask ( item 0 aux Fine ) [
1853 ; s e t MeetingTrack l p u t aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1854
1855 ; ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
1856 ; [ show ” event MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
1857
1858 ; s e t aux Memory [ ]
1859 ; s e t aux LoggedEventOrder p r e c i s i on
1860 ; ( aux LoggedEventOrder+ 0 .1) 2
1861
1862 ] ; d ea l wi th 1 s t t imers : MFI_Fine , GROUP_Fine, COVER_Loss
1863
1864
1865 ; cons ider e x p e l l i n g i f missed > 1 payment , endorse NEGATIVELY
1866 ; i f d e f a u l t e r covered some lo s s , cover t h i s c l i e n t l o s s
1867 ; IF missed more than X payments ( i n d i v i d u a l t o l e r anc e ) , vo te f o r
1868 ; e x p e l l i n g ( unaccep tab l e event )
1869
1870 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has missed a payment be fore , a l l
1871 ; group v i s i t househo ld (more pres sure )
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1872 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has NOT missed a payment be fore , group
1873 ; l e ade r v i s i t househo ld ( l e s s pre s sure )
1874
1875 ; l ook f o r the aux Fine c l i e n t database
1876 [ ; show ”MT: ” + MeetingTrack o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) ; debug
1877
1878 foreach MeetingTrack o f ( item 0 aux Fine )
1879 [ ; found the data about the corresponding prob l emat i c agent
1880
1881 ; same agent and has covered some l o s s
1882 i f e l s e ( length ? != 0) and
1883 ( ( item 1 ? = item 1 aux Problematic )
1884 and ( item 9 ? = ”COVERED_Loss”) )
1885 [ ; show ”FOUND prob l emat i c : ” + ?; debug
1886
1887 ; i f t h i s c l i e n t has missed a payment be fore , group v i s i t
1888
1889 ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack
1890 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1891 set aux Memory lput ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1892 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Fine ) aux Memory
1893
1894 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f
1895 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed meeting?
1896
1897 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f
1898 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed payment?
1899
1900 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f
1901 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1902
1903 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f
1904 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1905
1906 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f
1907 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
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1908
1909 set aux Memory lput ”COVER_Loss” aux Memory ; consequence
1910 set aux Memory lput ”NO_Loss” aux Memory ; ack . i t
1911
1912
1913 ; i f e l s e ( I sS ick o f ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) )
1914 ; [ s e t aux Memory l p u t ”Acceptab le ” aux Memory ]
1915 ; [ s e t aux Memory l p u t ”Unacceptab le ” aux Memory ]
1916
1917 ; language , to l e rance , debt , f i n e ( aux Run?)
1918 i f e l s e ( ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 ) < 0 )
1919 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1920 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1921 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1922 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1923 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1924 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1925 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1926 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1927 ] ]
1928
1929 [ i f e l s e ( item 1 item ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine ) 1)
1930 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1931 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
1932 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1933 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1934 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
1935 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
1936 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ]
1937 ] ]
1938
1939 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f
1940 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; current deb t
1941
1942 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory
1943 ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
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1944 [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
1945 ; ask ( item 0 aux Fine ) ; debug
1946 ; [ show ” event MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ]
1947
1948 set aux Memory [ ]
1949 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision
1950 ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
1951
1952 ; show ”Found meeting : ” + ( item 0 ?) +
1953 ; ” , c l i e n t : ” + ( item 1 ?) + ” , Troubled Meeting : ”
1954 ; + ( item 0 aux Prob lemat ic ) + ” , Agent : ” +
1955 ; + ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic )
1956 ] ; d e a l t wi th COVER_Loss
1957
1958
1959 ; c l i e n t has not covered any l o s s
1960 [ ; avoid copying even t s when scanning c l i e n t ’ s h i s t o r y
1961 i f ( aux VoteExpel = ” i n i t ”)
1962 [ ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack
1963 set aux Memory [ ]
1964 ; p rob l emat i c meeting
1965 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1966
1967 ; who i s the problem
1968 set aux Memory lput ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1969
1970 ; who i s s t o r i n g data
1971 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Fine ) aux Memory
1972
1973 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f
1974 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
1975
1976 ; missed meeting?
1977 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f
1978 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed payment?
1979
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1980 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f
1981 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
1982
1983 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f
1984 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
1985
1986 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f
1987 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
1988
1989 set aux Memory lput ”VOTE_Expel” aux Memory ; conseq .
1990 set aux Memory lput ”AVOID_Loss” aux Memory ; ack . i t
1991
1992 ; i f e l s e ( I sS ick o f ( item 1 aux Prob lemat ic ) )
1993 ; [ s e t aux Memory l p u t ”Acceptab l e ” aux Memory ]
1994 ; [ s e t aux Memory l p u t ”Unacceptab le ” aux Memory ]
1995
1996 ; language , to l e rance , debt , f i n e ( aux Run?)
1997 i f e l s e ( ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 ) < 0 )
1998 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
1999 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
2000 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
2001 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
2002 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
2003 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
2004 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
2005 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ] ] ]
2006
2007 [ i f e l s e ( item 1 item ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 )
2008 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
2009 and ( I sS i ck o f ( item 1 aux Problematic ) )
2010 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
2011 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
2012 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
2013 [ set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory ]
2014 [ set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory ] ] ]
2015
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2016
2017 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f
2018 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; curren t deb t
2019
2020 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory
2021 ; show ”aux Memory : ” + aux Memory ; debug
2022 set aux VoteExpel ”done ” ] ] ] ] ; d e a l t wi th non 1s t t imers
2023
2024 i f e l s e not ( empty? aux Memory)
2025 [ ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
2026 [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
2027 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision
2028 ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
2029 set aux VoteExpel ” i n i t ”
2030 ]
2031
2032 [ ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack
2033
2034 set aux Memory [ ]
2035 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
2036 set aux Memory lput ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory
2037 set aux Memory lput ( item 0 aux Fine ) aux Memory
2038
2039 set aux Memory lput MissedMeeting o f
2040 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed meeting?
2041
2042 set aux Memory lput Defaulted o f
2043 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; missed payment?
2044
2045 set aux Memory lput I sS i ck o f
2046 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
2047
2048 set aux Memory lput I sBadInvestor o f
2049 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; bad inves tment ?
2050
2051 set aux Memory lput I sUnpro f i t ab l e o f
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2052 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
2053
2054 i f e l s e ( ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine )   1 ) < 0 )
2055 [ i f e l s e ( ( item 1 ( item 0 Tolerance o f
2056 ( item 0 aux Fine ) ) ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
2057 [ set aux Memory lput ”COVER_Loss” aux Memory
2058 set aux Memory lput ”NO_Loss” aux Memory
2059 set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory
2060 ] ; acknowledge i t
2061
2062 [ set aux Memory lput ”VOTE_Expel” aux Memory
2063 set aux Memory lput ”AVOID_Loss” aux Memory
2064 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory
2065 ] ; acknowledge i t
2066 ]
2067 [ i f e l s e ( item 1 item ( (who o f item 0 aux Fine ) 1)
2068 Tolerance o f ( item 0 aux Fine ) = ” t o l e r an t ”)
2069 [ set aux Memory lput ”COVER_Loss” aux Memory
2070 set aux Memory lput ”NO_Loss” aux Memory
2071 set aux Memory lput ”Acceptable ” aux Memory
2072 ] ; acknowledge i t
2073
2074 [ set aux Memory lput ”VOTE_Expel” aux Memory
2075 set aux Memory lput ”AVOID_Loss” aux Memory
2076 set aux Memory lput ”Unacceptable ” aux Memory
2077 ] ; acknowledge i t
2078 ]
2079
2080 set aux Memory lput QuotaWithInterestRate o f
2081 ( item 1 aux Problematic ) aux Memory ; curren t deb t
2082
2083 set aux Memory lput aux LoggedEventOrder
2084 aux Memory ; l o g ged order
2085
2086 ; show ”aux Memory : ” + aux Memory ; debug
2087 ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
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2088 [ set MeetingTrack lput aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
2089
2090 set aux LoggedEventOrder precision
2091 ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 . 1 ) 2
2092 ]
2093
2094 ; ask ( item 0 aux Fine )
2095 ; [ show ” event MeetingTrack : ” + MeetingTrack ] ; debug
2096 set aux Memory [ ]
2097
2098 ] ; end o f f i r s t t imer o f who missed meeting and payment
2099 ] ]
2100
2101 set aux Problematic [ ] ; to avoid r e p e t i t i o n s
2102 ]
2103 set aux Fine [ ] ; to co r r e c t next i t e r a t i o n
2104 ] ] ]
2105
2106 ; agent i s par t o f prob l emat i c group
2107 [ ; show ? + ” , par t o f t r ou b l e d group in MEETING: ” + aux Repayment ; debug
2108 ;
2109 ; ;THIS ORDER IS VERY IMPORTANT to keep MeetingTrack co r r e c t
2110 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t aux Run aux Memory ; prob l emat i c meeting
2111 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t who o f ? aux Memory ; who i s the problem
2112 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t who o f ? aux Memory ; who i s s t o r i n g data
2113 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t MissedMeeting o f ? aux Memory ; missed meeting?
2114 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t Defau l ted o f ? aux Memory ; missed payment?
2115 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t I sS ick o f ? aux Memory ; i s s i c k ?
2116 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t IsBadInves tor o f ? aux Memory ; bad i n v e s t o r ?
2117 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t I sUnpro f i t a b l e o f ? aux Memory ; i s u n p r o f i t a b l e ?
2118 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t ” xxxxx ” aux Memory ; consequence
2119 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t ” xxxxx ” aux Memory ; acknowledge i t
2120 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t ” xxxxx ” aux Memory ; x
2121 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t QuotaWithInterestRate o f ? aux Memory ; current deb t
2122 ; s e t aux Memory l p u t aux LoggedEventOrder aux Memory ; l o gged order
2123 ;
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2124 ; s e t aux Memory [ ]
2125 ; s e t aux LoggedEventOrder p r e c i s i on ( aux LoggedEventOrder + 0 .1 ) 2
2126 ;
2127 ; ask ? [ s e t MeetingTrack l p u t aux Memory MeetingTrack ]
2128 ]
2129 ]
2130
2131 meet ing_dec i s ion ; record a de c i s i on
2132 end
2133
2134 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; MEETING_DECISION ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
2135 ;
2136 ; s imply counts and keep t rack o f a l l meeting r e s u l t s
2137 ;
2138 to meet ing_dec is ion
2139 ; count GROUP_Loss (MFI_Fine , VOTE_Expel ) ,
2140 ; GROUP_Fine (PARTIAL_SUPPORT)
2141 foreach aux OrderedGroup
2142 [ foreach MeetingTrack o f ?
2143 [ i f ( length ? != 0) ; to avoid empty e n t r i e s
2144 [ i f ( item 0 ? = aux Repayment )
2145 [ ; a c c ep t a b l e even t s
2146
2147 i f ( item 8 ?=”PARTIAL_SUPPORT”)
2148 [ set aux Tota lPart ia lSupport aux Tota lPart ia lSupport +1]
2149
2150 i f ( item 8 ? = ”LEADER_Visit”)
2151 [ set aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t +1]
2152
2153 i f ( item 8 ? = ”SUPPORT”) [ set aux TotalSupport aux TotalSupport+1]
2154 i f ( item 8 ? = ”GROUP_Visit”) [ set aux TotalGroupVis it aux TotalGroupVis it+1]
2155 i f ( item 8 ? = ”COVER_Loss”) [ set aux TotalCoverLoss aux TotalCoverLoss+1]
2156 i f ( item 9 ? = ”COVERED_Loss”) [ set aux TotalCoverLoss aux TotalCoverLoss+1]
2157 i f ( item 9 ? = ”NO_Loss”) [ set aux TotalNoLoss aux TotalNoLoss+1]
2158 i f ( item 10 ? = ”Acceptable ”) [ set aux Tota lDes i rab l e aux Tota lDes i rab l e +1]
2159
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2160 ; s i t u a t i o n per meeting
2161 i f ( item 3 ?) [ set aux TotalMissedMeetings aux TotalMissedMeetings + 1 ]
2162 i f ( item 4 ?) [ set aux TotalMissedPayments aux TotalMissedPayments + 1 ]
2163 i f ( item 5 ?) [ set aux Tota lS i ckC l i en t s aux Tota lS i ckC l i en t s + 1 ]
2164 i f ( item 6 ?) [ set aux TotalBadInvestors aux TotalBadInvestors + 1 ]
2165 i f ( item 7 ?) [ set aux Tota lUnpro f i tab l e aux Tota lUnpro f i tab l e + 1 ]
2166
2167 ; unaccep tab l e even t s
2168 i f ( item 8 ? = ”VOTE_Expel”) [ set aux TotalVoteExpel aux TotalVoteExpel+1]
2169 i f ( item 8 ? = ”MFI_Fine”) [ set aux TotalMFI_Fine aux TotalMFI_Fine + 1 ]
2170 i f ( item 9 ? = ”MY_Loss”) [ set aux TotalMyLoss aux TotalMyLoss + 1 ]
2171 i f ( item 9 ? = ”GROUP_Fine”) [ set aux TotalGroupFine aux TotalGroupFine+1]
2172 i f ( item 9 ? = ”GROUP_Loss”) [ set aux TotalGroupLoss aux TotalGroupLoss+1]
2173 i f ( item 9 ? = ”PaidOnTime”) [ set aux TotalPaidOnTime aux TotalPaidOnTime+1]
2174 i f ( item 9 ? = ”AVOID_Loss”) [ set aux TotalAvoidLoss aux TotalAvoidLoss+1]
2175 i f ( item 10 ? = ”Unacceptable ”) [ set aux Tota lUndes i rab le aux Tota lUndes i rab le +1]
2176
2177 i f ( P lot s ) [
2178 set current plot ”Events as i t happens ”
2179 set current plot pen ” LeaderVi s i t ”
2180 plot aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t
2181
2182 set current plot pen ”GroupVisit ”
2183 plot aux TotalGroupVis it
2184
2185 set current plot pen ”CoveredLosses ”
2186 plot aux TotalCoverLoss
2187
2188 set current plot pen ”TotalSupport ”
2189 plot aux TotalSupport
2190
2191 set current plot pen ” Expe l l ingVotes ”
2192 plot aux TotalVoteExpel
2193
2194 set current plot pen ” Tota lFines ”
2195 plot ( aux TotalMFI_Fine + aux TotalGroupFine ) ]
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2196
2197 ; wr i t e e v o l u t i on o f even t s per s imu la t i on
2198 i f (WriteToFile ) [
2199 f i l e type ” , ” + aux Tota lLeaderVi s i t + ” , ” + aux TotalGroupVis it
2200 + ” , ” + aux TotalGroupVis it + ” , ”
2201
2202 f i l e print aux TotalSupport + ” , ” + aux TotalVoteExpel + ” , ”
2203 + (aux TotalMFI_Fine + aux TotalGroupFine )
2204 ] ] ] ] ]
2205 end
2206
2207 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; MEETING ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
2208 ;
2209 ; s e t what happens be fore , dur ing and a f t e r a meeting
2210 ;
2211
2212 to meeting
2213 locals [ aux i aux j aux Tolerance aux Debt ProblemsOrder ]
2214 set aux i 0
2215 set aux j 0
2216 set ProblemsOrder [ ” d i s e a s e s ” ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ” bad inves tor ” ]
2217
2218
2219 ; wr i t e a l l f i r s t va l u e s
2220 i f ( aux Repayment = 0) [
2221 while [ aux i < MFI Group ]
2222 [ set aux Tolerance (value from item aux i aux OrderedGroup [ Tolerance ] )
2223 set aux i aux i + 1
2224 set aux Repayment aux Repayment + 1
2225 ]
2226 set aux Repayment 0
2227 stop ]
2228
2229 set ProblemsOrder s h u f f l e ProblemsOrder
2230
2231 ; in t h i s way , even t s are g iven a f t e r ALL d i f f e r e n t l y ordered problems
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2232 i f ( ProblemsOrder = [ ” d i s e a s e s ” ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ” bad inves tor ” ] ) [
2233 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e type ”Dis Unp BIn” ]
2234 setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e d i s e a s e s
2235 setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e unp r o f i t ab l e
2236 setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e bad inves tor
2237 set aux DisUnpBIn aux DisUnpBIn + 1 ]
2238
2239 i f ( ProblemsOrder = [ ” d i s e a s e s ” ” bad inves tor ” ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ] ) [
2240 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e type ”Dis BIn Unp” ]
2241 setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e d i s e a s e s
2242 setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e bad inves tor
2243 setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e unp r o f i t ab l e
2244 set aux DisBInUnp aux DisBInUnp + 1 ]
2245
2246 i f ( ProblemsOrder = [ ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ” d i s e a s e s ” ” bad inves tor ” ] ) [
2247 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e type ”Unp Dis BIn” ]
2248 setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e unp r o f i t ab l e
2249 setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e d i s e a s e s
2250 setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e bad inves tor
2251 set aux UnpDisBIn aux UnpDisBIn + 1 ]
2252
2253 i f ( ProblemsOrder = [ ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ” bad inves tor ” ” d i s e a s e s ” ] ) [
2254 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e type ”Unp BIn Dis ” ]
2255 setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e unp r o f i t ab l e
2256 setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e bad inves tor
2257 setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e d i s e a s e s
2258 set aux UnpBInDis aux UnpBInDis + 1 ]
2259
2260 i f ( ProblemsOrder = [ ” bad inves tor ” ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ” d i s e a s e s ” ] ) [
2261 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e type ”BIn Unp Dis ” ]
2262 setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e bad inves tor
2263 setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e unp r o f i t ab l e
2264 setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e d i s e a s e s
2265 set aux BInUnpDis aux BInUnpDis + 1 ]
2266
2267 i f ( ProblemsOrder = [ ” bad inves tor ” ” d i s e a s e s ” ” unp r o f i t ab l e ” ] ) [
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2268 i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e type ”BIn Dis Unp” ]
2269 setup de f au l t i ng investment i n f l u e n c e bad inves tor
2270 setup de f au l t i ng d i s ea s e i n f l u e n c e d i s e a s e s
2271 setup de f au l t i ng unpro f i t ab l e i n f l u e n c e unp r o f i t ab l e
2272 set aux BInDisUnp aux BInDisUnp + 1 ]
2273
2274 ; i f (WriteToFile ) [ f i l e  p r i n t ”MPPM: , ” + aux Poss i b l eProb l emat i cMee t ings ]
2275 ; i f ( aux Poss i b l eProb l emat i cMee t ings > 0 )
2276 [ show ”aux Poss ib l eProb lemat i cMeet ings : ”+aux Poss ib l eProb lemat i cMeet ings ]
2277 ; debug
2278
2279
2280 ; keep wr i t i n g the t rans format ions
2281 while [ aux i < MFI Group ] [ ; go through a l l l i s t i tems
2282 ; i n i t i a l i s e aux Tolerance
2283 set aux Tolerance (value from item
2284 aux i aux OrderedGroup [ Tolerance ] )
2285 set aux i aux i + 1 ; go on
2286 ]
2287 end
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How To Guide (Spanish version 07 June 2009, English version reviewed on 15 May 2010) 
Pablo Lucas, Centre for Policy Modelling, Manchester, England. pablo@cfpm.org    
 
1 Introduction 
The simulation model is available at http://cfpm.org/~pablo/MCModel and was developed using data collected in four 
surveys and one fieldwork administered in Chiapas, southern Mexico. The first three surveys were most useful to guide 
what should be modelled and realistic parameters’ ranges. The last survey was mainly used to better understand and 
justify certain assumptions taken regarding individual behaviour within microfinance groups. Following sections briefly 
explain how to configure and interpret data obtained in simulation runs. 
 
2 Configuring and executing simulations 
As described in the Spanish manual written for the MFI directors, once loaded the simulation interface contains 8 graph 
areas and 12 possible configurations available. Tables 1, 2 and 3 below show all parameters, whilst Table 4 in next 
section synthesises what and how data is presented. 
 
Property Description Range 
Rural True for a rural group, otherwise urban  Boolean 
MFI-Group How many participants in a simulated group? 3 to 7 
Bad-Investors How many people can be affected by bad investments? 0 to 7 
Unprofitable How many people can be affected by non-profitable activities? 0 to 7 
Disease-Incidence What is the percentage of people and payments that can be subject to disease? 0% to 100% 
 
Table 1: Configuring the circumstances of a group 
 
All possible parameter’s range are: MFI-Group between 3 to 7 (according to group size distribution findings), 12 or 24 
payments (the two options provided by them), rural or urban, number of unprofitable clients (0 to 7), bad investors (0 to 
7) and disease incidence (0 to 100% in intervals of 10). Respectively that means there are 5, 2, 2, 8, 8 and 11 possible 
configurations per parameter. All conceivable combinations amount to 14.080 options, without considering financial 
parameters. The latter, as listed in Table 2, includes: interest rates (from 0.5 to 3.5 in intervals of 0.5), minimum and 
maximum debts (from 1000 to 40.000 in intervals of 1000), equal or unequal credit distribution. Sweeping through all 
parameters is impractical and unnecessary, as many combinations are realistic. For instance the more unprofitable or bad 
investors added to a simulation, the bigger the microcredit group must become to allow coping opportunities; thus 
reducing the number of testable parameters. Additionally configurations can be mutually exclusive. I.e., it is not possible 
to have a micro-finance group in this simulation model whereby all members are highly problematic. Groups alike in 
reality are most likely to fail and evidence shows that this is an unusual and undesirable situation for micro-financiers, 
which is often amended by the corresponding institution before such groups receives credit.  
 
As previously said, the group size can impact directly in the simulation results. This happens as the more agents log their 
decisions, the more likely these will change results regarding their votes and events. These, of course, relate to missed 
meeting and/or payments. MFI-Group, Bad-Investors, Unprofitable and Disease-Incidence in Table 1, along with 
Repayments in Table 2, influences the total number of events that can be logged in the simulation results. This happens as 
individual outcomes depend on the quantity of people, potential problems affecting them, meetings to attend and quotas 
to be paid.  
 
Property Description 
InterestRate Interest rate for the total individual debt 
EqualCredit Will all participants deal with the same amount of credit or not? (Boolean) 
MaxAgentDebt Maximum individual debt, in case credit is not uniformly distributed 
MinAgentDebt Minimum individual debt, in case credit is not uniformly distributed 
Repayments How many meetings, and therefore outstanding quotas, each person has? 
 
Table 2: Financial configurations 
 
If EqualCredit is off, financial properties might affect participants in different ways, as if an individual with higher debt 
eventually misses a payment, covering that without penalisations is presumably more difficult. However, as there is no 
evidence as to how much, or which threshold, clients change their behaviour, assessing the feasibility of such logged 
actions are left to the end user. Choosing an uneven credit distribution means debts will be allocated randomly between 
the range of MinAgentDebt and MaxAgentDebt. The MFI itself has only recently started with this uneven credit modality 
and do not yet have enough experience with regards to how clients generally behave in this new scheme. Each simulation 
 
 
generates a detailed log of what all clients decided about a problematic event during their credit cycle. Thus, depending 
on the set configurations like debt range, one might understand certain logged actions as plausible or not. This cannot be 
automatically added in the model without biasing the simulated behaviour, as at some point the modeller must define a 
hypothetical threshold and there is no known reliable evidence on this regard.  If EqualCredit is set true, all clients will 
get the same amount of debt having 33% of MaxAgentDebt, according to the significantly most frequent of all financial 
criteria analysed in the financial data presented in the second report. The last configurable properties in Table 3 control 
the mechanical properties of the model. These include determining the initial state of the simulation (Init), whether the 
user wants to visualise graphs being updated (Plots) whilst Iterations are being executed (Go). 
 
Property Description 
Plots Update all interface graphs at runtime 
Init Initialise the model with all selected configuration parameters 
Iterations How many times the model will be executed with the same configuration? 
Go Execute simulations, plotting data graphically or simply writing it to a file 
 
Table 3: Configurations regarding the simulation process itself 
 
If the model is configured without any exogenous or endogenous problems affecting participants, the only possible result 
from simulations is a continuum of micro-credit groups classified as having equal number (zero) for desirable and 
undesirable events. Such individual registering is only triggered in light of a group member missing a meeting or 
payment. This happens as it is assumed that, without any negative interference, groups are most likely to succeed over 
time. Of course this is not always the case in reality, but without adding any known negative influence to the model –
gathered during this case study's fieldwork, nothing relevant from clients sanctions and decisions can be processed or 
logged at simulation runtime. Financial aspects such as interest rate, equal credit distribution, minimum and maximum 
individual debts are only relevant for interpretation purposes, as the simulation model only keeps track of social 
behaviour amongst group participants and annotates relevant financial aspects in it. When social behaviour in this model 
has a monetary dimension, such as groups or institutional fines, assessing whether a particular sanction or support action 
is a feasible outcome is an end-user task. In other words, the stakeholder, researcher or policy-maker using the model 
should interpret that. Although possible, adding an automatic evaluation of these in the simulation would considerably 
bias and therefore change simulation results. It would also complicate interpreting data generated by the model, as then 
the simulation would not be exclusively based on consistent evidence acquired in fieldwork. Instead, there would be an 
unfounded influence introduced by the modeller which end-users would not be able to identify in obtained results. This is 
important as this model was purposely built and driven only by using available evidence. Evidence seems to suggest 
greater behaviour variability between those with unequal credit distribution, yet this can only be understood as a 
conjecture drawn from what has been observed. 
 
3 Interpreting Results 
Every simulation generates outputs for groups with more desirable events, more undesirable events and equal number of 
those. It is not possible to precisely assess whether groups are successful or not, as simulation results rather imply their 
likelihood of failing or succeeding by how the group dynamics evolved during the simulations. In June 7th 2009 the 
simulation model, along with a short manual, was made available online to the MFI director for testing purposes. That 
document contains a brief description how the model can be used and interpreted, skipping all technical details in it to 
focus solely on their experience as users. The model is accessible via Web featuring a Java applet with all configurable 
properties and graphs that are updated at runtime. Few days after contacting the MFI director, the third fieldwork report 
containing findings from the fourth and last questionnaire to officers was presented to the MFI and research partners.  
 
           Each time a simulation is run, there is a detailed report of which configurations were used, time-series of all 
individual events during credit cycles and a summary of the most important data in it. Even before testing the simulation, 
it is possible to understand that some configurations can play a significant role in how results are obtained. For instance, 
the group size and number of repayments are directly linked to how many opportunities clients will have to face a 
problem and log a decision about it. If both the group size and number of repayments are configured lowly, say 
unrealistically both set as 3, results will differ a lot from other simulation runs with more participants and longer 
deadlines simply as the number of analysed individual events will change substantially. In this sense, it is better to 
analyse a handful of potentially interesting parameters instead of all possible combinations. 
 
 
 
3 Graphs 
Those entitled Elapsed Time and Individual Debts show the dispersion of their corresponding data to help understanding 
the variability occurring between simulations because tend to visually cluster over time. All the other graphs display the 
totals of every type of individually logged event that is described in the simulation. Depending on the quantity of 
registered events, by all group members, data will be displayed in the corresponding graphs. That is, in Desirable, 
Undesirable or Equal (in case there is exactly the same number of both events types). 
 
Graph Presented data 
Total group outcomes Desirable, Undesirable, Equal (number of simulations that fall within each category) 
Equal group events LeaderVisit, GroupVisit, CoveredLosses, TotalSupport, ExpellingVotes, TotalFines (totals) 
Desirable group events LeaderVisit, GroupVisit, CoveredLosses, TotalSupport, ExpellingVotes, TotalFines (totals) 
Undesirable group events LeaderVisit, GroupVisit, CoveredLosses, TotalSupport, ExpellingVotes, TotalFines (totals) 
Elapsed time Timer (how long each simulation took to be completed) 
Individual debts PersonalDebt, QuotaWithInterestRate (distribution of debts and quotas to be paid) 
 
Table 4: Simulation data presented in each graph 
 
It is not possible to determine with precision whether groups with more Desirable events actually had financial and social 
success, and that those with more Undesirable ones failed. This is uncertain as the criteria for this type of interpretation is 
very particular to the real circumstances of each microfinance group. The simulation model presented hereby can only 
suggest that groups presented in the Desirable graph have greater likelihood of achieving social and financial success. In 
these cases, according to their initial configuration and evolution till the end of their credit cycle, clients have presumably 
dealt with their problems in a more similar way to the characterisation of successful groups presented in the first and 
second fieldwork reports. 
 
The LeaderVisit occurs when a client missed a meeting for the first time, but has paid her quota. According to the first 
fieldwork findings, presented in the first report, this is the most common action in such occasions. Usually the group 
representative visits the affected person and regards this fact positively if the affected person is sick, otherwise negatively. 
GroupVisit events are registered only after the group member in question has already missed payments during the same 
credit cycle. TotalSupport event accounts to two different types of support available within groups. That is, those 
indicading CoveredLosses that can be a PARTIAL_SUPPORT event (which includes group fines) and SUPPORT in case 
there has been enough tolerance to waive collective fines. Fines usually do not appear in the graphs are these are generally 
rare events, only occurring occasionally due to their strong impact. The model contains in total 24 types of events, but not 
all them are necessary to interpret results in graphs, as many of these are auxiliary to the 6 chosen most representative 
events for analysing the generated data (LeaderVisit, GroupVisit, CoveredLosses, TotalSupport, ExpellingVotes, 
TotalFines). The complete list of events consists of: ElapsedTime, Run, #Events, Final Status, #Desirable, #Undesirable, 
#LEADER_Visit, #GROUP_Visit, #COVER_Loss, #NO_Loss, #PaidOnTime, #MyLoss, #AVOID_Loss,  
#Full_Support, #Missed Meetings, #Missed Payments,  #ExpelVote,  #MFIFine, #GroupFine, #GroupLoss, 
#PartialSupport, #EventsWithSickClients, #EventsWithBadInvestors and #EventsWithUnprofitable. 
 
4 Possible Extentions 
The model configures groups with properties such as their language, type of business and their location. Simulated groups 
are automatically associated with one of the following places, extracted from the Mexican IRIS Geographical Information 
System: Palenque, Zinacantan, Yajalon, Tila, Teopisca, Salto de Agua, Pantelho, Larrainzar, La Libertad, Ixtapa, 
Escuintla, Chilon, Chenalho, Catazaja, Jitotol, Pueblo Nuevo, Chiapa de Corzo, Motozintla de Mendoza, Pueblo Nuevo 
Solistahuacan, San Cristobal de las Casas. All clients have Spanish as their main language and, in case of simulating a 
rural group, each will additionally have one of the following languages: Tsotsil, Tseltal, Chol, Tojolabal, Zoque, or Mam. 
 
If a group is urban, possible business are: floriculture, beans, coffee, maize, animal husbandry, fruits and vegetables, 
groceries, bakery, vehicle parts, leather shop, plastics, drinks, cheese, tortillas, antojitos, cereal, ice cream, candies, 
sausages, bread, dishes, chicken, dairy, tamales, fish, toasts, piñata, hammocks, handicraft, carpentry, catalogue, 
seamstress, cosmetics, shoes, clothing and beauty salon. Businesses categories help understanding of worked distribution: 
Personal care, Service, Art, Leisure, Food, Drink and Trade. There is literature suggesting more cooperation between 
clients with more similarities, this simulation only takes into account whether one person is tolerant towards the other and 
whether they share the same languages. Albeit there are inter-group exchanges regarding their social norms, there is little 
evidence to properly guide the modelling process in this sense. The extra individual properties allows for adapting how 
the simulation model is executes. Such experiments have not been conducted, as effectively it means adding extra 
compatibility hurdles between particular agents in terms of regarding their actions as desirable or undesirable.   
275
Bibliography
Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., and Renner, E. (2006). Interest rates in group lending: A
behavioural investigation. Paciﬁc Economic Review, 11(2):185–199.
Ahlin, C. and Townsend, R. M. (February 2007). Using repayment data to test across
models of joint liability lending. The Economic Journal, 117:F11–F51(41).
Ahn, T. K., Ostrom, E., and Walker, J. M. (2003). Heterogeneous preferences and
collective action. Public Choice, 117(3-4):295–314.
Alam, S. J. (2008). Understanding Social Complexity in the Context of HIV/AIDS: A
Case Study in Rural South Africa. PhD thesis, Manchester Met. University, Business
School, Centre for Policy Modelling.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4):1243–1284.
Alesina, A. and Ferrara, E. L. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3):847–904.
Allinson, G., Braidford, P., Houston, M., Robinson, F., and Stone, I. (2011). Business
Support for Social Enterprises: Findings From a Longitudinal Study. Technical
report, United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation and Skills.
Alter, S. K. (September 2002). Case studies in social enterprise. Technical report,
Counterpart International Inc.
275
BIBLIOGRAPHY 276
Anthony, D. (June 2005). Cooperation in microcredit borrowing groups: Identity,
sanctions, and reciprocity in the production of collective goods. American Sociological
Review, 70:496–515(20).
Armendariz, B. and Morduch, J. (June 2005). The Economics of Microﬁnance. MIT
Press, Cambridge, United States, ISBN: 0262012162.
Austin, J. E. and Chu, M. (Fall 2006). Social Enterprise: Making a Diﬀerence, Business
And Low-Income Sectors. ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America, VI(1):1–3.
Axelrod, R. (2005). Advancing the art of simulation in the social sciences. In Rennard,
J.-P., editor, Handbook of Research on Nature Inspired Computing for Economy and
Management. Hersey.
Banerjee, A. and Somanathan, R. (2007). The political economy of public goods: Some
evidence from India. Journal of Development Economics, 82(2):287–314.
Bankes, S. C. (May 2002). Agent-based modeling: a revolution? Proceedings of the
National Academy of Science U.S.A., 99 Supplement 3:7199–7200.
Banks, J., II, J. S. C., Nelson, B. L., and Nicol, D. M. (2009). Discrete-Event System
Simulation. Prentice Hall, ﬁfth edition.
Battle, C. (2009). Quantifying achievements to improve eﬀectiveness in private sector
development. Enterprise Development and Microﬁnance, 20(3):205–219.
Beck, K. A. (2000). A decision making model of child abuse reporting. PhD thesis,
University of British Columbia.
276
BIBLIOGRAPHY 277
Bernard, H. R. (2005). Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches, Chapter 18: Data Analysis, Models and Matrices. AltaMira Press, fourth
edition.
Biggar, N. (September 2009). Measuring poverty outreach: how two diﬀerent mi-
croﬁnance institutions used the progress out of poverty index. Journal of Enterprise
Development and Microﬁnance, 20:177–187(11).
Boero, R. and Squazzoni, F. (2005). Does Empirical Embeddedness Matter? Meth-
odological Issues on Agent-Based Models for Analytical Social Science. Journal of
Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), 8(4):6.
Borgatta, E. F., editor (1991). Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. 3. Macmillan.
Borzaga, C., Defourny, J., Galera, G., Les, E., Nogales, R., Nyssens, M., and Spear,
R. (2008a). Overview of the emergence and evolution of social enterprise. In Social
Enterprise: a New Model for Poverty Reduction and Employment Generation – an
Examination of the Concept and Practice in Europe and The Commonwealth of
Independent States. United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
Borzaga, C., Defourny, J., Galera, G., Leś, E., and Nogales, R. (2008b). Initial Study
on the Promotion of Social Enterprises. In Borzaga, C., Galera, G., and Nogales,
R., editors, Social Enterprise: A New Model for Poverty Reduction and Employment
Generation. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and L’Emergence de
l’Enterprise Sociale (EMES).
Bouman, F. J. A. (1995). Rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations:
A development perspective. World Development, 23(3):371–384.
277
BIBLIOGRAPHY 278
Bousquet, F., Barreteau, O., Le Page, C., Mullon, C., and Weber, J. (1999). An
environmental modelling approach: the use of multi-agent simulations. Advances in
environmental modelling, pages 113–122.
Brau, J. C. and Woller, G. M. (2004). Microﬁnance: A comprehensive review of the ex-
isting literature. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures, 9(1):1–
26.
Burlando, R. and Guala, F. (2005). Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments.
Experimental Economics, 8(1):35–54.
Burns, J. M. C. (2009). Middle range theory. In Mills, A. J., Durepos, G., and Wiebe,
E., editors, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. SAGE Publications.
Camerer, C. F. and Fehr, E. (2001). Measuring social norms and preferences using
experimental games: A guide for social scientists. In Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles,
S., Camerer, C. F., Fehr, E., and Gintis, H., editors, Foundations of human sociality:
economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from ﬁfteen small-scale societies.
Oxford University Press, New York.
Campion, A., Linder, C., and Knotts, K. (November 2008). Putting the Social Into
Performance Management: A Practice-based Guide for Microﬁnance. Technical re-
port, Imp-Act Consortium, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.
ISBN: 978 1 85864 547 6.
Carden, F. (2009). Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development Research.
Sage.
Carillo, N. R. (2010). Family and group ties in Microﬁnance activities: framed ﬁeld
experiments in Mexico. Master’s thesis, Social Science Research Center, Technische
Universität Berlin, Germany.
278
BIBLIOGRAPHY 279
CGAP (2007). CGAP reﬂections on the Compartamos initial public oﬀering: A case
study on microﬁnance interest rates and proﬁts. International Web Conference.
CGAP and EU/ACP (July 2008). Microﬁnance Technology Survey. Technical report,
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), European Union-African, Caribbean
and Paciﬁc Microﬁnance Programme.
CGAP and FGV (February 2010). Branchless Banking Agents in Brazil: Building Vi-
able Networks. Technical report, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), São Paulo, Brazil
and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Washington, D.C., United
States, São Paulo, Brazil.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3):817–869.
Chatﬁeld, C. (2000). Time-Series Forecasting. Chapman and Hall, ﬁrst edition.
Chiquiar, D. (June 2005). Why Mexico’s regional income convergence broke down.
Journal of Development Economics, 77(1):257–275.
Choi, B. K. and Kang, D. (2013). Modeling and Simulation of Discrete Event Systems.
Wiley, ﬁrst edition.
Churchill, C. (2007). Protecting the Poor: A Microinsurance Compendium. Tech-
nical report, International Labor Oﬃce (ILO) and Munich Re Foundation. ISBN:
9789221192541.
CIA (2008). Mexico, world factbook. Technical report, Central Intelligence Agency,
United States.
279
BIBLIOGRAPHY 280
Cicirelli, F., Furfaro, A., Giordano, A., and Nigro, L. (2009). Distributed simula-
tion of repast models over hla/actors. In DS-RT ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 13th
IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Distributed Simulation and Real Time Ap-
plications, pages 184–191, Washington, United States. Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers IEEE.
Coleman, B. E. and Wynne-Williams, J. (2006). Chapter 5: Household Savings in Rural
ﬁnance in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: demand, supply, and sustainability:
results of household and supplier surveys. Asian Development Bank.
Coleman, J. (1998). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press.
Collins, D., Morduch, J., Rutherford, S., and Ruthven, O. (2009). Portfolios of the
Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day. Princeton University Press.
Conning, J. (1996). Financial contracting and intermediary structures in a rural credit
market in Chile: A theoretical and empirical analysis. PhD thesis, Yale University.
Conte, R. and Paolucci, M. (2004). Responsibility for societies of agents. Journal of
Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), 7(4).
Cook, C. W. (February, 2008). Mexico’s drug cartels. Technical report, Open CRS
RL34215, Congressional Research Reports for the People, Center for Democracy
and Technology, Washington, United States.
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1996). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and
Club Goods. Cambridge University Press, second edition.
Costa, D. L. and Kahn, M. E. (2003). Civic engagement and community heterogeneity:
An economist’s perspective. Perspectives on Politics, 1(01):103–111.
280
BIBLIOGRAPHY 281
Creswell, J. W. and Clark, V. L. L. P. (2010). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods
Research. SAGE Publications, second edition.
Davister, C., Defourny, J., and Gregoire, O. (2004). Work integration social enter-
prises in the European Union: An overview of existing models. Technical report,
L’Emergence de l’Enterprise Sociale (EMES) European Research Network.
De Oliveira, A., Croson, R. T. A., and Eckel, C. C. (2009). One Bad Apple: Uncertainty
and Heterogeneity in Public Good Provision. Social Science Research Network SSRN
eLibrary.
Defourny, J. and Nyssens, M. (2010). Conceptions of social enterprise and social entre-
preneurship in europe and the united states: Convergences and divergences. Journal
of Social Entrepreneurship, 1(1):32 – 53.
Dey, C. (2007). Developing silent and shadow accounts. In Jeﬀrey Unerman, J. B. and
O’Dwyer, B., editors, Sustainability accounting and accountability. Routledge.
Doorenbos, R. B. (2001). Production matching for large learning systems. Technical
report, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, United States.
DTIUK (July 2002). Social Enterprise: a Strategy for Success. Technical report,
Department of Trade and Industry United Kingdom (DTIUK).
Dunn, D. S. (2000). Statistics and Data Analysis For Behavioral Sciences. McGraw-Hill,
ﬁrst edition.
Easterly, W. (2000). Can institutions resolve ethnic conﬂict ? Policy Research Working
Paper Series 2482, The World Bank.
281
BIBLIOGRAPHY 282
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic
divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1203–1250.
Edmonds, B. and Hales, D. (2003). Replication, replication and replication: Some hard
lessons from model alignment. Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation
(JASSS), 6(4).
Edmonds, B., Lucas, P., Rouchier, J., and Taylor, R. (2013). Human societies: Under-
standing observed social phenomena. In Edmonds, B. and Meyer, R., editors, Simu-
lating Social Complexity: A Handbook (Understanding Complex Systems). Springer.
Edmonds, B. and Moss, S. (2005). From KISS to KIDS an anti-simplistic modelling
approach. InMulti-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation, volume 3415 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 130–144. Springer.
EMES and UNDP (April 2006). Case studies in social enterprise. Technical re-
port, L’Emergence de l’Enterprise Sociale (EMES) European Research Network and
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bratislava Regional Center.
Epstein, J. M. (2006). Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computa-
tional Modeling (Princeton Studies in Complexity). Princeton University Press.
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why social preferences matter – the impact of
non-selﬁsh motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. Economic Journal,
112(478):C1–C33.
Fischbacher, U. and Gachter, S. (2010). Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of
free riding in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 100(1):541–56.
282
BIBLIOGRAPHY 283
Foster, I. (1995). Designing and Building Parallel Programs: Concepts and Tools for
Parallel Software Engineering. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing, Boston, United
States.
Frigg, R. and Reiss, J. (2011). The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same
old stew? Synthese, 180(1):77.
Galán, J. M. and Izquierdo, L. R. (2005). Appearances can be deceiving: Lessons
learned re-implementing axelrod’s ’evolutionary approach to norms’. Journal of Ar-
tiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), 8(3):2.
Gash, M. (2012). Pathways to change. In Nelson, C., editor, Savings Groups at the
Frontier. Practical Action, United Kingdom.
Gächter, S. (2010). Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and
the ﬁeld and their policy implications. In Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A., editors, Eco-
nomics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field. The MIT Press.
Geller, A., Goolsby, R., and Hoﬀer, L. (2010). On qualitative data in agent-based
models. In 3rd World Congress on Social Simulation: Scientiﬁc Advances in Under-
standing Societal Processes and Dynamics. University Of Kassel.
Geweke, J. (2005). Contemporary Bayesian Econometrics and Statistics (Wiley Series
in Probability and Statistics). Wiley-Interscience.
Ghatak, M. (July 2000). Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending
and the Peer Selection Eﬀect. Economic Journal, 110(465):601–31.
Ghatak, M. (November 2002). Exploiting Social Networks to Alleviate Credit Market
Failures: On the Endogenous Selection of Peer Groups in Microﬁnance Programs.
Technical report, University of California, Conference on Credit, Trust, Calculation.
283
BIBLIOGRAPHY 284
Ghatak, M. (October 1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection.
Journal of Development Economics, 60:27–50(24).
Gilbert, N. (2007). Agent-Based Models (Quantitative Applications in the Social Sci-
ences). Sage, annotated edition.
Gilbert, N., editor (2008). Researching Social Life. SAGE Publications.
Gilbert, N. (March 2009). A personal introduction. In Association for the Advance-
ment of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI) Spring Symposium on Technosocial Predictive
Analytics, Stanford University, California, United States.
Gilbert, N. and Conte, R. (1995). Artiﬁcial Societies: The Computer Simulation Of
Social Life (Social Research Techniques & Methods). Routledge.
Gilbert, N. and Troitzsch, K. (2005). Simulation for the Social Scientist (Second Edi-
tion). Open University Press.
Gine, X., Jakiela, P., Karlan, D., and Morduch, J. (2010). Microﬁnance games. Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(3):60–95.
Given, L. M., editor (2008). Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods. SAGE
Publications.
Gladwin, C. H., editor (1989). Ethnographic Decision Tree Modeling (Qualitative Re-
search Methods). SAGE Publications.
Goldberg, M., Bowles, S., and Miller, J. (2004). To Get That Little: A Computational
Model of Microﬁnance. Technical report, Santa Fe Institute.
284
BIBLIOGRAPHY 285
Gomez, R. and Santor, E. (2001). Membership has its privileges: the eﬀect of social
capital and neighbourhood characteristics on the earnings of microﬁnance borrowers.
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique, 34(4):943–966.
Grameen Bank (February 2010). Grameen Bank At a Glance. Technical report,
Grameen Bank.
Greene, W. H. (2011). Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, seventh edition.
Grimm, V., Berger, U., DeAngelis, D. L., Polhill, J. G., Giske, J., and Railsback, S. F.
(2010). The {ODD} protocol: A review and ﬁrst update. Ecological Modelling,
221(23):2760 – 2768.
Guala, F. (1998). Experiments as mediators in the non-laboratory sciences. Philosoph-
ica, 62.
Guala, F. (2005). The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge University
Press.
Guala, F. and Salanti, A. (2001). Theory, experiments, and explanation in economics.
Revue internationale de philosophie, v.(217):327 – 349.
Guttman, J. M. (March 2007). Repayment Performance in Microcredit Programs:
Theory and Evidence. Technical report, Indiana State University.
Gächter, S. and Thöni, C. (2005). Social learning and voluntary cooperation among
like-minded people. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2-3):303–314.
Hanneman, R. (1988). Computer-Assisted Theory Building: Modeling Dynamic Social
Systems. SAGE Publications.
285
BIBLIOGRAPHY 286
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859):1243–1248.
Harper, M. (2002). Self-help groups and grameen bank groups: What are the dif-
ferences? In Beyond Micro-credit: Putting Development Back into Micro-ﬁnance.
Oxfam.
Heckman, J. J. and Vytlacil, E. J. (2007). Econometric evaluation of social programs,
part i: Causal models, structural models and econometric policy evaluation. In Heck-
man, J. and Leamer, E., editors, Handbook of Econometrics, volume 6 of Handbook
of Econometrics, chapter 70. Elsevier.
Helms, B. (2006). Access for All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems. Technical re-
port, World Bank and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. ISBN: 9780821363607.
Henrich, J. and et al. (2001). In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments
in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review, 91(2):73–78.
Hermes, N. and Lensink, R. (2007). The empirics of microﬁnance: what do we know?
Economic Journal, 117(517):F1–F10.
Hermes, N., Lensink, R., and Mehrteab, H. T. (2005). Peer monitoring, social ties and
moral hazard in group lending programs: Evidence from eritrea. World Development,
33(1):149 – 169.
Hirsch, G., Rosengard, J., Stuart, G., and Johnston, D. (July 2005). SymBancTM:
A Simulator for Microﬁnance Institutions. International Conference of the System
Dynamics Society.
Hirsch, G. B., Rosengard, J. K., Stuart, G., and Don E. Johnston, J. (November 2004).
Users’ Guide to the KSG Micro Finance Institutions Simulator, SymBancTMV.1.
Technical report, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
286
BIBLIOGRAPHY 287
Hoekstra, R. C., Arkel, H. v., and Leurs, B. (2007). Modeling local monetary ﬂows in
poor regions: A research setup to simulate the multiplier eﬀect in local economies.
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientiﬁc journal, 5(2):138–150.
ILO (March 2002). Microﬁnance for employment creation and enterprise development.
Technical report, International Labour Oﬃce, Committee on Employment and Social
Policy.
Islam, N. (2009). Can Microﬁnance Reduce Economic Insecurity and Poverty? By How
Much and How? Technical report, United Nations, Department of Economics and
Social Aﬀairs.
Ito, S. (August 2003). Microﬁnance and Social Capital: Does Social Capital Help
Create Good Practice? Development in Practice, 13(4):322–332.
Johnson, S. (2009). Quantifying achievements in private sector development. Technical
report, University of Bath, Centre For Development Studies, Working Paper.
Jones, N., Jones, H., and Walsh, C. (August 2008). Political science? strengthen-
ing science–policy dialogue in developing countries. Working paper 294, Overseas
Development Institute, London, England.
Karlan, D., Harigaya, T., and Nadel, S. (2009). Evaluating microﬁnance program
innovation with randomized controlled trials: Examples from business training and
group versus individual liability. In Watkins, T. A. and Hicks, K., editors, Moving
Beyond Storytelling: Emerging Research in Microﬁnance (Contemporary Studies in
Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 92). Emerald Group.
Karlan, D. S. (2001). Microﬁnance impact assessments: The perils of using new mem-
bers as a control group. Journal of Microﬁnance, 3:76–85.
287
BIBLIOGRAPHY 288
Karlan, D. S. (February 2007). Social connections and group banking. Economic
Journal, 117:F52–F84(1).
Keuzenkamp, H. A. (2006). Probability, Econometrics and Truth: The Methodology of
Econometrics. Cambridge University Press.
Klarsfeld, L., Lepicard, F., and Hystra (2012.). Leveraging information and commu-
nication technology for the base of the pyramid:. Hystra, [s.l.] :. Available online.
Kuorikoski, J. (2010). Society by Numbers: Studies on Model-based Explanations in the
Social Sciences. PhD thesis, University of Helsinki, Department of Philosophy.
Labaree, D. F. (1997). Public goods, private goods: The american struggle over edu-
cational goals. American Educational Research Journal, 34(1):39–81.
Ledgerwood, J. (March 2001). Microﬁnance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial
Perspective (Sustainable Banking With the Poor). World Bank.
Ledgerwood, J., Earne, J., and Nelson, C., editors (2013). The New Microﬁnance
Handbook: A Financial Market System Perspective. World Bank Publications.
Lehtinen, A. and Kuorikoski, J. (2007). Computing the perfect model: Why do eco-
nomists shun simulation? Philosophy of Science, 74(3):304–329.
Lucas, P. (2011). Usefulness of simulating social phenomena: evidence. Artiﬁcial
Intelligence and Society, pages 1–8. 10.1007/s00146-010-0315-1.
Lucas, P. (2014). An adaptation of the ethnographic decision tree modeling meth-
odology for developing evidence-driven agent-based models. In Kamiński, B. and
Koloch, G., editors, Advances in Social Simulation, volume 229 of Advances in In-
telligent Systems and Computing, pages 343–350. Springer.
288
BIBLIOGRAPHY 289
Lucas, P. (January 2010). Modelling the microﬁnance case study. emil-t (emergence in
the loop: simulating the two way dynamics of norm innovation). Technical report,
Centre For Policy Modelling, Manchester Met. University, Manchester, England.
Lucas, P. (July 2009a). Final data compilation. Technical report, Centre For Policy
Modelling, Manchester Met. University and Chair of Sociology, in particular of Mod-
eling and Simulation, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, England and Switzer-
land.
Lucas, P. (March 2009b). Relating ﬁnancial characterisation of microﬁnance groups and
their conventional social behaviour. Technical report, Centre For Policy Modelling,
Manchester Met. University and Chair of Sociology, in particular of Modeling and
Simulation, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, England and Switzerland.
Lucas, P. (September 2007). Aabss: Aﬀective agent-based social simulation –a critique
of models of primate-like social behaviour. Master’s thesis, (MPhil) at the School of
Mathematics and Computer Science, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Lucas, P., Banuri, S., and de Oliveira, A. (2014.). The eﬀects of group composition and
social preference heterogeneity in a public goods game: An agent-based simulation.
Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS).
Lucas, P., Morales, F., and García, I. (June 2008). First ﬁeldwork report: Social
conventions and dynamic of solidarity groups - an experience in chiapas. Technical
report, Centre For Policy Modelling, Manchester Met. University, Chair of Sociology,
in particular of Modeling and Simulation, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule and
PROIMMSE-IIA, Mexico National Autonomous University, England, Switzerland
and Mexico.
289
BIBLIOGRAPHY 290
Lucas, P. and Payne, D. (2014). Usefulness of agent-based simulation in testing collect-
ive decision-making models. In Adamatti, D., Dimuro, G., and Coelho, H., editors,
Interdisciplinary Applications of Agent-Based Social Simulation and Modeling. IGI.
Luck, M., McBurney, P., Shehory, O., and Willmott, S. (2005). Agent Technology:
Computing as Interaction (A Roadmap for Agent Based Computing). AgentLink.
Lunde, S. A., Sheldon, T., and Waterﬁeld, C. (December 2006). Using microﬁn 4, a
handbook for operational planning and ﬁnancial modeling. Technical report, Con-
sultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
Lyman, T. (October 2009). Market overview: Technology for microﬁnance - trends driv-
ing the technology, publishing supplement. Technical report, International Banking
Systems.
Lysenko, M. and D’Souza, R. M. (2008). A framework for megascale agent based model
simulations on graphics processing units. Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social
Simulation (JASSS), 11(4):10.
Mader, P. (2011a). Attempting the production of public goods through microﬁnance.
Journal of Infrastructure Development, 3(2):153–170.
Mader, P. (2011b). Making the poor pay for public goods via microﬁnance: Economic
and political pitfalls in the case of water and sanitation. Technical Report 11/14,
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Köln.
Maindonald, J. and Braun, W. J. (2010). Data Analysis and Graphics Using R: An
Example-Based Approach (Cambridge Series in Statistical and Probabilistic Math-
ematics). Cambridge University Press, third edition.
290
BIBLIOGRAPHY 291
Martey, R. M. and Stromer-Galley, J. (2007). The Digital Dollhouse: Context and
Social Norms in The Sims Online. Games and Culture, 2(4):314–334.
Mas, I. (April 2009). The Economics of Branchless Banking. Innovations: Technology,
Governance, Globalization, 4(2):57–75.
Mas, I. and Morawczynski, O. (2009). Designing mobile money services lessons from
m-pesa. Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, 4(2):77–91.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110(3):681–712.
Mauthner, D. M., Birch, M., Jessop, J., and Miller, T., editors (2002). Ethics in
Qualitative Research. Sage, ﬁrst edition.
Meadows, D. H., Randers, J., Meadows, D. L., and Behrens, W. W. (1974). The Limits
to growth: A report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind.
Universe Books, second edition.
Menard, S. (2001). Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (Quantitative Applications in
the Social Sciences). SAGE Publications, second edition.
Menard, S., editor (2007). Handbook of Longitudinal Research: Design, Measurement,
and Analysis. Academic Press, ﬁrst edition.
Merton, R. K. (1967). On Theoretical Sociology. Free Press.
microLINKS and USAID (2010). The Impacts of Social Norms on Value Chain Per-
formance. Technical report, Microenterprise Learning Information and Knowledge
Sharing (microLINKS) and United States Agency for International Development
(USAID).
291
BIBLIOGRAPHY 292
Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? nation building and public goods in kenya versus
tanzania. World Politics, 56(03):328–362.
Miguel, E. and Gugerty, M. K. (2005). Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public
goods in kenya. Journal of Public Economics, 89(11-12):2325–2368.
MIX (August 2010). Regional Benchmarks: Latin America and the Caribbean. Tech-
nical report, Microﬁnance Information eXchange (MIX).
MIX (December 2009). Microbanking Bulletin Number 19. Technical report, Microﬁn-
ance Information eXchange (MIX).
MIX (Spring 2007). Challenging Perspectives in Microﬁnance, Microbanking Bulletin
Number 14. Technical report, Microﬁnance Information eXchange (MIX).
Morawczynski, O. (2009). Examining the usage and impact of transformational M-
Banking in kenya. In Aykin, N., editor, Internationalization, Design and Global
Development, volume 5623 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 495–504.
Springer. 10.1007/978-3-642-02767-3_55.
Morawczynski, O. and Pickens, M. (August 2009). Poor people using mobile ﬁnancial
services: Observations on customer usage and impact from m-pesa. Technical report,
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
Moss, S. (2008). Alternative approaches to the empirical validation of agent-based
models. Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), 11(1):5.
Moss, S. and Edmonds, B. (2005). Sociology and simulation: Statistical and qualitative
cross-validation. American Journal of Sociology, 110:1095–1131.
292
BIBLIOGRAPHY 293
Mukhopadhyay, J. P. (December 2007). Integrating the Poorest into Microﬁnance:
An Impact Assessment. Centre For Microﬁnance, Eye On Microﬁnance Issue #6,
Chennai, India.
Murray, R., Caulier-Grice, J., and Mulgan, G. (2010). The Open Book of Social In-
novation: Ways to Design, Develop and Grow Social Innovation. United Kingdom
National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA).
Mäki, U. (2005). Models are experiments, experiments are models. Journal of Economic
Methodology, 12(2):303–315.
Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix (Harvard Economic Studies).
Harvard University Press, revised edition.
Omwansa, T. (February 2009). M-PESA: Progress and Prospects. Technical report,
GSMA Mobile World Congress, innovations MIT Press.
Palier, J. (2004). Deﬁning the concept of empowerment through experiences in India. In
Microﬁnance challenges : empowerment or disempowerment of the poor?, number 10,
pages 35–53. Institut Français de Pondichéry IFP.
Paxton, J. and Thraen, C. (2003). An application of mean-covariance structure models
for the analysis of group lending behavior. Journal of Policy Modeling, 25(9):863 –
868.
Pearce, C. (2009). Communities of Play: Emergent Cultures in Multiplayer Games and
Virtual Worlds. The MIT Press.
Pedhazur, E. J. (1982). Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research: Explanation and
Prediction. Harcourt College, second edition.
293
BIBLIOGRAPHY 294
Pedhazur, E. J. and Schmelkin, L. P. (1991). Measurement, Design, and Analysis: An
Integrated Approach. Psychology Press, student edition.
Pohjola, M. (2003). The adoption and diﬀusion of ICT across countries: Patterns and
determinants. In Jones, D., editor, New Economy Handbook, pages 77–100. Elsevier.
Polhill, J. G. (2010). Odd updated. Journal of Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation
(JASSS), 13(4):9.
Rajeev, M., Ranade, R., and Deb, S. (July 2006). Why do poor farmers default less?:
Case of Indian informal credit market a game theoretic exploration. Technical report,
MPRA Paper 768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Rashid, S., Yoon, Y., and Kashem, S. B. (2011). Assessing the potential impact of
Microﬁnance with agent-based modeling. Economic Modelling, 28(4):1907 – 1913.
Ravallion, M., Chen, S., and Sangraula, P. (2009). Dollar a day revisited. World Bank
Economic Review, 23(2):163–184.
Remondino, M. (2004). Analysis of Agent Based Paradigms for Complex Social Systems
Simulation. PhD thesis, University of Turin.
Richmond, P., Walker, D., Coakley, S., and Romano, D. (2010a). High performance
cellular level agent-based simulation with ﬂame for the gpu. Brieﬁngs in bioinform-
atics, 11(3):334–347.
Richmond, P., Walker, D., Coakley, S., and Romano, D. (2010b). High performance
cellular level agent-based simulation with FLAME for the GPU. Brief Bioinform.
Ritzema, T. and Harris, B. (2008). The use of second life for distance education. Journal
of Computing Sciences in Colleges, 23(6):110–116.
294
BIBLIOGRAPHY 295
Robinson, M. S. (2001). The Microﬁnance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the
Poor. World Bank.
Rodriguez Meza, J. (2000). Group and Individual Microcredit Contracts: a Dynamic
Numerical Analysis. PhD thesis, Ohio State University.
Rosenberg, R. (June 2007). Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) Reﬂections
on the Compartamos Initial Public Oﬀering: A Case Study on Microﬁnance Interest
Rates and Proﬁts. Technical report, Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)
Focus Note 42. Washington DC. , United States.
Rosenberg, R., Gonzalex, A., and Narain, S. (February 2009). The new moneylenders:
Are the poor being exploited by high microcredit interest rates? Occasional paper,
Consultive Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).
Rowell, D. and Wormley, D. N. (1996). Introduction to System Dynamics. Prentice
Hall, ﬁrst edition.
Roy, P. V. and Haridi, S. (2004). Concepts, Techniques, and Models of Computer
Programming. MIT Press, Cambridge, United States.
Rutherford, S. and Arora, S. S. (2011). The Poor and Their Money: Microﬁnance From
a Twenty-First Century Consumers Perspective. Practical Action, second edition.
Sanders, J. M. and Nee, V. (1996). Immigrant Self-Employment: The family as social
capital and the value of human capital. American Sociological Review, 61(2):231–249.
Sarkar, S. (2013). Scientiﬁc Models in Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopaedia. Rout-
ledge, second edition.
295
BIBLIOGRAPHY 296
Schreiner, M. (August 2009). Progress out of Poverty Index: A Simple Poverty Score-
card for Mexico. Technical report, Grameen and Ford Foundation.
Schreiner, M., Correa, M., Díaz, J. A., Escobar, A., and Mercedes, M. (2002). Scoring:
The next breakthrough in microcredit? Technical report, Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest.
Segone, M., editor (2008). Bridging the Gap: The role of monitoring and evaluation in
evidence-based policy making. United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF.
SEUK (2013). State of social enterprise survey. Technical report, Social Enterprise UK.
Shaﬁk, N. (1994). Economic development and environmental quality: An econometric
analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, 46(0):757–73.
Shapiro, I. (2007). The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences. Princeton University
Press.
Sharma, M. and Zeller, M. (1997). Repayment performance in group-based credit
programs in bangladesh: An empirical analysis. World Development, 25(10):1731–
1742.
Shipton, P. M. (2007). The Nature of Entrustment: Intimacy, Exchange, and the Sacred
in Africa (Yale Agrarian Studies Series). Yale University Press.
Sinha, F. (2006). Social Rating and Social Performance Reporting in Microﬁnance, To-
wards a Common Framework. Technical report, Micro-Credit Ratings International
Limited, Argidius Foundation, Small Enterprise Education and Promotion Network
(SEEP).
Squazzoni, F. (2012). Agent-Based Computational Sociology. Wiley, ﬁrst edition.
296
BIBLIOGRAPHY 297
Squire, L. (1993). Fighting poverty. American Economic Review, 83(2):377–82.
Srinivasan, T. N. (September 2004). Dollar a day - how much does it say? Poverty in
focus, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). Number: 4, Editor: Alejandro Grinspun.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets. World Bank Economic
Review, 4(3):351–366.
Suarez, E. D., Casta nón-Puga, M., and Marquez, B. Y. (2009). Analyzing the Mex-
ican microﬁnance industry using multi-level multi-agent systems. In SpringSim ’09:
Proceedings of the 2009 Spring Simulation Multiconference, pages 1–4, San Diego,
United States. Society for Computer Simulation International.
Swan, L. S. (2009). Synthesizing insight: artiﬁcial life as thought experimentation in
biology. Biology and Philosophy, 24(5):687–701.
Swidler, A. (1995). Cultural power and social movements. In Johnston, H. and Klander-
mans, B., editors, Social Movements and Culture, chapter 2. University of Minnesota
Press.
Taleb, N. N. (April 2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.
Random House, ISBN: 1400063515.
Tesfatsion, L. and Judd, K. L., editors (2006). Handbook of Computational Economics,
Volume 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics. North Holland, ﬁrst edition.
Theodorson, G. and Theodorson, A. (1969). A modern dictionary of sociology. Apollo
Eds. Crowell.
297
BIBLIOGRAPHY 298
Timothy, B. and Maitreesh, G. (2006). Public goods and economic development. In
Banerjee, A. V., Benabou, R., and Mookherjee, D., editors, Understanding Poverty.
Oxford University Press.
Townsend, P. (December 2006). What is poverty? A historical perspective. Poverty
In Focus, Issue 9, International Poverty Centre, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP).
UNITAR (March 2013). Fundamentals of microﬁnance. Technical report, United Na-
tions Institute For Training and Research (UNITAR).
United Nations (2006). Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development. United
Nations, Publication No.: E.06.II.A.3, ISBN: 92-1-204251-1.
United Nations (2010). The Millennium Development Goals. Technical report, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Aﬀairs of the United Nations Secretariat.
USAID (February 2008). Manual for the implementation of USAID poverty assess-
ment tools. Technical report, United States Agency for International Development
(USAID).
Van Bastelaer, T. (February 2000). Does social capital facilitate the poor’s access to
credit?: A review of the microeconomic literatutre (Social capital initiative working
paper). Technical report, World Bank.
Vigdor, J. L. (2004). Community composition and collective action: Analyzing initial
mail response to the 2000 census. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1):303–
312.
Vogelgesang, U. (2007). Essays on Access to Financial Institutions, Inequality, and
Redistribution. AV Akademikerverlag.
298
BIBLIOGRAPHY 299
Wallace, R. A. and Wolf, A. (2005). Contemporary Sociological Theory: Expanding the
Classical Tradition. Pearson, sixth edition.
Waterﬁeld, C. and Sheldon, T. (2004). Microﬁn: A Financial Modeling Tool for Mi-
croﬁnance Institutions. Technical report, Microﬁn and Consultative Group to Assist
the Poor (CGAP).
WEF (2010). Global Risks 2010. Technical report, World Economic Forum (WEF).
Westall, A. (2009). Business or third sector? what are the dimensions and implications
of researching and conceptualising the overlap between business and third sector?
Working paper, University of Birmingham.
WHO and FAO (2003). Diet, nutrition and the prevention of chronic diseases: Ex-
pert Consultation. World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), Geneva, Switzerland.
Wilson, W. J. and Chaddha, A. (2009). The role of theory in ethnographic research.
Ethnography, 10(4):549–564.
Wolkenhauer, O. (2001). Data Engineering: Fuzzy Mathematics in Systems Theory and
Data Analysis. Wiley-Interscience, ﬁrst edition.
Woolcock, M. J. V. (1999). Learning from failures in microﬁnance: What unsuccessful
cases tell us about how group-based programs work. American Journal of Economics
and Sociology, 58(1):pp. 17–42.
World Bank (1990). World Development Report 1990. Oxford University Press.
World Bank (2005). Mexico: Income generation and social protection for the poor,
volume 1: Integrated executive summary. Technical report, World Bank.
299
BIBLIOGRAPHY 300
Wydick, B. (1999). Can social cohesion be harnessed to repair market failures? evidence
from group lending in guatemala. The Economic Journal, 109(457):pp. 463–475.
Yoshioka, H. (December 2006). A q-analysis of census data: Intra-household income
allocation and school attendance in chiapas, Mexico. Quality and Quantity, 40:1061–
1077(17).
Young, J. and Mendizabal, E. (September 2009). Helping researchers become policy
entrepreneurs – how to develop engagement strategies for evidence-based policy-
making. Brieﬁng paper, Overseas Development Institute, London, England.
Yunus, M. (July 2007). Remarks by Muhammad Yunus, Managing Director, Grameen
Bank. Technical report, Microcredit Summit. Vol.: 5, No.: 1.
Zeller, M. (1998). Determinants of Repayment Performance in Credit Group: The
Role of Program Design, Intragroup Risk Pooling, and Social Cohesion. Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 46(3):599–620.
Zeller, M., Lapenu, C., and Greely, M. (October 2003). Measuring social performance
of micro-ﬁnance institutions: a proposal (ﬁnal report). Technical report, Argidius
Foundation and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Social Performance
Indicators Initiative (SPI).
Zhang, W.-B. (2006). Discrete Dynamical Systems, Bifurcations and Chaos in Eco-
nomics, Volume 204 (Mathematics in Science and Engineering). Elsevier Science.
Ören, T. I. (2002). Rationale for a code of professional ethics for simulationists. Summer
Computer Simulation Conference, pages 428–433.
Ören, T. I., Elzas, M. S., Smit, I., and Birta, L. G. (2002). A code of professional ethics
for simulationists. Summer Computer Simulation Conference, pages 428–433.
300
